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ABSTRACT 
The Country near the City:  
Social Space and Dominance  
in Tamil Nadu 
 
Recent anthropological, geographical, and historical studies have exorcised the 
conceptualisation of space as an empty container. Yet the anthropology of space 
often limits itself to examining representations of space instead of comprehending 
the wider spectrum of relations and processes that produce social space itself. Within 
the field of South Asian ethnography, this has, combined with the rejection of the 
‘legacies’ of village studies, cast a shadow over the village as an ontologically and 
epistemologically relevant category. In addition, scholarship of caste and gender only 
obliquely refers to the dialectic between the production of space and the 
reconstitution of social relations. This thesis redresses the problems emerging from 
these issues. 
Combining fieldwork in Tamil Nadu’s Madurai district with comparative 
research, the thesis explores the linkages between the production of social space and 
dominance. This research’s broad ethnographic focus on a micro-region dominated 
by the Piramalai Kallar caste throws light on transformations of past agrarian 
territories and caste dominance. With its sharper focus on a village near Madurai 
city’s administrative boundaries, and close to major national highways, the thesis 
also highlights the nature of new ruralities, which are shaped by transformations in 
transport infrastructures, widening markets of land, labour, and credit, global futures 
trading in agricultural commodities, developmental regimes, and the multi-scalar 
networks through which dominance and resistance are wrought. Grasping sites such 
as roads, irrigation tanks, land, and memorials as concrete abstractions, and 
attending to the turbulent and the normal – the event and the everyday – the thesis 
uncovers the co-constitutive characteristics of space and social relations, and the 
hybridity of social space in India. Simultaneously, it discloses the tension between 
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movement and stability, emphasising the relative permanence of social groups and 
the relative instability of objects and things that produce, and are produced by, this 
space.  
 
 
  
5 
 
CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................... 3 
MAPS AND FIGURES ..................................................................................................... 8 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................ 9 
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 13 
Repositioning the Field ........................................................................................... 17 
Product and Process: Theoretical Handles to Social Space and Social Relations .. 26 
Plan of the Thesis ................................................................................................... 43 
PART I WHAT IS A FIELD-SITE? ................................................................................... 46 
CHAPTER 1 VILLAGE, MICRO-REGION, CITY ............................................................... 48 
Ūr and Kirāmam: Two Tamil Concepts of Village ................................................... 48 
The Country, the City, and New Ruralities ............................................................. 54 
Nāṭu and Kallarnatu ............................................................................................... 63 
Malaiur and its Residents ....................................................................................... 69 
Modes of ‘Knowing’ Space and Social Relations .................................................... 77 
Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 84 
CHAPTER 2 ‘IT IS THAT SORT OF AN ŪR:’ NARRATIVES OF CASTE AND PLACE .......... 86 
From Ūr to Āḷkaḷ, or How to get from Place to Caste in a short span of time ....... 89 
Kuṇam, Varalāṟu, and an Ūr’s Notoriety ................................................................ 94 
Malaiur’s Past (Ūr Varalāṟu) ................................................................................. 102 
The Ūr in Sacred Geographies .............................................................................. 107 
Landscapes of Self and Other ............................................................................... 109 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 116 
PART II WHAT IS A ROAD? ........................................................................................ 121 
6 
 
CHAPTER 3 ‘IT IS NOT A RIBBON:’ REPRESENTATIONS OF INDIA’S ROAD 
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS .................................................................................... 124 
Urgency, Uneven Development, and a ‘Pathology of Space’ ............................... 126 
Imagining the Public, Imagining Mobility: India’s Rural Roads Programmes ...... 136 
Future Estimates and Present Fixes ..................................................................... 145 
A Road in Representational Space ....................................................................... 154 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 157 
CHAPTER 4 BUT IT MAY BE ‘ALL ABOUT WATER’ AND LAND: ON ROADS, LAND, AND 
IRRIGATION .............................................................................................................. 159 
Roads and Caste Relations ................................................................................... 160 
Roads, Land, and Property Disputes .................................................................... 170 
Roads and Tanks ................................................................................................... 178 
Rural Roads and Criss-crossing Policies: NREGS Roadworks ................................ 190 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 198 
PART III HOW IS A MEMORIAL VISIBLE? .................................................................. 200 
CHAPTER 5 COMMEMORATION .............................................................................. 202 
Martyrs, Memorials, and Commemoration in a Madurai village ......................... 203 
The Counter-Commemoration ............................................................................. 220 
Who are the Real Caṇṭiyar (Real Toughs)? Two Villages in the Race for Memorials
 .............................................................................................................................. 227 
CHAPTER 6 DESECRATION ........................................................................................ 241 
Desecration as Death, and worse: An Ūr responds to a Statue’s Desecration .... 245 
The Age of Bronze ................................................................................................ 273 
Statues as Portals to Scale-Jumping ..................................................................... 282 
Protecting the Statue: New Developments in Malaiur ........................................ 289 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................ 296 
7 
 
Reflections on enquiry and exposition ................................................................. 297 
Revisiting ūr, kirāmam, nāṭu ................................................................................ 300 
Dynamic social relations and their geographies .................................................. 306 
GLOSSARY ................................................................................................................. 311 
BIBLIOGRAPHY.......................................................................................................... 314 
 
MAPS AND FIGURES 
 
MAP 1 Tamil Nadu districts 14 
MAP 2 Madurai district 68 
   
FIGURE 1 Memorial Pillar, Perungamanallur, 2007 205 
FIGURE 2 Mural at Perungamanallur Memorial Site, 2007 208 
FIGURE 3 Tēvar Tēciya Maṉṟam’s billboard on Perungamanallur Martyrs’ 
Commemoration, Usilampatti, Madurai, 2008 
213 
FIGURE 4 Malaiur Memorial Pillar, Muthuramalinga Thevar statue in 
background, January 2015 
239 
FIGURE 5 Bronze Thevar statue, Malaiur, January 2015 241 
  
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Any work is a thing and a set of relations between people, between things, and 
between people and things. The same goes for this thesis – it goes by a name, under 
one name, even though it contains the labour of many. Citations and bibliographies 
map one set of relations but reveal little about the others that produce scholarship. 
Acknowledging the entirety of human social relations that have produced this thesis 
is as impossible as the thesis’s thingness conveying all the experiences and analyses 
that contribute to the thesis’s thingness. Anthropological research amplifies such 
trouble. Every meeting, incident, and instance appears important and illuminating. 
Almost everyone is a giver of gifts.  
This thesis was made possible by the award of a three-year (2006–09) grant 
from the Felix Scholarship Trust. I thank the trust for its extremely generous grant. I 
also thank the Charles Wallace India Trust for a doctoral study grant awarded in 2010.  
I am deeply indebted to David Mosse for his supervision of this thesis. It has 
been immensely rewarding and enriching to work with him. I have benefited as much 
from his insightful comments and suggestions as from his characteristic kindness and 
patience. But for his engaged responses and gentle steering, many of my arguments 
may not have left the safety of known harbours, while others may still be adrift, 
instead of shoring up this thesis. 
For their comments on aspects of this work, I am grateful to Ravi Ahuja, 
Sharad Chari, Christopher Davis, Chris Fuller, Anthony Good, Hugo Gorringe, Trevor 
Marchand, Magnus Marsden, Caroline Osella, Filippo Osella, Johan Pottier, Parvati 
Raman, Nikhil Rao, and Edward Simpson. At Delhi, interactions with Uma Chakravarti, 
Gopal Guru, Surinder Jodhka, Mary John, and Gurpreet Mahajan helped shape this 
thesis. I remain indebted to them. My thanks, also, go to Arul Mani, Cherian 
Alexander, Etienne Rassendran, and Shaji Varghese. Discussions with V. Arasu, 
Pritham Chakravarthy, C. Lakshmanan, A. Mangai, Muthaiah (MKU), Sundar Kaali, 
and G. Palanithurai influenced the unfolding of my fieldwork. I thank Anand Pandian 
for introducing me to his Madurai friends, and sharing parts of his research material.  
10 
 
I have a lot to thank Sundara Vanthiyathevan for. He shared insights and 
material he had gathered through his own research. I had as many illuminating 
discussions at his home as during our journeys across Madurai city and its villages to 
attend public events and meet people. Su Venkatesan helped in many ways. He 
introduced me to many people in Madurai and shared portions of his vast personal 
archives on Malaiur’s early-twentieth-century history.  
I incurred numerous other debts during fieldwork. My main debt is to 
‘Malaiur’ residents, whom I thank for their generosity, their time, and their concern. 
To maintain anonymity (Malaiur itself is a pseudonym) I do not individually thank 
them here.  
Arischandran and his family (Keelakuyilkudi), Durairaj (Perungamanallur), 
George Virumandi (Andipatti), Karuppu (Kavanampatti), K. Jeyaraj, Pechiammal and 
her family (Keela Urappanur), Rajaram (Chekkanoorani), Karunakaran Ambalam 
(Vellalur), and Susila, Pandian, and Kanagarajathi (Sellur) were among the many who 
helped me in Madurai.  
I received generous support from many district, state, block, and village-level 
officials. I thank Madurai District Collector L. Subramaniam for helping me, in January 
2015, access documents housed in the district’s Revenue and Records Department. I 
also thank Arumugam and others at the Collectorate Office. In the Revenue and 
Records Departments, Madurai, Rathnagandhi, Sarjad, Rehana, and Kalavathi were 
most helpful. At the Kallar Reclamation Office, Madurai, Anita was generous with her 
time. At the Land Records Office, Madurai, Jawahar, Rajendran, and Ramalingam 
were of immense help. At the Tamil Nadu State Archives, Chennai and the Madurai 
Districts Archives, I was greeted by helpful staff. I thank Suresh and Neelavannan in 
particular. I am also grateful for access to the Jesuit Mission Archives, Shembaganur. 
I thank staff at the libraries of SOAS, Stoke Newington, and the British Library 
at London; the Library of Congress and the Tenley Town library at Washington D.C.; 
and the JNU library at Delhi. Staff of People’s Watch Resource Centre, Madurai, 
provided relevant reports. For help with photographs, I thank Yogesh and Anirban. 
For help with maps, I thank Sunil Sejwal, Mohinder, and Tobias. Aditya, Madeesh, 
Shambhavi, Sreshtha, and Vaibhav helped with proofreading. Priya Ranjan helped 
11 
 
with referencing. Dhivakar, Sandhya, Rubina, Shambhavi, and Mohinder helped me 
access books and articles. 
Since blood is thin and kin groups are as quarrelsome as other groups, I am 
grateful to have many concerned relatives. I thank my grandparents, Ramaswamy 
and Padmavati, for their love and care. Thatha travelled with me from Chennai to 
Madurai in October 2007 and checked on my progress during his subsequent trips. 
In Madurai, Thangavelsamy periappa and Premala periamma shared their home for 
months and overwhelmed me with their care. I thank Ravi mama for finding a house 
to rent near Malaiur. Baagi athai and her family housed me during my subsequent 
Madurai visits. Ambi paati, Rajagopal mama, and Mala akka stored my books and 
clothes, and fed me great food. Aakash, Bragadeesh, Kavya, Laya, Madeesh, 
Prabhakar, Poornam, and Yogi shared rooms, vehicles, and jokes. I thank Kannan 
mama and Shanti athai, and Mala chitti and Jayapal chittappa, for housing me during 
my Chennai research trips. Rama chitti and Baskar chittappa helped in countless 
ways. 
My parents, Janarthanan and Jeyanthi, ensured that I stay moored. I do not 
know how to thank them. I have a thousand reasons to thank Dhivakar. Having once 
given himself the lofty epithet of ‘the sandcastle architect,’ he industriously 
demolished the sandcastles I built. He taught me to distrust words such as never, 
forever, everything, and nothing. A sibling’s love is still understandable. What truly 
surprised me is Sandhya’s generosity. She welcomed me with such warmth that I 
cherish the memories of my stay in their home while writing this thesis.  
Many friends have sustained me. I thank Aditya, Ajay, Anna, Arvind, Carrie, 
Deepa, Despina, Dharashree, Erica, Jitender, Mohinder, Nandini, Nicolas, Pradeep, 
Ramya, Roberta, Rose, Rubina, Smitha, Sanjeev, Santosh, Shambhavi, Shireen, Shuba, 
Shrestha, Smitha, Tobias, Uditi, and Vaibhav for shared dinners, rooms, writing, 
living, and storage space, conversations, and much more.  
The emergence of new friendships and the rediscovery of older friendships 
index my final ‘writing-up.’ Bhockha simply changed London for me, introducing me 
to wonderful places and people, reading the most rudimentary of drafts with the 
utmost seriousness, and listening to whatever I said about my research with patience 
and interest. Ruby offered sound and timely advice, and industrial-strength 
12 
 
encouragement. Smitha and Santosh provisioned various kinds of help, and housed 
me for months, as though it was no big deal. Shambhavi and Tobias provided me with 
the perfect opposite of a writers’ retreat. I thank them for their friendship, patience, 
and the extremely generous sharing of their home. They also reminded me that a re-
embedding and a re-integration into the social is more productive than a desk of 
lonely contemplation. I continue to be grateful for this; it preceded my own 
understanding that writing can mean and become many things, even a boat for life’s 
roughest storms. Mohinder continuously egged me on to finish, tried his logic against 
my habit, and argued that the only way to write a thesis is simply to write it. I thank 
him for his comments and for helping me externalise the thesis. Towards the end, 
Vaibhav joined Shambhavi and Tobias’s long-standing attempts to out the most 
undercover characters in my ‘inner police system.’ I have remained astonished at 
Priya Ranjan’s habitual kindness and patience, and his immense capacity to love. He 
moved to Madurai in early 2008 just so I could live near Malaiur, and has contributed 
to this thesis in numerous other ways. I thank him for everything. I thank everyone 
who aided and abetted, helped me knock down barricades and blues, and enriched 
this research with their friendships. 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
‘So, why us?’ asked Arumugam, sitting on one of the plastic chairs that the local body 
officials of his south Indian village, Malaiur, had arranged for the occasion.1 It was 
mid-January 2008, the beginning of the Tamil Tai month. The period of the Pongal 
celebrations, which mark major shifts in the region’s agrarian and ritual calendars. 
The occasion was the staging of a ‘typical’ rural Pongal in Malaiur for tourists and 
visitors.  
In October 2007, I had moved to Tamil Nadu’s Madurai district (see Map 1) 
for my doctoral research. At the time, my idea was to explore the reconstitution of 
caste and gender relations through ethnographic and historical research. My specific 
interests were in patterns of dominance and social mobility, and in land, irrigation, 
and labour relations in a western Madurai micro-region. This micro-region is often 
termed, after the locally dominant Piramalai Kallar subcaste, as Kaḷḷarnāṭu 
(henceforth Kallarnatu).2  
For centuries, many such micro-regions or nāṭu existed in the peninsular 
south. As agrarian territories, nāṭu were important socio-spatial categories. They 
partly framed production and reproduction relations. They were themselves 
transformed by shifting practices and ideologies related to kingship, farming, kinship, 
ethnicity, infrastructures, technologies, and trade. 
These micro-regions were not homogenous. They differed in terms of 
demography and ethnic composition. Modes of resource allocation, extraction, and 
redistribution differed. Their links with kings and chieftains fluctuated. A once 
                                                     
1 Names and, occasionally, biographical details of most individuals have been changed. The only place-
names I have changed are of three Madurai villages. I refer to my primary field-site as Malaiur, and 
two of its neighbouring villages as Tenur, and Pechikudi. 
2 Tamil Nadu is home to many Kallar subcastes. Piramalai Kallar is one of the two main Kallar subcastes 
of Madurai district. Unless stated otherwise, Kallar is shorthand for Piramalai Kallar. I use English 
spellings for caste names (Kallar, not Kaḷḷar). I follow the regional usage of plurals as respectful address 
– ‘Kallar wo/man’ rather than ‘Kallan (m)/ Kallachi (f).’ I only use singulars while reporting 
conversations, and to convey any informality or disrespect their users intended.   
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prominent nāṭu could wane in significance. A nāṭu peripheral to one polity could 
become central to another.  
  
 
Map 1 Tamil Nadu districts 
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Contemporary south India resonates with the pasts of these micro-regions. Nāṭu are 
no longer central elements of territoriality or generators of socio-spatial relations. 
Yet they announce their presence now and again, booming as temple festival 
disputes, and intimate caste-geographies. In modern cartographic representations of 
space, nāṭu lie buried under existing administrative markers. Yet they periodically 
resurface.  
The problematic of space first appeared on my fieldwork horizon as a 
deceptively minor constellation. Its first star appeared alongside incantations of nāṭu, 
of Kallarnatu. For a territory unspecified in Madurai’s modern maps, the 
incandescence with which Kallarnatu rose in my field encounters was remarkable.  
I am not the first researcher to have sighted the nāṭu, to have noticed how 
such ‘spectres of agrarian territories’ (Ludden 2002) haunt life and space in 
contemporary south India. At the time, perhaps because of the themes and 
approaches dominating the anthropology of space, I only heard metaphors in those 
incantations of territory, treated space as a readable text, and experienced the 
affective geographies my interlocutors evoked whenever they mentioned Kallarnatu.  
Later, I comprehended associations of real and representational, metaphor 
and matter, subjects and objects. The outcome is this thesis, an examination of social 
space and social relations, and an affirmation of their dialectics. I consider space 
neither as a container nor as an idiomatic expression of social relations, 
conceptualising it instead as a set of practices and representations that interact with, 
and is informed by, social relations.  
Kallarnatu is more than subterranean territory in this thesis. The place where 
Arumugam interviewed me, Malaiur – one of Kallarnatu’s many villages, or ūr – may 
be termed my primary field-site. Of the eleven months (October 2007–September 
2008) that constituted my first round of fieldwork, nine months (January–September 
2008) mainly consisted of research in – and on – Malaiur. In the first of my Madurai 
months, I was a day-job anthropologist, hoping to place my research and myself in 
one of Kallarnatu’s villages. I had to contend with three and a half months of ‘entry 
trouble.’ That period officially ended with my interview by Arumugam.  
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The Kallar comprised the majority of Malaiur’s population and held most of 
its land. As a social group, it is more powerful – economically, socially, and politically 
– than Malaiur’s other caste groups. I take recourse to standard anthropological 
approaches (e.g. Srinivas 1959, 1994) and term the Piramalai Kallar a dominant caste. 
I also consider caste and dominance as concepts needing re-examination. This thesis 
treats castes as social groups, but attends to the qualities, emergence, stability, and 
fractures of castes as groups. It emphasises the fluctuating materialisation of 
dominance and subordination by scrutinising castes groups from within and without. 
It shall thus respond to recent trends in the anthropology of caste – for instance, the 
call to ‘focus on relations between castes that simultaneously comprehends the 
dynamics within a caste’ (Natrajan 2005: 230), and the invitation to understand caste 
as ‘attachment, performance, or “composition” rather than as a sui generis entity… 
[and as] both a mode of domination and a means to challenge that domination’ 
(Mosse 2012: 96-7). The thesis also examines things, not so much as mute elements 
in space as active constituents in the production and transformation of spatial and 
social relations. How do I carry out these tasks? 
In this introduction’s first section, I use the pretext of introducing my field to 
engage with the theoretical and analytical frameworks I have found most adequate 
to my tasks. Here, I also briefly address the question ‘what is a field-site?’ that frames 
my first two chapters, where Madurai, Malaiur, and Kallarnatu re-appear through 
greater attention to socio-spatial dialectics. I ‘locate’ Malaiur in terms of different 
conceptualisations of space. This combined treatment of field description and 
thematic outline serves as a trailer to my manner of representing processes and 
dialectics.  
I then introduce the thesis’s key concepts and frameworks. Conceptual 
snapshots only capture a work as it leans on one intellectual frame here, and on 
another there. It is best if intellectual debts appear as stimulants rather than as 
formulaic applications, and emerge through chapter design, arguments, exposition, 
and details. This section is an initial admission to my main theoretical leanings; my 
chapters reveal a dispersed treatment of theory. Here, I also scan over my methods 
of inquiry in connection with what I inquire into. Finally, I outline the plan of my 
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chapters, summarise the themes I address, and explain why I group the chapters in 
three parts. 
Repositioning the Field 
As location, Malaiur seemed to fit with my research interests. Yet my interest in the 
village puzzled many of my Madurai Kallar acquaintances. Thinking Malaiur to be 
incompatible with my life-cycle status, some advised that as a woman researcher 
who was single (such as I was reputed to be), I avoid notorious villages (such as 
Malaiur was reputed to be). Some also cited Malaiur’s position within Kallarnatu as 
a reason for their scepticism. 
Heterogeneity was characteristic across nāṭu and within nāṭu. Within each 
nāṭu, settlements had varying degrees of political, social, and territorial importance. 
They occupied different positions in the nāṭu’s constitutive networks of temples, 
trade routes, ties of patronage, tributary systems, and irrigation. Ecological 
differences – land fertility, soil type, its suitability to different kinds of crops and 
animals, and hydrology – played a role in these variations. Human competencies to 
develop and utilise new technologies, and to forge and sustain social and political 
networks were equally decisive. There was, thus, considerable difference in the 
ability of constituent settlements to become, or come closer to, nāṭu centres.  
These positions and competencies were not static. Social groups had varying 
success in their ability to garner and redistribute resources such as agrarian produce, 
land, labour and water, gifts and patronage, and honour and other status indicators. 
Whenever possible, chieftains, families, lineages, and individuals contested their 
marginality. They sought greater centrality with respect to the nāṭu as well as the 
regional powers that knit different nāṭu into the fabric of segmentary polities. 
Kallarnatu was no different.   
Disputes over centrality in Kallarnatu continued long after colonial rule 
transformed ‘honour’ into ‘a particular form of “public” commodity’ (Dirks 1987: 
360). My fieldwork revealed long-standing, bitter disputes between Kallarnatu’s 
eight internal nāṭu, its many ūr or villages, and between Kallar lineages. Criticisms 
over my interest in Malaiur echo these disputes. The Kallar individuals who had 
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emphasised Malaiur’s marginality to critique my field-site choice were from other 
Kallarnatu villages.  
How was Malaiur marginal? In terms of metric distance, Malaiur was closer 
to Madurai’s centre than many of my sceptics’ native villages. Clearly, physical 
distance from the city is an insufficient measure of village marginality. Malaiur’s 
marginality arose when my critics located and repositioned it vis-à-vis Kallarnatu’s 
historical geography. They were perplexed that I chose Malaiur rather than one of 
Kallarnatu’s older power-centres. 
This calls for locating Malaiur in a matrix of social space. By positioning my 
field-site in social space, I shall also demonstrate the dialectics of space and social 
relations. Rather than treating space as external medium and place as empty 
location, I display the connections between field-site and world.  
Imagined as mere setting, ‘the field’ was yet to attract the reflexivity that 
anthropology’s ‘whats’ and ‘hows’ systematically received in the last quarter of the 
twentieth-century (Gupta and Ferguson 1997: 2). The field-site’s imperviousness to 
theoretical attention soon disappeared. One response was to destabilise older ideas 
of the field by highlighting the inherent instability of places. Criticism of 
anthropological practices that coupled places and people coincided with the grant of 
overwhelming causal power to globalization. Anthropologists substantiated their 
case for revisiting ‘the field’ by turning globalization into a key witness.   
As witnesses go, the concept of globalization responded only to queries it was 
posed. Academic and popular literature on globalization emphasised accelerating 
flows of capital, commodities, people, and ideas – flows taken to characterise the 
modern world since, at the least, the late-twentieth-century. Globalization thus 
became synonymous with ‘deterritorialization’ (Appadurai 1996, Clifford 2003: 29). 
So pervasive and powerful was this view that reterritorialization processes – equally 
characteristic of the contemporary world – were only minimally scrutinised. 
Consequently, much of this scholarship failed to grasp reterritorialization as an effect 
(and cause) of the same phenomena, the global space-time which emerged through 
capitalism.  
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How may we remedy this? Firstly, by avoiding presentism. Utilizing the 
concept of globalization to destabilize the earlier anthropological practice of 
incarcerating particular social groups in particular territories begs the question – did 
human mobility only become an important phenomenon in the late-twentieth-
century? Historians have answered with an emphatic no, asking that we instead 
attend to the ‘back-and-forth, varied combination of territorializing and 
deterritorializing tendencies’ (Cooper 2001: 191).  
Secondly, by understanding these tendencies as simultaneous effects and 
causes of processes characterising a given moment. Summarising the late-
nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century moment in the production of space, 
historian Manu Goswami says, 
The making of a global space-time was a dialectical, contradictory, and 
doubled process. It was generated by and expressive of the 
simultaneous “deterritorialization” (the acceleration of… “space-time 
compression”) and “reterritorialization” (the production of relatively 
fixed sociospatial organizations from material infrastructures to state 
forms that enable the accelerated temporal circulation of capital) of 
multiple socioeconomic fields and cultural imaginaries (2004: 39). 
To swing the discussion back to Malaiur, I reposition my field through geographer 
David Harvey’s discussion (2005: 94-8) of three main frames of space – space as 
absolute, as relative, and as relational. 
Most ethnographers begin their monographs with a mention of the place(s) 
where they carried out field research.3 The research site(s) is also located within 
wider and wider scales of territories. Such information is usually token; it still carries 
the sense of field as the ground from which the ethnographic account is to take off. 
This is schoolbook geography serving as pre-condition for anthropology. It is related 
to the dominant conception of space in the manner of maps and plans. The mode is 
something of this sort, 
                                                     
3 I have in mind the kinds of field-sites (villages, neighbourhoods) we conceptualise and represent as 
spatially bounded locales. But multi-sited ethnography, and the turning of scientific research 
laboratories, bureaucracies, aid organisations, professional communities, financial institutions, and 
virtual networks into field-sites, have entailed new strategies of representing and examining location, 
scale, and space. 
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Malaiur is a village in Madurai, about 15 kilometres westwards from 
one of the main public transport bus terminus at the city centre. 
Madurai is located in southern Tamil Nadu and is the state’s second 
largest city. Tamil Nadu is a state in south India.  
This describes Malaiur as unique location while positioning it in relation to other 
places. It involves two frameworks – space as absolute, and space as relative. It starts 
by furnishing Malaiur’s location within the frame of absolute space, the ‘primary 
space of individuation’ (Harvey 2005: 94). I could (although I do not) throw in 
Malaiur’s longitudinal and latitudinal coordinates, and anchor it in Newtonian and 
Cartesian notions of space as an empty container in which things exist. What are the 
uses of this framework? It specifies Malaiur as an absolute location in space. Such a 
description helps readers imagine the absolute geographic locations of most of the 
individuals, and phenomena, appearing in this thesis.4 Yet stopping at this framework 
is inadequate to my thesis. 
This representation inadvertently suggests that these individuals, and 
phenomena, are simply located in Malaiur, and that the village exists independent of 
them. Yet the above note also describes Malaiur in relation to other points in space. 
Even this staccato geography shifts from representing place as discrete location to 
representing it terms of distance and directions from other places. It thus orients the 
site vis-à-vis other kinds of territorial units, and administrative and juridical 
categories.  
An anthropology of socio-spatial processes requires that we supplant the 
space-as-absolute approach with other approaches. Let us think of Malaiur resident 
Dharmar, a Kallar man in his early-forties, as he prepares to leave, early morning, for 
work. For this routine task, Dharmar boards the bus going to Periyar bus terminus at 
Madurai city. The only distance I noted while describing my field-site is that between 
this bus-route’s endpoints (Malaiur and Periyar terminus). This gives us one frame 
                                                     
4 James Clifford notes that ‘fieldwork is... a special kind of ethnography, a spatial practice of intensive, 
interactive research organized around the serious fiction of a “field”. This site is not so much a discrete, 
single place as a set of institutionalized practices, a professional habitus’ (2003: 18). This is true of all 
places. Although true for ethnographers and residents alike, there are somewhat different sets of 
institutionalised practices and habitus which make their places, and by means of which each set 
produces these places. 
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with which to understand Malaiur’s relation to Madurai. My use of the present tense 
begs the question, has the village always been about 15 kilometres from the city?  
The question is far from being puerile; its sheer presence indicates that 
physical distance is a socio-historical attribute. We have so far only switched between 
the space-as-absolute and space-as-relative frames. Yet Malaiur’s distance from 
Madurai city already comes across as dynamic. Distance alters due to changes in 
transport infrastructure, public transport services, and privately owned motor 
vehicles. To emphasise this dynamicity is also to suggest that rural-urban relations 
are not absolute; they change over time.   
In fact, my thesis title gestures towards Raymond Williams’ The Country and 
City (1975). In this well-known book, Williams correlates English literary traditions of 
opposing the country to the city with social history. The region examined in this thesis 
has other problems and sources – poetic, historical, anthropological, administrative, 
and development and planning literatures. Here we have different trajectories to 
rural-urban relations, and other imaginaries juxtaposing city and village. What I must 
stress is that the country has been very close to the city for centuries, and that the 
two are more closely connected than we take them to be.  
I could encapsulate this in the space-as-relational framework by 
acknowledging that the country and the city are co-constitutive. They do not only 
exist as points or territories relative to each other. What a city is already consists of 
the country. The country likewise consists of the city. I could well have chosen 
another thesis title – The Country in the City; The City in the Country – to convey 
relationality rather than mere proximity. A relational exposition would destabilise the 
imagination of Indian villages as self-sufficient and static units (Dewey 1972) – an 
imagination that became pervasive and potent through British colonial rule, 
administrative knowledges, and theories, and was carried through to post-
independence sociological and governmental frames of knowing, planning, and 
doing.     
The representation of distance in metric terms is itself linked to particular 
ways of seeing and colonising space. This representation is a social practice and a 
result of historical processes. However, representations and practices themselves 
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change. Transport networks and motor vehicles, for instance, not only change how 
(and with what speed) people and things move between country and city but also 
provide an infrastructure for linking the rural and urban.  
Supposing we consider Kasi, another Malaiur resident who does not need to 
traverse the entire bus route? He disembarks the bus after 3 kilometres of travel on 
the Malaiur approach road. The stop is located on the intersection of this road and 
National Highway NH49. At the junction, the bus turns eastwards towards the city 
centre. Kasi, however, takes a bus travelling westwards, and gets off at a stop about 
15 kilometres on the opposite direction, further down the highway into Kallarnatu.  
The city might not immediately figure in Kasi’s daily journeys between his 
workplace and his home. Yet it mediates Kasi’s route, routine, and rhythm as he goes 
between home and his place of (contractual) work – a ‘ration shop’ or centre of the 
Public Distribution System that passes for India’s food security measure. Let us now 
look at Kasi as he travels on another task. This one takes him towards the city centre. 
He takes the village bus to Periyar, and then takes another bus, which drops him off 
at the Madurai bench of the Madras High Court. These trips are related to a land 
dispute between him and some villagers of neighbouring Tenur.  
Picturing all these tasks, the city comes through as a node connecting 
different places. We are yet to see the city as a place made by all these connections. 
Likewise, metric distance of village from city does not give us an idea of all the 
practices that produce space. Distance does not encapsulate all the routes followed, 
affirmed, or modified by daily practices. Nor does it say anything about other kinds 
of proximities and distances between Malaiur and Madurai city, other villages, or 
other cities.  
The conception of space undergirding this representational practice 
(measurement of distance in metric units) does not simply exist in the minds of 
planners. It undergirds circulatory practices, the patterned flow of people and things 
across places, the movement of labour and commodities. That is, the conception 
enacts and relates to a set of practices. Distance influences the already constrained 
decisions individuals take on where to work, where to live, which cinema to watch a 
film in, where to buy brinjals, how to send brinjals to markets, where to invest in real 
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property, and which school to send their children to. We shall see circulatory 
infrastructures not only as material objects but also as elements in affective space.  
For now, I need only state that a relational account would move beyond 
grasping Malaiur’s existence relative to other places in space. It would reveal the 
networks, pathways, and social relations that constitute place and space, and 
confirm them as product, process, and internalisation of these relations. As another 
geographer, Doreen Massey, reminds us, space is not a thing that takes ‘the form of 
some abstract dimension,’ it is ‘the simultaneous coexistence of social interrelations 
at all geographical scales, from the intimacy of the household to the wide space of 
transglobal connections’ (1994: 168, emphasis added).   
Massey intimates another aspect to repositioning the field, prompting us to 
conceptualise places as ‘formed out of the particular set of social relations which 
interact at a particular location’ (ibid). Thus, Malaiur is the amalgam of social 
relations that lend it its singularity; it is both incorporator and generator of social 
relations that are wider than its own area (ibid: 168-9). This is another way of saying 
that villages, cities, nation-states, regions, and the global emerge and transform 
through social and spatial processes operationalised at multiple scales. Every site, 
and place, develops through its location in a series of historical spaces. Places come 
to be stretched, dispersed, and shrunk. Moreover, as was the case for a settlement 
abutting Malaiur, places are also settled, abandoned, and recolonised through 
combinations of processes and actors specific to each historical moment. 
Malaiur is not just a container or backdrop. Malaiur consists of much more 
than its resident individuals, families, lineages, and castes, its panchayat office, bus 
stops, temples, homes, and fields, post office and telephones, television sets, 
newspapers, weeklies, school textbooks, loudspeakers, irrigation tanks, wells, roads, 
and statues. It consists of more than it contains. It also contains more than what it 
consists of.   
Now for the question posed by my non-Malaiur Kallar interlocutors. I could 
restate it as follows – whatever Malaiur is, contains, and consists of, how do these 
characteristics motivate my study? And how is all this related to Arumugam’s 
question, ‘Why us?’   
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There were many reasons as to why Malaiur. Like other anthropologists, I 
chose my primary field-site in circumstances not of my own making, due to factors I 
was yet to comprehend let alone explain at the time. But the impact of all that 
scepticism was such that when Arumugam asked ‘Why us?’ I presumed he too was 
asking ‘Why Malaiur?’ Arumugam clarified. No, he wished to know why my interest 
in his caste. I provided a synoptic account of my research proposal. I made light of 
my interest in dominance and subordination and overpitched the apparently 
innocuous research aim of a revisit. I told Arumugam that I was revisiting the area 
studied by ‘French researcher’ Dumont. 
Based on research in the late-1940s, Louis Dumont, a key figure in the history 
of South Asian ethnography had authored a monograph on the Piramalai Kallar. 
Some Kallar I met in Madurai had read parts of the English translation published years 
later (Dumont 1986). Anthropologist and monograph regularly featured in my 
conversations with school and college teachers, university students, political and 
caste association leaders, and administrators. Some of them thought Dumont had 
failed as an anthropologist of their caste.  
Dumont did not figure only in my discussions with middle-class Kallar, those 
able to afford higher education and sustained English language training. There has 
been some talk of translating the monograph into Tamil, but nothing has come of it 
so far. Even Kallar men (and occasionally, women) who were not proficient in English 
knew of the book. Opinions regarding Dumont overflowed any simplified matrix of 
Kallar class differentiation. (In a sense, what English proficiency – to the extent 
required to read the monograph – signifies in contemporary India is social mobility). 
Men like Arumugam could not read the monograph, their formal education ending 
at secondary school (with Tamil as the medium of instruction), but had had 
discussions with others who had read it. Arumugam had an opinion on Dumont’s 
ethnographic capabilities and on what the monograph’s central ‘failing’ was.  
Not that I knew Arumugam’s opinion when I first met him in January 2008. I 
only knew that there was no escaping the spectre of Dumont in the field – not least 
because those who introduced me to Arumugam had pitched my research as though 
it aimed at producing a true account of the Piramalai Kallar. As my preterrain 
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references went through and I applied for the post of Malaiur’s (temporary) resident 
anthropologist that morning, I was so sure of Dumont’s imminent appearance that I 
mentioned him myself. I also held the misplaced idea that revisiting Dumont made 
for a safe research genealogy. This is what I told Arumugam – I was revisiting the 
region from which Dumont first drew up his doctrines for an anthropology of India. 
I was prodded. What did I think of Dumont and his work? I resumed 
hesitantly. Another man intervened, only to be silenced. ‘Iru,’ Arumugam told the 
second man, somewhat irritably. ‘Wait.’ Signalling that I ought to speak, Arumugam 
went on to speak instead. ‘[Dumont] did not do [research] properly. [He] just sat, 
kept sitting and writing about temples and clans, marriage and marriage rules.’  
The ticking off was a reminder that anthropological revisits could be as 
controversial a genealogy as any other to parade. Arumugam proceeded to say that 
Dumont did not know a thing about Piramalai Kallar. His principal objection was that, 
despite its length and attention to detail, the monograph hardly referred to the 
Criminal Tribes Act, 1911 and its impact on his caste.  
In 1918, the government of Madras Presidency (a provincial unit of British 
colonial administration which encompassed large parts of peninsular south India), 
imposed this Act on the entire Piramalai Kallar caste. Its notification as a ‘criminal 
tribe’ emerged out of colonial modes of rule and representation conjoining over 
decades to stereotype Piramalai Kallar as a caste of thieves, predators, highway 
robbers, and extortionists. Arumugam’s questions regarding Dumont echoed those 
posed by other Kallar. How could Dumont not have written anything about this Act? 
Why did Dumont not mention the agitations for its repeal? Dumont was sure to have 
seen or heard of these agitations; does this not turn the misdemeanour of omission 
into a more serious crime?  
‘Now, what about researchers like you? Those who come after reading 
Dumont?’ ‘Will you correct those errors? Or repeat them?’ ‘Will there be a proper 
account of the Piramalai Kallar, our history, of the Act?’ These were the questions 
posed to me. 
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Recent scholarship (e.g. A. Pandian 2009) relating to Arumugam’s caste has 
focused on that legislation. Arumugam has also met researchers whose areas of 
interests overlap with some of Dumont’s, even though the analytical frameworks 
they bring to the study of kinship, marriage, and marriage preferences are far 
removed from his.  
This is additional to the local interest in the Criminal Tribes Act (henceforth 
CTA). The CTA is now the subject of many media reports, memorials, student papers, 
pamphlets, and books. Reporters interview Arumugam, seeking his statements for 
their write-ups on CTA-related commemoration. Individuals and associations have 
authored popular and academic writing (e.g. Jeyaraj and Maheswari 2003, 
Cuntaravantiyattēvan̲ 2011) and directed attention to the Act and its relation to 
Kallar history and identity through diverse media.  
A few words, then, on how I respond to the exhortations to correct Dumont’s 
‘failures.’ Given the thesis’s focus, I investigate the history, effects, and memories of 
this Act primarily in connection with contemporary intra- and inter-caste conflicts. I 
explore memorialisation practices and imaginaries enlisting the Act as evidence of 
territorial sovereignty and caste valour. I cannot help but wonder what Arumugam 
shall think about this work, geared as it is towards issues and themes that neither 
Arumugam nor I could have predicted in January 2008. So, what are these themes, 
and how do I approach them?  
Product and Process: Theoretical Handles to Social Space and 
Social Relations  
This section combines discussions of the thesis’s main theoretical handles with 
reflections on my research trajectories and methods. This approach nods to the 
processual nature of anthropological (or all) knowledge. Reflecting on the writing 
techniques deployed throughout the thesis, I also show that these strategies mirror 
the dialectical and processual nature of space and social relations. That is, I utilise 
discussions on methods as heft to my thesis claims. Since methods are inseparable 
from contexts and texts, I think the approach well advised. 
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An Entry tale  
To grasp the methods of research in conjunction with the subject of research is to 
attend to the networks of places, people, things, and infrastructures that produce 
that study. It is to consider the convergence of multiple spatialities and temporalities 
in each study. Of concern to such a task would be the space-time and rhythms of 
fieldwork, field, and academe, and the positions and temporalities through which the 
triad of researcher, researched, and research emerge.  
In September 2008, I went to Tamil Nadu’s capital, Chennai. Firstly, the brief 
visit aimed to build the bureaucratic scaffolding of research. I embarked on the 
somewhat complicated process of gaining library and archive access. Secondly, I 
aimed to meet scholars, activists, administrators, and others who could put me in 
touch with people in Madurai. Days later, this assemblage of papers and people, and 
documents and digital data cohered to produce a less sketchy preterrain.  
As a child, I had often visited Madurai during vacations. However, any 
thoughts I harboured of familiarity were soon put to rest. My parents’ villages were 
located in different reaches of Madurai district but neither was located in Kallarnatu. 
I also wished to avoid my kin during research and reorient myself to Madurai. My 
caste was negligibly present in Kallarnatu but villages where it was a dominant caste 
abutted this micro-region. Of course, castes have for long overflowed micro-regional 
orientations. It was this very overflow, this shared social and spatial history of castes 
and caste relations, and the dominance of my caste, that motivated me avoid my kin 
circle. Strangely, my fieldwork plan combined an awareness of my caste positionality 
with a brutal negligence of gender. The combination was to shape my research 
considerably.  
When I shifted to Madurai in early-October 2007, I had to fall back on my kin 
circle. I moved into the home of an uncle and aunt, promising to relocate myself soon. 
The promises were sincere but rash. The retreating monsoons that overhung my 
arrival disappeared long before my relocation. My uncle and aunt lived in a newly 
established residential colony just outside the southern borders of Madurai 
municipality. Basing myself in their home, I tried remapping my (still hazy) preterrain 
onto the lived space of Madurai.  
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Madurai highlighted Tamil Nadu’s reputation of being a well-connected 
region. Its streets buzzed with two-wheelers, shared auto-rickshaws, mini-buses, 
pushcarts, and lorries. The district had many public and private buses plying between 
villages, administrative headquarters or taluks, and city bus terminals; yet other 
buses connected Madurai to other districts and to neighbouring states.  
I set off each morning, taking whatever permutation of vehicles the day’s task 
demanded. I travelled to college canteens, university rooms, offices, homes, and 
temples across the city. My journeys soon began to include streets, fields, squares, 
temples, and government offices in some of Madurai’s southwestern and western 
villages. Each evening, I traversed a complex infrastructure network – in vehicles 
moving on national and state highways, district and panchayat roads, and city streets 
– with a growing sense of disquiet. I feared that I could never move out of my uncle 
and aunt’s home. 
Entry trouble was all very well as trope-supplier; what was I to make of its 
broker-like disposition and lingering presence? My time as fieldworker was on a 
budget but entry turned usurer, overshooting what ethnographers most credit it for 
– providing the moment of initial, productive dislocation. I activated my preterrain. 
Days rolled by. I sought ‘appropriate’ location(s). Weeks piled up. Time, in all its 
dimensions, came out of joint. Schedules came unhinged as field proposal contended 
with field. Duration slid towards deficit when field research’s ‘real participants… the 
“locals” whose decision it really is as to what kind of access, participation, and 
experience’ (Van Maanen 2011: 176) anthropologists gain began to overhaul my 
templates. Daily rhythms became exhausting, with travel to field-sites consuming as 
much of my day as research there did. Ultimately, all these dimensions of time played 
a role in my ‘finding out where to go’ (Dalsgaard and Nielsen 2013: 4).   
 All the while, I hoped and strove for the point when I could move to a 
Kallarnatu village and begin to understand something of dominance, social mobility, 
and the reconstitution of caste and gender relations in this micro-region. All the 
while, I discounted the experiences I gathered from this initial footloose 
anthropology. Only in retrospect could I understand those months of entry trouble 
as the gears that shifted my interests. That daily hypermobility – which had, for 
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ethnographic research, seemed constricting – led me to experience Kallarnatu, the 
relations between its villages, the relations between villages and city, and the 
relations between circulation and fixity, long before these territories and relations 
emerged as thesis matter. In a sense, this thesis extends that initial, experiential 
knowledge of the field as a real multiplicity of locations – each location coming to 
matter not as singular event in a spatial kaleidoscope but in relation to others. Those 
experiences were a tip-off on how to comprehend social space. 
I also learnt that places were more than mere setting for research. Different 
places and kinds of locations appear in this thesis – fields and homes; houses 
doubling up as workshops; streets, tea-stalls, and ‘squares’ where village and city 
residents ‘passed time;’ temples; administrative offices; and buses, bus stops and 
auto-rickshaw stands. This thesis accords locations the status of subject matter, not 
theatre. In an inversion of Clifford Geertz’s famous declaration (1973: 22), Malaiur 
was not simply the village in which I studied; it is part of what I studied. This links 
with recent anthropological efforts (Mines and Yazgi 2010) to investigate “village 
matters,” to analyse territories instead of merely analysing in them. This effort is 
crucial to understanding space as produced and dynamic rather than static and given.  
Productions and Relations 
To investigate social space is to investigate the production of social space. I found my 
starting point in the work of Henri Lefebvre, whose signal contribution to the 
scholarship on space can be summarised in one pithy sentence – (social) space is 
(socially) produced (Lefebvre 1991). Yet nothing could be more difficult to grasp, for 
social space is not produced in the manner in which computers, buses, or pasta are 
produced. Space is no a priori condition for social relations. To comprehend space as 
a static tableau in which social groups act is faulty scholarship.  
The Lefebvrian approach to space appears to be social constructionist. It is far 
from being one. To start with, Lefebvre favours the concept of production over that 
of construction, because the former ‘emphasised the integration of… spatial 
processes with more general processes of social production and reproduction’ (Ahuja 
2009: 26). Space is produced; conversely, it makes its way into production and other 
social relations. Lefebvre (1991: 85) signals social space’s peculiar link to production 
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by identifying how it ‘infiltrates, even invades, the concept of production, becoming 
part… of its content.’  
Lefebvre also understood space as a social relation. This social relation is ‘one 
which is inherent to property relationships (especially the ownership of the earth, of 
land) and also closely bound up with the forces of production (which impose a form 
on that earth or land)’ (ibid). Nowhere is Lefebvre like the social scientists criticised 
recently by some scholars (e.g. Latour 2005: 1) for their adjectival approach to the 
social. Lefebvre does not think of social space as akin to hardy tables, grainy 
photographs, or al dente pasta. Nor does he oppose social space to natural space, 
biological space, economic space, or poetic space. He presages many of the themes 
picked up in the associative sociology and actor network theories that has found 
favour amongst scholars more recently.  
There are important differences, however, with Lefebvre providing a keener 
attention to sequence and history, to the overlapping temporalities and spatialities 
in each moment and location, to everyday rhythms, and to the conflicts and 
contradictions that produce a space in motion. Lefebvre was just as interested in the 
emergence of perspectivism in art as he was in political, social, and economic 
relations of the time. He sought out the connections between the two. He was as 
interested in city plans and maps, and grids and routes as in architectural trends, and 
links between places and practices of work, residence, and leisure.  
His approach conjoined all these practices and representations to analyse the 
urban form and its reach. He was just as interested in the local as he was in the global. 
This theoretical framework led to a series of illuminating insights on the analytical 
category of spatial scale. He favoured not ‘flat ontology’ but attention to 
intercalations of the global and the local. This choice stemmed from acknowledging 
the different capacities of human actors, institutions, things, and ideas to act on 
space, and of the modes by which space acts on people and things. He was just as 
interested in products and works as he was in process and relations. It would be 
rather unfortunate, were an anthropology of space to make clipped references to a 
scholar whose reach included so many elements in their interconnections.  
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For most of us, an acquaintance with Lefebvre’s main treatise on social space 
(1991) is likely to have emerged through countless citations of the conceptual triad 
he introduces in that work. Some clarifications over Lefebvre’s method to conceptual 
abstraction are of necessity. The triad’s conceptual elements provide an analytical 
handle to social space. Lefebvre starts with a working definition of these elements 
but continues to hone and modify them throughout his investigation of space. 
Aspects of each element and their interconnections appear in one light here, and in 
quite another there. The triad first appears as follows.  
Lefebvre sets out to theorise social space through the triad of 
‘representations of space’ or conceived space, ‘representational spaces’ or lived 
space, and ‘spatial practices’ or perceived space (ibid: 33, 38-9). None of these – the 
spaces of planners and state institutions, the spaces of affect, emotion, and feeling, 
and the spaces of everyday practices, or the rhythms shaped by people’s (and things’) 
actions as these oscillate between work and leisure, and production, consumption, 
and reproduction – are independent of the others. My chapters differ in the attention 
they pay to each element. Some focus more on spatial imaginaries and affective 
spaces while others are more interested in plan documents and spatial practices. Yet 
they aim to evoke as well as make visible the interconnections between these 
elements.  
The Looping of Methods and Field 
What modes are adequate to the comprehension of space as both precondition and 
result of social relations, and as both product and process? The reach of such an 
investigation would depend on how it treats anthropological and historical methods 
of inquiry. For a while, I tried interspersing my stay in Madurai with visits to Chennai. 
These trips aimed at archival research in the Tamil Nadu State Archives. There, I 
exhibited an anthropologist’s proclivity to turn the archives into field. And, as novice 
historian, I suffered from the penchant for surface readings. I imagined the archive 
as a monotonous retreat, a welcome contrast to the unpredictable ethnographic 
field. The fantasy did not last. Paper and ink were just as exciting and volatile as 
people are—even though I approached these like a reader of detective fiction rather 
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than the detective herself, obtaining clues twice removed, plodding through files 
referenced in existing scholarship.  
 Outside of my own inadequacies, two rhythms framed my jumps between 
Madurai and Chennai, between ethnographic and historical fields. I shared the first 
with all researchers. This was the rhythm imposed by institutional rules and 
timelines. Research’s time has its own temporalities, with its schedules and duration 
running on budgets. This rhythm conjoins with all the other rhythms producing field, 
fieldwork, and biographical time. What with the prolonged untranslatability of my 
move to Madurai into my move to a Kallarnatu village, my time to research was so 
scarce as to disallow the prolonged embeddedness necessary for productive archival 
research.  
The second rhythm was also from without but connected to bureaucratic and 
political fields that had little to do with the institutionalised rhythms of doctoral 
research. My requests to access archival documents did not always come to fruition; 
staff could not locate all the files I requisitioned. The central government had recently 
constituted a National Commission for De-Notified, Nomadic, and Semi-Nomadic 
Tribes.5 The commission’s task was to make policy recommendations on improving 
these communities’ access to education, health, and livelihood opportunities. My 
field duration tallied with the final stages of the commission’s report preparation.  
Did the rhythms of this political field converge with my research time and 
result in my limited access to archival material? Other researchers in Madurai though 
so, guessing that the commission had requisitioned some of the documents I wanted 
to consult. To take that possibility seriously was to hear echoes of my field – the many 
meetings and CTA-related commemorations, Kallar caste associations’ petitions to 
increase affirmative actions for DNTs – ricocheted into the archive.  
These two rhythms conjoined to set limits to my archival research. The upshot 
is an inadequacy to my approaching space and caste relations as product or process 
via historical research. This is not to say that my archival research has had no impact 
                                                     
5 De-notified Tribes or DNTs refers to communities earlier notified as ‘criminal tribes’ under the 
Criminal Tribes Act, and subsequently ‘de-notified’ after the Act was repealed. 
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on this thesis. I also conducted research in the local archives at Madurai and, briefly, 
in the Jesuit mission archives at Kodaikanal district, Tamil Nadu. Archival research 
was not so negligible that I could ignore it completely. It was just too piece-meal to 
arrive at a sequential history of the region.   
I confronted a difficult choice in this regard. Ought I to make do with what I 
did access, perhaps dressing up my efforts as a valorisation of the fragment? Or, given 
sequential history’s importance to understanding processes, ignore my patchy 
archival research? The choice is a question of historical methods. Declarations about 
understanding space and social relations as product and process need backing by 
adequate evidence and commensurate methods.  
The nature of my historical research prevented me from achieving this. At any 
rate, I needed to signal the impact of archival research on this thesis. By allowing 
certain archival documents to appear in this thesis, I struck upon one solution to my 
predicament. These were the documents already circulating in the field, and through 
their circulation actively remaking the field. To ignore this double movement 
between field and archive proved impossible. Local newspaper articles, pamphlets, 
political speeches, conversations, and memorial structures pulled the archive back 
into the field, and into the collective memory through which contemporary Kallar 
identity is forged. My strategic use of archival documents may not give an adequate 
sense of space as process but it provides a sense of the social life of archival 
documents. It reveals the different rhythms or space-times producing constellations 
of locations and relations – the traffic between documents and monuments, the 
associations of objects and subjects, and the conjoining of representations and 
material practices.  
Similar associations between archive and field, documents and context, and 
people and paper were visible in all the places and practices that have gone into this 
research. Staff and other researchers at archives shared their insights on my research 
themes. Here are some instances. Selvam, a staff at Kodaikanal’s Jesuit missionary 
archives threw light on a well-known event of the time. A Dalit from Uthapuram, 
Selvam reflected on the years of conflict between members of the Dalit Pallar caste 
and the dominant Pillaimar caste of this Madurai village. He went through the history 
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of the much-publicised ‘wall of untouchability,’ built nearly twenty years earlier, and 
recently electrified, to segregate Dalits, and the temple-related disputes which had 
resulted in that wall.6 Weeks before we met, a portion of the wall had been 
demolished. As Uthapuram’s Pillaimar residents temporarily abandoned their homes 
to stay at a temple as a ‘protest’ against the demolition, ensuing tensions also 
received media attention. 
Selvam re-positioned these developments. He linked the developments to a 
new road that would affect a local temple. By arguing that Pillaimar caste action was 
just as connected to this road construction and its effects on this temple as it was to 
conflicts between social groups, he offered an associative sociology or anthropology. 
At Kodaikanal, my access to the mission archives was limited – texts were being 
digitised, and I was there only for a week. Yet the short stay influenced me, if only 
because Selvam’s modes of narrating conflict provided cues on how and where to 
base my own associative anthropology. For instance, in part II, my examination of 
roads and highways connect these concrete sites to human efforts as well as other 
objects and sites such as irrigation tanks. I may not delve into instances when new 
transport networks have led to new conflicts and to new practices and architectural 
styles for India’s ‘roadside temples,’ but part II offers an approach useful to 
reassemble types of sites, to represent associations that already exist between 
temples and roads.  
This thesis also draws from government and other institutions’ reports to 
pursue the connections between space and social relations. Some of these reports 
are available online, via new communication networks and virtual infrastructures 
that depend on and refashion existing socio-spatial processes. I also tracked many 
reports through physical visits to government offices and record rooms. My lengthy 
waiting periods turned these offices and rooms into field-sites. Conversations and 
observations in these offices also served as brief portals to interconnections of space, 
caste, class, and gender. Let me provide some vignettes of those waiting rooms, 
where my thesis aims were, unbeknownst to me, undergoing transformation.  
                                                     
6 ‘Electrified wall divides people on caste lines,’ The Hindu 17.04.2008; Viswanathan 2008.  
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Some visitors removed their footwear before entering the offices of upper-
level bureaucrats, according mariyātai or respect to district collectors (and other 
officials). The practice appears jarring in collectorates and modern institutional 
settings but it throws light on regional social relations. Individuals routinely remove 
footwear before they enter temples, according mariyātai to deities and preserving 
the sanctity of sacral spaces. The multiplicity of this practice across sites highlights 
sacrality’s link to power and social space’s hybridity – underlying themes to this 
thesis.  
Others visiting the Madurai Collectorate appended photographs of Ambedkar 
or local ‘caste icons,’ or the visiting cards of local politicians and activists to their 
paperwork. These Dalit petitioners cued that the most local of conflicts could 
potentially turn into state- or national issues. Their scale-jumping acts revealed 
dimensions of spatiality that this thesis addresses. 
As I waited to access Malaiur’s land records, I occasionally witnessed 
administrative staff dissuading people from selling or buying land. The moment these 
discouraged individuals left, staff would telephone and inform local big-men or land 
brokers about the ‘party’ that had just left, and the plot in question. Overhearing one 
end of these conversations, I realised that officials and brokers guessed how 
amenable those individuals would be to suggestions (from these officials) on whom 
to sell/ buy from, and at what price.  
My time at the Madurai district land records office again highlighted the 
routineness of such practices. There, one conscientious official, who taught me how 
to read land records, spoke of ‘missing land.’ He noted the frequency with which 
‘government land’ or wasteland could exist on paper while disappearing from the 
ground once any scheme requiring land was announced. By investigating road 
infrastructure, part II pursues the links between government policies, land 
acquisition, and the flights of land in speculative markets. 
All this is to say that my efforts to erect the scaffolding of this thesis’s many 
methods was forever bringing me back to the themes of this research. I could 
reaffirm what I have noted about archival research about all the methods I have 
deployed. Put another way, I have asked whether the limits and conditions of each 
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research practice reveals something of the field itself. Elaborating on these 
conjunctions shows that the field is what the fieldworker does and makes of it.  
Geographies of Caste and Gender  
To being with the statement, capital has played an important role in the 
reconstitution of caste, class, and gender relations, is to follow up with concrete lines 
of inquiry. How do accelerating turnover time, space-time compression, and time and 
space mediate these relations? How do different dimensions of temporality – 
‘rhythms, durations, episodes, and temporal ruptures’ (Dalsgaard and Nielsen 2013: 
3) – and different dimensions of spatiality – territoriality, location, place, distance, 
scales and networks (Brenner 2001: 597) – produce contemporary geographies of 
caste and gender?  
I have already alluded to my entry troubles. In itself, the experience is 
unsurprising. Regarding his fieldwork in a Moroccan village, anthropologist Paul 
Rabinow submitted that ‘there really was no reason to allow [him] into the village’ 
(1977: 78). Anthropological knowledge necessarily comes to play in a turf of 
objections, suspicions, expectations, and rules supplied by the individuals, groups, 
and institutions involved.  
If it is business as usual, does entry trouble require a mention, let alone 
honour a discussion? Can the ‘conditions of fieldwork’ be articulated as ‘part of what 
is to be accounted for in fieldwork’ rather than as ‘impediment to the task of doing 
fieldwork’ (Pratt 1986: 41). To further instantiate this an approach, I now return to 
the start of my field research, when social space had not yet become the lodestar in 
my explorations. In that period, my interests in the reconstitution of caste and gender 
relations were hitched onto a research proposal that had marked-down 
considerations of my own gender. My disregard of the co-constitution of my gender, 
age, and life-cycle status and my research is inexcusable. I am aware of this 
disclosure’s absurdity.  
Until I began to live in Madurai, I was primarily thinking of the ethical, 
political, and social dilemmas of anthropologists researching communities they are 
not part of. In all the Kallarnatu villages I visited during those initial months, I faced 
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little hostility over my ‘outsider’ status – outsider, that is, vis-à-vis this micro-region’s 
main caste groups. Most people I met appeared welcoming of, or indifferent to, my 
presence and research. I am attentive to the provisional nature of my reception. 
Given another caste position, I would have met with a different set of fieldwork 
conditions. I earlier provided one explanation for the responses to my project, 
namely the dominant position of my own caste.  
It is just as likely that the absence of direct confrontation over my (caste) 
outsider status elucidates the operations of caste relations at micro-regional and 
local-levels. The combine of my caste’s dominant position and its absence from 
Kallarnatu probably underwrote my research experience. This probably rendered my 
position as one of second-order, rather than immediate, relevance to caste as jati 
(Tamil cāti) as strictly local social relations. 
Subsequent ethnographic investigations sometimes brought to bear the 
‘unimportance of interactional rank in… everyday life’ (Mosse 2012: 127). This too is 
a strange admission, coming as it does from Dumont’s fieldwork region yet belying 
his tenet that caste is best encapsulated in the South Asian civilizational obsession 
with purity and pollution, and with ritual hierarchies.  
Here is a case in point. Months after our first meeting, I joined Arumugam’s 
family for a meal of mutton curry and rice. Arumugam’s son, Ajith, posed a question 
that stirred the Sunday post-lunch stupor. Posed to no one in particular – Ajith had 
wanted to know whether Gounder [another Tamil caste] were above or below Kallar 
– we were all invited to respond. The first response flowed from an equally young 
male cousin. Tickled by Ajith’s attempt to rank Gounder and Kallar in relation to each 
other, the second teenager simply replied – ‘Aey, they live in an altogether different 
place.’  
The cousin saw the importance of geographical proximity, location, and 
territorial organisation to caste rankings. Ajith’s mother, Jyothi, provided a radically 
different response. With her hands, she deftly assembled a stepladder in the air, and 
said ‘look here.’ She then matched her gestures with the terse statement that Kallar 
‘are one step, just so, above Chakkiliyar.’ Jyothi placed her own caste in relation to 
Chakkiliyar (also known as Arundhatiyar), one of Malaiur’s Dalit or ex-untouchable 
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castes. Jyothi recounted a common tally of caste rankings in ritual terms. This meter 
of hierarchy fails to read everyday relations of Kallar dominance and Chakkiliyar 
subordination, which only partially derive from idioms of purity and pollution.     
Later that day, other cousins teased Ajith. ‘Why did you want to know?’ ‘Are 
you romancing some Gounder girl?’ ‘Who above? Who below? Are you going to 
marry that girl?’ Ajith protested. ‘Simply asked.’ ‘Nothing of the sort.’ ‘Need there be 
a reason behind each question?’ This cackling conclave tutored itself in caste and 
kinship, possibilities and prohibitions. Synthesising street and village compositions 
with caste geographies of schools, private coaching classes, and public transport, 
these adolescents rehearsed distinction and difference, and teased their way 
through realms of marriages, kinship, endogamy, and other co-ingredients of caste 
relations.  
What may we take away from such twinning of fieldwork conditions and 
research interests? One, caste as local rank order does not exhaust relations of caste 
domination and subordination. One does not encompass the other. Land and labour 
relations, different capacities for mobility and livelihood, different strategies of 
networking and performing caste (Mosse 2012), are not readily translatable into rank 
orders. That the importance of ranking is also subject to change was evident each 
time I ‘returned’ to Malaiur.  
I returned to Madurai for shorter periods of research – a few weeks in 
December 2008–January 2009, in April–May 2010, and in January 2015. I understand 
that return visits are not the anthropologist’s equivalent of RSS feeds. The purpose 
of these brief visits were many – to seek clarifications over something that had 
interested me when I first lived there, to re-orient myself with the field after the 
many intervening months full of deskwork, and to refresh the relationships I had 
forged during my first fieldwork period. What the visits most reaffirmed was 
temporality, the processual nature of what constitutes places, people, social groups, 
objects, and associations of all these. Since ethnographers never return to the same 
field, my visits inevitably propelled additional interests, events, and themes. Each 
visit, especially the last, revealed that caste relations are not static and that local rank 
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orders could become more important where they were less so (or less visible where 
they were more so).  
Two, highly localised rank orders may be superseded by other nodes and 
networks through which caste emerges as a social group (in the associative sense). 
The well-known distinction between caste as jati and caste as varna (the four, or five, 
categories under which castes are classified), and accounts of the intermingling of 
jati and varna indicate this. Three, although South Asian ethnography has often 
engaged with caste as though it were the primary axis of identity, power, and 
belonging, caste is (and was) only one of many interlocking – even contending – 
measures of power, status, distinction, and resource control and redistribution.  
There is enough historical scholarship (e.g. Ludden 1999, 2003; Stein 1977, 
1980) to remedy any tracing of regions and social groups as just so many images of 
premodern immobility and intransience. My research – its conditions and themes, its 
process and product – examines these very aspects of socio-spatial dialectics. 
Perhaps the uneven importance of interactional caste ranking signals not so much 
the realisation of modernity’s promised deliverance from caste ascriptions as older 
regional variations to caste domination and subordination. 
Four, mobility and group formations have for long characterised integrative 
frameworks of social relations and spatiality. Subcastes, castes, and supracastes, as 
well as lineage, kin, and marriage circles exhibit a mix of fixity and fluidity. This 
tension and repose partially emerges from their dialectical relation to space. The very 
elements that enable these associations prevent them from gaining permanence. Yet 
mobility has not dismantled caste and kinship’s constitutive links with space.  
Aspects of spatiality transform while social space continues to be dialectically 
tacked to social relations. And precisely due to this dialectic, contemporary social 
groups and relations take on and provision a set of human (or inter-subjective) 
agency to the ‘different geographical properties’ of different ‘dimensions of capitalist 
spatiality’ (Brenner 2001: 597). Individuals, social groups, relations, locations, and 
associations exhibit and generate the geographical properties of ‘extension, 
embeddedness, situatedness, immobility, enclosure, dispersion, [and] connectivity’ 
(ibid).  
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Let me return to the field and fieldwork conditions and go over the stream 
system that braids these spatial and social relations. Another anthropologist – say, 
someone from a northern Indian Dalit caste – is bound to encounter Madurai, 
Kallarnatu, and Malaiur as radically altered fields. Her emplacement in and by these 
fields are bound to be different. How may we understand different emplacements? 
What enables the emplacement of strangers in local caste registers? Is it mainly 
assisted by the operationalisation of caste as varna, a classificatory model that 
avowedly holds the entire subcontinent in a tight embrace, and is as archaic as is 
fixed? What about other modes through which caste relations operate at local- and 
supralocal-levels? Do they also fashion this sensibility? 
Localised caste relations obtain macro purchase not just as geographical 
extension of varna knowledge but also as extension of caste practices. Some intra-
caste solidarities falter while others gain ground. Political projects seek to merge or 
create new castes. Assimilations work in some contexts and fail in others. Inter-caste 
conflicts come to bear on intra-caste differentiations. The embeddedness of caste 
relations works through their extension. This is to affirm that caste relations – like all 
social identities, practices, and ideas – are witness to reconstitution and 
reterritorialization. With their reproduction and reconstitution by scale enlargement, 
extension, circulatory networks, and borders, caste groups also reorient their 
attachments and relations to other castes.  
Delving in the conditions of my fieldwork and other modes of investigation 
has served as concretisations of my research focus. The very social and spatial 
relations I seek to illuminate have assembled and instantiated the research practices 
that have gone into this thesis. 
Spatialities and Ruralities 
Philosophers, geographers, anthropologists, and others have expended an 
extraordinary amount of theoretical labour to study social space, often conjugated 
these undertakings with the ‘urban question.’ My task is to provide just such a critical 
valence to the examination of contemporary ruralities, agrarian territories, and 
villages.  
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The regular association of the rural with time rather than space makes this 
task trickier. Linked chiefly to agrarian production, rural spaces are more readily 
associated with cyclical time and seasonal rhythms than with social space. This is not 
to suggest space’s absence from rural ethnographies. I only emphasise the 
inadequacies of additive approaches to space and the ‘reading’ of space as though it 
replicates a static rural social order.  
What about contemporary ruralities, dynamism, and conflict; how may we 
examine them? Firstly, we must avoid using the ‘mutations’ of villages as proof that 
each village is only another city (or suburb) in waiting. Secondly, we cannot allow the 
urbanisation question to subsume the examination of rural space. While we may be 
accustomed to thinking of the country and the city as distinct, even conflicting, types 
of human settlements, social space itself is changing at a planetary scale. Yet even as 
the urban form exceeds city-space, the transformation of land use is not the only 
‘spatial’ aspect of new ruralities. Nor is occupational diversification from agriculture 
the only other reason why anthropologists of the rural ought to consider space.  
Social space and social time have for long inflected agriculture. Seeds, 
fertilisers, cropping patterns, irrigation systems, electricity, circulatory 
infrastructures such as roads and highways, and markets of credit, labour, land, and 
agrarian produce – none of these things and relations are mute expressions of static 
space and society. They contribute to, and render dynamic, socio-spatial relations. 
They also generate new rhythms of cultivation. Infrastructures of irrigation, energy, 
transport, and storage; new seeds, pesticides, and fertilisers; and new markets – 
these have decreased cultivation’s dependence on seasonal and diurnal rhythms. 
They reconfigure the associations of humans and non-humans in any village. 
Ruralities are fully enmeshed with the question of space. 
Geographers, anthropologists, and philosophers of space and place have 
provided us with enough tools to go about our current task. While keeping in mind 
the urban-centric nature of space-scholarship, we also need to address the 
comparative imperative of social sciences. How amenable to our task is the 
Lefebvrian account of transitions in social space? Lefebvre argued that the transition 
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to capitalism in Europe accompanied and was enabled by the transition to an abstract 
space. 
This abstract space slowly overlaid existing social space, that is, absolute 
space and historical space. These older social spaces characterised space as it was 
annexed by, organised by, and expressive of, social relations that bound groups 
through idioms and practices of kinship, blood, and sacrality. But abstract space is 
Newtonian space, the space of cadastral surveys of land, city planning, and the global 
rise of urbanisation.  
Abstract space realised its height and reach in and through the steady 
annihilation of space through time. This ‘space-time compression’ enables capital to 
stay in motion, to congeal, and to shift between fixity and motion, and reduces its 
turnover time (Harvey 2006). It has also affected biographies, ideas, art forms, 
structures of feeling, work practices, weddings and marriages, and schooling and 
residence. Does the ‘global’ reach of this compression turn the entire world into the 
image of capital? What measure of the abstract, to utilise Lefebvre again, is a striving 
for homogeneity? What measures of it are potential and tendency? To what extent 
is it is a goal?  
To determine the validity of these processes for regions whose histories are 
shaped by colonialism, we must pose a different set of questions. An underlying 
motive of this thesis is to examine the processes that have produced, in one such 
region, what may be termed a hybrid space.  
The hybridity of this space is commensurate with the continued presence of 
caste relations in India. Thus, it is fallacious – although common – to imagine caste 
relations as feudal remnants or vestiges of precolonial social orders. Social space’s 
hybridity in this region stems from the interlocking of colonialism and capitalism. 
Here, characteristics of absolute space are present as much more than traces. This 
hybrid space not only sustains caste relations and local patterns of dominance but 
also internalises these to capitalism. Caste relations and patterns of dominance and 
subordination sustain capitalism and are integral to its embedding in this region.  
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So, how do the following chapters forward my aims, and what of the 
representational techniques through which this thesis realises its intentions?  
Plan of the Thesis 
The challenges of grasping and presenting the space–society dialectic have mandated 
a specific logic of presentation. I meet these challenges by deploying different tactics. 
This thesis consists of six chapters, grouped into three parts. Most chapters focus on 
specific sites. To an extent, this conscious focus on sites disallows the thesis from 
slipping into a human-centric approach, and from relegating space to the 
background. Rather than using readily available frames – political economy, field-
site, historical background, economy, kinship, and religion – I arrange the chapters 
as expositions of different kinds of sites. The attempt is to allow for a processual and 
relational account of space and social relations by treating these sites as concrete 
abstractions.  
Conceptualising and examining each site as a concrete abstraction has the 
potential to unravel and re-present complexity, and query existing representational 
practices. Part I addresses these challenges through an exposition of particular places 
– villages, cities, micro-regions, and settlements – and their interlinkages. What 
exactly does comprehending a field or site as concrete abstraction entail? A village 
conceptualised in concrete rather than abstract terms is comprehended not only as 
what it contains but also as what it consists of. The method recognises that 
individuals, social groups, and objects co-produce the village as more than a locality. 
Individuals, families, lineage and caste groups, kinship and friendship circles, roads, 
government offices, fields, pathways, vehicles, water taps and tanks, bunds, 
electricity and its infrastructure, gas stoves and mud hearths, firewood and fodder, 
and animals, rocks, shrines, and hills are seen as partial producers, retainers, and 
channels of relations that exceed the village.  
Spatial practices network territories, locales, and places. Structures of feeling, 
geographies of emotions, and spatial imaginaries also connect places, territories, and 
locales. Part I focuses on affective space and on imaginaries linking caste, village, 
territory, city, and self. It helps us to comprehend that every narration of the village 
pushes outwards and pulls inwards, and reveals the historical patterns and 
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determinants of the sign-vehicles in stories, songs, and memories. It is also 
groundwork for my analysis of affective space in later chapters.  
Part II shifts the focus to roads. The road as a site first appears, in chapter 3, 
as an abstraction. It, however, ‘attain[s] “real” existence’ (Lefebvre 1991: 86) in 
chapter 4, as this site is queried through government documents, land relations, 
tanks, kinship, and property and credit markets, the road. A similar attention to 
‘networks and pathways…[and] bunches or clusters of relationships’ (ibid) allows us 
to perceive the embeddedness of other sites – tanks, temples, commemorative 
structures – that frame this thesis.   
I seek a logic of presentation that simulates the analytical logic. In part II, I 
examine roads and their association with land, water, property, caste, and kinship 
relations. These sites, entities, actors, and relations are the result of social and spatial 
processes operationalised at different scales. We shall also see that scalar 
operationalisation is anything but the superimposition of the global on the local. 
Roads and highway construction are not simply global impositions on the local. Local 
social groups and individuals may mobilise for or against road projects. Objects and 
the products of human labour bring another set of relations and ‘individuated’ 
characteristics to an event. In part II, I move across locations and places. This 
movement is determined not so much by ethnography’s favoured ‘participation 
observation’ techniques as by spatial connections already present in legal 
documents, news reports, and secondary literature. Part II mirrors this network of 
places, documents, people, and ideas.   
Part III takes up another set of ‘things,’ examining memorials as they come 
alive through human action, and as agents in their own right. Here, we see memorials 
not only as expressing social relations – caste dominance and subordinance – but also 
as things acting back on the social.  
Parts II and III also disclose the tension between movement and stability. 
Throughout the thesis, I emphasise the relative permanence of social groups and the 
relative instability of things that produce, and are produced by, social space. Since 
many voices emanate from and meet at any given place, anthropological accounts 
must move through a maze of scales and places, fields and factories, worksites, 
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homes, housing projects, colonies and other sites of dwelling, places of consumption, 
government offices, educational institutions, health centres, and transportation 
networks. Anthropology, in addition, must recall and trace the networks and 
constellations that congeal into visceral subjects and objects, and graspable 
manifestations of institutions. My representational logic mimics this analytical logic. 
Since I aim to comprehend things, relations, people, social groups, and space 
in movement, my argument proceeds through an additional logic. The grouping of 
chapters – into three parts, each comprising two chapters – captures a specific 
dialectic. Each set of chapters highlights a tension or expounds a familiar opposition. 
The separation of representation from reality, the symbolic from the real, or a plan 
from its execution is negated as we proceed through a thicket of ethnographic 
investigation, policies and reports, secondary literature, and interpretations.   
Take chapters in part III. Chapter 5 focuses on memorials as they become 
visible through and act via commemorations, while chapter 6 focuses on memorials 
as they become visible through and act via desecration. Part II is organised around 
the basic opposition of a policy and its implementation. Both chapters (3 and 4) 
concentrate on road building and infrastructure. Together, they address part II’s aim, 
which is to understand what a road is. They do so by taking into account plans, policy 
decisions, conflicts, and implementation.  
Part I works through an additional tension emerging from different 
expectations from anthropological knowledge. The academe and the discipline of 
anthropology makes one set of demands related to the knowing or representing of a 
field (chapter 1). Those who live in and produce the fieldworker’s field ‘know’ this 
space through their bodies, and feel and experience it through spatial imaginaries 
(chapter 2). 
PART I WHAT IS A FIELD-SITE?  
Most ethnographies emerge from transformations of research intentions and 
research proposals, and continuous traffic between the desk and the field. Perfectly 
sensible research proposals fall apart in the field as they ‘lose their motivating force’ 
and are replaced by ‘the preoccupations of the people on the spot’ (Strathern 1999: 
1-2). The traffic between anthropology’s desks and fields is not one-way. Its circuits 
leave anthropologists correlating emergent and original interests, and might leave 
them routing for representational modes that meet the demands of a diverse 
audience.  
I have already summarised the shift in my research interests, using these 
reflections to examine person, position, field, temporalities, and spatialities. But how 
do the pre-field desk (of the research proposal), the field, and the post-field desk (of 
the ‘writing-up’ period) come together in the production of ethnographies? What do 
these processes reveal of space known corporeally, of knowledge produced by 
bodies oriented in space? What do they signal about actors and the acted upon?  
Firstly, the pre-field always already constitutes the field. We arrive at the field 
not with a blank slate but as bearers of theoretical orientations and research goals, 
and as consumers and producers of academic resources. The pre-field desk is not 
excess luggage that we can put away during field research. We carry it to the field. 
Along with our experiences, habits, emotional predispositions, and rhythms, the pre-
field desk drags itself through the ground of thoughts, choices, actions, and 
improvisations in the field. The desk’s actualisation is routine. It cohabits the field we 
conceptualise, experience, and seek to comprehend. Secondly, there are just as 
many moves in the opposite direction. Although field research is seldom so 
alchemical as to transform every theoretical field it draws from, the field’s effects 
and relations lead us to reinterpret the pre-field. These two moves reveal the pre-
field and the field in a dialectical bind.  
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A third process runs through the production of ethnographies. Comprising the 
modes by which the ‘desk collapses into the field,’ it highlights the ‘relational nature 
of anthropological knowledge’ (Mosse 2006: 937). Such a collapse may be more 
marked in some projects than in others. One set of interlocutors may be more vocal 
and possess more resources than others (or the anthropologist herself). Some 
interlocutors have a more powerful presence than others do when they ‘surround 
the anthropologist at her or his desk’ (ibid). 
‘Writing-up’ involves more than what the term suggests, for ‘ethnographic 
writing creates [its] second field’ (Strathern 1999: 2). Writing does not simply seat 
the desk and field in proximity. It reassembles them relationally. Since the network 
of relations comprising ethnography cuts across (Mosse 2006) and binds pre-field, 
field, and post-field, it is unsurprising that the product of ethnography runs through 
different sources and audiences. This is another way to indicate relationality of 
knowing and writing, description and analysis, and academic expectations and field 
expectations.   
Chapters 1 and 2 signpost the knottiness of knowledge production, and 
unravel the threads tying what we comprehend and how we communicate that 
comprehension. They also address ethnography’s diverse audiences. What is 
everyday experience for one is analytical matter for another. What is requisite 
material for one is all too obvious for another. Ethnographic knowledge proceeds by 
addressing these different concerns.  
A few words on part I’s matters of exposition. Chapter 1 provides a relational 
examination of different places and spatial categories. It discusses three Tamil spatial 
categories (ūr, kirāmam, and nāṭu), and unravels the relations between three 
different places and territories – the village of Malaiur, the city of Madurai, and the 
micro-region of Kallarnatu. Chapter 2’s subject matter is the imaginaries of place and 
caste. It starts by examining how mobility, or circulatory practices, can lead to a 
paradoxical fixing and collapsing of people and places. Understanding regional 
practices, wherein ‘geographical placement [becomes] the interrogatory means to 
identify a person’s (caste) identity’ (Mosse 2012: 99), makes way for an analysis of 
narratives of caste, place, self, and the past in Malaiur. 
CHAPTER 1 VILLAGE, MICRO-
REGION, CITY  
I have already introduced the major theoretical tools utilised in this thesis. This 
chapter extends that discussion. I begin by reflecting on two spatial terms – ūr and 
kirāmam – with which Tamil speakers refer to village. The second section reveals 
connections between Malaiur village and Madurai city. It notes that new ruralities, 
networks of places, and territorial reorganisation complicate the traditional 
opposition of country and city. The third section elaborates on another Tamil spatial 
category, the nāṭu. It intersperses reflections on territoriality with references to 
Kallarnatu’s history.  
I finally provide an overview of Malaiur’s land and labour relations, and its 
settlement and housing patterns. To describe a place and its social relations as 
though they were distinct from each other would be at cross-purposes to this thesis. 
To meet one of the thesis goals – demonstrating the dialectics between space and 
social relations – I avoid representing space or place and social relations as discrete 
concerns or realms while juggling demands of diverse readership and discipline-
specific representational templates.  
Ūr and Kirāmam: Two Tamil Concepts of Village 
When Arumugam asked ‘Why us?’ I presumed he wanted to know why I was 
interested in his village, Malaiur. My misinterpretation likely stemmed from my 
interactions with non-Malaiur Kallar who had expressed scepticism over my field 
choice. My initial response to Arumugam was to clarify my interest in his village 
rather than in his caste.  
The misinterpretation touches upon the contiguous associations between 
person, caste, and village in this region – indeed, in significant portions of South Asia. 
Anthropologists (e.g. Daniel 1984, Mines 2005) suggest that Tamils refer to the village 
in distinct ways when they speak of it as ūr and kirāmam. They also note the 
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significance of the ‘polysemic, multireferential’ ūr (Daniel 2010: 318) to Tamil notions 
of personhood, caste, and emplacement.  
That January morning in 2008, my misinterpretation had more to do with my 
being a Tamil speaker than my familiarity with this literature. For often, the very first 
question Tamils ask each other involves the ūr. And since ūr is frequently conflated 
with other signs such as caste and person, the ‘us’ in Arumugam’s query could well 
have meant his village, his ūr, rather than his caste. To match up to the importance 
of village, the next chapter looks at narratives of caste and place, especially from and 
about Malaiur. For now, we can make do with a brief outline of ūr and kirāmam.  
Dictionary meanings of ūr include village, town, city, and place. Ethnographic 
investigations however, differentiate between the ‘person-centric’ spatial category 
ūr and the village as administrative spatial category kirāmam. Here is how Valentine 
Daniel condenses the distinction:  
[K]irāmam and ūr have different cultural meanings despite the fact 
that they can both refer to the same territorial unit, the village. 
Kirāmams are legally defined spatial units with boundary lines of an 
exact and clearly demarcated nature. The ūr, as a village, is a spatial 
unit with the focus on the centre of the village and with a vulnerable 
“frontier”…or a periphery through which foreign substances from 
beyond the village enter (1984: 77).1  
In a sense, ūr’s polysemic nature and territorial multi-referentiality (to village, city, 
even country) parallels geographical categories in other languages – home in English 
(Daniel 1984: 67) or heimat in German. Kirāmam has an imprint of governmentality. 
It evokes official maps, bounded places, administrative boundaries, land records, 
panchayat offices, rural policies and schemes, contracts and funds dispensation, and 
taxation. Daniel suggests that seeing the village as ūr helps us understand it, while 
seeing it as kirāmam only explains it (2010: 327-28). For him, ūr is an ontic category, 
while kirāmam is an epistemic one.  
                                                     
1 An earlier, considerably different, account of kirāmam, Ūr and ūr is provided by Brenda Beck (1972) 
in her study of the Kongu region, contemporary Coimbatore and portions of some surrounding 
districts. Beck translates these terms as village, hamlet, and settlement. Unlike Daniel, she writes of 
both kirāmam, revenue village, and Ūr, hamlet, as spatial units characterised by annual ritual 
celebrations.    
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What would social space in rural Tamil Nadu look like, when approached 
through this interpretive path? The village as ūr would appear central in most 
festivals and ritual contexts and everyday life, whereas the village as kirāmam would 
seem important in administrative and juridical contexts. Daniel’s insights help us 
comprehend diverse aspects of social space – the ontological and epistemological, 
the material and the symbolic, the mundane and the extraordinary. It is now 
standard practice for anthropological or geographical accounts of, or set in, the Tamil 
region to treat ūr and kirāmam as distinct notions of space. To limit ourselves to this 
framework, however, is to be oblivious to the routine traffic between village as ūr 
and village as kirāmam.  
Firstly, this approach ignores instances where contemporary Tamil speakers 
discard the distinction. Were I motivated by faithfulness to existing conceptual 
distinctions rather than experiences and events, I would say that my own (admittedly 
bogus) arrival scene was set in Malaiur as it celebrated (or staged) Pongal as kirāmam 
rather than ūr. Actually, fidelity to my pre-desk affected my experience of the field. I 
failed to notice immediately that Malaiur speakers used both concepts while 
addressing visitors and tourists that day. More importantly, I did not realise that the 
concepts cannot be placed across an insurmountable chasm.  
Secondly, we may fail to examine why Tamil speakers use these terms 
interchangeably. The governmental echo to kirāmam allows Tamils to use it instead 
of ūr. Such interchangeable usage is especially marked in contexts where speakers 
wish to avoid using ūr, as its polysemic characteristic inadvertently opens up certain 
associations they do not want to explicitly state. Wanting their listeners to infer these 
very associations, they use kirāmam instead. This was the case in political meetings 
(chapter 5) where public speakers used kirāmam instead of ūr, and terms such as 
āḷkaḷ (people) and camūkam (society) instead of cāti (caste), and iṉam (ethnic 
category, caste).  
Thirdly, when panchayat officials participate in and organise ūr or nāṭu 
temple festivals, they often do so as kirāmam representatives. Likewise, some 
kirāmam officials (representatives or descendants of hereditary office holders, who 
had once served as conduits between village and wider polities) are honoured during 
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key moments in these temple festivals. These phenomena highlight social space’s 
hybridity. 
 Let me elaborate at the micro-regional scale. Dumont’s monograph is not the 
only frame through which Piramalai Kallar and Kallarnatu are ‘known’ or represented 
in the academia, the media, and activist circles. In the mid-1990s, Pappapatti, 
Keeripatti, and Nattarmangalam – three villages of this micro-region – gained 
regional, national, and even international notoriety (Sumathi and Sudersan 2005).  
In these Madurai villages, Kallar groups stalled elections to the posts of 
panchayat presidents for nearly ten years from 1996, when the state government 
notified that the posts would be reserved for Scheduled Castes (SC) candidates. (SC 
is an administrative category of ex-touchable castes, also known as Dalits). These 
notifications, and corresponding changes to state-level rules for local body elections, 
were in line with national constitutional amendments.2 The ten-year period 
highlighted Kallar dominance in the form of economic boycotts, threats, and violence 
against Dalits. Kallar groups also threatened political parties, nongovernmental 
organisations (NGOs), and administrators who supported village Dalits or sought to 
broker peace. The effort is to reaffirm dominance by hedging in the spatial scales in 
which local Dalit castes could regroup, rescale, and represent their interests.3 
Kallar representatives justified their objections to Dalit political 
representation (Sumathi and Sudersan 2005) through many kinds of arguments. One 
contention of ūr makkaḷ – ‘village people,’ but specifically, Kallar villagers – was that 
as kirāmam representative, Dalit panchayat presidents could receive mariyātai 
(honour, respect, distinction) during ūr and nāṭu temple festivals. 
One of the three villages, Nattarmangalam, had a Dalit president during 
1996–2001, winner in a contest between three ‘dummy’ Dalit candidates fielded by 
                                                     
2 In 1996, Tamil Nadu held the first ordinary elections to rural and urban local bodies in accordance 
with the 73rd and 74th amendments to the Indian Constitution and the new Panchayati Raj Institutions 
introduced through state-specific legislations and rules. 
3 When elections for the reserved posts were finally held in 2006, peace and administrative (or 
political) success was celebrated. The achievement was a brokered one. Success was achieved after 
the district administration agreed to demands voiced by Kallar representatives, and held simultaneous 
elections for other panchayat offices, thereby allowing Kallar individuals to contest for the vice-
president’s post. 
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three Kallar factions of the ūr. It was only in the next term that Nattarmangalam 
joined Pappapatti and Keeripatti villages in stalling elections altogether. Why the 
initial difference in Nattarmangalam?  
Some of the district administrators, Communist Party of India (Marxist) or 
CPI(M) activists, NGO workers, and Kallar individuals I met in Madurai provided one 
explanation. They correlated Nattarmangalam’s initial ‘acceptance’ of participatory 
democracy to this ūr’s ‘inferior’ or ordinary status within Kallarnatu. Nattarmangalam 
is an upakirāmam, one of the two main types of territorial units within Kallarnatu. It 
is one of Kallarnatu’s 24 upakirāmam or ‘secondary-villages’ (Dumont 1986: 164). 
Upakirāmam is a category of territorial unit normally considered inferior to 
Kallarnatu’s other main category of territorial unit, also known as nāṭu. We shall 
return to these distinctions later; what is relevant here is the general view that 
Nattarmangalam (like Malaiur) was in a peripheral position within Kallarnatu. This 
was not the case with Pappapatti and Keeripatti villages. They are part of ‘Pappapatti 
nāṭu,’ one of Kallarnatu’s eight nāṭu. Kallar representatives of these two ūr received 
mariyātai during festivals at nāṭu temples such as the Ochandamman temple, 
dedicated to Ochandamman, a deified female ancestor.  
The patterns to power’s dispersal within Kallarnatu and the continued 
importance of temples appear to have factored in the initially different approaches 
Kallar groups in these three villages took vis-à-vis the elections. Those who referred 
to Nattarmangalam’s ordinary status also thought that Pappapatti and Keeripatti 
Kallar had been ‘adamant’ from the start precisely because their ūr were closer to 
old centres of power and sacrality.  
That ūr and nāṭu are not outside of the functioning or even the definition of 
the kirāmam was apparent on a number of occasions. Consider one day in November 
2007, when I met seventy-seven-year-old Paga Thevar in a public transport bus. I had 
boarded this bus at Usilampatti, an urban centre in Madurai district and an important 
place within contemporary Kallarnatu. Paga Thevar was returning to his ūr. I was on 
my way to a kirāmam that had recently gained disrepute. The ūr that Paga Thevar 
was going back to and the kirāmam that I was visiting were the same – Pappapatti 
village.  
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And the territory that was narrated and enacted during our subsequent 
conversation was Pappapatti as both ūr and kirāmam. At a tea-stall that Paga Thevar 
took me to, I was introduced, firstly, to the ūr. Paga Thevar, the tea-stall owner, and 
four other Kallar male villagers described Pappapatti nāṭu’s origin, its lineages and 
villages, and its main temples and festivals. They also delineated the mariyātai 
recipients during temple festivals. This led us to broach Pappapatti as kirāmam. 
By this time, participatory democracy was ‘successfully’ introduced in these 
villages, after protracted negotiations between Kallar groups, district officials, and 
some political parties. Two of the residents stressed on this, adding that the ūr had 
accepted this just as it had accepted inter-caste couples ‘living right here, living well, 
and jolly.’ Paga Thevar continued to object, stating that the new Dalit president 
would portend doom for ūr and nāṭu. ‘If we accept his leadership, what will happen? 
Will the [Ochandamman] temple gods not become angry? What will happen to the 
ūr if [a Dalit panchayat president] is given mariyātai?’ Others said panchayat 
presidents are not honoured unless they also held hereditary offices or appeared as 
ūr representatives.  
This discussion highlighted the possibility of an ūr representative doubling up 
as kirāmam representative. An allied phenomenon is the determination of panchayat 
presidents by ūr makkaḷ deliberations rather than the kirāmam electorate’s votes. As 
I later learnt, Malaiur’s panchayat president was regularly nominated through ūr 
decision and declared as elected unopposed. In Malaiur, the president’s post was 
rotated between representatives of ūr Kallar lineages, and Kallar residents projected 
this process as proof of democracy.  
In Kallarnatu, there have also been successful or attempted auctions of 
panchayat president posts and, in at least two panchayats where the president’s 
office was reserved for Dalits, of vice-president posts. Bidding for the posts occurred 
in Kallar dominated assemblies at the village square or temple. Auction was justified 
on the count that the money thus obtained would return to the village through 
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temple renovation. Moreover, temple renovation was termed as village 
development.4  
Thus, the ūr, its temples, and mariyātai distinctions between families, 
individuals, lineages, and castes are co-constitutive of the kirāmam. This complicates 
not only the neat conceptual distinction between ūr and kirāmam but also the 
Lefebvrian thesis on the withering away of absolute space and its domination by 
abstract space. I have tried to retain the specific Tamil term used by my interlocutors 
when they refer to village. But delineating ūr and kirāmam as distinct concepts may 
belie a processual account of social space or, indeed, of social relations. Chapter 2 
provides a processual account of legislations and government policies producing 
Malaiur as ūr, not just as kirāmam.  
All this is not to dismiss but to qualify existing insights on these two concepts. 
Of course, I was unaware of the need for such qualifications when I met Arumugam 
in January 2008. I was also unaware of the extent to which ūr and kirāmam are 
interlinked to the city.  
The Country, the City, and New Ruralities 
When Arumugam posed that question to me, ūr Pongal celebrations were yet to 
commence. Now, that would have been a perfect backdrop for setting an arrival 
scene. I could have begun by describing Malaiur’s caste groups as they went about 
observing Pongal, gone on to report the festival as it is celebrated at the level of each 
caste’s lineages, and then provided an account of the rituals and any attendant 
contestations. A description of arriving at the village as ūr.  
Except, I had been to Malaiur a week earlier to meet Arumugam, one of the 
most well-known gatekeepers of the ūr (as far as researchers, novelists, and 
journalists are concerned). I could not meet him. He and other villagers were on a 
pilgrimage to the famous Murugan temple in Palani. I went to the then panchayat 
president’s house. Already, in my first attempt to interact with Malaiur residents, I 
unconsciously replicated the folding in of ūr and kirāmam.  
                                                     
4 ‘Dalit woman panchayat president auctioned for 2.16 lakh in TN village,’ The Indian Express, 
19.11.2006; and ‘Bid to auction panchayat post foiled, 6 held,’ The New Indian Express 26.09.2011. 
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On the day that Arumugam inverted the standard ethnographic interviewer-
interviewed roles, I thought I was going to see the village as kirāmam. That was when 
Madurai’s district administration and Malaiur’s local administrative body, its kirāma 
panchayat, had come together to frame the village for the gaze of tourists. Local 
papers had reported that Malaiur was to be the location at which visitors would be 
treated to a ‘typical village style’ Pongal.  
It was for the second year in a row that Malaiur served as a venue for this 
tourists’ Pongal. The festival was organised under the banner of Sangam, a literary 
forum launched in Madurai the previous year. The forum aimed to promote, among 
other things, an ‘exposure’ to sangam compositions – the corpus of early Tamil 
literature, traced to academies patronised by regional Pantiya kings. Through its very 
name, Sangam echoed an idea of oldness, tradition, and culture. Indeed, in 2007, the 
five-day festival held under its banner was termed Tamiḻar Paṇpāṭṭu Tiruviḻā, Tamils’ 
cultural festival. The district administration had organised buses to Malaiur for 
visitors to witness and consume this event.  
In 2008, the spectacle was re-enacted in Malaiur under the sign of tradition. 
This time, I too was party to its consumption. We reached Malaiur’s bus stand, in 
buses, bullock carts (rented, to provide tourists a ‘feel’ of rural India), and other 
vehicles. Before reaching the main village, we halted near the ūr temple. As is 
common practice in this region, it was known as the Karuppu temple, after Karuppu, 
a fierce, guardian deity. During the tourist Pongal, Malaiur’s Karuppu temple turned 
into an indicator of Tamil rurality. 
This temple is at the foot of the ‘Jain Hill.’ Our stopover included a short climb 
to visit Jain rock-cuts and reliefs on this hill. Speeches and sights informed us tourists 
that we were visiting a very old settlement. An organiser greeted us with these 
words: 
Good morning. I invite all of you, the foreign delegates, and all other 
local tourists. The Pongal festival is being celebrated in our district in 
great manner. Madurai is a very famous… one of the ancient cities in 
India. This city is called as the Athens of south India. Madurai, the 
name of the city itself explain… the land of paddy fields… It has the 
unbroken history of 2500 years… This place [Malaiur] is one of the very 
ancient Jain centres. The hill we are seeing is called as the Jain Hill. So, 
the hill itself explains the association of Jainism. Jainism is deep rooted 
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in south India, particularly the Madurai region, 300 B.C. itself. More 
than 15 centres in and around Madurai were Jain centres. This Malai… 
is a south Indian old monument. We are going to see the monument. 
By ‘south Indian old monument,’ the speaker meant the sculptures and the hill itself. 
Yet the success of rural tourism typically rests on reframing villages as relics. Tourism 
turns markers of rurality into commodities. It also leads to the manufacturing of 
‘ancient’ village traditions. Recall that the organisers had rented a bullock cart to lend 
authenticity to the event. They had also dressed the welcoming party of children in 
costumes of recognisable pan-Hindu deities. This was not so much a direct outcome 
of sanskritisation, the adoption of high-caste practices and symbols for upward 
mobility, as an effect of tourism – non-local visitors were unlikely to recognise local 
deities. (Also, local deities, being fiercer and given to possessing human beings, are 
not amenable to such laidback mimicry).   
Innovations have emerged in ritual cooking itself. A highpoint of Pongal 
festivities is the cooking of ‘pongal,’ a dish prepared by boiling recently harvested 
rice until it foams and spills over. This spilling over signifies prosperity. The question 
is how to convey this to non-Tamils or in virtual media.  
In summer 2010, my visit to Malaiur coincided with the visit of a Tamil tele-
series’ production unit. To depict a typical village scene, the crew roped in some 
Malaiur women as background characters and directed them to cook pongal. The 
women had to boil detergent powder, instead of rice, in water. This is standard 
cinematic technique, since the ‘detergent-pongal’ was foamier and ‘looks better on 
camera.’  
Rural tourism and the production of rurality effects conceal some kinds of 
rural-urban relations and co-constitution. Scholarship on rural India can also be 
selective in its focus. Until January 2008, I seldom visited Kallarnatu villages 
unaccompanied, instead travelling with individuals I had contacted via academics in 
distant places or my Madurai-based relatives. Accompanying me during my first 
Malaiur visit, some days prior to the tourists’ Pongal, was a young Piramalai Kallar 
man, whose close kin lived in Malaiur. I had contacted this Madurai-based scholar 
through a US-based anthropologist.  
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A vast network – of roads, buses, auto rickshaws, telephones and e-mails – 
came through to enable my visit to Malaiur. The country and the city may have once 
served as an important spatial dichotomy. This is no longer the case. In fact, the rise 
of concepts such as suburbanisation, periurbanisation, and new ruralities signals the 
invalidity of this distinction.  
The Pongal event in Malaiur was as much about the ‘newness of old things’ 
(Bate 2011: xv) as it was about oldness and antiquity. Indeed, the term paṇpāṭu, with 
which organisers marked it as a cultural event, is a neologism (A. Pandian 2007). By 
2006, Madurai’s district administration was in a frenzy to step up infrastructure 
conducive to tourism development. The district collector was asked to prepare a 
‘tourism master plan.’ The Confederation of Indian Industries had already formed a 
committee to promote medical tourism here. Madurai had only recently beaten most 
of its competitor cities in south India, emerging as a favoured destination for medical 
tourists.5 Promoting rural tourism was part of this effort, and organising the event in 
Malaiur was a foray in that direction.6  
This accorded with recent institutional efforts towards urban development in 
India’s smaller cities, referred to as tier-II and tier-III cities. Key to Madurai’s USP in 
tourism-related efforts was its temples. Its ‘focal point’ was the renowned 
Meenakshi Sundareswarar temple, which provides one kind of orientation to the city, 
its ‘unbroken history,’ and its villages. This temple, envisioned as Madurai’s centre 
by some of its kings and resident groups, has to compete with other centres of power. 
Yet many continue to consider it as Madurai’s centre. 
For long, Madurai’s orientation was that of a ‘ceremonial city’ (Lewandowski 
1977). Its built form, the axes to its orientation, and its plan illustrated how places, 
buildings, kings, deities, persons, bodies, and sacred space partook of and 
contributed to cosmologies, geographies, and categories of thought. This ‘Hindu 
holism’ echoes premodern holistic ontologies in other regions (Gurevich 1985).  
Colonialism significantly altered Madurai’s built form (Viguier 2011). In 
specific moments, administrators attacked Madurai’s nerve centres. However, 
                                                     
5 ‘Integrated plan for Madurai tourism,’ The Hindu, 14.08.2006. 
6 ‘Rural tourism all set to get an impetus,’ The Hindu, 14.12.2007. 
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colonial rule was also accommodative of existing spatial and social relations. 
Contestations and collaborations characterised the interactions between local 
groups and administrators.7 These historical developments shaped the city I came to 
know during fieldwork. 
Many of its residents bemoan that Madurai is nothing but a city of villages. 
Scholarship can also depict Madurai as a non-city. ‘Despite its size,’ writes one 
analyst, ‘Madurai is more like a sprawling premodern town than a modern industrial 
city… best thought of as an urban centre that is halfway between a village and a 
metropolitan city’ (Kohli 1990: 154). Even as textile mills, granite industries, new 
production chains, four-lane highways, bypass roads, and Special Economic Zones 
transform villages and rural-urban relations in the district, a good number of the 
people I met in Madurai during 2007–08, held that it is a city of villages.  
As per the 2011 census, a little over 60 per cent of Madurai’s population lived 
in territories classified as urban. Less than seven per cent of the district’s total 
workers were cultivators, while 27.5 per cent were agricultural labourers. Statistics 
on agricultural labourers suggest remarkable gender differentiation – 42 per cent of 
Madurai’s total female workers, but only 20 per cent of total male workers, were 
agricultural labourers. My ethnographic investigations revealed a similar 
feminisation of agrarian labour in Malaiur. This is linked to changes in cropping 
patterns, Malaiur’s steady shift towards vegetable cultivation. Over 60 per cent of 
Madurai’s working population engaged in neither agricultural activity nor household 
industry. These figures do little justice to Madurai’s agriculture-driven growth 
patterns.  
Views that posit Madurai as a hick town probably stem from expectations 
over what cities and villages ought to be like. Additionally, the actual extent of rural 
and urban spaces is debatable. The government seems to be in a rush to proclaim 
that India’s villages are dead or dying. According to the 2011 census, India’s urban 
population had grown marginally over the preceding decade. What had dramatically 
                                                     
7 Other colonies have experienced an accommodation-and-reconstruction combine – e.g., in the 
1910s, key French administrators sought to re-engineer Morocco by birthing an urban form 
commensurate to a modern, dual hierarchy (Rabinow 1989: 285-8). 
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increased was the number of villages now grouped into and classified as ‘census 
towns,’ promoting analysts to read this as ‘census activism’ (Kundu 2011).  
One explanation attributes the surge in census towns to transparency and 
modernisation of enumeration; the 2011 census thus revealed not extraordinary 
urbanisation but the more modest success of updating already urbanised villages to 
the category of census towns. In this view, reclassification was long due – but for 
village groups preferring to be administered (and administer themselves) as rural 
rather than urban citizens, urbanisation’s extent would have shown up in earlier 
censuses. 
Yet there is enormous pressure to demonstrate rapid urbanisation – and not 
only because urbanisation signifies development. Reclassifying a village as part of a 
census town, while rendering its residents ineligible for government schemes specific 
to rural populations, is enabling in other realms. Reclassification equips 
administrations and the real estate sector with simplified templates for modifying 
land use. Malaiur is one of many villages now falling under the Madurai Composite 
Local Planning Authority. In 2014, nearby villages were added to those already under 
the Madurai Palkalai [University] Nagar New Town Development area. These 
reclassifications eased juridical and administrative procedures for realtors to gather 
and assemble land. When I returned to Malaiur in January 2015, the effect was visible 
in the form of new housing colonies.   
In Malaiur’s vicinity, I counted at least one marriage hall, some small 
industries and showrooms catering to the construction sector, and many more 
fenced properties containing little but earth, weeds, and hope. This hope rests on a 
speculation bubble created by the recent upgradation of a national highway, NH7, 
passing along Malaiur. Property owners and dealers hoped the bubble would swell, 
and for ribbon development along NH7 to further boost land prices. As construction 
of the new university branch commenced after the 2014 notification, the bubble only 
grew bigger.  
In 2008, only a tiny housing colony existed in Pechikudi, a neighbouring 
village. By 2015, there were many more houses. Substantial numbers of Malaiur 
families now live in Pechikudi, while other families have moved to already established 
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colonies nearby. They relocated to neighbourhoods near new roads bringing the city 
closer.   
These colonies and townships were established through the efforts of 
housing societies, land developers, revenue officials and other administrators, and 
local politicians and big-men. Some landless families I met in Malaiur and 
neighbouring villages in 2015 stated that local big-men had lobbied for their villages’ 
incorporation in the new or amended administrative areas. Thus, rapid urbanisation 
emerges from census activism as well as actions of the real estate sector, 
bureaucrats, and villagers. This reveals the real and the representational, and 
representations of space and spatial practices, converging in the transformation of 
Malaiur and its vicinity. Transformations are also visible in representational space. 
Urban aspirations are signalled by the Nagar (town) suffix to names of new colonies 
– Pasumpon Nagar, Maxworth Nagar, Malaiyan Nagar. These transformations draw 
from links between the locality’s dominant social groups, administrators, and real 
estate developers. Malaiur villagers and Madurai-based property dealers act in 
tandem with seemingly fortuitous events such as the NH7 upgradation (part II). 
Thus, Arumugam’s ūr now correlates with a kirāmam rather different from 
the one I knew through fieldwork. Although ūr’s open-endedness avowedly contrasts 
with kirāmam’s stability (Daniel 1984), kirāmam boundaries, the population 
administered in its territory, and its relation to other administrative and juridical 
territories are liable to change.  
As per the 2001 census, Malaiur’s population was about 3000. According to 
the 2011 census, its population fell to about 2650. It was not as though in those ten 
years, many had migrated out of Malaiur, or that many had died. Residents had not 
stopped marrying either. Marriages added new individuals – mostly women, given 
patrilocal arrangements – to existing population. Villagers had not stopped having 
children. That is, these statistics represent neither mass migration nor tectonic shifts 
in decennial birth and death rates. Malaiur kirāmam now simply consisted of fewer 
families in its jurisdiction. As I mentioned earlier, some village residents had shifted 
to Pechikudi or nearby residential colonies. In the same decade, Pechikudi’s 
population rose from just over one hundred to nearly one thousand.  
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Other kinds of rural-urban linkages need outlining. Unlike ūr, kirāmam only 
refers to rural territories; this probably correlates with the history of modern land 
tenure and revenue arrangements, and with colonial and postcolonial administrative 
differentiation between country and city. Yet space and social relations do not fully 
obey conceptual and administrative differentiation. This was obvious even in the 
modes by which state representatives conflated village history with a partial history 
of the ūr during the 2008 tourist Pongal.  
The January 2008 event complicates distinctions between ceremonial and 
commercial, and rural and urban. It also complicates the oeuvre and product 
distinction, a point Lefebvre (1991) makes in connection to the space and history of 
Venice. Cities like Madurai (and Venice) are both oeuvre and product. Modern 
tourism depends on Madurai-as-oeuvre but hastens the city’s annexation as product. 
Administrative pandering to the tourist impulse is part of the ‘art of rent’ (Harvey 
2002). Unsurprisingly, many Malaiur residents took pride in the event, which they 
referred to as the government festival or government Pongal, aracu viḻā or aracu 
poṅkal.  
The district administration and the panchayat, epitomisers of the kirāmam, 
had been well behaved towards the ūr, having gone as far as to organise the event 
one day before the ‘real’ Pongal began. Tourists were thought of as possible 
impediments to the ūr Pongal. There was a fear of tourism complicating the ritual 
reproduction of village as ūr. Moreover, since tourists are likely to be repelled by the 
conflicts that routinely attend ūr festivals, the ūr Pongal was seen as possible 
impediment to rural tourism. (Even during the staged pongal, organisers repeatedly 
reminded us that the ūr was hosting foreigners, and pleaded that we refrain from 
fighting, occupying the best seats, and so on). 
Why had the district administration chosen Malaiur? The then Collector of 
Madurai had stated that Malaiur was chosen as venue because of its history. The 
events he summarised as history – counting that Malaiur was the first village to have 
a girls’ school and the first to get a metalled road, nearly hundred years ago – are 
precisely those Kallar villagers recount to prove that Malaiur was first among equals, 
home to Kallarnatu’s bravest Kallar. They turned being first in a sequence – their 
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village was the first to see schools, roads, and so on – into a matter of pride and 
distinction. Being home to, or experiencing, something first, mutal, became a 
measure of firstness, mutalmai, a concept detailed later.  
The school, the road, and this version of history only constitute a partial 
history of Malaiur. All references by the event organisers were to twentieth-century 
history as perceived and represented by Malaiur’s dominant caste. It was also partial 
in the sense that twentieth-century history was collapsed to a single event. 
This was the notification of the Piramalai Kallar, under the CTA 1911, as a 
‘criminal tribe.’ This partial history mirrors contemporary Kallar memory. The most 
prevalent theme in Kallar collective memory, in narratives I heard in Malaiur and 
elsewhere in Madurai, related to this Act’s implementation. It was a brutal act, 
normalizing a state of exception, and severely restricted the mobility of all adult male 
Kallar.  
The CTA was repealed soon after independence. In the Tamil region, 
associations and political leaders from the social group now known as the 
Mukkulathor played an important role in agitating against the CTA. Mukkulathor is a 
modern supracaste, comprising of the Kallar, Maravar, and Agamudaiyar castes of 
southern Tamil Nadu. Mukkulathor castes now commemorate these efforts in a 
number of ways – by organising public meetings and the occasional university 
seminars, and erecting memorials of key figures in the anti-CTA agitations.  
Commemorative structures such as the statues of Muthuramalinga Thevar, 
an important Mukkulathor icon, have been key to contestations in southern Tamil 
Nadu, particularly between Dalit and Mukkulathor groups. A statue installed to 
commemorate Kallar subalternity vis-à-vis the late colonial state also expresses Kallar 
dominance vis-à-vis other social groups. Subordinate groups, in turn, act on the same 
statue to challenge Mukkulathor violence and dominance.  
By January 2015, a bronze statue of Muthuramalinga Thevar had emerged on 
the bund of Malaiur’s largest tank, although it had a shadowy presence as far as the 
local administration was concerned. Adjacent to it is a memorial commemorating 
Malaiur Kallar’s notification under CTA. Exactly how commemorative events and 
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monuments alter space rather than simply express social relations are taken up in 
part III. Its chapters elaborate on the constant circulation between administrative 
space and spaces of affect, between representations of space, representational 
spaces, and spatial practices. So far, I have illustrated this traffic by confining myself 
to village and city. It is now time to turn to nāṭu, a Tamil spatial concept I have already 
been using, and to provide a brief history of Kallarnatu.  
Nāṭu and Kallarnatu  
Scholars such as Mines and Yazgi (2010) argue that villages have become ‘lost 
objects’ in South Asian ethnography, especially as it is practiced in European and U.S. 
academia. If villages are in need of urgent resuscitation as frame, place, concept, and 
‘matter,’ other territories could likewise do with a rematerialisation. In the mid-
twentieth century, Dumont devoted as much (if not more) attention to another kind 
of territory, as he did to the village. I refer to Kallarnatu, the nāṭu where Piramalai 
Kallar have lived at least for four centuries. Regional histories of the peninsular south 
(contemporary south India) abound with such nāṭu – another of those polysemic, 
multireferential concepts for territories.   
For many centuries, nāṭu formations were an axis to agrarian territoriality in 
the Tamil region, especially in its fertile riverine belts (Stein 1977, 1980, Ludden 1986, 
1986). Nāṭu existed in centres and peripheries of competing, overlapping, and 
segmentary polities (e.g. Stein 1980) across the peninsular region, with each 
historical moment inflecting older territorial formations with new content and 
meaning (Ludden 2002: 246-48). For about three hundred years from the mid-
fourteenth century, the Vijayanagara Empire served as an umbrella regional polity, 
paradoxically provisioning more power to a number and variety of chieftains. Both 
overlords and lesser lordships – such as the Madurai Nayakas – adopted similar 
political, military, and entrepreneurial strategies to hold sway over domains. 
Agrarian expansionism heightened in dry lowland forests. New nāṭu emerged 
in the dry regions of contemporary southern Tamil Nadu. These expansionist drives 
involved the incorporation of ethnic communities such as Maravar and Kallar then 
living in these regions, and the settling of new migrant communities (Ludden 1986). 
One way of incorporating communities within the folds of segmentary polities was 
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through the provisioning of pāḷaiyakkārar (poligars in colonial-sprache) titles. This 
linked chiefs of smaller territories and overlords. Pāḷaiyakkārar provided tributes to 
overlords in the form of military services, while overlords often legitimised 
pāḷaiyakkārar territorial control via temples and irrigation network, by settling land, 
granting rights over land, crop, and other produce. 
The kāvalkārar institution was another means to stabilise rule. Recruited 
from different ethnicities, kāvalkārar provided kāval, protection to settlements, 
places of worship, fields, and trade and pilgrim routes. In the Madurai region, many 
kāvalkārar came from the Piramalai Kallar subcaste. Malaiur Kallar families provided 
kāval at a number of the city’s streets and localities until the late colonial period, and 
at the countryside for longer still.   
With the English East India Company becoming a significant regional 
presence, pāḷaiyakkārar and kāvalkārar were recast as predatory chiefs heading 
institutionalised extortion rackets. British colonial rule involved diverse tactics over 
modes and institutions for revenue extraction and for policing populations. 
Exigencies of rule led to alternating or co-existing tactics that upturned, transformed, 
or destroyed existing institutional networks and social relations. Colonial knowledge 
misapprehended the logic of sovereignty and patronage (Dirks 1987, 1989) in a 
region marked by, and recognising, historical contiguities between kingship and 
banditry (Shulman 1980a). But colonial administrators, ethnographers, travellers, 
and missionaries also collaborated with elite native groups to discover tradition. New 
frameworks for understanding subcontinental and regional history reconceived 
spatial and social relations. 
This was the context wherein new ideas of crime and criminology were 
annexed to older Tamil spatial and social distinctions, and many Mukkulathor 
subcastes were designated as criminal groups. In account after account, travellers, 
missionaries, administrators, and ethnographers conveniently glossed the Tamil 
word kaḷḷan (plural kaḷḷar), meaning thief, as evidence that Kallar subcastes were a 
‘traditional’ community of thieves or robbers (A. Pandian 2009: 4). Etymology 
excused itself as history. Generic words morphed into proof of castes’ ‘traditional 
occupations.’ By end-nineteenth-century, the colonial framing of Kallar kāvalkārar as 
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predators rather than protectors of the countryside had stabilised (A. Pandian 2009: 
79-80). 
Kallar groups argue that British colonial rulers designated them as criminal 
groups and repressed them only because they had ruled the region, especially their 
own nāṭu, as ‘independently’ and resisted colonial rule. Collective memory now 
recalls the early-twentieth-century CTA as but one episode in a long-drawn struggle 
over sovereignty. Piramalai Kallar claim to have resisted not only British colonialism 
but also the fourteenth century ‘Islamic invasion’ of Madurai by the Delhi Sultanate, 
and later Nayaka ‘intrusions.’ 
Despite claims of Kallar intractability and resistance to external polities, there 
is enough evidence to suggest intricate connections between non-Kallar rulers and 
Kallar groups. One kind of evidence is the built structures in this micro-region’s 
landscape, the temples, tanks, canals, and pilgrim and trade routes. Landscape itself 
hints at the historical networks between the Kallar community and regional polities. 
Evidence also exists in the form of land and labour relations in the region. 
Substantial numbers of Kallarnatu villages including Malaiur were inām lands, tax-
free lands gifted to priests and other service providers of the Madurai Meenakshi 
temple. Other dwellers (and not just Kallar) were granted land in return for services 
to the nearby Tirupparankunram Murugan temple. Tributary and redistributive 
arrangements, irrigation infrastructures, temples, and hereditary chieftainships 
reveal social relations and interconnections of a kind that would have to be erased 
from Kallar self-representations of uninterrupted sovereignty.  
Links between Madurai Nayakas and Kallarnatu is represented vividly in a 
copperplate inscription dating to the early-seventeenth-century reign of Tirumalai 
Nayaka (Dumont 1986). Metal whispers a historical secret that the contemporary 
project of Kallar memory would rather not hear, as caste members maintain that they 
have always fiercely guarded their territory and ruled it independently.  
In segmentary polities, it is difficult to gauge the exact nature and extent of 
relations between overlords and local lineages, families, and chieftains. Elsewhere, 
‘marginal’ communities played an important role, aiding overlords through military 
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services and by organising raids and cattle thefts during war (Ludden 1986, Mosse 
2003, Skaria 1999). Malaiur Kallar men admit as much, but say that it is their village 
that most harangued king and colonial ruler alike. They rest their claim by evoking 
Malaiur’s physical distance from Madurai city – utilising an element of abstract space 
for a battle over honour within Kallarnatu.  
Arumugam harboured little doubt that any anthropologist interested in 
Kallarnatu would be interested in his village. Malaiur may have been peripheral 
within Kallarnatu at the time of Dumont’s research. Non-Malaiur Kallar stressed its 
marginality through two counts. One, they highlighted that Malaiur does not have its 
own temple. Given the importance of temples to agrarian territoriality, this served 
as crucial evidence of Malaiur’s marginality. Two, they stated that Malaiur 
representatives did not receive mutalmai in Kallarnatu’s main temples.  
The word mutalmai – from mutal (first, best) – translates to primacy, 
superiority, or ‘firstness.’ In the Tamil region, mutalmai is an important mode 
through which an individual or group is distinguished or given mariyātai. The order 
in which persons are accorded mutalmai during temple festivals and rituals is an 
important measure of their social position. Malaiur representatives’ non-receipt of 
mutalmai in nāṭu festivals was thus proof of village marginality. 
The village as ūr was not internal to any of Kallarnatu’s eight nāṭu. It was not 
even one of Kallarnatu’s 24 upakirāmam. While Kallarnatu included other kinds of 
territorial units, the nāṭu and upakirāmam were its main territorial categories. The 
eight nāṭu, themselves ranked, were more central to Kallarnatu than its other 
territorial units were. According to Dumont, upakirāmam peripherality derives not 
so much from reduced population or area as from the ‘inferior status of their 
founders, the “younger” sons of headmen’ (1986: 164). Despite the inclination to 
subsume territoriality under kinship, he offers another tentative explanation – that 
Kallarnatu’s upakirāmam were ‘more recent settlement[s] separating out of the 
[eight nāṭu]’ that comprise the micro-region’s main type of territorial unit (ibid).  
Lately, some Madurai-based researchers have reinterpreted this territorial 
hierarchy. For example, Cuntaravantiyattēvan̲ (2011) dismisses the idea that 
territorial classification and ranking derived from miscegenation or from the ranking 
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of founders as senior or junior sons, suggesting instead that upakirāmam were 
gathered into the folds of Kallarnatu at later historical moments. The reinterpretation 
attempts to reduce such mutalmai fixations from affecting contemporary intra-Kallar 
relations. 
Such attempts are few and ineffective. Kallar individuals and associations 
continued to describe Kallarnatu as a territory of eight nāṭu and 24 upakirāmam. 
Disputes over mutalmai also spilled over from the time-space of their formal 
reckoning (at temple festivals, say) and re-emerged during mariyātai-focussed 
ordinary conversations. Malaiur Kallar routinely encountered taunts and gentle 
banter over their peripherality. 
Yet Malaiur’s contemporary importance overshoots its ‘traditional’ place in 
Kallarnatu. Its transformed status largely stems from residents’ employment in 
Madurai’s textile mills. Other recent spatial practices – the city’s sprawl in Malaiur’s 
direction, greater transport infrastructure, the rise of real property markets in the 
vicinity – have only boosted the economic mobility of Malaiur’s dominant families, 
and energised Malaiur’s claims to centrality in contemporary Kallarnatu. 
There are legends regarding the means by which Malaiur villagers challenged 
their previous peripherality. Routine clashes at temple festivals – as in the 
Moonusami temples at Kallarnatu’s Karumathur nāṭu – and the occasional murder 
are inevitable plot elements in most accounts of Malaiur Kallar propelling themselves 
to Kallarnatu’s centre and forcing others to acknowledge their ūr’s importance. 
Where changing the order of mutalmai at a ritual or festival proved difficult, Malaiur 
Kallar articulated their upward mobility through other methods such as sponsoring 
nightlong Special Drama performances during nāṭu temple festivals. 
Colonial and postcolonial history demonstrates a partial separation of religion 
and rule. Temples are no longer significant nodes in the redistribution of resources 
such as land, water, and labour but contemporary battles over temple honour prove 
that nāṭu continue to be of significance. Following historian David Ludden (2002), I 
can term Kallarnatu as a ‘spectre of an agrarian territory.’  
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Kallarnatu does not appear in Madurai’s official maps. In any case, since nāṭu are 
characterised by frontiers rather than boundaries, they are less amenable to modern 
cartographic conventions. Contemporary official maps outline national, state, 
district, and taluk borders, and evoke other elements of capitalist spatiality. These 
representations and territorialities are very different from precolonial space, polities, 
and spatial scales of periyanāṭu, nāṭu, and ūr (Stein 1977). Nevertheless, for the sake 
of readers accustomed to modern cartographic representations, I could say that 
Kallarnatu can be juxtaposed on portions of Usilampatti, Thirumangalam, and 
 
Map 2 Madurai district 
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Tirupparankunram or Madurai South (administrative and revenue blocks) in a 
contemporary map of Madurai (Map 2).  
Barring urban centres and new residential neighbourhoods, Kallarnatu 
continues to be a ‘single-caste’ settlement. Piramalai Kallar is still the locally 
dominant and largest caste. Inevitably, conflict in Kallarnatu is not only between 
Kallar and Dalit castes but also within the dominant Kallar caste. These internal 
conflicts and the range of individuals and families making a pitch for dominance are 
exemplified by the increase in caste associations. In agrarian production, and labour 
and land relations, we see as many (or more) contestations among Kallar as between 
Kallar and Dalits. This is as true of Kallarnatu as it is of Malaiur.  
Malaiur and its Residents 
Malaiur is today not the ūr that was gifted as an inām village to one of the priest 
families of the Madurai Meenakshi temple. For decades, land has been a commodity, 
agrarian labour has been remunerated mainly through money wages, and residents 
have diversified from agriculture. Yet commoditisation of land did not automatically 
result in the sale and purchase of Malaiur’s agricultural fields to non-villagers. In 
2008, some Malaiur residents could still comprehend the ‘original’ land distribution 
pattern along Kallar lineages. Changes to land ownership have been more noticeable 
since my first fieldwork period.  
Outsiders (people from outside the ūr) have purchased significant portions of 
Malaiur and neighbouring villages’ land. Realty, not agriculture, motivated these 
transfers. By January 2015, uncultivated tracts abutted new residential 
neighbourhoods, showrooms, and the occasional small- or medium-sized factories. 
With greater dispersal of the village’s families, there was further disjuncture between 
Malaiur as ūr and Malaiur as kirāmam.  
Yet ūr dispersal predates this round of urbanisation. Long-term employment-
related migration is more pronounced among, although not restricted to, the Kallar. 
Migrant families periodically reappeared at Malaiur. They participated in temple 
festivals and fulfilled personal vows made to household, lineage, or ūr deities. They 
invested in Malaiur land and contributed to temple- and house-(re)constructions. 
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During visits, they settled disputes and organised life-crisis rituals. Some visits to the 
conta ūr, native village, had no specific purpose. Migrants and residents mobilised 
and refreshed kinship ties during these visits. Migration signalled a connection 
between ūr dispersal and the pursuit of non-farm work outside Malaiur.  
Older dispersal of settlements emerged from agriculture. Malaiur consisted 
of a thickly populated main ūr, and a number of ottai vīṭu or ‘single house’ in its 
vicinity. To use a contemporary analogy, ottai vīṭu are like satellites of ūr. Villagers 
dated them to a distant past when farmland was parcelled out to certain Kallar sub-
lineages or families. The ottai vīṭu were established when such groups took to 
residing near their farms.  
Street and House Geography 
Where and how did Malaiur’s different social groups live in 2008? Firstly, as in other 
Tamil villages (Mosse 2012: 101-6), there was a ‘caste geography’ to Malaiur’s streets 
and settlement pattern. Kallar residents represent the ūr as a lineage geography, 
saying the main ūr still exhibits a division of village space according to Kallar lineages. 
They usually refer to their five lineages not by the names of ancestors but by the 
names of the village’s main streets. Four of these streets are named, after the four 
main directions, as the east, west, north, and south streets, while the fifth is known 
as the middle street. This was Malaiur as a Kallar-generated representational space. 
Kallar lineages suffuse the ūr and its streets, and permeate spatial orientations and 
directions. Kallar narratives of Malaiur’s origin also forward this representational 
space. 
The lineages are traced back to five brothers. Kallar individuals say that no 
one knows where exactly these brothers were born or when they existed. They were 
simply born ‘somewhere [else],’ and lived many years ago. Here is a gist of their story, 
which doubles up as Malaiur’s origin story: 
The brothers part ways while still young and head out in different 
directions to search for food and work. By chance, all five meet some 
years later in Tenur, a village in Malaiur’s vicinity. In Tenur, a Pillaimar 
woman adopts the five brothers. She was already sheltering the 
middle brother, as though he was her own son. The brothers settle in 
Tenur. They marry and have children. Their children have children. 
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Over time, there are so many descendants that Tenur can no longer 
contain them. This is a time when Malaiur does not even exist. It only 
comes into being after the five brothers’ descendants move out of 
Tenur and resettle in a neighbouring area. This place becomes the ūr 
known as Malaiur.  
These five Kallar lineages now form Malaiur’s largest group. Yet Malaiur’s Kallar 
population, although synonymous with these five lineages, includes some affinal 
Kallar households. These affines are said to be recent settlers who moved to Malaiur 
in search of livelihood.  
Dominant social groups often serve as metonyms of their village. As spatial 
practice, however, Malaiur’s residential pattern was more complex than Kallar 
representational space posited it to be. Malaiur also consisted of many other castes. 
There was a sizable number of Konar (‘shepherd’) families, some Agamudaiyar 
(another Mukkulathor caste, here known by their honorific title ‘Servai’) families, 
fewer families of Asari subcastes (blacksmiths, carpenters), one Vannan (washerman) 
family, and a good number of Pallar and Chakkiliyar (Dalit castes) families.  
The larger castes subdivided into lineages existing within Malaiur, each lineage 
having its own shrines, festivals, and ‘head’ families. Some of Malaiur’s smaller castes 
likewise divided into intra-village lineages. Vannan, Asari, and some other castes 
were so small that their lineages exhibited an inter-village rather than intra-village 
orientation. 
Malaiur’s most subordinate caste group is the Chakkiliyar (or Arundhatiyar). 
We can follow existing analysis (Dirks 1987: 269) to say that Malaiur Chakkiliyar 
internal structure ‘replicated’ that of Malaiur Kallar. Chakkiliyar are divided into 
exactly the same number of lineages as Kallar. Malaiur Chakkiliyar usually refer to 
their lineages as the first, second, middle, fourth, and last. They too retrace 
themselves to Tenur. Malaiur Kallar termed Tenur their ‘mother village.’ Malaiur 
Chakkiliyar termed Tenur Chakkiliyar their elder brother. Kallar residents were proud 
of having wrenched mutalmai from Tenur. But Chakkiliyar residents observed their 
own goddess festivals only after Tenur Chakkiliyar announced and celebrated theirs. 
The deferral of festivals was in deference to Tenur Chakkiliyar.   
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Secondly, closer attention revealed a somewhat multi-caste composition to 
Malaiur’s central, most accessible, streets. These were the streets near the village 
bus stop, main tank, panchayat and other government buildings, and important ūr 
temples. Kallar, Pallar, Agamudaiyar, and Asari houses abutted one other. Atypically, 
some Malaiur Pallar families lived in central locations. One Pallar house in fact 
doubled up as the village post office. Some Pallar houses neighboured Kallar houses 
on by-lanes emanating from the embankment of Malaiur’s main tank. Here, ancestral 
and household shrines of both castes were likewise dispersed.  
Surprised, I enquired about these streets’ multi-caste composition. Some 
Kallar residents believed that these Pallar families had only recently shifted to their 
current locations, and that it was a deviation from the original parcelling out of 
Malaiur to Kallar lineages. However, I once heard, while sitting on the porch of her 
house, thirty-eight-year-old Pallar woman Muniamma’s reverse explanation. 
Pointing to the ‘amman’ or goddess shrine located within the compound, Muniamma 
first referred to its importance in ūr rituals. She also stated that it was one of the ūr’s 
oldest shrines. Only then, once she had outlined our surroundings as sacred 
geography, did Muniamma assert that Malaiur’s original inhabitants were Pallar, and 
not Kallar.  
Sacred and human geographies repeatedly intertwine (chapter 2). We must 
note at least two points in this regard. One, a village could have as many origin stories 
as social groups (castes, lineages, and households). Two, similar origin narratives 
could be utilised for dissimilar assertions. Kallar origin stories fixed Malaiur as though 
their ancestors’ movement determined its settlement. On rare occasions, some 
Kallar individuals echoed Pallar versions of Malaiur’s past. Weeks after I heard 
Muniamma’s assertion, I asked Arumugam about caste-housing patterns. 
Surprisingly, he said that Pallar houses perhaps existed in Malaiur long before Kallar 
moved in from Tenur. Arumugam also thought that Kallar ancestors had only wrested 
control over an existing settlement and turned it into the ūr as it now exist. Thus, 
origin narratives gloss either primordiality (in Muniamma’s assertion that Pallar were 
Malaiur’s original inhabitants) or variability (in Arumugam’s rare concession) in 
village settlement.  
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Let me return to Malaiur’s streets and castes. Konar families were similarly 
dispersed. In the main streets, Konar houses neighboured Kallar and Agamudaiyar 
houses. Significant numbers of Konar lived outside the main ūr, near an ottai vīṭu. 
The largest bunching up of Konar houses was in one main ūr street. Here, in a Kallar 
dominated street, about twenty Konar families lived within a compound, which also 
housed their ancestral shrine. This street also included Agamudaiyar houses, some 
likewise bunched up within compounds.  
There was a marked spatial segregation with respect to one Malaiur caste. 
This is the third aspect of Malaiur’s street and house geography. It reveals Malaiur’s 
street geography to be only partially ‘mixed-caste.’ Chakkiliyar lived near Malaiur’s 
bus stop, temples, and government buildings. But they were more or less segregated. 
In 2008, most Chakkiliyar lived in a newly established ‘colony.’ The street 
immediately west of this colony still housed some Chakkiliyar families, deities, and 
public spaces. The new colony consisted of houses constructed through a state 
housing scheme that avowed to improve the rural poor’s living conditions, only to 
‘creat[e] anew the spatial segregation of the “untouchable (dalit) colony” that is 
stereotypic of Tamil villages’ (Mosse 2012: 105).  
Agricultural Land and Labour  
Kallar residents held most of Malaiur’s land until recently. Some Kallar families and a 
handful of Pallar families also owned irrigated or ‘nanjai’ land in Tenur, where they 
cultivated paddy and cash crops such as bananas. It was difficult for me to trace 
actual household land holdings as these were scattered across Malaiur and 
surrounding villages.  
The original settlement register of Malaiur revenue village recorded 120 
holdings, inclusive of government land. The updated register from 1987 reveals 
further divisions of these holdings. When I succeeded in accessing the register, there 
were 1312 jointly- or individually-owned holdings. Most holdings ranged from 0.08 
to 0.14 hectare. Only two or three Kallar families owned about three acres (1.21 
hectares). Their total holdings included non-agricultural land in Malaiur and Tenur, 
and plots in nearby urban(ising) localities.  
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The fragmentation of landholdings is one factor to villagers taking up non-
agrarian work. One early-twentieth-century document illustrates villagers and 
colonial administrators mentioning agriculture’s inability to sustain Malaiur’s 
population. The colonial sociology of ‘Kallar criminality’ briefly (and partially) 
appeared in this document as an agrarian question. It suggested that these 
individuals and groups might be taking to crime because agriculture could not 
support them. The framing of Piramalai Kallar criminality as an agrarian question was 
to recede after Malaiur’s notification under the CTA.  
This document dates back to the 1910s, and is a note on the Malaiur Kallar, 
signed by Madurai’s District Superintendent of Police. The note was prepared before, 
and in preparation for, Malaiur’s notification. It referred to a recent survey of 
Malaiur.8 According to the survey, there were about 210 families in Malaiur. (Most 
were likely to be Kallar families). Out of a total adult male population of 321, only five 
were landless. The rest held about 265 acres of wet land and about 185 acres of dry 
land.  
This document suggests that, already in the 1910s, Malaiur could not solely 
depend on agriculture. A hundred years since, dependence on agriculture has further 
reduced. By 2008, there were over 725 households of different castes in Malaiur. 
Many individuals have shifted away from cultivation or agrarian labour.   
Malaiur’s landless agricultural labourers were mostly Kallar, Konar, and 
Arundhatiyar. Landless agricultural workers classified themselvess as coolie (kūli) or 
daily wage (aṟṟaikūli) workers, and contrasted themselves to cultivators whose were 
classified as camucāri (farmer, householder, married person).  
Most male non-Kallar labourers were Arundhatiyar, while female labourers 
were from all of Malaiur’s castes. A single-crop paddy grown in some fields depended 
mostly on Arundhatiyar labour. Paddy cultivators organised labour cultivation by 
paying an Arundhatiyar headman, who brought along about ten or fifteen 
Arundhatiyar to the fields when labour requirement was high.  
                                                     
8 Note on the “Malaiur” Kallas by Mr H.G. Clinch, District Superintendent of Police, Madura, 
14.03.1914. 
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For horticulture, labourers were recruited and paid daily. In 2008, women’s 
wages was Rs 50 for a full day’s work and Rs 30 for half a day’s work. This was only 
half of men’s daily wages. Since farming involved gender-segregated tasks, both 
women and men participated in the day-to-day labour negotiations between 
landholding families and landless labourers. Farming involved gender-segregated 
tasks. Women of land-owning or tenant families recruited women labourers for the 
next day in the field, or later in the evening by going in person or sending word 
through their children to the homes of potential workers. Men of cultivating families 
did likewise for male tasks. Cultivating families referred to this daily recruitment of 
waged labour through the typical statement that ‘anyone can work for anyone.’ 
Usury and indebtedness, however, complicates this picture of free labour. 
Occupational Diversification 
Most families across castes recall a not so distant past, when everyone was involved 
in agrarian production. Agrarian festivals, and modes of representing caste relations 
through this realm, continue to be important. In 2008, I could see significant 
occupational differentiation in Malaiur. In the 1970s, a number of Kallar men had 
found employment in textile mills either located at Madurai city or peppering the 
countryside closer to Malaiur.  
With the closure or downsizing of mills, most of these men had lost their jobs 
by 2008. More recently, jobbers recruited young, unmarried women across castes 
and sent them to out-of-town textile mills and garment production sweatshops. 
These women worked there for months and accumulated a small fund of wages, 
which was released only at the termination of their ‘contract.’  
In August 2008, when it was almost time for me to leave, the much-awaited 
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MNREGS, 
henceforth NREGS) finally materialised in Malaiur (chapter 4). The NREGS was a state 
generated ‘guarantee’ of rural employment. It was a workfare scheme rather than 
the welfare scheme it was touted to be. Initially, NREGS provided some of Malaiur’s 
poor a patchy source of income and entitlements. Its first set of workers consisted of 
women across caste and age groups, and mostly elderly Chakkiliyar men. During later 
visits, I saw that the NREGS was more woven into the fabric of village life and rhythm.  
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Initially, the ūr handled this sudden outflow of labour from agriculture 
through arrangements with kirāmam officials and others appointed to supervise the 
scheme. One evening in early-January 2009, I met a group of women from landless 
Kallar, Pallar and Konar families by a public drinking-water supply tap. These women 
informed me that cultivator families had met and decided a few weeks earlier to stop 
NREGS work since they needed labour for the paddy harvest. 
By January 2015, even women from small landholding families had entered 
the muster rolls and were spending hours at NREGS worksites. This was a result of 
diminishing real farm income for small farmers – or income depletion, in the words 
of Vaidehi, a young Kallar woman from a family that held and cultivated 0.09 ha. But 
this was modifying cultivation’s diurnal rhythm in Malaiur. In that short visit, I saw 
women scurrying between stoves, wholesale vegetable markets, NREGS worksites, 
farms, and water supply taps, desperately manoeuvring time, space, and rhythms to 
meet routine tasks.  
In 2008, a national-level construction boom provisioned Malaiur’s single-
largest non-agrarian employment opportunity. Unlike in neighbouring villages, only 
men from Malaiur worked in the construction sector. They were recruited from 
different castes by Malaiur contractors-cum-workers. Male construction workers 
denoted themselves and their contractor with a single term, kottaṉār. Contractors 
worked alongside, instead of merely supervising, their village- or caste-brethren. 
These contractors temporarily held in place the village, caste, and kin networks to 
recruit construction workers. But significant numbers of Malaiur’s construction 
workers preferred to find work through daily labour markets.  
Other villagers went to other ‘unskilled’ labour markets, searching for work 
as loaders, carters, and so on. Some simply purchased commodities from wholesale 
markets each morning and hawked these wares in urban neighbourhoods. A few 
Malaiur residents had also obtained coveted public sector jobs, and served as 
teachers, policemen, or panchayat officials. Some families derived additional 
incomes through public works contracts, fixing-and-dealing, and usury. Dominant 
families recently entered the real estate sector. Individuals from other families now 
serve at the sector’s lower end. 
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I have described a village not altogether agrarian even though agriculture 
continues to be an important source of livelihood. Agriculture also frames the pool 
of symbols, idioms, and representations. This is characteristic of a region where 
farming has existed ‘in a land of emotion’ (Ludden 1999: 60). Millwork, usury, and 
real estate likewise exist in a land of emotion. The processes, institutions, people, 
and places constituting these sectors also partake in representations and practices 
involving ‘gods, poetry, ritual, architecture, outsiders, frontiers, myths, borderlands, 
landmarks, and families’ (ibid). It was Malaiur’s mill workers who spearheaded the 
demand that Kallarnatu recognises their village’s changing status. Until early-2010s, 
Malaiur workers’ associations of different mills had sponsored Special Drama 
performances during important ūr and nāṭu temple festivals. The sponsorship had 
continued for some years after mill workers lost their jobs. 
Modes of ‘Knowing’ Space and Social Relations 
Another kind of task has cropped up in Malaiur. It concerns the traffic between desks 
and fields, people and paper, and realities and representations. As more and more 
journalists, novelists, and academics become interested in village and region, some 
residents gain importance as Malaiur’s ‘learned folk.’ Were I literally to consider 
Malaiur as a ‘little republic,’ how would I designate these learned men? For nomadic 
researchers, they would no doubt be Malaiur’s Public Relations Officer, Under 
Secretary of Narratives, Memories and Myths, and Liaison Officer.  
Many of these men held cultivable land. Arumugam, along with his wife Jyothi 
and waged labourers, farmed vegetables out of his share of land inherited from his 
father. (He had three brothers). He occasionally performed (informal) panchayat 
duties, settling marital, moneylending, and property disputes.  
Why note the obvious, that individuals engage in multiple tasks? It cautions 
us, when aggregating and characterising social groups, against turning somewhat 
fluid processes into permanent truths. In rural anthropology, a typical aggregation is 
generated through household surveys. 
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Absent Tables, Attendant Relations 
Between June and September 2008, I thrice undertook a survey of Malaiur 
households. My questionnaire covered everything from household composition, 
property, occupation, and incomes, to caste and lineage affiliations. My survey also 
attempted to identify marriage circles. Despite the time spent on surveying, I cannot 
confidently represent my survey results in a manner that can serve as numerical 
shorthand for Malaiur and its residents.  
Perhaps my failure to generate a village-level ‘avalanche of numbers’ stems 
from the astuteness of individuals who knew that surveys could ‘make them up’ 
(Hacking 2002: 100). Responses to my surveys contained villagers’ experiences of 
numerous other surveys and censuses. Censuses and surveys are well recognised as 
practices that create, rather than simply report the existence of, social groups. They 
create new classifications while tabulating present ones. I shall illustrate the twinning 
of realities and representations through religious identities in Malaiur.   
When I ‘arrived’ in Malaiur, this twinning was visible in some residents’ 
characterisation of village population. Only hours prior to Arumugam’s ‘why us,’ I had 
met Sachin, a young Kallar man originally from Malaiur. A new recruit in the police 
force, Sachin resided elsewhere and was visiting his ūr for the tourist Pongal. Sachin 
welcomed me with the manner of someone expecting researchers to land up in his 
ūr. He said, ‘Oh, yes. Malaiur is an important ūr… These British [wanted] to somehow 
reform us, this ūr Thevamar.’ (Thevar is an honorific title of Piramalai Kallar and some 
other Mukkulathor subcastes. Thevamar denotes the Thevar people).  
I probably mimicked other anthropologists (e.g. Mines 2005) when I promptly 
asked Sachin who else stayed in Malaiur. In turn, Sachin’s response reverberated with 
responses other anthropologists have received to this query. Sachin replied, ‘Ahm… 
Majority Kallar… Then, Konars… And SCs.’ He added, ‘But one thing. You will not find 
a single Christian or Muslim. If anyone else tries to enter our ūr, we drive him away. 
There is no place for anyone else.’  
Sachin signalled the recent rise of Hindutva forces and the inroads made by 
belligerent Hindu nationalist groups in this region. Fluid religious identities are 
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thought to have characterised south India until recent decades (Mosse 2012). 
Historians (e.g. Bayly 1989) have outlined narratives, practices, and cults suggestive 
of long-drawn processes wherein many marginal communities gained upward 
mobility through Christianity and Islam. 
Religious identities may be broached via their links with caste identities. This 
approach provides additional proof and purchase of the worn-out yet valid lens of 
intersectionality, while instantiating connections between governmental and social 
practices, and the representational and the material. Official enumerations of India’s 
Christian population are underestimations. This underestimation, scholars of 
Christianity remark, stems from ‘the fact that the declaration of Christian identity 
bars certain categories of converts from state welfare and protections as Scheduled 
Castes’ (Mosse 2012: 285). Malaiur’s Christian Dalits probably passed themselves as 
‘Hindus’ during my surveys because state policies streamline their responses. This 
does not fully explain why Malaiur Christians conceal their religious identities and 
practices.  
Before exploring this, I shall elaborate another process at work in surveys. My 
interlocutors treated my surveys as opportunities to refashion themselves. They said 
one thing but asked me to note down something else. Part of my survey tabulated 
what I already knew, say, the extant of households. Yet respondents strictly regulated 
my entries over what was public knowledge. They asked me to count individuals or 
entire sub-units permanently residing outside Malaiur. Deceased family members 
occasionally haunted my schedules. Elderly residents inflated their age, hoping this 
would help them access some welfare scheme. Some respondents refused to count 
spouses because of domestic disputes, or name ‘native village’ if they had failed to 
secure livelihood there. Others attributed to themselves occupations starkly 
different from current ones.  
Their intention was not always to fool me. They probably hoped these 
surveyor-surveyed collusions would forge a realisation of needs and desires. The very 
objects of paper and pen rendered my survey an official activity. Even residents who 
had interacted with me for months began to see me anew. Field’s repositioning of 
fieldworker had less to do with the degree of familiarity between ethnographer and 
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interlocutor and more to do with people’s familiarity with survey, its hints of state 
and non-state practices.  
An additional complication was the NH7 upgradation and resultant land-
related activities in and near Malaiur. Speculation, land transfer, and related tactics 
of persuasions and evasions (see part II) co-produced my methods. NH7 built itself 
into my research process, directing the routes along which my survey exercises could 
proceed. The absence of tables precisely representing my survey results is, then, not 
simply emblematic of my limitations. It testifies to relations and processes in my field. 
I had to contend with the heightened caginess of people who had enough reasons to 
evade land-related queries. 
I nonetheless refer to these household surveys, because the ‘excess’ of these 
exercises cues my research themes. Absent tables reappear, in the following pages, 
as ethnographic incidents. What this thesis loses in terms of group aggregates and 
numerical expressions of individuals’ and social units’ characteristics, it earns back – 
by a meta- or para- ethnographic approach – as insights into the ‘systems of 
relationship’ (Leach 1967: 77) that are visible during all surveys.  
Malaiur residents took my surveys to be a complete waste of time. They 
suggested I engineer numbers, if numbers were crucial to my passing myself as a 
researcher. One Kallar teenager, however, wanted to borrow my survey results and 
pass them to her teacher. Swetha attended the government-run school in Malaiur. A 
teacher had ordered Swetha to fix a length of statistics about Malaiur. For days, 
Swetha nagged me to produce and share a statistical table. Had I the requisite 
confidence in my surveys, I would have supplied both Swetha and this thesis with 
these statistics.  
Swetha had only nagged me because her teacher had harangued her. The 
teacher had badgered Swetha because data collection further burdened her. Such 
requests for data were routinely and openly made. Villagers sympathised with 
schoolteachers and their double duties. In any case, they argued, if a journalist or 
ethnographer could request narratives, why could a data collector not request some 
numbers?  
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In Malaiur, numbers had not acquired absolute purchase. Statistical data was 
only one element of truth regimes. It was not uncommon for key villagers to 
collaborate with surveyors, and fabricate, summarise, or render anecdotal, statistics. 
My survey respondents wondered why I was not adopting these modes. I could not 
outsource the work of surveying even though my fieldwork time was limited. Perhaps 
I was too much of an anthropologist to be efficient as a surveyor, while not lacking in 
the ambition to be both.   
To gather the threads of this discussion – relationality of places, importance 
of history and process, and ways of knowing and representing – let me return to 
religious identities in Malaiur. In my initial weeks in Malaiur, as also later, significant 
numbers of Kallar residents echoed Sachin’s views – that Malaiur was a decidedly 
Hindu space. How valid were these claims?  
Some Kallar residents attributed Malaiur’s fierceness and essence (ūr kuṇam) 
to the avowed absence of Christians. Here is a summary of their claims. ‘Because we 
were fearless and fierce, we could not be bound (kaṭṭuppāṭu) by the white man. Since 
the white man could not defeat us, no missionaries could enter our ūr.’ Their 
narratives emplotted an undifferentiated ‘white man’s time,’ interchanged colonial 
rulers and Christian missionaries, and expressed caste, place, and religion in terms of 
kuṇam or essence. Kallar kuṇam was characterised as ‘independent’ spirit and valour. 
It emerged in a register that accounted for all historical events and processes as just 
so many revelations of Kallar refusal to pay taxes or accept the authority of overlords. 
Their fashioning of a ‘Christian kuṇam’ then allowed for the effacing of historical 
processes hindering these imaginaries.  
This might be a local enunciation of the widespread view that Christianity in 
India had its roots in colonial history. Malaiur villagers were perhaps forwarding this 
view when they recast Christianity, mission work, and colonialism’s relations through 
their talk of a Christian ‘collaborationist’ kuṇam. Malaiur Kallar utilise this view to 
contest certain claims about Kallar in Perungamanallur, another Kallarnatu village 
(chapter 5).  
As Malaiur and Perungamanallur Kallar, and different political formations, 
compete over whom to denote as the truest representatives of Kallar essence, and 
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whom to identify as the most valiant rebels against the colonial state, religious 
identities and their imaginings returned in a peculiar manner to caste identities. 
Malaiur Kallar contested Perungamanallur’s claim of epitomising Kallar kuṇam. One 
evidence of Malaiur being the place of true Kallar essence was the absence of 
Christians in this village, contrasting this to the ‘intrusion’ of Christians and 
missionaries in Perungamanallur. In a circular fashion, the absence both signifies 
Malaiur’s fierceness, and ensures an unbroken dissemination of this quality.  
The claim that Malaiur is devoid of non-Hindus was questionable. I realised 
that this regularly stated opinion made it difficult for the few Christian residents to 
express their faith publicly. Inside homes, the hesitancy lessened somewhat. I was 
still unable to enumerate religious groups in Malaiur. In any case, religion is also 
expressed as orientations rather than fixed identities. A Kallar woman at Malaiur’s 
southern limits said some of her children ‘liked’ Christianity. A Pallar woman living 
near the village centre said one of her four sons and all three daughters were a ‘set’ 
now. She spoke of their ‘liking’ for Jesus (Yēcu cāmi), not the adoption of another 
religious identity.  
But late one afternoon in mid-2008, Muthupillai’s otherwise silent house was 
enlivened by the presence of many visitors. Born in Malaiur, Muthu, a Pallar woman, 
had married a man from a village almost 25 kilometres away. In 2002, she returned 
to Malaiur with her husband. They had had to sell her parents’ land to meet health 
bills and began working in other villagers’ fields. Muthu now lived alone. She was 
often ill and unable to work. That day, the streets and houses surrounding Muthu’s 
house reverberated with songs broadcast over powerful speakers.  
Cinema, folk, and devotional songs defined the aural landscapes of Tamil 
villages (and cities). What was unusual was that the speakers installed in Muthu’s 
house were broadcasting Christian devotional songs. I was in the vicinity and caught 
the discussion in nearby streets. Much of the discussion took place in the thirty 
centimetre voices women used while gossiping. These were voices outside of my 
hearing range on normal days let alone on days swinging by a set of loudspeakers. I 
could catch the refrain – ‘Look, look, what she is up to now,’ or a ‘How [she] does all 
this.’  
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For an hour, I visited houses in the vicinity. I did not want to seem too eager. 
I thought the subterfuge necessary. Some villagers regularly asked me whether I 
were Christian (which, in their opinion, was a very bad thing). I finally stopped by at 
Muthu’s house. There were rows of chairs in the front room. There were over fifteen, 
very energetic people. I asked Muthu whether they were her relatives. No, they were 
guests, she said. Muthu probably wanted to avoid mentioning that they were fellow 
members of a church she had recently started visiting. (While the loudspeakers 
announced a new assertion, Muthu seemed diffident). 
Muthu’s church was relatively new but there were other churches in urban 
localities near the highway. When one of these churches installed a cross brightly lit 
in red, I noticed the disquiet in my fellow bus travellers. Ravi, who was going to a 
clinic on the highway, even stood up to see it. This ‘wickedness’ (akkiraram) was 
noted by some of the men that night and was conversational topic for a few days. 
Churches were frequently termed as new practices in the neighbourhood, although 
Christianity predates these new churches by years.9 
When Malaiur was recreated as Hindu space, the emphasis fell on Christianity 
rather than Islam. Other political projects – geopolitical and Hindu nationalist – 
targeting Muslims had also converged in Malaiur. Dumont could write of Kallar 
accounts that linked caste with Islam and Muslims. I could not. On my first visit, one 
of my companions was a college student whose family had moved out Malaiur. He 
stopped to point out the letterings on a grilled archway to a tiny street clustering the 
houses of one Kallar sub-lineage. The lettering spelled out on this archway to a 
lineage shrine was ‘Mammuthu Thevar.’ Lest its significance went unnoticed, I was 
told that Mammuthu is the Tamil rendering of ‘Mohammed.’ Actually, the one who 
was most shocked was a young Kallar boy who lived in that street. This boy 
immediately asked, ‘Mammuthu…is a Muslim name?’  
                                                     
9 Catholic presence at a nearby village is traceable to the seventeenth century. See 
http://maduraiarchdiocese.weebly.com/nagamalai-pudukottai.html for a description of this village as 
‘an ancient Christian center frequented by Jesuit Missionary Robert de Nobili.’  
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I waited some weeks before broaching the subject. Some villagers said all they 
knew was that Mammuthu was an ancestor. One individual responded differently. 
Arumugam (brusque, wary): Why do you all ask this question?  
Dhivya (almost sure whom he had in mind): Who is all? 
Arumugam: Amerikākāri [American woman]. 
This was a US-based anthropologist Arumugam had recently met. She figured 
in our conversations occasionally. Arumugam named a string of researchers who had 
asked him about Mammuthu Thevar, wanted to why an ottai vīṭu of a nearby 
Kallarnatu village was called the Allah ottai vīṭu, and asked why practices such as the 
circumcision of Kallar boys had become infrequent. (I did say he was a Liaison Officer 
between Malaiur and its researchers).  
Dhivya (undeterred): The name Mammuttu? 
Arumugam: It is not Mammuttu. The chap who made the grill misspelt the name. It 
is actually Mā Im Muthu Thevar.  
It was an ingenious response. He had had time to think of it, what with the pesky 
āyvāḷar (researchers) and their predictable queries.  
Conclusion 
This chapter took us through Tamil spatial categories ūr, kirāmam, and nāṭu. It 
elaborated the history of Kallarnatu and the broader region in which it exists. It 
introduced Malaiur’s castes, settlement patterns, land and labour relations, and 
residents’ main occupations. It positioned Malaiur village, Kallarnatu micro-region, 
and Madurai city in a relational geography. By the end of the next chapter, part I shall 
have fulfilled its remit – explaining what a field-site is, and doing so in a manner 
faithful to ethnography’s double location.  
While ethnographers ‘yield to the flow of events and ideas which present 
themselves’ in the field (Strathern 1999: 2), the field yields to the presence of 
ethnographers, surveyors, and reporters. Trends towards ‘objectification and self-
reflection’ are present in both field and academia, and conjoin in the anthropological 
project (Rabinow 1977: 119). As Rabinow argues, ‘the data we [as anthropologists] 
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collect is doubly mediated, first by our own presence and then by the second-order 
self-reflection we demand from our informants’ (ibid).  
The reach, nature, and frequency of field research and representation, 
censuses and surveys, and interviews and conversations are such as to affect both 
ethnographers and interlocutors. The narratives interlocutors provide ethnographers 
are partially fashioned out of their brush with government, media, and academic 
techniques of knowing, reporting, and reflecting. Thus, the second-order self-
reflection that anthropologists access in the field emerges from their interlocutors’ 
interactions with other institutions, practices, and actors. 
This chapter scanned the networks cutting across desks and fields. By linking 
ethnographic surveys with other enumerative practices, it captured researchers and 
residents lugging around the weight of desks as they produce living texts. Elements 
of such collaborative knowing link up in a manner similar to associations of lived, 
conceived, and perceived space. Knowledge production and the production of space 
– both involve objects and humans. The next chapter twists the analytical lens onto 
another aspect of their co-production in Malaiur, and takes in place-self relations, 
landscapes, and imaginaries.
CHAPTER 2 ‘IT IS THAT SORT OF AN 
ŪR:’ NARRATIVES OF CASTE AND 
PLACE 
Tamil speakers are likely to ask strangers, ‘What is your ūr?’ Does this indicate a 
peculiarly Tamil drive to orient everyone in place? Alternatively, does this signal ‘the 
nature of the human subject who is oriented and situated in place,’ and disclose that 
these Tamils simply illustrate the ‘geographical selves’ existing across cultures (Casey 
2001: 683)? To meet these inquiries, we must acknowledge that while emplacement 
may be universal, the way we orient ourselves to place differ.  
South Asian scholarship highlights regional trajectories to orientations of 
body and self to space. This calls for refreshing our previous discussion of Tamil 
spatial categories. Valentine Daniel understands the person-centric definition of 
space – encapsulated in the spatial categories ūr and nāṭu – as flowing from ‘the 
person-centric orientation of Hindu culture’ (1984: 70).1 Other anthropologists of 
south India have pointed to the ‘geographical placement’ through which a ‘person’s 
(caste) identity’ is known (Mosse 2012: 99).  
I begin by stressing the closeness of caste and place. The first section 
examines the collapse of place- and caste- identities. For the strategy of 
emplacement to be effective, places themselves need to have meaning. Places are 
partly constructed or imagined through local knowledges, which take ‘dwelling’ to be 
‘not just living in place but also encompass[ing] ways of fusing setting to situation, 
locality to life-world’ (Feld and Basso 1996: 8). The meanings or senses of place shape 
that place’s singularity.  
                                                     
1 He writes that this ‘person-specific view of reality is… in keeping with the Hindu’s underlying 
understanding of substance and the rules for its proper mixing’ (1984: 71). He reads the ūr-person 
relation as a search for compatibility, a search mediated by such variables as soil type, strategies 
persons and castes employ in their transactions with ūr, and the dispositions and qualities of both ūr 
and persons/castes (ibid: 85, 89-90).  
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Some scholars understand singularities as accretions over time. Geographer 
Yi-Fu Tuan writes, ‘places, like human beings, acquire unique signatures in the course 
of time’ (1979: 409). In my fieldwork region, this signature becomes legible through 
the lens of kuṇam (Sanskrit guṇ). The Tamil Lexicon translates kuṇam as attribute, 
property, quality, character, or fundamental quality. I take up kuṇam’s link with 
history in the second section. This section focuses on Malaiur but examines it as a 
place where processes operationalised across spatial scales merge. I then assess the 
operations of history or process in the making of caste kuṇam. 
Both places and people possess kuṇam. Tamil speakers regularly evoke 
kuṇam through and alongside caste. To put this differently, they express caste 
relations through many paradigms and idioms, one of which is kuṇam. The concept 
of kuṇam has been analysed within an ethnosociological framework (Daniel 1984, 
Marriott 1990, Osella and Osella 2000). Fencing scholarship around emic theories of 
biology, chemistry, physics, and cosmology, this approach has ploughed 
interpretations with the favoured concepts of substance, code, transactions, and 
exchange. There is another way to ask how people and places come to possess their 
kuṇam. Malaiur residents provided the clearest, impromptu enunciations of kuṇam 
when narrating histories of place and caste.  
McKim Marriott and Ronald Inden (1977), pioneers of the ethnosociological 
view of India, had a particular kind of flow in their mind, when they spoke of the 
‘dividual’ person in Hindu society. Rejecting the universality of Western 
conceptualisations of the individual, Marriott stressed ‘the “dividuality” of the 
person in the flow of social relationships’ (1976: 190). The ideas these writers identify 
– much like the substance they write about – flow rather seamlessly from the 
fountainhead of Vedic monism, mix in various contexts (ritual and everyday) and 
emerge in various proportions as thought-pools within contemporary Hindu heads 
and beliefs.  
While ethnosociology sought to correct Dumontian structuralism by 
emphasising caste’s processual and fluid nature, both approaches stood united in 
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assuming civilizational unity and making short shrift of historical processes.2 Yet 
ethnosociologists (Marriott 1990) considered this meta-level holism, which collapses 
actor and action, moral and material, and person and environment (or place), an 
important corrective to many assumptions of modern Western thought.  
South Asian scholarship is not the only field to have stressed on holism. There 
are other attempts to correct modern Western thought’s methodological 
individualism. Many historical and anthropological studies have shown the 
conception of space and time as homogenous to be non-universal. David Harvey 
(1996) illustrates how historian Aaron Gurevich (1985) and anthropologist Nancy 
Munn (1986) unravel space, time, and self as dialectical and relational. Harvey, 
however, notes that scholarship is impaired when processes and relations are 
conceptualised in essentialist terms. Munn’s well-known ethnographic account of 
value, symbols, and fame in a Papua New Guinea island implies a region where 
residents ‘live in a self-contained process of constructing intersubjective space 
times… entirely free from colonial influences’ (Harvey 1996: 222).  
How do the flows and processes emphasised in ethnosociology relate to that 
other kind of ‘flow talk’ – of global processes and histories – that animates 
contemporary social theory? Do Tamils or, broadly speaking, South Asians construct 
personhood and places only with the tools of substance and transactions? Are there 
other axes along which places and selves come into being? Do process and history 
figure in this talk of kuṇam? One anthropologist suggests that the Tamil ‘concept of 
habit and repeated practice is… consistent with some historical approaches to human 
activity’ (Mines 2005: 112). This chapter situates the accruing of kuṇam to places and 
people in historical processes, and attends to history as expressed in local narrative 
forms such as varalāṟu (history) and katai (story), and in memories and ordinary 
conversations. 
                                                     
2 Ronald Inden later distanced himself from the ethnosociological project. He critiqued essentialising 
caste, treating it as ‘the unchanging (substantialized) agent of the civilization, from the rise of the 
Indus Valley culture and the arrival of the Aryans down to the present day of regionalism and caste in 
electoral politics’ (1990: 83). Inden’s work on medieval Bengal, which rehabilitated ‘kingship or a 
polity’ as a central and ‘constitutive institution of Indian civilization’ (ibid: 82), played a role in this 
decision.   
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From Ūr to Āḷkaḷ, or How to get from Place to Caste in a short 
span of time 
Examining conversations during which the question about place is posed reveals that 
it serves as a prelude to (or used instead of) the direct quizzing of individuals’ caste 
identity. Someone who is not fully immersed in ‘being a person the Tamil way’ (Daniel 
1984) may mistake the questioner’s interest to be purely geographical. Someone 
who fully comprehends the question’s implications could stall the proceedings by 
giving geographical responses from which their caste identity cannot be easily 
second-guessed. For individuals from subordinate castes, cities and towns (or 
municipalities) provide some barrier to an immediate mapping of caste and place.   
  In Madurai, I often had to go through a series of questions and answers in my 
initial encounters with individuals. These sessions typically went as follows:  
Question: What is your ūr? 
My reply: Madurai. 
Q: Where in Madurai? 
A: Thirumangalam [a municipality in Madurai district]. 
Q: Thirumangalam or near Thirumangalam? 
A: Near Thirumangalam. 
At this point, I would name my father’s village. If I did not, I would be asked to. Here 
the obstinate respondent is taking the interrogator through a series of geographical 
territories. The Chinese boxes or concentric circles which have served as framing 
devices in some ethnographies (Beck 1972, Daniel 1984) nod towards such 
responses, which run through the names of region, city, taluk, and village, and 
perhaps, lineage and family. These opening gambits seem like hurdle races. 
The litany of places may be bypassed by directly asking the person’s conta ūr, 
native village. Occasionally, individuals bypass all references to place and simply ask, 
‘What āḷkaḷ are you?’ If my interrogator did not know my father’s village, s/he would 
ask ‘What āḷkaḷ are you?’  
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This Tamil word means people; it is also widely recognised as a referent of 
caste identity. It is tempting to think that āḷkaḷ is a euphemism for cāti (jati) but I 
would seriously doubt such an interpretation. Instead, such utterances reveal caste 
as an important constituent of personhood. There have been debates over the 
nature of the caste ‘system,’ the varna and jati distinction, and the processes that 
have shaped contemporary experiences and conceptions of caste (Dumont 1980, 
Gupta 1980, Srinivas 1991, Dirks 2001).  
Yet the classification of people or āḷkaḷ into cāti is hardly a moot point. Some 
anthropologists even argue that it is not only human beings but also ‘animals, plants, 
and even inorganic material’ to whom jati is applied (Daniel 1984: 2).3 To then say 
one has no cāti, as anthropologist Diane Mines found out in a Tamil village, ‘mean[s] 
something like “I don’t exist as a kind of anything – living or dead – in this universe”’ 
(Mines 2005: 12).  
The conversation I noted earlier reveals the importance of place and caste 
identity in how an individual (the anthropologist) becomes known (to her 
interlocutors). Now, it is possible for this conversation – which begins from a spatial 
category and disembarks at the question of caste identity – to be interpreted as 
simple cross-examinations. Would people not want to know the place and caste of 
an anthropologist displaying an interest in them, their locality, or in local caste 
relations? Yes, they would. It is doubtful, however, to take these conversations as 
specific to interactions between an anthropologist and her informers.  
Firstly, my own Tamil identity renders this interpretation doubtful. In 
Bangalore and later in Delhi – prior to any affiliations with anthropology, that is – I 
had faced the same questions from Tamil speakers. Ethnographic research only 
highlighted aspects of conversations I had already participated in but not really 
grasped. Secondly, there are many such conversations between other kinds of 
participants. Conversations in buses and trains, public gatherings, educational 
institutions, and government offices revealed a persistent curiosity about where a 
                                                     
3 Daniel prefers to translate āḷkaḷ as genus (not caste) since this better alludes to jati as a classificatory 
principle applied to an array of beings and things.  
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person is from and who s/he is. They also revealed people’s ability to correlate places 
and castes. Below are a few instances of how people do so.  
Many of the non-Kallar I knew in Madurai referred to Piramalai Kallar as 
‘Usilampatti Thevamar.’ Usilampatti is a small town in Madurai, returning a 
population of over 30,000 in the 2001 census. It is located at one end of Kallarnatu. 
Kallar men could identify themselves as Usilampatti kāraṉ, Usilampatti Thevan, or 
Usilampatti Kallan in mixed-caste gatherings, especially those taking place in urban 
settings.4 
One afternoon in April 2008, as I was walking down a street in Malaiur’s 
southern limits, I heard someone hail me. It was middle-aged Andi Thevar. I went 
over to the porch where he and other Kallar men sat resting. Andi Thevar had been 
to the city that morning. He was talking about how he had threatened a street vendor 
there. The vendor had sought to over-charge Andi and had refused to bargain. A 
crowd gathered to watch them argue. The argument was going nowhere. Until Andi 
Thevar yelled, ‘Who did you think I am? I am an Usilampattikāraṉ.’ The vendor 
apparently yielded within seconds. I asked, ‘Why? Is Usilampatti such a scary place?’ 
Andi Thevar replied, ‘Yes. What else? To say “Aey, I am a Usilampattikāraṉ da” is 
enough. [They] will understand who [we] are. Why, did [the vendor] not understand 
that I am a Kallan? [Do you think] he reduced the price without understanding?’  
‘But many people stay in Usilampatti,’ I persisted. ‘How will [they] know who 
you are?’ Another man intervened. ‘Why, Dhivya, you have stayed in Madurai for 
days but don’t even know this? To other āḷkaḷ, to town āḷkaḷ, ‘Usilampatti’ can only 
mean Piramalai Kallar. Would they know the names of all the Kallarnatu ūr? They 
may know. They may not know. But they would certainly know Usilampatti. And who 
are Usilampatti’s famous āḷkaḷ? Kallar.’ 
Referring to Usilampatti also helped Kallar individuals identify one another. 
Soon after I arrived in Madurai, I met Senthil, a Piramalai Kallar man who had lived in 
                                                     
4 Thevar is the honorific title used by Piramalai Kallar and some other (Mukkulathor) subcastes. Non-
Kallar use Thevar or Tēvamār āḷkaḷ to refer to the entire Mukkulathor supracaste. The noun terminator 
kāraṉ (feminine kāri) signals a person doing or possessing something – Usilampattikāraṉ signifies a 
man from Usilampatti, while Madraskāri refers to a woman from Madras (Chennai).   
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Chennai for a few years. By 2007, he had moved with his family to a house near 
Usilampatti bus terminus. Senthil recalled the joys of accidently running into a 
Piramalai Kallar in Chennai. He admitted that identifying a person’s caste is no big 
deal, although some people hesitate to ask directly. ‘If I say “I am from Usilampatti,” 
they will ask, “Usilampatti or near Usilampatti?” That is because in Usilampatti itself, 
so many cāti stay. There are Kallar, Nadar [a Tamil caste], SCs. Anyone can live in the 
town. But if I say I am from a village near Usilampatti, they will ask “Which ūr?” and 
from that identify me as a Kallan.’  
True enough, a few weeks later, when Senthil and I visited a Kallarnatu village 
near Usilampatti, one of the village big-men quizzed us about our ūr. Once I went 
through the Q&A noted above, the big-man turned to Senthil. Senthil had already 
said ‘I am from Usilampatti.’ (‘Nā Usilampatti’). So the big-man asked Senthil, as 
though to confirm, ‘Are you from Usilampatti?’ (Nīṅkaḷ Usilampattiya?) Senthil 
affirmed, and proceeded to name his conta ūr.  
These interactions suggest that individuals can effortlessly collapse place and 
caste identities. They tempt us to conclude that territories have static caste 
compositions, and that castes are fixed in distinct territories. However, recent studies 
have shown mobility rather than fixity as characterising the South Asian region. Given 
‘modernity’s consignment [of] human mobility to the dusty dark corners of archives 
that document the hegemonic space of national territorialism’ (Ludden 2003: 1062), 
and a popular ‘presentist periodisation’ (Cooper 2001: 193) which treats pre-
twentieth-century human actors as immobile beings, it becomes all the more 
important to examine the links between human mobility, place-making, and caste-
place relations. 
We need to recognise mobility’s integral role in the production of space. The 
Tamil region’s existence as a cognitive space has been visible for long, resonating in 
Sangam poetry. Yet the region as we know it today – as an intermeshing of smaller 
regions, and with connections to larger territorial canvases – is an outcome of 
circulatory regimes (Stein 1977) in different periods. 
Just as circulatory regimes change over time and remake social space, so too 
have people’s ways of ‘placing’ and knowing self and other. Although human mobility 
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complicates these queries, there are many ways to know a person’s caste. Tamils are 
able to guess caste through place because of their knowledge of the region’s 
historical geographies, agrarian territories, micro-regions, and historical patterns of 
migration. New processes, such as the postcolonial articulation of caste identities 
through regional political mobilisation (Palshikar 2006), add to ways of knowing caste 
territories.  
Across India, castes are equated with regions, micro-regions, and villages, 
even as different caste members continuously move between territories. This 
twinned embeddedness and dispersal has ensured spatial imaginaries that continue 
to connect caste and place. Circular migrants (Gidwani and Sivaramakrishnan 2003) 
bring back to rural spaces their knowledge of other spaces and other people. Thus, 
circulation, as much as fixity, fashions a geographical imagination wherein 
emplacement allows for a knowledge of caste identities (Mosse 2012: 99). 
My initial wonder at people’s ability to make that jump from place to caste 
gave way as I immersed myself in the habitus that is the fieldworker’s location. Like 
residents, I too moved between villages and urban neighbourhoods. I read 
newspapers, watched television, and listened to the incessant analysis and discussion 
of media reports in local tea-stalls, fields, and homes. I peered out from bus windows 
to see hoardings that announced life-crisis rituals, and political meetings. I read (or 
glanced at) wall posters announcing temple renovations and festivals. I saw various 
caste associations holding meetings or organising roadblocks. I moved through 
urban, semi-urban, and rural landscapes, and built environments where wall-colours 
signified political parties (some of which were caste-specific formations). Each of 
these actions generated certain kinds of cognitive connections between places and 
people. Individuals also make these connections through marriages and alliances, 
through fellow workers and students, each practice and person bringing their own 
knowledge of places, castes, and place-caste relations.    
The short journey from ūr to āḷkaḷ involves many travel mates. Help is 
provided by the non-discursive elements of every social encounter. An individual’s 
dress, bodily comportment, speech, dialect, language, education, and occupation 
provide clues to her caste. The Madurai street vendor may have guessed Andi 
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Thevar’s caste through the reference to Usilampatti as well as Andi’s gestures, 
speech, and comportment. As Andi explained, ‘From the way we say “we are 
Usilampatti āḷkaḷ,” with so much emphasis and stress, [they] will know that we are 
Kallar. Who else from Usilampatti can be so rough, so fierce, so threatening?’ 
Another aid is the web of relatives a person spins and makes known during 
interactions. After naming their conta ūr, individuals (particularly those from 
dominant castes) could name a big-man or a well-known political leader from their 
village or region and then add, ‘I am his relative (contakāraṉ).’ Once Senthil named 
his conta ūr, he mentioned his family members to that village big-man. The kin Senthil 
named were successful and well-known individuals – a grandfather who had been a 
‘kirāma munsip, nattanmaikarar,’ and an uncle who was a top-ranking police officer.  
Senthil might have wanted to establish his own lineages and access to power 
while interacting with the big-man. Yet this was a common conversational frame. This 
approach allows people to disclose their caste identity and provide a measure of their 
own kin circle. If all else fails, there is always the direct question ‘What āḷkaḷ are you?’ 
to take recourse to.  
Kuṇam, Varalāṟu, and an Ūr’s Notoriety  
Places have reputations. This is true of London boroughs. Peckham Rye and St John’s 
Woods have different ‘characters.’ This is true of entire cities. Detroit and New York, 
and Newcastle and London have different ‘characters.’ This is just as true of regions. 
In England, a vibrant South East is opposed to a dying North. Many anthropologists 
(Gordillo 2004, Munn 1986, Feld 1996, Basso 1996) and cultural and social 
geographers have revealed place to be a ‘locus of imaginaries’ (Harvey 1996: 294).  
In parts of the northern Indian plains and western India (Pocock 1972), village-
ranking accompanies village exogamy as considerations in the search for alliances. 
Likewise, in the Tamil region, village reputation influences marriage circles of castes 
and lineages. During their search for alliances, my own relatives avoid entire villages 
– some because they are full of drunks; others because my caste members are 
divided along religious identities; while yet others are simply dismissed for being 
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rotten places. But marriages are not the only realm in which village reputation plays 
a role. A place’s reputation influences work, residence, and travel decisions. 
Many of Madurai’s non-Kallar and Kallar residents take entire Kallarnatu to 
be a place of lawlessness and disorder. Within Kallarnatu, some villages were thought 
to be more ‘notorious’ than others were. Many individuals, including Kallar men and 
women, warned me about Kallarnatu’s ‘interior’ villages. I was advised against 
travelling alone to villages far from highways or other busy roads. 
Proximity to urban centres and road networks were thought to redeem places 
from affinity to violence. Yet this view was regularly contradicted. We have seen that 
Usilampatti was itself suspect. It is seen as prone to violence, ready to stage public 
enactments of machismo and caste dominance. Likewise, Kallar dominated 
neighbourhoods – such as Karimedu and Sellur – in Madurai city were considered 
fearsome places. Taking crime reports as his source, Dumont had concluded that, 
barring ‘villages close to Madurai,’ the most dangerous Kallar lived in Madurai city; 
these were ‘people who have left their villages to come and work in the spinning 
mills’ (1986: 31). Neighbourhoods such as Karimedu and Sellur are firmly positioned 
in this geography of fear because of their Kallar residents. Dumont interpreted such 
areas’ crime statistics as symptomatic of emergent class relations and city life. He 
writes, ‘Here the criminal cases reveal that the phenomenon goes beyond caste, for 
it applies to a sort of nascent industrial proletariat for whom the traditional rules of 
the caste are yielding to the promiscuity of living conditions and work’ (ibid). These 
geographies of feeling reveal that absolute and relative locations do not subsume 
representational spaces. 
Kallar dominated villages such as Malaiur did not lose their notoriety simply 
because they were closer to the city, the centre of civilization, refinement, culture. 
Non-Malaiur Kallar alleged that Malaiur was a terrifying village (payaṅkaramāna ūr). 
Thus, in addition to being criticised for choosing a field-site peripheral to Kallarnatu, 
I was also thought to be too audacious in basing myself in Malaiur. Take middle-aged 
Indiran, one of the first to suggest I rethink my choice on the second basis. Indiran’s 
life history encapsulated the colonial state’s diverse reform efforts targeting the 
Piramalai Kallar community. His father’s family had moved from their Kallarnatu 
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village to present-day Theni district. Their relocation was entangled with colonial 
history; many Kallar families migrated due to severe famine in the nineteenth-
century, while others were placed in an agrarian settlement set up in the early-
twentieth-century to deter ‘criminal tendencies’ (A. Pandian 2009).  
Indiran had grown up in Theni and attended a Kallar school there. There were 
over 250 such schools in Madurai, Dindigul, and Theni districts. These schools are a 
legacy of the CTA and attendant efforts to ‘reform’ the community. When we met in 
2007, Indiran was teaching at a Kallar school near Usilampatti. That day, Indiran said 
he had retraced his grandparents’ movement when his employment brought him 
back to Kallarnatu. Our discussions touched upon Kallar migration out of Kallarnatu; 
migrant families’ religious, economic, and kinship ties with their nāṭu and ūr; Kallar 
social mobility; and the policies that most Kallar individuals identified as having 
transformed their region, place, caste, and kuṇam. 
When I informed Indiran that I had decided to work on Malaiur, he responded 
by saying that I had thrust my hand into a tiger’s mouth. Since I had already heard 
others denote Malaiur (and its neighbouring villages) as Kallarnatu’s gateway, I 
thought Indiran was positioning the ūr in relation to nāṭu. But his response was 
idiomatic. He advised me to be vigilant throughout my interaction with Malaiur since 
it was a thieving village (kaḷavāṇi ūr), where everyone was a thief until recently. True, 
its residents had reformed (tiruttu), he said, but a transformation of ūr kuṇam would 
take time, a lot of time. Indiran also stated that some Kallarnatu ūr had changed 
considerably, while others had not. He was not alone in suggesting that caste kuṇam 
varied across Kallarnatu ūr.  
From his field-site, the ‘relatively orderly and peaceful’ village of Tengalapatti 
further away from Madurai city, Dumont observed that ‘there is an uneven 
distribution of the surviving traditional lifestyle, which is particularly concentrated in 
a few places’ (1986: 30). Here, Dumont takes the Kallar ‘traditional lifestyle’ of 
delinquency to be unevenly distributed and links this variance with mid-twentieth-
century urbanisation patterns. Indiran, however, justified the common perception of 
Malaiur’s kuṇam by evoking the order in which the CTA was imposed on Kallar – 
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Malaiur being one of the first Kallarnatu villages to be notified under the CTA (A. 
Pandian 2009: 263). 
The entire caste was notified in 1918 but Malaiur’s adult male Kallar were 
notified some years earlier. Conceived of as the ‘headquarters of the Kallans,’ 
colonial officials held that the notification of villages such as Malaiur would help 
controlling crime (cattle-lifting, highway robbery, grain looting) in the region. 
Malaiur’s current residents submit that a large part of their village’s notoriety derived 
from its proximity to the city. In their view, the Act’s sole aim was the repression of 
their fathers and grandfathers, many of whom had provided kāval or watching 
services in Madurai’s streets.  
Many state that Malaiur was the first village in Madras Presidency to be 
notified under the Act.5 The colonial archive provides one kind of representation of 
Malaiur and other Kallar villages – as places requiring special surveillance because of 
their existing notoriety. The field, however, discloses another representation 
wherein Malaiur’s current notoriety is partly an outcome of the notification. 
Collective memory represents the CTA as having criminalised not only the Piramalai 
Kallar, adding to the construction of caste kuṇam, but also entire villages.  
Drawing from colonial reports and Tengalapatti residents’ perceptions, 
Dumont concluded that Kallar kuṇam was concentrated in certain villages. We here 
notice colonial conceptions entwining with Tengalapatti Kallar’s perception of these 
villages. Sixty years since Dumont’s research, Malaiur continued to be perceived as 
an ūr thick with Kallar kuṇam. In the village itself, the gloss on kuṇam often shifted 
from crime to valour. Within that library of annotations, ūr Kallar cited themselves as 
the truest representatives and heirs of Kallar kuṇam and varalāṟu or history.  
What we have seen so far is that history is seldom an outside to essence. 
Instead, the two constantly circulate and collapse into each other. It is partly through 
such a traffic in kuṇam and varalāṟu that the ūr emerges as a lived space. I was to 
hear many narratives of this traffic. For instance, history and essence were 
                                                     
5 Many of Madras Presidency’s itinerant social groups were notified under the Act (Radhakrishna 
2001). Nonetheless, many Kallar believe that their caste was the Act’s primary target.  
98 
 
transmuted into space through local expositions of toponyms and place-names. One 
evening in May 2008, Malaiur resident Rasangam attributed meanings to place-
names of neighbouring villages. This elderly Kallar man spoke of a time not long gone 
when  
Travellers passed through Kallarnatu with thudding hearts. As they 
drew away from Madurai city, fear would come on its own, descend 
on them, even before they entered the domain of thieves. This place, 
where they were seized (paṟṟu) by dread (acham), is the village called 
Achampathu. What can they do? They had to somehow overcome the 
fear, and rush through Kallarnatu. How to do this? They would urge 
and whip and drive (viraṭṭu) the bulls pulling their carts. This place 
comes after Achampattu. This place, where they would begin to drive 
their bulls ruthlessly, is the village known as Virattipathu. 
I was eager to hear Rasangam’s explanation of other villages’ names. But he bypassed 
many villages on this route, and arrived at Malaiur. In response to my ‘What happens 
next?’ he resorted to a ‘What else, do you think we will let them go? A truly thieving 
village (kaḷavāṇi ūr).’ Rasangam stressed that Achampattu and Virattipathu were not 
even Kallarnatu villages. They had derived their names simply by virtue of their 
location near his own ūr.  
Rasangam located his ūr in a network of places, ‘named places [which] are 
not only the environment of experience… [but] also objectifications of previous 
experience and process’ (Myers 2002: 105). But while history may be appended to 
caste and place kuṇam in representational space, caste dispositions and place 
characteristics were also perceived as resistant to change.   
Rasangam and other Malaiur Kallar forwarded metonymic relation between 
person and place by stating, ‘Our kuṇam is our ūr kuṇam.’ They thus represented 
themselves at Malaiur’s centre. Dominant castes were more prone than lower-castes 
to equate caste and place kuṇam. The same ūr could be the locus of different 
imaginaries for different individuals and social groups. So what kind of imaginaries is 
Malaiur a locus of? How do Malaiur residents remember their ūr’s past? What kind 
of reputations has the ūr garnered? 
One morning in January 2008, when I was on my way to Malaiur, I ran into 
Selvi, a Kallar woman in her late-forties, whom I had earlier met at a life-crisis ritual. 
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Sharing a seat during our bus journey, Selvi regaled me with stories of Malaiur. I was 
already familiar with Malaiur’s reputation, but found Selvi’s account of this ūr 
remarkable in many ways. For one, she was pleased with my choice of field-site. This 
was different from the criticisms I usually met with. Secondly, Selvi asserted that I 
could ask her anything I wished to know about her ūr. Although it was her conta ūr, 
it was surprising that Selvi identified Malaiur as ‘her’ village; married women 
normally identified with their husband’s conta ūr. Thirdly, Selvi repeatedly asserted 
that she knew everything there was to know about Malaiur. I would realise later that 
Selvi was one of the few women to associate themselves readily and directly with 
ethnographic projects.  
Assertions of being repositories of knowledge, assigning themselves as 
researchers’ main ‘informants’ were male prerogatives. Men had prior experiences 
of being informants, had their own modes of ‘objectification and self-reflection,’ and 
had taught themselves to respond to anthropologists’ demands for ‘explicit self-
conscious translation’ of these ‘into external medium’ (Rabinow 1977: 119). Men 
more readily abstracted from their immediate and routine surroundings, to speak in 
terms of caste, custom, culture, and kuṇam. Astute participants in the dialogic 
process of ethnographic knowledge creation, men often acted consciously to steer 
and control the representations of their caste.  
I found that women were less inclined to do so. True, they too spoke in terms 
of caste, custom, culture, and kuṇam. Yet when asked to formally extrapolate on 
these, most women directed me to men – normally towards Liaison Officer 
Arumugam and others with a reputation of being learned members of village and 
caste – with the greatest experience in the art of informing. My repeated attempts 
to turn women into ‘key informants’ – while recording interviews – fell through the 
interstices of caste and gender.  
Thus it was atypical for a woman to state that she knew everything about 
Malaiur and was ready to share this knowledge with me. When Selvi offered to help 
with my research, I wished to explore her links with Malaiur. Did she live there? Selvi 
clarified, no, but it was her conta ūr. Selvi had grown up in Malaiur. She then married 
a textile mill worker and moved to a small rented house in Madurai city, where they 
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had brought up their children, two sons and a daughter. They met household, 
medical, and educational expenses, somehow juggling with the husband’s wages. 
Selvi hoped to supplement the household income through money lending but her 
husband, a communist, prohibited her from doing so. (There are various frameworks 
in the Tamil region from which to launch a moral attack against usury, and one of 
these relates to communism).  
Until her husband’s death eight years ago, Selvi’s attempts to turn into a 
moneylender had to be undertaken with a degree of stealth. She had pawned her 
jewels to raise money, which she released into the usury circuits through her 
brothers, three of whom lived in Malaiur and were part-time moneylenders. After 
her husband’s death, her brothers helped Selvi buy a plot in a new residential colony 
about four kilometres from Malaiur. Utilising the interest accrued through small-
scale usury, Selvi also constructed a house on this plot.  
In my later fieldwork period, I often ran into Selvi (or one of her sons) when 
she (or they) visited Malaiur to track down borrowers or to meet the brothers (or 
uncles) through whom the borrowers could be ‘persuaded’ to meet the hyper-social 
‘contract’ of extra-legal transactions. Selvi and her brothers epitomised the usury 
that Malaiur was known for, in which ūr reputation and caste kuṇam played an 
important role. But here are a few snippets from that conversation which are 
relevant to the discussion of history, essence, and Malaiur’s reputation. 
Selvi: What sort of an ūr do you think mine is! It troubled the white man [veḷḷaikkāraṉ] 
so much that for this ūr alone, he built a road, constructed a jail, passed laws... Have 
you seen [the road, jail, and other related structures]?  
Dhivya: Not all of them. 
Selvi: Had you gone with me, I would have taken you to these places… The kairēkai 
caṭṭam [‘Fingerprint Act,’ the Criminal Tribes Act], the white man created it just for 
my ūr. An ūr famous for robbery. To somehow bring this ūr under their rule. This is 
why the white man brought such laws. Was it any use, doing all that? [No way, she 
gestured]. We still thieved, kept on thieving.  
Dhivya: What, even now? 
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Selvi: No, but even now, everyone looks at this ūr with fear. What else? Was it only 
the white man who feared our ūr? [The same gestures of negation]. It has brought 
entire Kallarnatu under its control.  
Selvi then positioned her ūr in a sacred matrix. She spoke first of the ūr 
Karuppu koil, a temple shared by Malaiur and Tenur. These two villages are 
administered separately; Malaiur and Tenur are today distinct kirāmam. Like others, 
Selvi used the term tāykkirāmam – ‘mother village’ – to denote Tenur as the principal 
village of Malaiur.  
Selvi: Karuppu koil was once part of Tenur. But slowly, because of our strength and 
display of power, it became our koil. City folk might not even have heard of Tenur. 
But our Malaiur is very famous. Many know the Karuppu temple. Ask anyone, [they 
will say] it belongs to Malaiur. Today, it is Malaiur that receives mutalmai in the 
temple.   
Selvi then counted other sacred spaces in which Malaiur had gained 
mutalmai. It is noteworthy that although Selvi shifted from events in colonial history 
to the sacred realm, she retained an emphasis on process and power. Selvi evoked a 
sacral matrix in motion.  
This cautions us against theoretical models where an all-encompassing 
religion or an immanent spiritual authority subsumes temporal power as well as 
theories that split religion and politics into two distinct realms. Historians and 
anthropologists have stressed that south Indian temples are not just reflector-sites 
for social relations. As sites of power, south Indian temples’ ‘features are 
synthesized… unique(ly), both in cultural and structural terms (Appadurai and 
Breckenridge 1976: 189). Temples undergird precolonial social relations, and shaped 
patterns of dominance, authority, and differentiation (Dirks 1989). In present-day 
festivals and rituals, we glimpse how social groups continue to regard temples as 
important grounds for assertion and resistance (Mines 2005). It is no surprise that 
sacred space is evoked in narratives about caste and place. 
Let us pay attention to the terms with which Selvi denoted village–temple 
relations. When talking about the Tenur-temple relation, Selvi used the word 
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cērntatu. But she used the word contam when linking Malaiur to the Karuppu temple, 
stating that the temple now belongs to Malaiur. The word cērntatu suggests that the 
temple was joined with, part of, and blended with Tenur. The word easily summons 
the ‘synecdochal and metonymic associations’ (Mines 2005: 32) between ūr, ūr-
temple, and ūr-people. Malaiur residents also used the word to convey their ūr’s 
relationship with the temple. But contam allows for greater assertion and extension 
of these associations; the word connotes exclusive ownership, rights, and belonging. 
The temple only became Malaiur’s contam, residents say, due to ūr tāṭṭiyam 
(coercion, force, aggression).  
Malaiur’s mobility and assertion has enabled it to obtain mutalmai, to be 
honoured earlier rather than later at temple festivals. Malaiur residents admitted, as 
Selvi had, that their ūr had only recently acquired this firstness. They did not think 
money-incomes or economic prosperity had automatically generated mutalmai. 
Their stories accounted for a firstness obtained through power struggle. And ūr 
varalāṟu and kuṇam had key roles in the stories of these struggles. Selvi culminated 
her talk of Malaiur’s notoriety by looping history and essence, saying, ‘Like the white 
man, Kallarnatu shivers at (the sight of) Malaiur.’ 
By sharing stories, memories, lullabies, and so on, Malaiur residents 
participated in an ongoing process of place-making. They actively emplaced selves 
that were already place-immersed. The point is, although individuals provided their 
own sequences and stresses, fragments and finishing touches, their narratives 
showcased persistent entanglements of kuṇam and varalāṟu. The next section 
utilises one particular narrative as a hinge to open wider this discussion between 
history and essence.  
Malaiur’s Past (Ūr Varalāṟu) 
One morning, end of February 2008, I found Sunda Thevar sitting in the shade of a 
tree near the Karuppu temple. Sunda Thevar, along with other elderly Kallar men, 
spent his days there. Here, he was close to home, food, temple, and friends, and to 
the stop from which he occasionally caught a bus to visit a doctor.  
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Sunda Thevar was a gentle and generous Kallar man in his mid-nineties. An 
equally gentle piety characterised him. He often indicated Malaiur’s singularity 
through notions of sacredness, partaking in a sacred framework he shared with other 
residents and bringing to his narrative his personal piety. That February morning, 
however, his account took off from colonial history and Malaiur’s location in a 
geography of fear intensified through this history.  
Since the beginning, many people of this ūr were into theft and 
burglary. All Thevar āḷkaḷ. So, its name entered the gazette. That it was 
a thieving ūr. During the white man’s rule… when the British come and 
rule Madurai… he hears about this ūr. Then, he thinks, ‘Have to 
somehow reform (cīrtiruttam) these thieves, have to look after that 
ūr’ and comes here.  
There were no roads then. Only cart tracks. Only the ridges of fields 
that made do as pathways. The white man comes wandering.  
At this point, Sunda Thevar stops to interact with some visitors. When he resumes, 
some details alter. The generic ‘white man’ becomes a Superintendent of Police on 
horseback (‘no cars, no vehicles, in those days’).  
He comes, sees the ūr. Lo! Just as they said, there is no olukkam 
(orderliness, decorum), no mariyātai (civility, respect). What does the 
white man do? He calls some important ūr men, men with title and 
land (paṭṭātār) and asks, ‘What do you do? How does the ūr live?' They 
speak truthfully, ‘We survive by thieving.’ This is true. Everyone used 
to thieve then. Only one in a hundred did not. This was the profession 
(toḻil) of every child born here.  
The white man beckons a thirty-five-year-old man, and asks what his 
toḻil is. This Malaiur chap does not know English. Lifting all five fingers 
of one hand, he says, ‘Since I was five, I have been in the thieving 
profession (tiruṭṭu toḻil).’ The white man asks, ‘Is that so? What do you 
steal? How do you steal?’  
Sunda Thevar then proceeded to sing the man’s reply. Here is a translation.  
At five, I started thieving. That was the beginning. By twenty, I 
committed a major theft. Even if the British come with the wind’s 
speed, I will seize whatever they come on and fling it to the ground. 
Even if men, the police, come hither and tither, I will hit and split open 
their heads. The jewels women wear on their necks, their ears, I steal 
all those jewels.  
Sunda Thevar stops singing but continues.  
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That chap goes on and on like this. The white man asks, ‘So, what kind 
of kirāmam is yours?’ To that, he says, ‘The directions (tisai) are four; 
the cardinal points (tikku) are four. This ūr’s name and fame is known 
in all eight directions (aṣṭa-tikku), all the continents, and all the nine 
regions.’ The white man asks, ‘How is that? Speak.’  
Again, Sunda Thevar sings the Malaiur man’s reply. 
This Malaiur of great renown, 
to see it, a thousand  
eyes are needed. 
To the Malai Karuppana- 
sami guarding it, three  
poojais daily. 
The light from  
Alagar, Subramanium and  
Meenakshi falls here.  
We worship them directly, 
can see them from here.  
Gesturing in the directions of these temples, Sunda Thevar says, ‘Look! Light from 
Alagar koil, Meenambikai koil, Velayudham Subramaniyar koil reaches the 
Karuppusami koil. We obtain taricaṉam of those three right here.’ The reference to 
taricaṉam or sight is suggestive of the powerful sensory exchanges between devotee 
and deity in Hinduism. Sunda Thevar continues. ‘It is in such a place that Malaiur was 
created. Not only that…’ (Sunda Thevar continues to sing about the ūr) 
In this seven-  
oceans-ringed earth, 
throughout,  
it is renowned. 
This ūr ascends through praise.  
‘This ūr’s name [and fame] is known in all the cities in all four directions, in all the 
kirāmam surrounding these cities,’ says Sunda Thevar. ‘Known even today. Is that not 
why the British came here, to this ūr? What they did for this ūr, they did not do for 
any other. They kept in mind information from all nāṭu, and then did so much. In this 
sort of ūr, everyone accepted that, ‘Yes, here, we have been thieving all along.’ 
The white man again asks, ‘How do you steal?’ The man (from 
Malaiur) speaks about one theft. When two men tried to steal a goat 
from a place near a city temple. There, surrounded by high walls, goats 
were reared, guarded. Someone spotted them just as they were 
leaving with one goat. Just as they were scaling the high wall. That 
goatherd caught one thief. The one carrying the goat. The other thief 
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was already on the wall’s ledge. From there, he clasped his 
companion’s hand and pulled. Pulled and pulled. Goat, goatherd, and 
thief, all three landed outside. A single man yanks and tosses these 
three on the other side. Such strength.  
The white man understands. ‘So, is that how you steal?’ ‘Yes, that is 
how they stole.’ What the white man does, he challenges the ūr. 
Within a month, they are to take a chest from a bank near the 
Meenakshi temple. At that place, where the bank was in those days, 
there is a police station today. The ūr accepts the white man’s 
challenge. Just as the month ends, one thief goes there. Waits for the 
guards to rub their eyes in sleep. Goes inside the bank. That chest, it 
is huge. He carries it out of the bank. But he cannot carry it all the way 
to the ūr. So he goes into the Meenakshi temple, throws the chest into 
the pond, and returns to the ūr. The day breaks. In the bank, they see, 
‘Oh! The chest is not here. Surely, it is stolen by the chap in that ūr 
which had accepted the challenge.’  
They come to the ūr. That thief, his name was Pekkathi Kaluvathevan. 
They say, ‘Adey Kaluva, stealing from there is indeed a great deed. But 
now, you must return that chest.’ He agrees. Goes to the Meenakshi 
temple, throws the chest out of the pond. They ask what he wants as 
a reward. ‘Whatever you want, tell, [we shall] give [it].’  
Sunda Thevar then envisages and shares with me a few probabilities. ‘That day, had 
Pekkathi Kaluvan asked for all of Madurai’s poṟampōkku (puṟampōkku) nilam 
[wastelands, uncultivable lands, ‘outside’ lands, classified as ‘Poromboke’ lands], 
they would have given it. But 
Pekkathi says, ‘I don’t want any of that. In this town, there is an oil 
press. If I and my descendants get oil from that mill on all my festival 
days – that is enough.’  
‘Now, that,’ Sunda Thevar suggests, ‘that is a thieving chap’s wisdom. Near this 
railway track,’ he says, gesturing towards a track passing near Malaiur, ‘even now, 
there is unclaimed land. Had they given us deeds to all that land, this entire kirāmam 
would have lived well. That day, they said no to land. Then, this land was lying 
unused. Uncultivable. Nothing. “If we ask for this land, we will not get anything. Who 
will look after it? Who will pay taxes (kisti)?” Thinking so, he asks for oil!’ 
Sunda Thevar then linked place and caste characteristics. Saying, ‘That 
thievishness, that thieving kuṇam. Didn’t think of land as important,’ he immediately 
spoke of CTA.  
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‘Then, only after that did the British, the white man come to this ūr to 
take fingerprints (rēkai). Came and took the fingerprints of all the men 
above 18 years. For identification. After that, if anyone from this 
kirāmam wants to spend the night in the next kirāmam, he has to 
approach authorities (kirāma muṉcip, nāṭṭāmai, talaiyāri) in both 
villages and give them that record. He has to get their signatures. Only 
if these signatures are there, “He stayed in this place, on this day…” If 
this is written… if you are without this, and they catch you, then 
straightaway, case [legal case and imprisonment]. If they file a case… 
Those enquiries... Those lawyers… No one could do anything. They will 
ask, ‘At the time of the roll-call (hācil), were you in another kirāmam?’ 
Saying ‘yes’ was not enough. If you did not have that record, 
punishment. Three months. And a fine. This is what is known as CTA 
(kairēkai caṭṭam). That British, that white man, he came and started 
taking rēkai everywhere in 1918. 
Sunda Thevar had began his account by referring to an encounter between the ūr 
and a white man. At one point, he specified the ‘white man’ as a Superintendent of 
Police (SP). Some other villagers’ versions of this encounter likewise particularised 
the white man. In end-April 2008, when Tenur resident Kannan asked me to record 
Malaiur’s history, he started with the dramatic words, ‘Having killed a Sub-
Inspector…’ Specifying the white man’s designation highlighted Malaiur’s 
importance. No lowly beat-constable for this renowned village; only top officials 
visited Malaiur, their own position in the colonial bureaucracy matching the ūr and 
ūr Kallar’s importance. 
Three other versions did not mention the policeman’s designation, but 
stressed that he was killed by irate villagers. In these accounts, the murdered white 
man had visited Malaiur after the village was notified under the CTA; he was not 
conducting inquiries but initiating the registration of adult Kallar men.   
In Sunda Thevar’s version, when the Superintendent of Police arrived at 
Malaiur, ūr Kallar readily admitted to thieving, and introduced him to a geographical 
imaginary that co-mingled notoriety, fame, and sacrality. Despite ūr Kallar’s 
repositioning of Malaiur in an absolute space, the Superintendent doggedly pursues 
his queries on crime. Other narratives about Malaiur’s past allude to colonial 
representatives consolidating an array of property and social relations. The grain of 
local interpretation is to read the CTA as colonisers’ tactic in the battle over 
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sovereignty but the narratives contain hints to wide-ranging material interests 
embedded in the Act. 
The Ūr in Sacred Geographies 
This oft-narrated episode must have occurred in the late colonial period. Yet for 
Kallar residents, ūr reputation does not simply emanate from its location in colonial 
space. Malaiur’s fame is taken to predate its designation as a ‘thieving ūr.’ Pekkathi 
Kaluvathevar, the colonial subject named in Sunda Thevar’s narrative, positions his 
ūr in older geographies. Through the stress on specific spatial orientations and 
directions, and the cardinal points traced outwards from Malaiur, Pekkathi 
emplotted the ūr in sacred geography.  
At first glance, the account of ūr reputation mirrors spatial themes in post-
Vedic or puranic texts. When we are told that the ūr is renowned in all the eight 
directions, in all the islands or island-continents separated by oceans, and in all nine 
regions, we are transported within the reaches of a geography in which ‘the earth 
consists of seven concentric island-continents, each surrounded by an ocean’ (Selby 
and Peterson 2008: 8). Yet protracted interactions between Sanskritic and Tamil 
cosmologies transformed regional conceptions of space and place.6  
Both Selvi and Sunda Thevar moved from events in political and social history 
to religious notions and practices. Also, Sunda Thevar elaborately sketched one 
aspect of what Selvi had summarised in her short account of Malaiur – the intimate 
relations between south Indian religion and polity. Both Selvi and Sunda Thevar 
charted out their ūr’s location within sacred geographies of differing magnitudes. 
Both accounts emphasised the localisation of sacredness and deities in the Tamil 
region. While Sunda Thevar narrated Malaiur’s location within a broader network of 
sacred places and scales, Selvi’s account was more localised. Selvi concentrated on 
ūr and nāṭu temples, providing no reference to Madurai’s renowned temples.  
Sunda Thevar emphasised the flows between the ūr Karuppu temple and 
Madurai’s important temples. He first pointed towards the city’s northeast and the 
                                                     
6 Examining space, place, property, and polity under medieval Cola rule, historian Daud Ali writes, ‘the 
assumptions [in Cola accounts]… were not part of some generalized Indian worldview but rather parts 
of a specific group of conceptions that held sway at the courts of early medieval India’ (2008: 120).  
108 
 
Alagar temple dedicated to Visnu. He then indicated Madurai’s centre and the 
Meenakshi Sundareswarar temple, which is more closely associated with Meenakshi 
than with Siva. He finally pointed towards the city’s southwest and the 
Tirupparankunram Skanda temple dedicated to Murugan. The temples’ current 
complexes or structures evolved from much older shrines at these sites. Linked with 
Madurai’s Pantiya kings, all three temples are also associated with the later Nayaka 
rule that brought about many changes to their built form and festival cycles (Hudson 
1977, Fuller 1984, Branfoot 2004).  
Relations between Piramalai Kallar and Madurai Nayakas are a recurrent 
theme in collective memory, rivalled in importance only by the community’s relations 
with the colonial state. By networking ūr and Madurai temples, Sunda Thevar 
interlinked political and sacred geographies. These geographies were constructed 
with ‘tools of metonymy’ not unique to the Tamil region (see, e.g. Inden 1990: 257). 
Singing of Malaiur’s fame, Sunda Thevar re-enacted another regional theme 
important to kingship. Famous emperors in the south Asian region conquered space 
(digvijayam) when their representatives (horses, horsemen, armies) passed 
unchallenged or victorious through all realms in all directions. Malaiur conquered 
representational spaces when its fame spread outwards in all directions, continents, 
and regions, and across oceans. This made the ūr so powerful that one needed a 
thousand eyes to partake of its worth.  
Sunda Thevar sang of a sacredness localised through landscape. The visibility 
of Madurai’s bigger temples from Malaiur augmented the Karuppu temple’s 
sacredness. These were sensuous links – since the light from the bigger temples are 
refracted to the ūr temple, those wishing to ‘see’ these deities need not go to the 
temples. That highly agentive sight or taricaṉam (here meaning the visual exchanges 
between divine and human beings) can occur from the ūr temple itself. Such a telling 
exalted Malaiur’s location in a hierarchy of places by linking it to other sacred sites 
widely acknowledged as superior and more powerful.  
This refracted taricaṉam corresponds to socio-spatial relations that have 
retained many features from earlier social formations termed as segmentary polities 
(Stein 1980) or alternatively, as imperial formations (Inden 1990). The past does not 
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simply exist as traces of a pre-capitalist past. Rather, they are aspects of 
contemporary realities considerably reworked through capitalist development, the 
latter likewise predicated upon these social relations.  
At times, residents mentioned Malaiur’s symbiotic links with the Meenakshi 
temple. Their ūr was iṉām land, tax-free gifts to a priest of this temple.7 A folksong 
known to older Kallar women in the village refers us to those older relations, and 
their contemporary expression in temple festivals. When a Kallar woman in her 
fifties, Annakili, sang of the votive terracotta horses periodically installed in the ūr 
temple –  
Taking clay from the banks,   
making horses for Karuppu, 
for the five Thevars, five horses, 
the first horse, the paṭṭattu kutirai 
 – her verse traced links between the five brothers from whom the ūr’s main Kallar 
lineages traced their descent and the recipient of the first horse. This song describes 
a ceremony resembling one Dumont observed in another Kallarnatu location. That 
ceremony required the installation of at least seven horses. Six horses represented 
the six ‘residential clusters.’ The seventh horse was known as the paṭṭattu kutirai, 
translated by Dumont as the ‘titled horse’ (1986: 442). Annakili and others said the 
horse was called thus because it was the ‘Brahmin priest’s horse.’ Through this horse, 
the ūr honoured the paṭṭar, the Meenakshi temple priest who had been gifted the 
village lands. Older land and labour relations and social spaces still find expression in 
the realm of honours.  
Landscapes of Self and Other 
Malaiur residents often summoned aspects of our immediate landscape to 
emphasise, localise, and enrich their myths, stories, and memories. They did so when 
I sat down with a tape recorder. (The recorder not only served as a mnemonic device, 
it magically rendered me a good researcher – my interlocutors took almost 
                                                     
7 Marnadu, a Malaiur Vannan (‘washerman’), said his family had held māṉiyam land in neighbouring 
villages, land his ancestors had obtained as kāṇi for services provided in the Tirupparankunram 
temple. The services he counted were similar to those for which Vannan caste members elsewhere 
(Dirks 1987: 428) received grants. 
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everything else I did to be wasteful walking and talking). They paid similar heed to 
landscape during ‘veṭṭi pēccu,’ ‘useless’ or ‘empty’ talk with which they passed time 
(and which I seldom recorded).  
With each mention of a landscape feature, there were reverberations of 
ancestors, kings, lineage and village founders, gods and heroes, brave and 
honourable women, loving sisters, clever and powerful thieves. Conversations were 
marked by statements such as: ‘These footprints on our hill – Rama stopped here on 
his way to search for and bring back Sita;’ ‘Do you know that this canal [at 
Koothiyarkundu, a place between Malaiur and the city’s centre]? Tirumalai Nayaka 
constructed it because one of his concubines who was from that village asked him to 
do so;’ ‘There, by that banyan tree, Karuppusami humbled a proud ancestor of ours 
returning from a successful robbery by showing that gods surpass men in everything, 
including stealing;’ ‘It was into that field’s well that a woman born in Malaiur jumped 
when her husband’s family dishonoured her brothers.’ 
Landscape is integral to good stories, which ‘acquire part of their mythic value 
and historical relevance if they are rooted in the concrete details of locales in the 
landscape, acquiring material reference points that can be visited, seen and touched’ 
(Tilley 1994: 33). A considerable number of Malaiur residents – Kallar residents, 
particularly – who spoke to me about their ūr’s past or reputation, utilised landscape 
to locate their village in broad sweeps of regions, countries, and cosmologies. A 
recurrent landscape feature in these accounts was Nagamalai – Snake Hill – an almost 
continuous rocky stretch passing near Malaiur. Villagers drew mythic connections 
between Nagamalai and the Jain Hill closer to Malaiur. They looped Madurai’s 
talapurāṇam or ‘place-history’ with recent archaeological investigations of 
inscriptions etched into the Jain Hill.  
Place-histories or talapurāṇam, usually codifications of existing oral 
narratives and retaining many of the characteristics of their sources (Shulman 
1980b), and oral legends of localised temples and deities infuse Tamil print cultures. 
Individuals I met in diverse locations in Madurai – in old neighbourhoods within the 
city, new suburban colonies, Malaiur, and other villages – sometimes broke from 
conversations to point towards some hills. They would recount legends forming the 
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corpus of one of Madurai’s most famous place-histories, namely the Tiruviḷaiyāṭal 
Purāṇam, or Siva’s Sacred Games (Harman 1989) 
This text serves as the talapurāṇam (Sankrit sthalapurāṇam) of the 
Meenakshi temple and, through metonymic association, of Madurai. Attributed to 
the early-seventeenth-century poet Parañcōti Muṉivar, other versions of this place-
history continue to be printed and distributed extensively. Some episodes from the 
text circulate more widely. It is as though Madurai’s landscape and place-names 
elicited the circulation of these very episodes. Versions also circulate in other media. 
One is the oft-broadcasted Tamil film Thiruvilaiyadal (1965), starring popular actor 
Sivaji Ganesan in Siva’s role, a successful mythological drama focusing on a handful 
of the text’s sixty-four episodes.  
By retelling episodes focusing on topographical features in their vicinity, 
Malaiur residents reproduced the long-standing regional emphasis on place-
orientation, place-histories, and the sacrality of specific places. Once, when I was at 
a tea-stall near the Karuppu temple, a group of Malaiur Kallar men began to trade 
stories about local appearances of deities. Some of them recollected an incident they 
had witnessed a few months earlier from the same spot, when a little boy appeared 
out of nowhere, warned them about four village boys who were, unnoticed by them, 
drowning in the temple’s pond, and disappeared. They surmised that this boy was 
none other than Virumandi, an important Kallar deity – they had not seen him earlier, 
they never saw him since, and he was fair, good-looking, just like Virumandi cāmi. 
When one of the men, getting up to leave, rounded off the talk with a ‘This is a lucky 
place,’ another corrected him – ‘No. It is a sacred place.’ This second man was the 
son of Virumandi cāmiyāṭi, known thus because he danced the god Virumandi. A 
third man, Karuppiah, pointed to the hill, and asked if I had paid it any attention. I 
was not sure what he meant. ‘There are many writings (inscriptions) on the hill. 
Samanar (Jains) lived here, many, many years ago.’ A fourth villager addressed him – 
‘Yenpa, if Jains lived in the cave [in the hill], they will also be buried somewhere here.’ 
They were not buried, Karuppiah emphatically stated. Rounded up by the Pāṇṭiya 
maṉṉaṉ, a Pantiya king, ordered that all the monks be rounded. The monks were 
then taken to Madurai city and impaled. Karuppiah continued: 
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Once, long ago, Samanar lived in most of the hills surrounding 
Madurai. What were they doing there? They were creating demons! 
Idho, here, (pointing in the direction of these three hills) look, this 
Nagamalai here, that Anaimalai (‘Elephant Hill’), and that Pasumalai 
(‘Cow Hill’) there. Those Samanar created three huge monsters –a 
serpent, an elephant, and a cow. Yenma, you must have seen them. 
Anyone looking at the Anaimalai will see an elephant. And this 
Pasumalai – looks like it was born with a horn to tear the sky apart. All 
these were monsters created by the Samanar. They wanted to destroy 
Madurai. What could the Pantiya king do? He called Siva to rescue the 
city. Siva came. Came and cut the serpent into three pieces. Sent 
Nandi (Siva’s vehicle, a bull) to the cow. Turned the elephant into 
stone. All these were turned into stone by Siva. This way, Siva 
protected Madurai. In later times, this same Nagamalai protected us 
from enemies. 
Paralleling other religious traditions where ‘sacred stories are imprinted in the 
landscape’ (Eliade in Harman 1989: 35) in retelling these episodes from the 
Tiruviḷaiyāṭal Purāṇam, my interlocutors immersed landscape within a sacred 
geography. According to one reading, it is through these features and episodes that 
the text emerged as so powerful a place-history, codifying and extending the reach 
and circulation of particular conceptions of space, place, cosmology, and landscape. 
The account I heard in Malaiur that day ended when the narrator looped these sacred 
geographies into Kallarnatu. By suggesting that Nagamalai was not simply 
Kallarnatu’s ‘natural boundary’ but a vestige from Siva’s protection of Madurai, he 
was turning the hill into a ‘reminder of and testimon[y] to Siva’s involvement in their 
past, and perhaps more important, in their present experience of the world’ (Harman 
1989: 35). 
Such narratives emphasise specific self-other relations. The Pantiya king could 
only save his kingdom because Siva heeded his plea. Jain monks appear as evil beings 
who ‘grew’ monsters out of sacrificial fires. From this, a framework is routinely drawn 
wherein Saivism becomes the Tamils’ true religion; Siva and, by association, the 
Pantiya king emerge as the Tamil country’s true patrons and defenders; and Tamil 
itself achieves greatness through divine and courtly patronage. The stories I heard 
echoed the ‘standard historical narrative concerning South Indian Jainism and 
Saivism, which tells a story of heterodox challenge and Hindu revival and triumph’ 
(Davis 1998: 214). Early and medieval Tamil narratives, with their many references to 
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Jain-Saivaite encounters, posit Jains as the absolute other (and as Peterson [1998] 
shows, an alien Other) of a ‘Tamil’ self. Tamil personhood was constituted through 
constant exchange between deities, rulers, humans, and the environment. While 
these imaginaries reveal relational identities and processes, an absolute 
characterisation of self and other provides another template for contemporary 
identity constructions in the Tamil region.   
In a vein somewhat similar to Karuppiah and his friends, Sunda Thevar 
continued with his narrative about Malaiur’s pasts and placed the Jain Hill within a 
sacred Saivaite geography by drawing from another narrative about Saiva-Jain 
clashes. This was the second story he narrated – ‘secondly,’ he had begun that day, 
as soon as he concluded the varalāṟu of Kallar encounters with the colonial state – in 
this case transposing onto the ūr, many features of the legendary account of the 
‘child-saint’ and medieval Saiva poet Tiruñāṉa Campantar’s victory over Jains. The 
well-known legend – which circulates through many media, and has even been part 
of school curriculum – goes as follows: 
The Pantiya king in Campantar’s lifetime had come under the 
influence of Jain monks. His devout Saiva queen, fearing that the 
ascendant Jain supremacy would engulf the entire kingdom, sought 
Campantar’s help to reign in the king. At the queen’s behest, he 
organised battles to pit Jains against the Saivaites. In one of these 
battles, both groups threw their ēṭu or manuscripts (formed by tying 
palmyra leaves on whose surface text was etched) into the river and 
waited to see whose manuscript would survive the test. The Jain texts 
drowned in the river whereas the Saiva texts rushed upstream, 
unscathed, finally halting at Thiruvedagam.  
Sunda Thevar did not once refer to Campantar, nor did he frame the legendary events 
as a battle between Jains and victorious Saivaites. Instead, it was the ‘Tamiḻ matam,’ 
the Tamil religion, which had won. His story refers to thirty-three crore warring 
deities. When the manuscripts of all these religions are thrown into the river, all but 
one fails to emerge from the water. It is only the text of the Tamil religion that leaped 
out of the water, tore across the surface like river carp, swam upstream, and came 
to a rest at Thiruvedagam. He again stressed that his ūr was located within a network 
of sacred places, this time evoking the distance between Malaiur and Thiruvedagam. 
Elucidating Thiruvedagam’s place-name, which is said to originate from this legend – 
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this is the place (akam) of the sacred (tiru) palmyra manuscript (ēṭu) – he said such a 
holy place was only a few kilometres from the ūr. Sunda Thevar began and ended this 
story by denoting the Jain Hill as a dwelling-site of these religious rivals.  
Sunda Thevar’s account appears as a mellowed retelling of this legend. But 
terms such as ‘Tamiḻ matam’ have complex histories. In one sense, it simply 
illustrates a dominant perspective that turns the Tamil region into a Hindu space. This 
sense is ricocheted in Sunda Thevar’s figure of thirty-three crore gods. Sunda Thevar 
draws this common tally of the total number of ‘Hindu’ gods from the present back 
to the past. It also expresses another equation, one between Tamil language and 
Saivism.  
This is a persistent equation, resonating in medieval Saiva texts and bhakti 
poetry, and reworked at least since the late-nineteenth century by Tamil literary and 
nationalist movements. These movements anthropomorphised the Tamil language 
as a goddess, and produced highly devotional and passionate attachments to Tamil 
(Ramaswamy 1997), and were reminiscent of earlier devotional paradigms such as 
those provided by medieval bhakti movements. The term, Tamiḻ matam, denotes 
religion in both senses, because the development of Tamil language is itself 
attributed to divine and court patronage. Such literary lineages are traced to Sangam 
compositions and grammatical treatises, but the genealogies are refreshed through 
later texts and accounts of medieval Saiva (and Vaisnava) courtly and devotional 
canons. Moreover, popular interpretations of these processes elide Jain and Buddhist 
contributions.8 Although ‘Saiva Siddhanta and Jainism… appear to share several 
fundamental attitudes and concepts’ (Davis 1998: 214), many individuals who 
narrated the legends about the Saiva defeat of Jains spoke of the latter as a threat to 
Tamil country and Tamil language.  
Thus, when Arumugam casually mentioned that his caste had probably 
descended from Jain monks who had taken refuge in Madurai’s hills to escape the 
wrath of Pantiya kings, I was somewhat surprised. This was the only time I heard such 
                                                     
8 For an overview of Saiva depictions of Jains, see Peterson 1998, and Walters, who writes that ‘the 
diatribes against… Jains and Buddhists by the Saiva adepts make sense only if both groups actually 
posed a threat to Saiva supremacy in the region’ (2000: 133). See Davis 1998 for a different reading 
of the long interactions between Saiva and Jain traditions in the Tamil region.  
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an ‘origin myth’ of Piramalai Kallar, and tried my best to track it. The only clue I got 
was from another Malaiur resident, Chinna Kalai, who was sympathetic to CPI(M). He 
said some CPI(M) leaders tried every once in a while to ‘change’ local stories and 
memories and inculcate new values – ‘equality,’ and peaceful caste relations – in the 
Kallar community. Many political parties, including CPI(M), had grosser calculations 
(with subtler veils) when they organised or participated in meetings, gatherings, and 
memorial events targeting the Kallar community and addressing demands voiced by 
its dominant representatives. Chinna Kalai thought CPI(M) truly wished to mould 
memories and stories that would foster equality. I was reluctant to concur with these 
parties’ self-professed motives. We shall see (chapter 5) that despite continuous 
interactions between political parties, caste associations, and a ‘caste public,’ it is 
nearly impossible to annex dominant castes’ social memory and create an Indian 
proletariat ‘undivided’ by caste.  
Even if collective memory can be this easily transformed, it does not 
automatically foster feelings of equality or shared subaltern subjectivities between 
Kallar and Dalit castes. The pretext for communist formations’ participation in 
dominant castes’ symbolic politics is that these castes would begin to populate a non-
caste-marked ‘proletariat’ class. Its realisation is an elusive project, for it mistakenly 
locates caste relations outside capitalism and reads them as superstructure. 
Arumugam himself only half-heartedly traced his caste’s descent from 
persecuted Jain monks, even though Jains are today seldom taken to be the alien 
other to a Hindu self. Other religious communities have been cast in this role. In the 
Madurai district gazette published in 1960, one of the Tiruviḷaiyāṭal Purāṇam 
episodes is reworked by replacing Jains with Jesuits as the evil other intending to 
destroy Madurai (Baliga 1960). At least one historian of the region places this 
narrative in a government publication alongside ‘a number of local legends [in which] 
early hinterland missionaries actually summon up demonic beings to engage in 
cosmic warfare for them’ (Bayly 1989: 393). I too found remarkable symmetries 
between previous characterisations of Jains as the other and more contemporary 
framings of Christian and Muslim communities as the other to a Tamil Hindu self.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter focused on Kallar narratives of place and self because these play an 
important role in the production of space here. We saw Kallar individuals repeatedly 
assert that Malaiur is a ‘Tēvamār ūr,’ a Thevar village. Kallar kuṇam is ūr kuṇam; Kallar 
varalāṟu is ūr varalāṟu. The ūr’s fame is a result of ūr Kallar’s actions. Kallar individuals 
classifying themselves as ‘Hindu Piramalai Kallar’ during my household surveys and 
depicting the ūr in ordinary conversations as a Hindu ūr sought to turn it into an 
exclusively Hindu place. Speeches and gifts from representatives of the five Kallar 
lineages given from the stage at a ‘state ceremony,’ demonstrated ‘another 
metonymical form of dominance in the village’ (Mines 2005: 33). I shall conclude with 
views that displace and contest the dominant strains in representational spaces – 
within which the ūr’s dominant social group sought to construct ūr after their own 
image.  
Firstly, do all castes readily identify and accept such a morphing of dominant 
caste and village? Anthropologist Gloria Raheja has noted that strangers in 
northwestern Uttar Pradesh asked each other ‘what is your village?’ replied by 
stating the names of their villages, and followed this with responses such as ‘it is a 
village of Gujars,’ or Jats, or Rajputs (1988:1). Individuals across castes identify 
villages with their locally dominant landholding caste (ibid). I did observe such 
identifications among non-Kallar individuals in Kallar dominated villages. The 
question is what kinds of identification these were. Here are three instances from 
Malaiur. A Konar woman on her way to fulfil gift obligations during an auspicious 
season complained of the increase in money prestations in the ‘Tēvamār ūr’ she was 
going to. An Arundhatiyar woman once told her visiting nephew, her younger 
brother’s son, that she had no money to pay interests (at alarming rates) on 
household loans, but she had to find the money somehow – ‘What else [can I] do, [I 
have been] married off to a Tēvamār ūr.’  
As a final illustration, we could look at instances of rural caste conflicts. When 
conflict between Dalits and the dominant Pillaimar caste in Uthapuram, a village in 
Madurai district was reported in the local press, I found the events being discussed 
by a number of residents in Malaiur. At one of the village’s tea-stall, I found an elderly 
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Kallar man whose myopic vision had lent him the diminutive ‘Good Eyes’ peering 
closely at a Tamil daily’s coverage of the conflict and its ‘mediation’ by political 
groups and bureaucrats. Busy at the stove, his ‘son’ (who traced himself to the same 
ancestor – Periyandi, the eldest paṅkāḷi – as Good Eyes did) who ran the tea-stall 
asked what deserved such concentration. A discussion ensued, in which all the Kallar 
men at the tea-stall participated with gusto. Bringing that round of talk to a 
conclusion, one of the men emphasised that the problem had only ended quickly 
because Uthapuram was a ‘Pillaimar ūr.’ A Pallar resident I met a few days later 
echoed this view, predicting a different turn of events had the incident occurred in a 
‘Tēvamār ūr.’ 
If these Konar, Pallar, and Arundhatiyar women equated the ūr with its Kallar 
residents, they did so to record grievances, to express the consequences of and the 
suffering that ensued from sharing that ūr with its dominant caste. In sharing that 
space, they suggested, they had begun to share the practices of the dominant caste. 
It is in this mode that members of subordinate groups connected the ūr and its 
dominant social group. Unlike Kallar narratives, theirs’ was not an equation readily 
announced. It was narrated in a sphere of complaint, of resigned acceptance and 
even, of resistance.  
Secondly, do they matter, the stories that inhere in a granite outcrop to 
individuals, social groups, business entities, and state representatives only interested 
in the granite? No and yes. Granite is immediately a source of capital for the 
quarrying industry, and as an input, a source of greater capital accumulation through 
other industries. The abstract space produced alongside capitalism is a space 
generated out of the divorce of concrete meanings. It values the granite not the 
stories about the hill. For all the infusion of sacredness into the landscape around 
Madurai, the district is also home to a thriving quarry ‘mafia.’ Sunda Thevar had 
nearly died battling a tiger on the hill in the early-1950s. The incident occurred when 
portions of this hill and the nearby range were quarried, only a couple of years after 
the Archaeological Survey of India declared the Jain monuments on this hill and the 
surrounding region as centrally protected monuments. The hill appears to have 
turned into a feature in an abstract space engendered by capitalism.  
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Do narratives of village within sacred geographies, kuṇam, and caste and 
place exist only as trace elements in a social space totally conquered by capitalism? 
Do they only illustrate that ‘no space ever vanishes utterly, leaving no trace’ 
(Lefebvre 1991: 164)? To follow this is to recognise that capitalism is not present 
everywhere and at all moments homogenously. It works in and through highly 
uneven space-times, generated as the ‘logic of capital’ actively reconstitutes social 
relations at other scales. (Geographical scales themselves are best understood as 
being intercalated, rather than existing in a vertical hierarchy).  
Harvey captures this when he writes that ‘capitalism frequently supports the 
creation of new distinctions in old guises. Pre-capitalist prejudices, cultures and 
institutions are revolutionised only in the sense that they are given new functions 
and meanings rather than being destroyed’ (2006: 416). Except that neither caste 
relations nor perceptions of kuṇam are premodern or pre-capitalist. Although 
capitalism and modernity are perceived to be a radical, even clean, break from the 
past, caste provides a set of relations through which capital generates the 
fragmentation of labour (Natrajan 2012: 109).  
Caste and place kuṇam and perceptions of village and micro-regional pasts 
are repeatedly emphasised not only in village tea-stalls, temples, homes, streets, and 
squares but also in buses, university seminars, caste association meetings, tourism-
related events, and political parties’ public meetings (part III). They generate a 
‘collective “work of representation”’ that ‘disorganizes class formation’ (ibid). We 
saw that village and place reputation feeds into the credit market, specifically in 
usurious practices. Informal credit, which rests on usurers’ ability to enforce debt 
collection, furthers the indebtedness of groups ranging from marginal farmers to 
landless labourers.   
Stories of the hill become important to the mining or quarrying industry in 
another sense, when they matter to the individuals and social groups whose interests 
conflict with those of the industries. Tourists, archaeologists, and other researchers 
regularly visit the hill near Malaiur, now part of a Jain Tourist Circuit covering other 
Jain engravings and inscriptions nearby. At the hilltop is a derelict stone structure 
that Malaiur dwellers denote as the old Karuppu koil. Inscriptions at the structure’s 
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bottommost horizontal blocks reveal it to be a ninth-century Jain temple. 
Archaeologists suspect that some of the statues in the new Karuppu koil at the 
foothill, worshipped as lineage founders by Malaiur’s five Kallar lineages, are those 
of Jain monks brought down by villagers and reinstalled.  
For archaeologists and Jain tourists, the hill is a sign or monument of ‘history,’ 
needing to be protected from the quarry mafia. The mid-twentieth-century 
notification of the rock-cuts and caves alone were insufficient measures. For yet 
others – DHAN Foundation, which had begun to organise periodic walks for tourists 
in this region – a better tactic to end quarrying in adjacent hills and save whatever 
remains of half-destroyed Jain structures, is to recreate older sacred sites in the 
image of contemporary sacred sites. Thus, a DHAN newsletter suggests the following 
measure to end quarrying – ‘In order to give immediate protection to [the hill] it has 
to be converted as a temple of a local deity namely Karupparamy or Dhroupathi or 
Muniyandi etc, with the help of a local Samiyadi [god dancer]’ (Aravindan 2008: 19). 
A better-known contemporary example is the conflict between Vedanta 
Resources, with mining interests in the bauxite-rich Niyamgiri hills in south-west 
Orissa, and the Dongria Konds, residents of the region who have fiercely opposed 
these extractions. The struggle was over many things at once – central and state 
governments kow-towing to the global Aluminium cartel at a frenzy to extract as 
much bauxite ore as possible during a global economic crisis; present decisions of 
governments and business entities taken with an eye on futures trading markets; and 
a struggle over meaning. What was, to Vedanta and many others – representatives 
of national-, regional-, and local-level dominant social groups, and the plan’s support-
base in political parties, the bureaucracy, and the media – only a site rich in resources 
or raw materials, was also a sacred space to the Dongria Konds. One website 
documenting this struggle suggests: 
To be a Dongria Kondh is to farm the hills’ fertile slopes, harvest their 
produce, and worship the mountain god Niyam Raja and the hills he 
presides over, including the 4,000 metre Mountain of the Law, Niyam 
Dongar. Yet for a decade, the 8,000-plus Dongria Kondh lived under 
the threat of mining by Vedanta Resources, which hoped to extract 
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the estimated $2billion-worth of bauxite that lies under the surface of 
the hills.9  
The hills and forests are, for Dongria Konds, places of cultivation, location of dwelling 
sites, places for gathering resources, places to rear livestock in. Yet the mountain’s 
sacrality is foregrounded. These are but two instances of social groups using 
‘absolute space’ and ‘historical space’ (Lefebvre 1991) during moments of 
heightened conflict in an abstract space that has been producing and produced by 
capitalism. In the South Asian region, absolute space appears not as a relic or 
remnant but as a constitutive element of contemporary social space. Absolute space 
holds relevance not only for groups opposing events or instances generated by 
capitalist development but also to capitalism. In part II, we shall continue with these 
examinations by asking another obvious question – ‘What is a road?’  
The previous and current chapters demonstrated the union of method and 
context, audience and purpose, and exposition and representation. One of my 
concerns was to reveal the relationality of places. This aspect of spatiality is extended 
in parts II and III. An acknowledgement of different dimensions of spatiality in the 
analysis of space and society shall materialise in later chapters. The analysis of spatial 
imaginaries pegging Kallar subjectivity and place-making, and connections made 
between the evoking of the past and subjectivities, and history and essence, in the 
production of caste identities avowedly poised, forever, at the edge of aggression 
and violence, shall be of use to later discussions of conflictual space and social 
relations.
                                                     
9 http://www.survivalinternational.org/tribes/dongria/sacredmountain  
 
PART II WHAT IS A ROAD?  
In 2007-08, a period of rapid transformations in India’s road networks, I often 
travelled between Madurai, Chennai, Bangalore, and Delhi. These inter-city journeys 
were additional to my daily travels within Madurai. Travel was integral to my 
research process. It enabled fieldwork, archival and library research, and conference 
participation. It also altered my research interests. Roads’ hyper-visibility led me to 
investigate the relation between road building, circulatory regimes, and socio-spatial 
relations.  
Part II examines road infrastructures as an ‘infinite regress of relationships’ 
(Bateson in Star 1999: 379). It analyses relations between people and objects, and 
relations between objects. This shift in research interests also led me to reimagine 
research practices. Chapters 3 and 4 combine ethnographic observations with an 
analysis of court judgements, and reports by international and national agencies, 
market analysts, and media houses. While the entire thesis reflects on the multiscalar 
nature of space and social relations, the jumps across locations and scales are most 
evident in part II.  
Policy and popular literature on infrastructure projects posited immense 
urgency to road-building and road-upgradation. This literature called for re-
networking an array of locations – ‘remote’ mountain hamlets, port cities, congested 
urban centres, tier-II cities, and villages. Presumably, these locations only awaited 
better road connectivity to turn into efficient commercial hubs. 
Many of these projects were sanctioned under turn of the century 
infrastructure policies. In 1998, India’s Atal Bihari Vajpayee-led National Democratic 
Alliance (NDA) government announced the NHDP, National Highways Development 
Project, to be implemented by the NHAI (National Highways Authority of India).1 
NHDP envisioned phase-by-phase upgradation and expansion of India’s national 
highways network. The most celebrated mega-infrastructure projects were the 
                                                     
1 Constituted under the National Highways Authority of India Act, 1988, NHAI became operational in 
1995 (NHAI 2008).  
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North–South corridor between Srinagar and Kanyakumari, the East–West corridor 
between Porbandar and Silchar, and the project popularly known as the ‘Golden 
Quadrilateral,’ connecting India’s largest metropolitan cities, Delhi, Kolkata, Chennai, 
and Mumbai. In addition, there were many port-connectivity projects, upgradation 
of existing highways, and bypass road constructions.  
In 2000, the NDA government announced the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak 
Yojana, PMGSY, a rural roads project. PMGSY aimed to provide all-weather access 
roads linking unconnected rural habitations to the nearest market centres, towns, or 
cities.2 In 2005, when the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) 
government introduced a national rural employment guarantee scheme that allowed 
roadworks, it further boosted rural infrastructure.  
These projects altered urban, semi-urban, and rural land use patterns, 
circulatory practices, environments, and livelihoods. They ushered new rhythms and 
space-times. They relocated and re-networked work, leisure, and dwelling sites. It is 
therefore important for us to analyse the role of roads in the production of space. 
An immediate factor to the shift in my research interests was the four-laning 
of the North–South corridor’s national highway NH7 passing near Malaiur in 2008. 
This highway upgradation and an emergent speculative property market influenced 
many of the issues that interest anthropologists of rural India – property and 
inheritance disputes, and land, family, and kinship relations, settlement patterns, and 
even responses to household surveys. Fieldwork led me to understand circulatory 
infrastructure as generators of new rhythms and space-times.  
I locate the escalating desire for roads in contemporary India alongside the 
global economic crisis. Chapter 3 links this desire for infrastructure with the 
overaccumulation of capital. It correlates the heightened emphasis on road-building 
with the infrastructure sector’s capacity to provision temporary spatial fixes for 
overaccumulated capital. Chapter 4 reveals roads as entities transforming not only 
                                                     
2 PMGSY is implemented by the Government of India’s Ministry of Rural Development.   
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land relations and circulatory practices but also caste relations and sites such as 
tanks.3  
Contemporary policies related to rural India, particularly in the field of 
transport infrastructure, author new ‘geographies of urbanization, which…ultimately 
explode the erstwhile urban/rural divide’ (Brenner 2013: 87). Rural spaces are 
colonised directly through state policies and indirectly through the amorphous and 
multi-authored actions that attach to or follow these plans. The next two chapters 
demonstrate that highway upgradation and rural connectivity enable the 
consumption of space through urbanisation.  
While roads affect human mobility, everyday rhythms, and work and leisure 
practices, they also affect other objects. Rather than frame them as ‘slave, master 
and substrata’ (Latour 1996: 235) of signs such as development or progress, chapters 
3 and 4 attend to roads themselves. An associative account (e.g. Latour 1993, 1996, 
2005), would reveal that roads are sound gavels for shattering the silence over the 
objects that surround us but are marginalised, rendered formative absences, through 
modernity’s projects. Part II examines how roads reassemble subjects and objects 
without taking recourse, however, to a flat ontology or a flat social. 
                                                     
3 Transport infrastructures transform a number of practices. For links between roads and religious 
practices, see Flower 2004 for China and Ahuja 2009 for eastern India. 
CHAPTER 3 ‘IT IS NOT A RIBBON:’ 
REPRESENTATIONS OF INDIA’S ROAD 
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS  
 
The whole Mediterranean consists of movement in space… [Land and sea] routes are 
the channels of this movement. But they are more than mere ribbons over the land, 
lines across the sea.  
Braudel (1995: 277) 
 
Let us look at ethnographic research in the light of what historian Fernand Braudel 
emphasises – that regions are in perpetual movement and that routes are 
constitutive of regions. Typically, ethnographic research elides the travel routes that 
enable it, taking fieldwork to be ‘intensive, “deep” interaction… something 
canonically guaranteed by the spatial practice of extended, if temporary, dwelling in 
a community’ (Clifford 1997: 59). Ethnographers may attend to roads at specific 
points in their research – in the initial fieldwork period, for example, as they travel in 
search for a field-site. There was another reason why I could not gloss over the 
‘routed/rooted’ (ibid: 68) nature of my research – the routes were so obviously in 
sight.  
Some anthropologists (Star 1999) have suggested that infrastructure is 
normally invisible to us, while others (Larkin 2013) emphasise the situatedness of 
infrastructure’s in/visibility. Secure occupiers and users of roads, especially efficient 
ones, might have little need for consciously noticing roads. Roads under construction 
or in disrepair and new roads are more visible since they overturn daily rhythms. An 
engagement with this infrastructure is part of daily life for road workers – ‘what is 
background for one person is a daily object of concern for another’ (Larkin ibid: 336). 
This debate throws into relief differential motility and mobility of bodies, and the 
effects of corporeal knowing in specific perceptions of space. 
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Despite these differences, policy and project literature flattens road 
infrastructure, representing it as neutral and homogenously accessible and 
experienced. This literature forwards representations of space that attend to 
abstract space. We may recall that each historical period produces its own social 
space, that the transition to capitalism synchronised with the emergence of abstract 
space, and that abstract space is produced through an ensemble of particular 
representations of space, spatial practices, and representational spaces (Lefebvre 
1991). 
Abstract space, like abstract labour, is space fallen prey to abstraction 
(Lefebvre 1991: 49). It is space created in the language of volumes and quantity, of 
empty homogeneity, and easy substitution and exchange. It attempts to turn space 
into a commodity. Abstract space is ‘the locus, medium and tool of [the] “positivity”’ 
derived from the positive relation towards technology, planning, and ‘knowledge 
bound to power’ (ibid: 50).1 The emergence of abstract space is linked to the 
emergence of particular ways of seeing space. 
We need also recall two additional characteristics of conceived space. Firstly, 
representations of space affect material changes, re-network locations or points in 
space, and transform spatial practices. These representations generate material 
outcomes, and this capacity is geared towards generating space in the image of 
capital. Secondly, despite their hegemony, representations of space neither 
completely nor permanently produce the outcomes intended by planners, builders, 
banks, or bureaucracies.  
It is in this light that this chapter frames its analysis of the representations of 
roads and road construction in India’s recent infrastructure policies and schemes. 
The first three sections connect policy imaginations and representations of roads to 
capitalist crises and to the representations of space from which infrastructure 
projects seemingly derive their force and design. These sections are also interspersed 
with descriptions of concrete socio-spatial relations and practices that destabilise 
                                                     
1 Lefebvre also argues that abstract space is negatively related to ‘the historical and religio-political 
spheres’ which ‘perceive and underpin it,’ and to the ‘differential space-time’ which it carries within 
itself (1991: 50). 
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abstract representations. The fourth section explores divergences between 
representations of space and representational space by investigating Malaiur 
residents’ memories and perceptions of a road leading to their village. 
Urgency, Uneven Development, and a ‘Pathology of Space’  
State-, corporate-, and media-generated literature on India’s transport infrastructure 
evoke a sense of urgency to road development. The question is whether this rhetoric 
of urgency links with a capital-generated valuation of urgency in the production of 
space-time.2 This leads us to examining the processes by which the rhetoric of 
urgency becomes an art of persuasion, a technique utilised by states, lending 
agencies, and infrastructure corporations. This rhetoric readily illustrates a recent 
trend in the anthropology of infrastructure, which highlights infrastructure’s 
powerful affective presence, its centrality in many projects of modernity, 
development, and nation-building (Larkin 2013). Anthropology inadequately 
addresses how the emphasis of urgency in infrastructure projects enables what David 
Harvey (e.g. 2006), following Marx and Lefebvre, terms a ‘spatial fix’ to capitalist 
crises. A spatial fix is the temporary postponement of the generalised crises 
periodically affecting capitalism, crises which emerge not from extraneous agents but 
from the internal workings or the tendencies of capital.  
Policy literature typically conjures up infrastructural exigency as follows. It 
first posits an urgency to upgrading India’s road networks, especially to avoid global 
capital’s flight to China, where an ever-expanding infrastructural net awaits to trap 
it.3 It then seeks a hastening through of every road project. Project delays are taken 
                                                     
2 As rhetorical and material practice, urgency is not unique to infrastructure. In the biotechnology 
sector, ‘first the government and then the public and other companies’ pursue a similar ‘breathless 
rhetoric of speed’ and utilise it as a ‘material-rhetorical fulcrum’ (Sunder Rajan in Müller 2006: 6). 
Infrastructure’s sectoral specificities – massive capital investment, land-related conflicts, and the 
significant time-lapse between capital investment and realization – lend a different order and weight 
to the actions of states, public, and companies in road-building. 
3 Reports published by governments, the media, international institutions, and by think-tanks 
(embodiments of Friedrich Hayek’s dream for ‘second-hand dealers in ideas’ Mitchell 2009: 386-7) are 
replete with such arguments. Maj Gen Khanduri, head of India’s Ministry of Road Transport and 
Highways in the Vajpayee-led government, bemoaned India’s difference from China. Khanduri posited 
that since China was unburdened by democracy, it easily overrode objections to policies. The New 
York Times reporter interviewing Khanduri then writes that, ‘Having invested more than 10 times as 
much as India since the mid-1990s, China now has 15 times the expressway length’ (Waldman 2005). 
In 2014, former governor of the Reserve Bank of India, and then Director of Brookings India Centre 
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to result not from present conflicts or from differently imagined futures, but from 
the obduracy of India’s past. Objections are seen as the intrusion of politics into a 
purely economic and technical realm. India’s past is reduced to its ‘licence and 
permit’ raj; this has to give way to bold, new modes of administration. 
Urgency invigorates a particular notion of time. It privileges immediate time. 
Policy literature posits infrastructure development as so urgent and important as to 
compel us into thinking that the moment a road is conceived, it must be constructed. 
Many reform initiatives – single-window clearance and the recent idea of abolishing 
‘planning’ itself – seek to shorten the (time) gap between a project’s 
conceptualisation and its materialisation and completion. For how else, this 
breathless prose of policy suggests, can India trap something as fickle as international 
capital within its territory?  
In addition to shrugging off the deadweight of outdated bureaucratic 
machineries, India is then urged to tick off its unruly publics. Institutional frameworks 
and unruly publics appear as logjams to infrastructural development. Both are taken 
to emerge from the refusal of private interest (of corrupt bureaucrats, rent-seekers, 
and objecting individuals or social groups) to give way to public interest.4 
Nearly every policy is a pretender to the throne. Road-related policies gather 
the additional force of being about infrastructure, the ground from which other 
policies take off. Infrastructure policy and project literature forwards older 
developmental frames of village India but also reframes the rural – attributing 
agrarian distress to the lack of proper roads for timely transport of farm produce to 
markets, and ascribing rural poverty to the lack of non-farm employment 
opportunities, in turn linked to inadequate road infrastructure.  
                                                     
(branch of policy research institute, Washington D.C. Brookings Institution), likewise compared China 
and India’s infrastructure-ranking. Subir Gokarn. ‘Slippery slope for infrastructure,’ Business Standard. 
09.03.2014.  
4 In May 2015, India’s BJP-led NDA government ‘prioritised unblocking infrastructure projects that had 
gathered dust because of either an obstructive bureaucracy, a lack of private sector investment, or in 
some case [sic] public interest litigation.’ ‘Faster than China? India’s road, rail drive could lay doubts 
to rest.’ Reuters. 31.05.2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/01/india-economy-
infrastructure-idUSKBN0OH17Z20150601.  
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Policy literature on India’s infrastructure-building recreates a ‘pathology of 
space’ (Lefebvre 1991: 99). New roads supposedly energise not only ‘ailing 
neighbourhoods’ (ibid) but also the entire national economy. Pathology emerges not 
only at subnational scales (regions, cities, districts, neighbourhoods) but also at the 
national scale. This signals the state’s continued role in producing the path 
dependencies to capital circulation. Pitching urgency at the level of state-space also 
conceals the multiple ends for which state officials, bureaucrats, and politicians 
pursue infrastructure projects. The reification of infrastructure allows a reified state, 
charged with building an efficient road network to heal the national economy, to 
emerge as the main planning agent.  
There are other effects of ascribing pathology at the national-scale. The 
problematic of uneven development and global patterns of territorialization and 
reterritorialization are construed within national boundaries. Uneven development 
is recast as a national problem, not as a reflection of inequalities partly structured at 
the global-scale. The illustrations that generate this pathology of space emanate 
from existing geographical patterns of development but turn into managerial and 
technical problems of inadequate infrastructure. This literature suggests that what is 
needed to iron out uneven development is a renewed attempt to integrate places to 
the ‘market,’ although markets themselves – whether spot markets, the abstract 
Market, or virtual markets – are product and tool of uneven development.   
The notion of an abstract economy, emerging alongside abstract space and 
capitalism, also poses challenges for scholarship on this region. Historians suggest 
that this notion incapacitates us from grasping regional institutions and sites – 
temples, tanks, towns, royal centres, and markets – as co-constitutive.5 
                                                     
5 Interestingly, Arjun Appadurai’s (1981) influential study of south Indian temple worship as a 
redistributive process drew inspiration from economic anthropology. Appadurai acknowledges (1981: 
33-4) Marshal Sahlins’ distinction between reciprocity and redistribution as the inspiration for 
understanding temples as the nodal points in redistributive economy (cf Dirks 1987: 287-8). The 
difficulty in abstracting and separating the economy is visible in Aidan Southall’s (1988) revisit of the 
segmentary state (the model which inspired Burton Stein’s history of the Tamil Cola Empire). But built 
structures reveal what analytical frameworks fail to grasp. Although considerably transformed under 
colonialism, traces of the constitutive collusion of temple and market may still be found in the spatial 
arrangement of many Indian cities and towns. What modernity split into distinct realms (religion and 
market, religion and state) are located side-by-side, if only as structures in the built environment.   
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Contemporary spatial practices can only be understood by attending to historical 
processes. In India’s small towns, cities, and peri-urban regions, weekly markets 
(haat, cantai) still reflect the characteristics of a social space that predated the 
availability of cheap and extensive transport infrastructure, their locations 
determined by the distance that an average adult person could traverse on foot in a 
single day.6  
Mobility’s dependence on human (or animal) energies does not indicate weak 
circulatory regimes in precolonial south India. Nested hierarchies and relational 
arrangements for resource extraction and redistribution produced well-networked 
places and communities, a complex ‘historical geography’ of circulation in the 
peninsular south (Stein 1977, 2005).  
Here, centres and peripheries were knit into a loose fabric, characterised by 
segmentary rule, redistributive mechanisms routed across settlements, and 
relational ties between emperors and kings, overlords and lords, and lords and 
chieftains. By the late medieval period, these spatial fabrics were thickly knotted at 
certain places through ‘state building… tank building… and the raising of temple 
towns’ (Stein 2005: 24). Practices of merchant groups, territorial overlords, local 
retainers of shares in agrarian produce, heads of sects and pilgrim centres, and many 
other social groups looped pilgrim routes, rest-houses, market-centres, tanks, and 
temples. These practices directed regional circulatory networks.7 The co-constitution 
                                                     
6 In late-nineteenth-century Gangetic Bihar, even as the circuits for petty traders (usually also 
moneylenders and rich peasants) became more extensive, one estimate placed this circulation’s 
extant as a perimeter of about twenty miles, the distance traders could cover on foot in one or two 
days (Yang 1998: 248).  
7 These directions differ from path dependencies generated by capitalism’s circulatory infrastructures, 
a point worth stressing, given the tendency to trace lineages of capitalism and neoliberal 
entrepreneurship back in time. Gurcharan Das, leading ‘market guru’ exemplifies such anachronistic 
readings. Das applauds treatises such as Kautilya’s Arthashastra for provisioning tax rebates, and 
reads trade between ancient Tamilakam (Tamil country) and Romans as evidence of free market 
(‘Gurcharan Das: We raise questions that are relevant even today,’ Mint 14.12.2012, 
http://www.livemint.com/Consumer/7i3qXj4UkBGftr9cDTG2xM/We-raise-questions-that-are-
relevant-even-today-Gurcharan-D.html). India’s Central Public Works Department also exhibits this 
tendency, giving us the following ‘historical background’ to ‘public works’ – ‘the execution of public 
work [sic] has been an organized function of the State from times immemorial in our country.’ It treats 
Mohenjodaro and Harappa as evidence of ‘the building traditions of India prevalent 3,000 years before 
the Christian Era,’ and celebrates the Arthashastra for ‘anticipat[ing] the community projects ideas of 
those (sic) days, (and) remind[ing] us…that ideas of modern town planning are not really modern’ 
(http://cpwd.gov.in/ accessed last in June 2010). Ravi Ahuja cautions us against anachronistic 
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of centres and peripheries in segmentary polities resulted in the dispersal rather than 
centralization of resource extraction and redistribution. 
Many old market centres turned into colonial administrative and commercial 
centres, and thus into thick nodal points in Madras Presidency’s infrastructure 
networks. At a micro-regional-scale, administrative and commercial centres still 
exhibit the characteristics of locations that emerged before the advent of modern 
transportation. Most markets and administrative centres in and around Madurai city 
are situated at the distance of a day’s walk (Blackburn 1978: 41).8  
These phenomena affirm social space’s historicity, and that the ‘space of the 
present is interlaced with spaces of the past’ (Ahuja 2009: 36). Current spatial 
practices, the emplacement (and networks) of sites of production, habitation, and 
consumption, emerge from the reorganisation of earlier social relations, social space, 
and spatial scales.   
New spatial practices may outmode older spatial hierarchies without 
eliminating them altogether. Tamil Nadu’s urbanisation is a case in point. Some 
scholars attribute the state’s extensive urbanisation to its ‘decentralised and 
dispersed physical infrastructure’ (Harriss-White 2003: 201). Yet contemporary 
urbanisation patterns are linked to colonial and postcolonial reorganisation of earlier 
social spaces. Since segmentary rule and historical geography generated a well-
connected region, these histories are as important as modern transport 
infrastructures in shaping contemporary spatial practices.  
This does not mean one-to-one correlations between older and newer spatial 
practices. Historical research (e.g. Ludden 1986) reveals instances when older 
                                                     
interpretations of circulatory networks, and stresses, after Marx, that circulation becomes internal to 
production only with capitalism (2009: 88-9).  
8 Stuart Blackburn’s interpretation of this as evidence of weak Nayaka control, whose ‘political 
power… extended only as far as their economic control’ (1978: 41), misapprehends centre–periphery 
relations in segmentary polities. This recalls the myth of total Kallar independence and intractability. 
My Kallar interlocutors represented themselves as warriors of an independent territory primarily on 
the basis that they did not pay taxes to the Madurai Nayakas or the colonial state. They downplayed 
other tributes, gifts, grants, and exchanges particular to centre–periphery relationality in segmentary 
polities, and more complicated relations with the colonial state (see Introduction and part I). 
Memories and narratives of caste history and essence, and commemorative practices highlighting 
Kallar valour and independence vis-à-vis colonialism undergird a contemporary political project – that 
of turning class-differentiated caste groups into united moral communities (part III). 
131 
 
market-temple-polity centres were bypassed, their importance reduced with the 
construction of rail networks and new roads. Abstract space generates new patterns 
of urbanisation, where a place’s importance depends on its physical proximity to 
cities, to production centres, and to sites for circulation and logistics. Recent studies 
show that Madurai’s ‘urban sprawl’ follows national and state highways and other 
main roads (Saravanan et al 2012).9  
How does this discussion link to the imagination of urgent cause in India’s 
infrastructure projects? Historical processes shape the formation of clusters and the 
location of production and commercial enclaves. Transport infrastructures seldom 
create entirely new spatial arrangements; they often reinforce existing tendencies 
and reproduce uneven development. This is worth stressing, since contemporary 
infrastructure projects forward the view that ‘spatial chaos’ or ‘disparity’ (Ahuja 
2009: 53-60), outcomes of uneven development and capitalism’s regional 
specificities, can be overcome by a ‘more of the same’ approach. Support for 
infrastructure projects – at the level of both arterial highway networks and rural road 
networks – is sought in the name of efficiently networking points in space. Roads turn 
into magical agents that can eliminate chaos by annihilating the supposedly empty 
space between locations, or between a village and a market-centre. 
In any case, small- and medium-scale spot markets are not the main targets 
of mega-infrastructure programmes. Upgraded national highways are oriented 
towards nodal points, the big cities, key districts, centres of production, and 
circulatory and logistics-sites such as wholesale markets, godowns, airports, and 
ports.10 Following freight-volume trends towards metropolitan cities and transport 
hubs, upgradation projects generate distantiation effects vis-à-vis places they 
bypass.11  
                                                     
9 When such studies provide metric measurements of sprawls, they partake in a representation of 
space geared towards a consumption of space.  
10 Such trends are also visible in other regions. Campbell, writing of a long-awaited highway 
upgradation in Amazonia, sees highways as ‘colonization corridors’ (2014: 242). For Campbell, this 
road project deserved ethnographic consideration because it failed to exemplify the colonization 
trend and instead turned into an ‘odd kind of frontier’ which illuminated the ‘conjuring [of] property’ 
(ibid: 247) and the ‘speculative accumulation’ along its stretches.  
11  In their account of a Sino-Mongolian region, Pedersen and Bunkenborg focus on technologies of 
distantiation, where roads are ‘carefully crafted social tools that ensure that people can remain 
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Even as India’s new rural roads connect villages to nearest markets, spot 
markets may simultaneously be relocated. Wholesale vegetable markets are shifted 
to peripheral locations through continuous urban restructuring. New city bypasses, 
interfering with production and circulation networks and other infrastructures, 
reconfigure rural space (chapter 4). 
With regards to highway development, we are told that the national highways 
network require urgent upgradation, since they constituted less than two per cent of 
the total road length in India, while servicing over forty per cent of the total traffic 
(NHAI 2008: 1). This low proportion of highways to the entire road network compares 
unfavourably with other countries.12 Planners and technicians of space oversee a 
reductive interpretation of these statistics. That such heavy traffic plies on such a 
miniscule portion of the roads network becomes a measure of highway overuse and 
inefficiency, and then a reflection of an infrastructural block to India’s economic take-
off. This technicalization of India’s transport infrastructure dodges important 
questions. What happened in regions serviced by the remaining 98 per cent of roads? 
Why did these roads not generate dispersed and universal development? Why were 
they not used as conduits for the dispersal of production and consumption? If 
anything, the logic that extensive road networks are automatic forerunners of 
development ought to reflect in well-developed countryside and small towns. 
Once again, we must note that the Golden Quadrilateral, the North–South 
and East–West corridors, and many other NHDP highway projects are upgradation 
projects. They are likely to recreate patterns of uneven development. The metropole-
                                                     
minimally connected over time’ (2012: 557). Marc Augé explored distantiation vis-à-vis France’s 
autoroutes. Augé takes these roads to be paradigms of ‘the two complementary but distinct realities’ 
of non-place, stressing that the production of space for certain ends (such as connectivity) is distinct 
to the experience of space (with individuals experiencing alienation and distance) (1995: 94; cf. Moran 
2005). 
12 In 2009, highways constituted five per cent of the road infrastructure network in the U.S.A., Japan, 
and Brazil, and thirteen per cent in the United Kingdom and Korea (Ghani et al 2014: 3). The recent 
worldwide emphasis on infrastructure – substantially translating into projects for territories in Africa 
and Asia – is wrought by new statistical devices such as LPI (Logistics Performance Index) scores of 
each country. LPI scores (derived mainly from the experience of global freight forwarders) are annexed 
to the projection of urgency for restructuring infrastructure networks. India’s low rank (in comparison 
to China or Brazil) was a tool for building opinion favourable to large-scale investments in its transport 
infrastructure, even though the World Bank (which kick-started the LPI index) admits India as an 
‘overperformer,’ a country whose logistics networks are relatively higher than its corresponding 
national income levels (Arvis et al 2010).  
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oriented Golden Quadrilateral project and NHDP’s port-connectivity projects are in 
continuation with the colonial prioritisation of ‘radial axes directed at the colonial 
metropolises over local networks of circulation’ (Ahuja 2009: 112).13  
Highways also affect other locations along the routes, evidence of which is 
quickly paraded as projects’ success. In little over a decade, World Bank-led impact 
assessments (Ghani et al 2014) of the Golden Quadrilateral showcased new industrial 
activity and efficient resource allocation within a ten kilometre radius of non-nodal 
districts.14 When networks stabilise and strengthen path dependencies, the effects 
of new highways can be seen beyond this radius. The point is that impact studies take 
up specific quantifiable effects to garner support for the ongoing thrust on 
infrastructure building. Impact evaluation studies not only garner support for future 
land acquisition and huge capital loans, they also rework the social after ‘rendering 
[it] technical’ (Li in Mosse 2013).  
Rural roads programmes are different from mega-infrastructure projects. 
With their low traffic densities, rural roads projects have witnessed little private 
participation. They are financed almost entirely by states. Their impact assessments 
are radically different from the assessment of arterial roads.  
Rural roads project assessments also promote infrastructure’s representation 
as universal public good. Since conventional assessment studies display little impact 
of rural roads, new impact measurement criteria have emerged. The shift in criteria 
responds to crises of representation in neoliberal frameworks. The 
disproportionalities between large funding and small impacts have necessitated new, 
non-economic modes of reckoning ‘impact.’ A reworked social is looped back to the 
technical in rural roads assessment studies. These studies employ new frameworks 
and ways of creating a techno-social (van de Walle 2009). For instance, an 
assessment study of PMGSY in three Tamil Nadu districts involves considerable effort 
                                                     
13 While centres and peripheries of post-1947 India retain these orientations, new centres and 
peripheries have emerged out of ‘supply chain capitalism’ (Tsing 2009) and ‘flexible accumulation’ 
(Chari 2004) – for e.g. the development of cities such as Bangalore and Hyderabad reflect their 
emergence as peripheries in a global spread of information technology industries.  
14 The Ghani et al (2014) study identified the Golden Quadrilateral’s non-nodal districts as districts 
other than Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, and Chennai, and their suburban areas.  
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in tracing the roads’ effect on ‘social indicators’ of health, education, poverty 
alleviation, and housing (Chathukulam 2012).  
Impact assessment studies themselves mirror capitalism’s ontic commitment 
to urgency. These studies begin to evaluate impact even before we comprehend the 
ways in which new roads or networks recreate or destabilise existing circulatory 
paths. The urgency to assess impact mimics the utilisation of urgency in rebuilding 
infrastructure. It attempts to contain contending temporalities and spatialities at the 
level of the moment, at current duration.  
As noted earlier, pitching pathology at the national-scale erases the 
intercalation of spatial scales and practices generating uneven development. The 
temporalities and conception of history in the literature of infrastructure are similar 
to those prevalent in development literature. In development literature, questions 
of social space and uneven development are subsumed by projecting India’s 
development as a matter of time. These projections create a formulaic ‘let us catch-
up’ answer to structural and historical issues that have shaped regional trajectories 
of capitalism. Within such a framework, India’s recent infrastructure projects become 
the magic wand for catching-up. Massive highway-building has been pitched as the 
road to ‘catch-up’ with the industrialised and urbanised West. 
When characteristics of uneven development are attributed to inadequate 
infrastructure for attracting capital investment, national policy frameworks are 
reassembled. State-space is mobilised so that global capital can be invested in 
infrastructure projects, and temporary fixes are obtained for crises of over-
accumulation. The support these spatial fixes derive from the articulation of 
infrastructure projects as universal and public good is discussed in the next section.  
The importance of ‘urgency’ to infrastructure rebuilding recalls many of the 
themes an anthropology of space encounters. Urgency relates to contending 
temporalities and spatialities, contestations over spatial practices and rhythms, and 
differences between representations of space and representational space. The 
evocation of urgency also enables political fixes. It addresses the political challenge 
of meeting capitalism’s ontic commitment to urgency while allowing for the co-
existence of participatory governance.  
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It is commonplace in some circles to take neoliberalism as a retreat of the 
state and a celebration of the auto-correcting market. This view, as historians of 
neoliberalism have shown, is a myth. Neoliberal thought, since its emergence 
through the Mont Pelerin collective, has been vocal about having an active state. 
Neoliberalism is no ‘mere epiphenomenon of a certain type of economics;’ it is a 
primer for politics, a persistent command for states ‘to act,’ a push for constructing 
a ‘strong state as both producer and guarantor of a stable market society’ (Mirowski 
2009: 433-5).  
But the popular imagination is one of neoliberalism strongly opposing state 
intervention, planning, and funding. There is now an anti-planning atmosphere 
across the world. Fashioning this atmosphere among dominant social groups has 
been easy in India, with its ‘burden’ of licences and permits. Yet planning ‘is not going 
away,’ and across the world, the subcontracting state ‘is increasingly bound up in 
proliferating forms and domains of planning’ (Abram 2014: 130). This additionally 
burdens (indeed, becomes a ruse for burdening) the process of participation. The 
rhetoric of speed contends with the emphasis on participatory models of 
governance. We can see (chapter 4) in conflicts over road projects that the 
commitment to urgency, neoliberalism, and participatory democracy sit uneasily 
with each other.  
Participatory democracy surfaces as a template for bureaucrats, who have to 
publicise policies, schemes, and tenders, award contracts with transparency, and 
organise meetings with stakeholders. This ought to increase the scope for objections 
and allow greater participation in decision-making. Yet there are major disjunctions 
in the notions of space and time held by different actors.  
These disjunctions become obvious in disputes over road building. Conflicts 
reveal the bureaucratic field and businesses coming down heavily upon participatory 
processes by portraying objections as delay tactics. Curtailing the time necessary for 
participatory democracy serves many purposes. It releases capital held back by 
objections into circuits where it again becomes mobile. It translates participation as 
quick-flowing procedure rather than time-consuming process. It caps contending 
notions of space, time, and rhythms.  
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In corporate and bureaucratic notions, infrastructure projects are for the 
present and immediate (and maybe more distant) futures. It is the past that is given 
the short shrift (Abram 2014). Nothing matters but for the execution of the current 
road project. Thus, infrastructures for circulation can take precedence over irrigation 
infrastructures that have been produced through previous rounds of labour 
extraction and investment for agricultural production. Neoliberal tight-fistedness on 
project duration, shared by most of India’s political parties, seek to contain conflict 
using the sense of urgency. Yet the template of participation can be utilised to create 
a wedge, to fold back the past into projects, to expand time horizons, and to unfurl 
different spatial and temporal practices. Space need not be recreated purely in the 
image of capital (chapter 4). 
Viewed alongside the role of large-scale infrastructure projects in absorbing 
capital and keeping it temporarily in motion, the urgent-requirement argument turns 
out to be more than rhetoric. Urgency is not just one of neoliberal capitalism’s 
‘epistemic commitment’ (Mirowski 2009: 418). It is, and has been, an ontic 
commitment under capitalism. Indeed, as rhetoric, urgency not only marshals one 
temporality to seize command over contending temporalities but also enables a 
particular rhythm to the realisation of capital. The bureaucratic and corporate 
evocation of urgency fits with the thrust to continuously decrease the turnover time 
of capital. It effects quick spatial fixes by the absorption of devaluing, 
overaccumulated capital into built environments (Harvey 2006). Packaging 
infrastructure as a universal good becomes even more imperative. 
Imagining the Public, Imagining Mobility: India’s Rural Roads 
Programmes 
As capitalism rendered circulation integral to production, transport networks were 
reimagined as public goods with universal accessibility. Although colonialism 
imparted certain specificities to the history of India’s modern infrastructure (Ahuja 
2009), a shared conceptualisation of roads as more than circulatory networks was 
generated in both metropole and colony.15 In colonial representations of space, ‘the 
                                                     
15 The pull of infrastructure is strongly felt in other regions such as the Soviet (see Larkin 2013 for a 
summary), and Albania (Dalakoglou 2010, 2012). Recent anthropological investigations posit 
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creation of a “good” transport infrastructure was considered an incontestable boon 
for an imagined all-embracing “public”… and those who opposed colonial efforts to 
transform social space [through infrastructure building were deemed] irrational.’ 
(Ahuja 2009: 30-1). 
These representations were more or less adopted by proponents of economic 
nationalism in the early-twentieth-century (Ahuja 2009, Goswami 2004). Similarities 
in nineteenth-century colonial, early-twentieth-century nationalist, mid-twentieth-
century postcolonial, and early-twenty-first-century conceptualisations of road 
infrastructure are noteworthy. Across different moments, road development is 
portrayed as a boon for an undifferentiated public. Roads are imagined as irrefutable 
ushers of rationality, modernity, thrift, and industry. 
Recall PMGSY, the rural roads project announced by the BJP-led government 
in 2000. The next, UPA-led, central government launched this scheme in 2004 under 
Bharat Nirman, a six-point scheme for rural development. The same year, the World 
Bank announced its assistance to PMGSY in the form of a US$400 million Rural Roads 
Project.16 Initial Bank assistance concentrated on four states – Himachal Pradesh, 
Jharkhand, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh. Subsequently, the Bank provisioned 
US$500 million towards project implementation in five other states.17 Other World 
Bank projects also emphasised rural connectivity – the need to take India’s 
                                                     
infrastructure development in these ‘post-socialist economies’ as ‘vernacular expressions of anxiety 
and efforts to come to terms with the relatively new ethics of the market economy’ (Dalakoglou 2010: 
139). We must be cautious while attributing distinct ethics and values to particular periods and 
political formations – the Soviet effected a homegrown version of capitalist development, thereby 
recreating uneven development within its territories (Lefebvre 1991: 421). Lefebvre also criticised the 
Soviet for not comprehending socio-spatial dialectics and introducing new built environments and 
spatial architectonics contradictory to its stated visions.  
16 World Bank and Asian Development Bank loans have partly financed these projects. A fuel cess, 
routed to a central road fund, also finances the projects. By linking fuel cess and road development 
funding, the state introduced new ways of taxing the public, strengthened an idea of self-sufficiency, 
and recreated the public in the image of a user or consumer of road space. 
17 Details are from the World Bank website, last accessed, June 2010. 
http://www.worldbank.org.in/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/INDIAEXTN/0,,conten
tMDK:21479699~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:295584,00.html. Interestingly, assistance 
to the rural roads project became an occasion for the Bank to decry, and render technical, the state’s 
inability to manage funds – ‘rural road agencies lacked the technical expertise to deploy the large 
sums that were disbursed to them under the program.’ Last accessed, June 2010 at 
http://www.worldbank.org.in/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/INDIAEXTN/0,,conten
tMDK:21742596~menuPK:295589~pagePK:1497618~piPK:217854~theSitePK:295584,00.html. 
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‘agriculture to the market’ – and suggested an opening up farmland for global land 
markets by strengthening farmers’ access to supply chains (World Bank 2008). 
In four years, the Bank found evidence of new roads transforming rural India. 
Bank documents described transformation in terms of greater (economic) 
opportunities as well as higher human development indices or quality of life. Take a 
January 2008 Bank newsletter, reporting changes in a ‘nondescript’ Himachal 
Pradesh village. It triumphantly celebrates the transformation of ‘once-sleepy 
hamlets that dot the hillsides into great hubs of enterprise.’ It also states, ‘mobility is 
indeed the key to opening up new opportunities in rural India. A new vitality is now 
palpable in countless remote hamlets that have been linked to main trunk roads 
under the PMGSY.’  
The representation of space in these impact assessments is similar to that 
found in colonial literature on public works.18 The difference lies in the Bank 
literature’s incorporation of new frames of reference such as programme-impact on 
‘target groups’ – the poor, women, adivasis, Dalits. I shall now examine the framing 
of road infrastructure as the single-most important catalyst for poverty alleviation, 
for physical mobility or circulation of people and things, and for social mobility in the 
light of ethnographic observations from Malaiur.  
                                                     
18 Consider John Norton’s mid-nineteenth-century work, mostly a compendium of Company literature 
on Madras Presidency addressed to the Joint Secretary, Board of Control, East India Company. To 
highlight the importance of roads, Norton mobilises the deposition of a Colonel to the Lords’ 
Committee – ‘Cultivation has been extended; manufactures have increased, and the price of food has 
been cheapened. I may instance Tanjore especially, where the value of land has been raised, 
cultivation generally extended, and the condition of the people ameliorated materially’ (Norton 1854: 
49). In their late-nineteenth-century study, Strachey and Strachey make a series of claims regarding 
the all-round improvements effected by public works. Their preamble states that ‘progress… is seen 
in every branch of the administration, and in the whole condition of the people… [T]he reforms… have 
served to lighten the burdens pressing upon the people, to give them greater means of material 
progress, new markets for their produce, cheaper salt and cheaper clothing’ (1882: viii-ix). A road 
development committee appointed in 1927 to consider means of financing road networks and the 
formation of a Central Roads Board represents infrastructure in similar terms. ‘The social and political 
effect of good communications, especially on the rural population, is not less important than the 
economic… It is commonplace that social and political progress is advance by intercourse, and 
retarded by isolation’ (Report of the Indian Road Development Committee, 1927–28. Calcutta: 
Government of India, Central Publication Branch, 1928: 18-9). The idea of isolation, which fit with 
colonial conceptualisations of the village republic, continues in contemporary pathologisation of rural 
space. Contemporary policy documents and impact studies propose infrastructure as a technical 
solution to contradictions of capitalist space, and to the ‘spatial chaos’ and the disparities generated.  
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One of the changes attributed by impact studies to the rural roads project is 
a dramatic increase in the school attendance of girls. Governmental regimes in India 
have for long emphasised literacy, connecting it to the very capacity of rural citizens 
to represent themselves (Cody 2009: 352-4). Since state emphasis on formal 
education combines with the widespread belief that education is a sure-shot route 
to social mobility, educational access becomes an easy addendum with which to 
secure public support for infrastructure projects.  
Consultants, lenders, and bureaucrats are not the only ones to link road 
construction and school attendance. Individuals, families, and social groups may 
similarly link transport and educational opportunities. Roads and schools index 
‘formative absences’ (Li 2014a: 112) for villagers in many regions but Malaiur 
residents seldom connected the two.19 
There were a number of educational institutions near Malaiur. In addition to 
government schools, there were many private schools in nearby peri-urban colonies. 
Madurai had many such good ‘school districts.’ Gender differential in school 
attendance was not very high in the district. In Malaiur, girls (and boys) set out each 
morning for their schools in public buses or private vehicles. Some older children 
pedalled the pista-green cycles recently distributed by the state government (to 
students from Backward Classes, Other Backward Classes, and Denotified 
Communities, ostensibly to increase representation from these administrative 
categories in higher-secondary schools). Children from families that could afford it, 
had an additional daily-dose of ‘private tuitions’ outside Malaiur. Others were 
tutored by teachers who visited Malaiur each evening for some moonlighting before 
returning to their own homes. 
Actually, a girls’ school was established in the 1920s in Malaiur, as a measure 
to turn village Kallar away from crime. Most elderly residents spoke as though this 
school had little impact. Malaiur girls had preferred goat rearing and agriculture to 
attending classes; the school was too much of a disciplinary space to be a venue for 
                                                     
19 In Indonesia’s Central Sulawesi region, highlanders associated roads and schools with ‘modern 
village life’ (Li 2014a: 57), and petitioned for roads, hoping good roads would ensure that 
schoolteachers showed up for work regularly (ibid: 112). 
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social mobility. Even children from Malaiur’s ‘elite’ families, members of the Kallar 
panchayat, and supervisors, contractors, and beneficiaries of the credit association, 
weaving centre, and coir production unit – all an outcome of colonial efforts towards 
Kallar reformation – had stayed away from the school. Allikodi was one such person. 
The only child of the family that had housed the weaving unit, she and her husband 
had continued to stay in Malaiur. The family was unable to hold onto and translate 
this opportunity. In Allikodi’s terms, evil eye had resulted in the once impressive 
house to lie in a state of ruin. Her reminiscences hinged on two aspects – the decline 
of her house, and her refusal to go to school. The sight of girls returning from school 
in the evenings often led Allikodi to contrast their mobility and her own immobility 
when she was at that age. She and other young girls of Malaiur had refused to take 
the two steps necessary to go to school whereas now, every little female donkey took 
a bus, an auto, or a van and attend schools outside the village, disregarding the one 
in Malaiur.  
Now administered as a government Kallar Middle School, it is bunched up 
with Malaiur’s panchayat office, bus stand, anganwadi (day-care cum crèche set up 
under a government programme), and Public Distribution Scheme outlet. That is, this 
school is one of the structures through which the kirāmam manifests itself in the ūr 
centre. But caste representation in the school is uncharacteristic of village as caste 
space, typified by this folding in of ūr and kirāmam. Children from poor families 
across castes attended this school. Their families did not have the resources for 
‘quality’ (private school) education. In Malaiur, road infrastructure had little to do 
with families’ ability to send children to desired schools or colleges, although nearly 
everyone wished to secure good education and ensure social mobility.  
For decades, very few children attending the Kallar School pursued higher 
education. By the time Arumugam had finished his school education, the state had 
established the Madurai Kamaraj University (MKU) in a sprawling campus in the 
middle of Kallarnatu. Had he wanted to, Arumugam often said, he could have gone 
to college, to university; his mother’s conta ūr was near a Jesuit-run college and to 
MKU, and he could have stayed with relatives. But he and most of his peers did not 
know what good would come of education.  
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Although Arumugam seldom rued this, the desire for education sometimes 
re-emerged as allegory in the poetry he wrote. In one poem he authored, a man 
addressing his love interest, and bemoaning his inability to marry her, says, ‘Your 
eyes are the University’s gates/ I stand at the threshold, unable to knock.’ But what 
about Malaiur girls of his generation? Girls? Girls, he said roughly, they had too much 
going on, days packed with chores – collecting firewood, caring for younger siblings, 
cooking, cleaning, grazing, weeding. Which girl could find the time to attend school? 
Forget about college, and university.   
Roads only serve as infrastructure for connectivity. Actual mobility depends 
on reliable and cheap (or free) public transport. Of course, the promise of a better 
life is linked to rural road projects through extensive frameworks. These 
representations include the argument that roads enable improved economic 
conditions, allowing adults to earn more and spend more on children’s education. 
Put another way, policy literature portrays transport infrastructure as catalyst of 
universal and particular goals.  
One facet to this imaginary was the relation posited better transport 
infrastructure and labour circulation. We may recall that a section of Malaiur Kallar 
gained social mobility with their employment in Madurai’s textile mills. None of these 
men connected transport infrastructure and mill employment. Rarely did a bus route 
cover the daily commute between Malaiur and their work-sites. Only a handful of 
mill workers had cycles. Most workers had traversed fields, walked on tank bunds, 
took short-cuts, and made new pathways. This was possible because the mills they 
worked in were located in nearby Kappalur, Tirupparankunram, and Tirunagar.  
Although most men had lost their mill jobs by 2008, they vividly recalled the 
time when wages allowed for small pleasures – going to the cinema, buying flowers 
for their wives, or buying snacks for their families. But mill workers had money 
incomes – a rarity in the ‘60s and ‘70s – which they began to use for small-scale usury. 
These changes led to the perception that mill employment had played a substantial 
role in the social mobility of not only workers and their families but also of Malaiur. 
As workers associations began sponsoring special dramas in Kallarnatu temple 
festivals, the ūr itself became upwardly mobile in the micro-region. 
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In postcolonial societies where ‘capital is not hegemonic through bourgeois-
democratic politics,’ and development is a sign under which subaltern groups make 
claims (Chari 2004: 33), mill labour signals mobility. For landless and cultivators alike, 
factory work was a firm step towards upward mobility. In November 2007, Valaiyar 
caste women (in a multi-caste settlement, a rarity in Kallarnatu) rubbished my 
queries about community and caste; these construction workers held that useful 
research is only that which generated occupation (toḻil) in their village. 
In the first round of factory employment from Malaiur, transport 
infrastructure had little influenced labour flows. This was not the case during my 
fieldwork period. Malaiur was then home to a small group of Kallar and Dalit women 
that had temporarily migrated to work in the garment units that comprise Tamil 
Nadu’s textile clusters of vast, global subcontracting chains. These were young 
women; as per my 2008 surveys, 17-23 years old.  
At the time, a campaign to highlight the bonded or unfree nature of their work 
was gaining ground in Madurai. Yet villagers lauded these young women for returning 
to Malaiur with town-ways and fairer skin. If at all, the prison-like arrangements in 
factory-sites assuaged the mothers of these young women. There was little talk of 
bonded labour. Instead, recruiters were termed as ‘known people’ (distant kin, and 
local or familiar recruiters). Parents and neighbours stressed that the young women 
could return home in case of severe illness or deaths in families. But they preferred 
the restrictions on mobility in these work-sites.  
Better transport networks may facilitate labour circulation, thereby serving 
as infrastructure to escape the village (Mines 2005). They do not automatically 
destabilise unfree labour’s mobilisation through kin and caste networks and place-
based affiliations. For these young women, labour migration also generated new 
modes of gendered exploitation. These modes deploy affective categories that 
contradict gender’s regular appendage in government policies and financial 
institutions’ literature. This deployment is visible in the names – cumaṅkali tiṭṭam, 
tirumakaḷ tirumaṇa tiṭṭam, māṅkalya tiṭṭam – of the work schemes floated by textile 
manufacturers. Both māṅkalya and cumaṅkali have offered key frames to gender 
relations (Reynolds 1980), connecting auspiciousness and women’s marital status to 
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prosperity and abundance. The names of these ‘schemes’ reveal not only the means 
by which these young women are affectively bound through exploitative contracts to 
the textile industry but also the criss-crossing of global capital, flexible labour, local 
patriarchies, and the state.  
Recruiters cite marriage transactions to mobilise this migrant labour, 
projecting the small stash of money paid at the end of the contract period as a dowry 
fund. The flexible accumulation of capital heightens the exploitation of migrant 
women workers. But as it conjoins the promise of immediate access to the city and a 
better future (through better marriage alliances), circulatory practices travel 
inwards, into the interiors of the self. Expropriation of labour power operates as a 
trade with time, with present hardships traded against the security of future 
marriage.  
Additionally, since marriage to ‘suitable’ men is a significant dream-space, a 
desire for the domestic emerges. This desire expresses the hope that a good marriage 
alliance will lessen the burden of domestic work (e.g. if the home includes necessary 
domestic appliances not already supplied by the state government in rounds of 
populist schemes), if not enable women to move out of the sphere of social 
production. Thus, while road networks increase the net of locations for labour 
migration, they also effect new ‘technologies of servitude’ through the creation of 
‘certain dispositions toward others and oneself’ (Rudnyckyj 2004: 412). They also 
increase the use of migrant labour to keep wages at bare minimum.   
Road networks also do not ensure that mobility is safe and substantively 
accessible to all. As I traversed Kallarnatu on buses from Madurai’s Arapalayam bus 
station to Usilampatti and back on the NH49, the specificities of women’s relation to 
social space was brought home to me many times. This occurred not only through 
the usual fare of harassment from men but also through casual conversations with 
other women travellers. On a busy festival day in late-October 2007, I sat next to an 
elderly woman who was returning from her lineage temple to her home in Madurai 
city. The woman cautioned me against travelling alone. When I said I could not avoid 
travel, she instructed me to visit a renowned temple in the city, obtain a protective 
amulet, and wear it on my body at all times.  
144 
 
In instructing me to seek divine protection, my travel companion was not 
simply utilising absolute space as a prosthetic with which to prop up abstract space. 
Her advice signalled a ‘mixing and mating’ of global labour outsourcing and 
resignification of work ‘outside earlier labour struggles’ (Tsing 2009: 151). In this 
sense, my situation as migrant ethnographer recalls that of Malaiur’s young women 
whose migration emerged through ‘supply chain capitalism’s… use of diverse social-
economic niches through which goods and services can be produced more cheaply’ 
(ibid: 171).  
My companion’s advice was but one instance of existing social relations which 
infrastructure projects do not automatically contend with. Better transport networks 
and public transport might be effected from above, but the mere presence of roads 
and motor vehicles does not guarantee substantive access to everyone. Malaiur men 
often joked that even demons [pēy picācu] have fled the ūr – such were the 
overpowering effects of modernity on the countryside. Attending to women’s 
experiences of this modern space, however, suggests that the demons have 
relocated themselves, not permanently migrated. At first glance, the limits of 
abstract space apparently re-emerge as a haunting of absolute space. Consider the 
numbers of young girls and women who are possessed by supernatural entities while 
returning from schools and colleges. Women often recounted such instances, saying, 
‘Do not know what or why! She just came back from school and this happened.’  
Anthropologist Isabelle Clark-Decès discovered that many of the demons, 
while responding to exorcists’ queries on their identities, recalled their initial 
moment of possession of the female body in places such as bus stops or buses – ‘not 
in any of the traditional wasteland landscapes but in the heart of large urban centres’ 
(2008: 187). The space engendered by modern transportation annexes older 
representations of space. These representations rematerialize as elements in new 
representational spaces. Take the regional spatial concepts, nāṭu and kāṭu (forest, 
wasteland, uninhabited space). The two distinguish between settlements and 
territories tied differently to agrarian production and rule. The nāṭu–kāṭu distinction 
was once of essence to social space; for centuries, it was part of conceptions of space. 
This opposition highlights region-specific histories of differentiating between kinds of 
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agrarian territories rather than cities and villages (A. Pandian 2009). In contemporary 
spatial imaginaries, the nāṭu–kāṭu distinction reworks new fears and dangers. With 
bus stops and buses assuming the characteristics of kāṭu, ‘new landscapes’ come to 
be as dangerous as those traditionally associated with danger, anonymity, death, or 
possession (Clark-Decès ibid). The upshot is further restrictions on women’s mobility.  
Thus, transport infrastructure seeks to generate connectivity but many social 
groups experience the same space via alienation and social distance (Augé 1995: 94). 
Put this way, these processes emerge not simply as test cases of abstract space or as 
the haunting of absolute space. They characterise the hybrid space in which space-
time compression and mobility conjoins with new ways of appropriating labour and 
policing women. They also demonstrate the space-society dialectic and disclose 
roads in social, rather than physical, space. It is not physical space, expressed in terms 
of road length, availability of vehicular transport, or distance between points in 
Euclidian space, but social space that interacts dialectically with social relations. Yet 
road-building projects have the capacity to enchant, and to pull ‘culture’ into the 
technical; many social groups thus welcome roads (Li 2014a; Campbell 2012, 2014; 
Harvey and Knox 2008, 2012). Concrete illustrations of passive acceptance, 
disruption, objection, and enthusiasm over road-building are taken up in chapter 4. 
With the next section, we move from examining the projection of road projects as 
urgent necessity and universal good to considering how infrastructure projects help 
overcome crises wrought by capital’s internal contradictions.   
Future Estimates and Present Fixes 
Mega-infrastructure project implementation provide opportunities (Davidson 2015) 
to criticise postcolonial states for political failures – corruption, ‘rent-seeking,’ and 
the overestimation of future necessities to award unnecessary contracts in the 
present. What is seldom touched upon is the global scales at which megaprojects are 
imagined and implemented, and that roads are not just routes for capital relocation 
but also a great sponge for absorption of devalued capital, a venue to engineer spatial 
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fixes.20 A recent report on corruption in India’s NHDP implementation gives me a 
window to explore these connections.  
In May 2015, the news website Cobrapost posted a report on high-level 
corruption in India’s highway upgradation projects.21 The news item begins with the 
assertion that in 2005-06 the UPA-led central government approved the six-laning of 
existing four-lane highways to ‘steal the thunder’ from the previous NDA regime 
which had bequeathed one of its ‘greatest gifts’ to the country in the form of the 
Golden Quadrilateral. In September 2006, the Committee on Infrastructure lowered 
the traffic volume specifications necessary for lane upgradation, and this was only 
‘the first of many norms/ rules changed to hasten project implementation.’ The 
report also levelled specific corruption charges in two six-laning projects where the 
government increased the Viability Gap Funding (VGF) from a limit of 5 per cent of 
total construction cost to a phenomenal 36 per cent. The central government audit 
body later reported the current traffic flow on one of these projects to be so low that 
the government was burdened not only by high VGF but also by having to forgo toll 
revenues for the next 24 years.  
In Public Private Partnership (PPP) models of infrastructure building, VGF is 
ordinary procedure. VGF is a state grant contributing to capital outlay, thereby 
making road projects more ‘viable’ and attractive to private companies. It is a 
procedural means to overcome the sectoral peculiarities to capital’s fixity–motion in 
road projects (or other spatial fixes in the built environment). Although road projects 
absorb enormous amounts of devaluing capital, the realisation of this capital takes 
effect after a long period. States not only continue to absorb project costs (either 
directly through fund allocation or indirectly by agreeing to conditions imposed by 
lenders) but also absorb risks to private infrastructure companies.  
                                                     
20 The idea of space as a sponge for absorbing overaccumulated capital is widely accepted. 
Schoenberger, for example, summarises Harvey’s concept of the spatial fix as that which ‘provides a 
way to productively soak up capital by transforming the geography of capitalism’ (2004: 428). 
21 http://cobrapost.com/index.php/news-detail?nid=8723&cid=64, accessed 30.08.2015. Unless 
specified otherwise, quotes in this section are from this report. Other national dailies such as the 
Times of India also published the report within days.  
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These governance techniques and political projects appear as economic 
incentives to induce private participation in ‘risky’ fields. Risks include the non-
materialisation of projected increases in a route’s traffic flow – when there are not 
enough people renting the commodity of a tollway, it takes longer for achieving 
target revenues.22 PPP risk management means that gaps in intended and actual toll 
revenues are already folded into initial project design and funding. States insure 
private builders against these risks with public monies. It is widely recognised within 
the infrastructure sector that ‘risk allocation is… a critical component of all links 
between government[s] and the private sector’ (Lay 2009: 43). Risks continue to 
threaten these projects, even as big data and mathematical modelling seek exact 
estimates and projections. 
When a road is conceptualised, it is standard procedure to predict future 
traffic density on the route and to rework these projections back into the present. 
There is always the possibility of major statistical error. The backcasting of 
overenthusiastic projections appear to be shaky grounds for infrastructure 
companies to build roads on. Road builders, engineers, and bureaucrats are aware of 
this and count it as one of two key risks for national road authority bodies (ibid).23 
Since the construction of a road with some ‘initial over-capacity’ is taken to extend 
the life of the road itself, and seen as ‘economically justifiable’ (Lay 2009: 65), 
corruption is an inadequate analytical tool to understand UPA’s approval for six-
laning.24  
Large-scale corruption undoubtedly exists in mega-infrastructure projects. 
Politicians, bureaucrats, and planners utilise such projects to line their own pockets. 
                                                     
22 The Cobrapost reported specific corruption in two projects – NH5’s Chandikhol–Jagaptur–
Bhubaneswar section, and about 192 km of NH2’s Varanasi-Aurangabad section. Other factored risks, 
according to the government and NHAI, was that since nearly 140 km of the NH2 section passed 
through Bihar, no company was willing to take up construction on a BOT basis. The government 
justified VGF increase on the grounds that companies had a ‘risk perception for working in Bihar,’ and 
that the highway passed through ‘Naxal-affected area.’   
23 According to this author of a road technology handbook, the other risk is that in road construction, 
‘funds invested are ‘sunk’ in the construction of the project, and cannot later be withdrawn or re-
allocated’ (Lay 2009: 43). Where road projects are financed by loans (as most roads are), lenders are 
‘particularly interested in the extent to which the Government guarantees loan repayments’ (ibid). 
24 Recent ethnographic research on infrastructure sites elsewhere in India adds that the ‘techniques 
and inequalities previously associated with the “shadow state” or “corruption” have become central 
to the realization of state projections and revenue’ (Bear 2011: 57). 
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Infrastructure projects also allow politicians to sanction works in their own 
constituencies. Indeed, these projects find favour among politicians because roads 
easily exceed their ‘technical function’ (as infrastructure for the circulation of people 
and goods). They offer many opportunities – via, for example, government contract 
dispensation – to forge and sustain patron-client relations (Larkin 2013: 334).  
Each government attempts to reframe road projects to its advantage. Thus,  
a highway project initiated by one regime can be construed as the ‘greatest gift’ to 
the nation, and a successive regime’s upgradation of these highways can be 
construed as ‘stealing the thunder,’ as is the case in Cobrapost’s opening frame. In 
addition to these ‘poetics of infrastructure’ where road projects are ‘concrete 
semiotic and aesthetic vehicles’ (ibid: 329), roads also materially serve political 
networks.  
Dividing a road construction project into smaller projects has many uses. One 
is the ease of managing and funding. The per kilometre construction costs of four- 
and six-lane highways are unimaginably high.25 The other is that awarding contracts 
for smaller stretches of a road generates more contracts that can be awarded. In 
turn, these can be apportioned to smaller and local businesses that are roped in as 
subcontracting firms. Politicians can thus accommodate more clients.  
                                                     
25 When the NHDP was set up, the cost of constructing a four-lane highway was Rs 4 crore per km. By 
2010, when costs had increased to Rs 9 crore per km, NHAI requested the Planning Commission to 
increase its allocation to Rs 12 crore per km. The Planning Commission disagreed, terming it inflated 
cost-estimation. It estimated that, adjusting for inflation, the cost would go up to Rs 9.6 crore per km. 
Industry analysts agreed with the Planning Commission, with one infrastructure consultancy firm 
estimating an increase to a maximum of Rs 9.7 crore per km (‘NHAI, Plancom differ on cost of 4-lane 
highways.’ Business Standard. 10.08.2010). NHAI estimates for revising highway construction cost 
allocation were then calculated on the basis of changes in construction material costs and India’s 
Wholesale Price Index (WPI). Labour costs are only a small portion of highway construction costs in 
India. The approximate material-equipment-labour cost ratio in June 2015 stood at 64.1:21.5:14.2. 
NHAI then revised its methodology for cost estimation and came up with an independent sector index, 
the NHCCI (National Highways Construction Cost Index) to overcome difficulties in using WPI in ‘price 
escalation clauses for settling claims’ (NHAI. 2014. Discussion paper on compilation                                                                     
of NHCCI, http://www.nhai.org/Doc/27june14/discussion%20paper%20on%20NHCCI%20-
%20website.pdf, accessed 18.07.2015). Experts argued that relying on WPI index leads to errors in 
calculations of price escalation – the composition of road construction’s ‘item basket’ was specific 
whereas WPI is too broad and too inadequate an index (it did not include all elements of the road 
construction ‘item basket’) for arriving at a road construction cost index (NHAI. NHCCI: Methodology, 
http://www.nhai.org/NHCCI_methodology_Jun15.pdf, accessed 18.07.2015). 
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This allows for the doubling of infrastructure (Larkin 2013), wherein roads act 
simultaneously as substrata for circulation, as unifying projects, and as political and 
social projects (also Harvey and Knox 2008). In the instances reported by Cobrapost, 
the division of a road construction project also provided governments an easy exit 
route from following mandated procedures and safeguard measures. Cobrapost 
reveals this much, through its interpretation of why the entire 6500 km of highways 
that were to be six-laned in this NHDP phase were divided into 65 projects of 100 km 
each. Since road segments lengthier than this require cabinet-level approval, 
apportioning a road into smaller projects dispenses with the necessity.  
But the category of corruption makes for lazy scholarship. It disables us from 
seeing how structural priorities at the global-scale dictate infrastructural projects. 
The impetus to exaggerate present necessity and future realisation exists at the 
moment of a project’s conceptualisation. That is, exaggeration exists prior to 
contract dispensation and any attendant corruption. What Poovey says of futures 
trading is equally applicable to infrastructure projects, that ‘the representation of 
future profits actually generates those profits’ (2003: 28).  
Predictions of exaggerated increase in traffic flow serves to augment costs of 
projects. In general, bagging contracts in megaprojects present companies with 
opportunities to author great forward-looking statements. Growth forecasting 
affects the way financial analysts interpret and report new developments. The 
company’s share prices shoot up and it is able to raise capital more easily (Poovey 
2003: 29-30). Thus, greater the traffic flow predictions, bigger the market for roads.  
The extension of road networks also generates new users. More cars mean 
more revenue for toll companies, quicker exhaustion of a road’s life, and swifter 
oversaturation of traffic corridors.26 This calls for newer, more expansive roads. 
                                                     
26 It is the car – not the public transport bus – that appears most frequently in current government 
reports on highway building. For example, the Ministry of Shipping, Road Transport and Highways’ 
Manual of specifications and standards for six-laning of national highways through public private 
partnership suggests, ‘if the Project Highway has regular movement of buses either through 
Government or through private sector, bus bays shall be planned, designed and provided’  (2008: 8; 
emphasis added). This cues us to the greater planning emphasis on spatial practices favouring car 
owners and freighters as consumers of road space, and the slow dismantling of public transportation. 
Of course, heightened road building carries on across the globe (more so in developing economies), 
undeterred by issues such as climate change. We here see the continued operations of the agnotology, 
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Besides, road-building technologies also keep changing; the best material mix and 
design twenty years ago may now be outdated. Diverse interests uphold the 
continued focus on upgradation of existing routes. 
At the global scale, statistical forecasting and backcasting in the infrastructure 
sector provides many fixes in the game to ricochet capital between the poles of fixity 
and motion. Fixed capital, as Marx defines it, is not just the set of instruments of 
labour (such as machinery), themselves commodities to be traded in capital goods 
markets. It also envelops the actual physical routes through which all commodities 
and people circulate. More the spread of transport networks, greater the scope to 
annihilate space through time – ‘fluid movement over space can be achieved only by 
fixing certain physical infrastructures in space’ (Harvey 2003: 99).  
But to construct a highway is to sink enormous amounts of capital into place, 
and unlike other kinds of fixed capital, the potential for a second-hand market for 
roads is of a different kind. Markets in recycling are fields in which to productively 
dump devaluing capital. Medical instruments that are outdated in one territory can 
be exported to another, thereby extending the value that accrues from them. Ships 
that ‘expire’ or outlive their regulated lifetime in one region can come to Alang, 
Gujarat, or somewhere else, for recycling or death. That is, some kinds of fixed capital 
can be dismantled, and its components reused as raw material in other industries.  
But a road is not a ribbon (Braudel 1995) that can be rolled up and shipped to 
another location where it can be unrolled. The second-hand market in roads is more 
complex. When a road dies, it is unceremoniously buried and papered over with 
another bout of construction in some locations but recycled in others. The extent to 
which road construction materials are recycled varies. Given the impetus to use roads 
as a sponge for absorbing overaccumulated capital, efforts to coordinate the market 
for recycling materials may well be ‘one of the best-kept secrets.’27  
                                                     
a complete denial of climate change, which was one of neoliberal capitalism’s early responses 
(Mirowski 2013). Broadly speaking, though, by representing better and more roads as more energy-
efficient, road projects draw climate change as though it were a trump card – better roads are needed 
because they are a means to save fuel and thereby contribute towards climate change mitigation. 
27 Equipment World. 02.03.2008. ‘Technology: Road recycling.’ Accessed at 
http://www.equipmentworld.com/technology-road-recycling/. Asphalt recycling is well-developed in 
the US, where 80 per cent of about 73 million tons of recycled asphalt returns to road construction. 
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A final illustration follows, one last allegorical vitalisation of road before I 
pronounce it overused. State policies also engineer sudden deaths of existing roads 
by favouring new constructions over repairs. New roads allow for investing more 
over-accumulated and devalued capital into transport infrastructure. This is true not 
just for high-intensity and heavy traffic corridors such as national and state highways 
but also for rural roads. Tamil Nadu government’s 2007 guidelines for fund allocation 
under its Infrastructure Gap Filling Fund (or IGFF) for rural areas, gave considerable 
leeway to district administrators on project selection and financial outlay. The 
guidelines did say that there was no baseline or minimum value of projects. 
Technically, the IGFF could finance small-scale works. The government 
seemed fiscally cautious and favouring works that were small-scale yet out of reach 
for panchayats. But the thrust was on overspending. The State Finance Commission’s 
guidelines actually stipulated that district collectors avoid sanctioning piece-meal 
works and instead take up ‘substantial works,’ stating that ‘if a road work is 
sanctioned, the entire length of the damaged road should be taken up instead of 
taking up only a stretch of the damaged road.’28 
Internal contradictions and the characteristics of road construction such as 
the ones examined above (including the poetics of infrastructure), and the constant 
back-and-forth movement necessary to keep capital bouncing between the poles of 
fixity and motion, ensure that road building is a favoured activity. This brings us to 
another set of problems for the circulation of capital in the infrastructure sector. How 
to ensure that the enormous amount of capital sunk in a highway continues to be 
realised? One way is by ensuring that production itself respects the path 
dependencies produced by transport networks.  
Roads ‘act as a significant drag upon geographical transformations and the 
relocation of capitalist activity’ (Harvey 2003: 100). While cautioning ourselves 
                                                     
Manufacturer associations for other road construction material similarly extend markets. One US 
cement manufacturers association lobbies for, and provides technical skills to road authorities on, 
using cement-based techniques for ‘in-place recycling of worn out asphalt pavements with cement’ 
(http://www.roadrecycling.org/About-FDR-with-Cement.html, accessed 31.08.2015). The thrust on 
recycling may be connected to the housing sector crash, when cement manufacturers had to invent 
new uses for their commodity.  
28 http://www.tnrd.gov.in/Pt_Raj/linkfiles/go_rd_182_07_pg282.pdf accessed 23.08.2015. 
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against reification of capital, we must also bring to bear the interconnectedness and 
systemic interactions between production, circulation, distribution, and 
consumption; between port authorities, road builders, raw material extractors, and 
factory owners. As Marx writes, ‘fixed capital is as much a presupposition for the 
production of circulating capital as circulating capital is for the production of capital’ 
(in Harvey 2006: 215).  
Firms engaged in production or the extraction of raw materials double up as 
financiers of ports, and rail and road corridors. Oil firms, fruit exporting companies, 
and bauxite extraction businesses have stakes in keeping their commodities on the 
move, and therefore on the building and maintenance of transport networks.29 Toll 
companies have their own interests in keeping industrial production intact along 
their routes, and are interested in routes that maximise the number of road users 
willing to pay rent for using this commodity. 
Resource extraction and production, however, have their own rhythms and 
temporal frames, which incorporate both non-human space-time and abstract 
capitalist space-time.30 Oil and bauxite sources run dry. Banana plantations become 
unproductive over time. Crop diseases may wreak entire cacao plantations instantly 
(Li 2014a). Without cotton production, cotton roads and railway stations fall into 
neglect unless they come to serve the circulation of another commodity, or local 
groups appropriating these infrastructures successfully petition the government to 
keep them intact. The lack of commodities for circulation normally means lesser 
interest in keeping the means of circulation intact. Roads then fall into disrepair, 
railway tracks abandoned, and ports shut down.  
Some dramatic moments and processes sustain and increase the 
opportunities for capital investment in infrastructure. Roads sink and drag capital but 
what is sunk may also be drawn out. Natural disasters and wars offer moments to 
                                                     
29 Korean giant POSCO was accorded land to build a steel plant in eastern India, and given additional 
land and promises to allow the sinking of a new captive port and road and rail networks. 
30 Recent ethnographic work explores these tensions. For instance, Laura Bear draws upon Alfred 
Gell’s characterisation of time existing in three forms – ‘as a non-human timespace phenomenon 
traced in Einsteinian physics; as a social framing of time; and as a personal experience of time’ – to 
call for anthropological explorations of ‘the full range of time-maps and their different social effects’ 
(2014: 25-16). 
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ward off the effects of capital being sunk into space for unproductively long 
durations. War victors benefit from both the destruction and the rebuilding of 
infrastructure in territories they gain (Harvey 2003, 2006). Less obvious is freeing of 
capital sunk in transport infrastructure through continuous transformations of 
geographical chains of production and reproduction. 
Production sites shift due to the effects of non-human time on capitalist 
production. Production sites also shift in accordance to the abstract space-times 
engendered by capital. The global spread of JIT or just-in-time production and ‘supply 
chain capitalism’ (Tsing 2009) have required states and regions to modify road 
networks (and ports, airports, and railroads) and pay adequate attention not only at 
the arterial level but also at the capillary level. The worldwide extension of and 
constant modifications to supply chains ensure that capital is not ‘sunk’ for too long 
in transport infrastructures. The combined effect is that of an industrial, technocratic, 
and bureaucratic thirst for infrastructure. This is a thirst that cannot easily be 
quenched – since technically capital shifts towards territories that enable greater 
value to be realised, infrastructural networks have to be constantly modified.31  
Decisions over when, where, and what kinds of roads and road networks are 
built, sustained, or neglected are influenced by capitalism’s internal contradictions, 
the need to balance capital’s fixity and motion, and changing patterns to the 
realisation of value. What about road-related local conflicts more easily grasped by 
ethnographic research methods, the kinds of conflict that geographical analyses of 
capital and transport infrastructure over large territories are less likely to address? 
The next chapter examines conflicts in locations re-networked and transformed 
through road construction. But before that, I turn from plan documents and 
representations of space to modes by which Malaiur Kallar turn a village feeder road 
                                                     
31 These changes are visible also in port development. For instance, new ports and railway lines were 
planned alongside projects for mineral extraction in parts of eastern India. Take Odisha’s Dhamra port, 
one of the first minor ports to come in the purview of PPP models. As the rate at which mineral 
extraction from nearby regions increased, the older port required urgent upgradation – a new port, 
in effect – to ‘serve this hinterland with the greatest efficiency.’ This included building new rail routes 
from the port to the point of loading commodities, which was over sixty km into the hinterland. 
http://www.dhamraport.com/profile.php.  
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into an aspect of representational space. By re-entering village feeder roads, 
memory, and affect, we also return to Kallar self-representation. 
A Road in Representational Space 
Of all the built structures pointed out by Malaiur’s Kallar residents as the remnants 
of a village–colonial state confrontation, the Willingdon road was the only one not in 
a state of ruin. Also, when compared to access roads of a few other Kallarnatu villages 
I had visited, the Willingdon road was in a good condition. On the morning of the 
tourist Pongal in 2008, Sachin and other Kallar men stressed the importance of the 
road we were travelling on, and briefed me on its history. Researchers are likely to 
know of this road’s significance well before visiting Malaiur. Kallar individuals in 
Madurai city and Usilampatti had notified me of it long before I visited Malaiur. Two 
months later, in March 2008, speakers and audience members at a seminar 
organised by Madurai Kamaraj University on ‘The impact of the Criminal Tribes Act: 
Yesterday, Today and the Days to come’ referred to this road.  
This road has multiple significance. It opened up the country in ways 
commensurate to colonial rule, enabling surveillance over village Kallar, transforming 
circulatory practices, and allowing officials and missionaries to implement an array 
of small-scale schemes for Kallar Reclamation. The Willingdon road transformed 
many spatial practices but Kallar collective memory now anchors it as evidence of 
CTA-related repression.   
We shall examine Malaiur-specific memories of this road but the widespread 
trend in Kallarnatu was to compress its significance as follows. Malaiur was the first 
village in Madurai district to be serviced by a metalled road. The road was built to 
control this ūr. The Earl of Willingdon (one-time Governor of Madras Presidency, later 
Viceroy of India), took this road to visit Malaiur. This visit gave the road its name. 
During our initial interactions, Malaiur Kallar residents often stated that I was 
using the same road that this famous visitor to their ūr had taken. Although repaired 
and rebuilt many times, according to villagers, the road was never realigned. The 
social relations, spatial practices, and representations of space involved in road 
design, in maintaining the original alignment, in realignment, and in repairs, are 
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questions for the next chapter. But here is a sample of the standard reasons Kallar 
villagers attributed the Willingdon road’s original alignment to.  
Arumugam: Before Malaiur was notified under the Fingerprint Act, the white man 
tried many times to control us. To bring an entire ūr under control [kaṭṭupāṭṭu], the 
white man needed police, horses, and a path. Those days, there were no roads. There 
were only pathways amidst fields. Horses and policemen could not move quickly. 
Kept sliding, falling. So [the white man] built a road. When he hears that Malaiur 
people stole here or there, he can reach quickly… But what did we do? Just so he 
cannot come quickly, we built a road with many curves… Dhivya, did you ever think 
why this road is not straight? 
Dhivya: No.  
A: This is why. Those days, only very comfortable folk had horses and bullock carts. 
No one that comfortable in this region. Our grandfathers, fathers, they would climb 
this hill. If they saw a horse or a bullock cart, they knew it was the police. They would 
wave a white towel from the hilltop. To inform the ūr. By the time the police or other 
officials reached, the ūr would be silent [with everyone fleeing]. For the sake of time, 
Dhivya, to escape before the police arrives. That is why this road has so many curves. 
D: So, did Malaiur people build this road? 
A: No. How? Why would we build it? 
D: Then who did? 
A: People of nearby villages. For labour coolie… See this new road, this four-lane [the 
NH7, then being upgraded near Malaiur]. From Bihar, from Maharashtra, from all 
these places, these men come. To build roads in places of unfamiliar tongue. Then 
too, Dhivya. To build a road to this ūr, the white man used other village coolie.  
In such accounts, the Willingdon road is an eye of the empire, built for 
surveillance over Malaiur Kallar. It was built to bring the village physically closer to 
the police, an infrastructure necessary for other instruments and institutions of 
surveillance. It was to help the state keep a close watch on villagers whose own 
watching rights as kāvalkārar conflicted with new colonial arrangements for power 
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and surveillance in the countryside. This was also a road to protect other roads, built 
to control those who had gained notoriety as highway robbers.  
According to Arumugam, the colonial state built the road to ‘gain’ time 
whereas villagers aligned it such that it was they who gained time. It was an account 
I heard on many occasions in that period. In 2014, during an event commemorating 
the CTA’s implementation in Malaiur, Arumugam spoke about the road alignment. 
From a newspaper report, I gathered that Arumugam had termed it a tactic to delay 
the police. 
These road-related memories turn from conceived space to lived space. As 
we shift our focus from representations of space to consider a road with respect to 
representational space, curvatures and alignments barely connect to technologies of 
road building and designs. In abstract representations, existing ecological (perhaps 
also social) frameworks dictate road alignment. We presume that experts decide on 
road curvatures for reasons unclear to non-experts.  
For Malaiur Kallar, the excessively curved feeder road is but a material and 
design manifestation of representational space. The road emerged only because the 
state feared their village. This fear, in turn, was caused by qualities of caste and 
village – Malaiur was notorious as a payaṅkaramāna ūr, a terrifying village (chapter 
2); Malaiur was also the place where caste kuṇam or essence, Kallar valour, best 
exhibited itself (see chapter 5).  
Significantly, Malaiur villagers did not mutely accept the colonial conception 
of the road as an instrument of control. They connived to redesign the road and give 
themselves sufficient time to avoid arrest. Their action swelled up the road, 
destabilising the time-space compression the state intended.  
All this is not much by way of explaining why this was the first metalled road 
in rural Madurai. We do not know whether colonial officials built a metalled road 
simply to ensure speedy police movement. We do not know how production 
relations affected road construction and alignment. We do not know how the efforts 
to turn Malaiur into a site of commodity production – district officials set up a 
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weaving centre and an agricultural credit society in the village – linked up with the 
circulatory practices this road affected. 
I was unable to conduct extended, well-designed archival research that would 
help me address these queries. But I address a different set of linkages between road 
infrastructure and social and spatial relations in the next chapter. These explorations 
concentrate on the NH7 near Malaiur, which has influenced land ownership and land 
use, kinship, and other aspects. 
Conclusion  
By taking the representations of road projects as its main object of analysis, and 
juxtaposing these representations with spatial practices and representational space, 
this chapter hints at the incomplete production of social space in the image of capital. 
Abstract space can only attempt to project space as though it were empty and 
homogeneous (Lefebvre 1991). Cities’ master plans, and national highway or 
intercity tollway projects do not emerge only through a combination of city planners, 
administrators, and subnational, national, and international abstract designing of 
space. They are seeded with the interests of local land-owners, real property dealers, 
and politicians. Yet without completely seizing space, attempts to render space 
empty and homogenous has considerable effects. City master plans enable the 
demolition of working-class neighbourhoods, the plans of intercity expressways 
enable land acquisition, and draft-plans of highways generate speculative markets. 
Lefebvre has been criticised for forwarding the binary logic he seeks to 
destabilise (Mitchell 2002: 79). Timothy Mitchell notes that laws of private property 
divide ‘the world into law on one side and land on the other, abstraction versus 
material reality,’ and that the world is resolved into two separate and opposed 
dimensions, ‘thing versus idea, reality versus abstraction, space versus its meaning’ 
(2002: 78). Mitchell’s observations about colonialism producing a social space that 
built into its very edifice the denial of difference by redistributing arbitrariness are 
important to us.  
Yet Lefebvre presages such analysis of space, and his triad destabilises binary 
logic. The charge that Lefebvre relies on binary logic arises through our erroneous 
reading of his spatial triad. As noted in the thesis’s introductory remarks, it is we who 
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take elements of the triad – representations of space, spatial practices, and 
representational space – as concepts for distinct dimensions. Lefebvre’s method of 
exposition was to first provisionally define these elements, and then to develop them 
throughout his work.  
The next chapter shows how the abstract space produced in and through 
capitalism in India works precisely through the ‘fuzziness’ of property regimes. We 
shall see that roads (and land acquisition for its construction) is only apparently 
conceptualised in the abstract. Road-building depends on, and expresses from the 
beginning, concrete, multi-scalar social relations. 
CHAPTER 4 BUT IT MAY BE ‘ALL 
ABOUT WATER’ AND LAND: ON 
ROADS, LAND, AND IRRIGATION 
Two thousand years ago, Saint Thiruvalluvar, in one of his couplets “on the greatness 
of a Kingdom” wrote thus: […] “Waters from rains and springs, a mountain near, and 
waters thence; These make a land, with fortress’ sure defence.” Which means: The 
constituents of a kingdom are the two waters (from above and below), well situated 
hills and indestructible fort. These writ petitions [on a proposed highway 
construction across tanks in Tamil Nadu’s Trichy district] are all about waters. 
—Selvakumar vs Union of India, 2010, Madras High Court 
When a man buys a mat he rolls it up and takes it away; similarly unless the purchaser 
has rolled up my land and taken it away how can he be said to have purchased them?  
—A Chotanagpur adivasi (1921) responding to eviction (Li 2014b: 589) 
 
The realisation that social space is in ‘perpetual movement’ leads us to appreciate 
that it is ‘the totality of social relations’ which is the moving power of social space 
(Ahuja 2009: 30). It enables anthropology to observe how contradictory social groups 
produce social space at any given moment. The previous chapter identified 
contradictory impulses in the infrastructure sector. How do these contradictions 
work in and through the units typically studied by ethnographers? Do roads only 
generate new conflicts and new spatial arrangements, or do they also reconstitute 
existing social relations? How do different individuals, families, generations, castes, 
genders, and classes respond to road projects? Are the concerns of an ayacutdar,1 
who knows that a road cutting across a tank affects irrigation and cultivation, the 
same as those of landless families seeking means for subsistence outside the village? 
Also, do people simply respond to infrastructure policies? This chapter shall reveal 
that the local does not only absorb infrastructures as diktats imposed by the global, 
national, or regional. It also attends to the dialectics between social space and social 
                                                     
1 From ayacut, the command area of an irrigation source; ayacutdar are cultivators whose fields fall 
in this area.  
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relations, by asking whether spatial practices such as infrastructure-building simply 
unfold or also reconstitute existing dominance-subordination relations. 
In chapter 3, large-scale producers, corporations, bureaucrats, and 
international and national agencies appeared as main actors in infrastructure 
projects. An impulse for road building can also come from regionally or locally 
dominant groups and subordinate groups. While dominant groups have greater 
success in lobbying for new roads or realignments, by transforming existing relations, 
roads also enable new socially mobile groups to further their ascendance.  
I start from southern Tamil Nadu, examining interconnections between 
villages and cities, and caste groups and village roads. In this section, I also examine 
roads in other locations during moments of conflict. The second section examines 
how roads reassemble land and affect property markets. It takes up a tollway project 
between Bangalore and Mysore in Karnataka state and the connection between the 
2008 NH7 upgradation and land transfers and property disputes in Malaiur. We see 
the road not only as an infrastructure for agricultural and industrial production but 
also for the production and consumption of space itself. I then consider how roads 
act on tanks. Finally, I examine roadworks undertaken through a recent (nationwide) 
employment guarantee scheme. This demonstrates policies ensuring a steady supply 
of labour for the reconstitution of India’s rural areas. 
Roads and Caste Relations  
The previous chapter identified that transport infrastructure creates and follows path 
dependencies in the geographies of production and reproduction. A number of 
modern roads were even named after the commodities they were built to circulate 
(sugarcane roads, cotton roads, salt roads etc.). Historical research reveals that 
petitions by sugarcane associations and cotton merchants for roads in this region 
have had greater chance of materialising than the desires of a labour force for roads 
and public transport. Where direct public works were not sanctioned, powerful 
associations of commodity producers and merchants even raised money through 
subscriptions and contributed to road construction and maintenance.  
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These ventures yielded benefits and made such groups more powerful. In the 
nineteenth century, expanding commercial cotton production in Madras 
Presidency’s black soil southern districts enhanced venues of social mobility for 
lower-caste groups (Ludden 1986: 159-62). One such group consists of Shanar, or 
Nadar, subcastes ‘traditionally’ engaged in toddy-tapping but including powerful 
merchant families by mid-nineteenth century. Nadar are currently perceived by 
other regional groups as a caste of extremely rich merchants. Yet class-differentiation 
exists within this group along individual, familial, and subcaste lines, illustrating that 
social mobility is seldom extensive within castes. 
Across the region, some dominant families, controlling land as per older social 
and spatial practices, were unable to translate existing networks of dominance and 
rule into dominance within an abstract space emerging through colonialism. Other 
dominant families, and some newly mobile families and groups, could utilise the 
transformations of this period for their benefit.  
Transport infrastructures played an important role in these reconstitutions of 
caste relations. We could superimpose the staggered mobility of Nadar subcastes 
onto a map of transport routes of the period to correlate uneven caste mobility with 
an emergent social space dictating and responding to changes in agricultural 
production and new circulatory infrastructures (Hardgrave 1969: 104-6). In cotton 
market towns and processing centres such as Virudhunagar, Kamudhi, Aruppukottai, 
and Sivakasi, Nadar merchants became more powerful with the advent of quicker, 
cheaper transportation (ibid; Ludden 1986: 193-6). By the close of the nineteenth 
century, ‘caste clashes’ between Nadar and other social groups marked these places 
(Hardgrave ibid; Frykenberg 1981). These included Maravar and Kallar subcastes, 
some of which had experienced a decline in dominance (Ludden ibid).  
Not all these changes in social relations and spatial practices emerged from 
new infrastructure; to suggest so would be to replicate the spatial fetishism in 
infrastructure policies. Circulatory infrastructure is but one element that keeps space 
in motion. Other elements include spatial practices and the networks and relations 
between people, places, production, territoriality, and kinship, gender and caste 
relations.  
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And a space in movement re-networks the relations between people, places, 
commodities, and objects, and transforms notions of territoriality, and production 
and reproduction relations. Railways and roads built by cotton traders and the 
colonial state transformed, strengthened, or produced fresh path dependencies to 
the transformations of social relations. Modern transport infrastructure affected 
Kallarnatu territoriality, relations between Kallar lineages, and relations between the 
subcaste and other social groups. There was no single, overarching author (including 
infrastructure) of these transformations. 
In 1841, Nadar merchants in Thirumangalam, Madurai, raised sufficient 
finances through subscriptions to start reconstructing a north-westerly road of about 
18 miles between Thirumangalam (in south Madurai) to Sholavandan (one of 
Madurai’s old agrarian settlements). The colonial government then took up this 
effort. The effort of merchants actually ‘induced the [District] Collector to make 
preliminary efforts towards the construction of a road’ from Tiruchuli, a taluk in 
present-day Virudhunagar district, to Thirumangalam.2 In 1856, the Thirumangalam–
Sholavandan road, which would allow traffic between the south’s market centre and 
Dindigul to bypass Madurai, was still under construction.3  
The Thirumangalam–Sholavandan road that merchants sought to build fed 
into what was then Madurai district’s ‘chief road,’ which connected Madras to Kollam 
(or Quilon), an old port city in present-day Kerala. At the Thirumangalam end, this 
merchants’ road joined the route witnessing the maximum of Madurai’s mid-
                                                     
2 ‘Summary of News – Madura,’ Utayatārakai/ Morning Star (Supplement) 01 July 1841, 13: 132. 
American Mission Press: Jaffna. Interestingly, this report’s appearance in Morning Star, Jaffna’s oldest 
news magazine, reveals another kind of circulation and the emergence of a print culture in the Tamil 
region. Here we see interconnections between transport and communication. A widening net of 
transport infrastructure, produced mainly for the circulation of commodities (and for older concerns 
such as surveillance and control), was appropriated for the circulation of periodicals, newspapers, 
printed caste histories and talapurāṇam (place-histories). These travelled along with commodities 
such as cotton, sugarcane, and rice, and created complicated nodes and intersections for the 
circulation of ideas and the production of new identities, and novel caste- territory interactions in the 
colonial Tamil region. Interestingly, the Jaffna periodical report and source is also cited in the current 
Wiki entry for Sholavandan. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sholavandan, accessed 31.08.2015.  
3 Report from Collector of Madura to Chief Engineer, Madura, 13.05.1856, No. 460. Selections from 
the records of the Madras Government, Volume 47. Report on the district roads, for 1855–56. Madras: 
Hindu Press.  
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nineteenth-century road traffic. On the other end, Sholavandan lay on a branch of 
another major route connecting Dindigul with Madurai and Ramnad.4  
The route between Thirumangalam and Sholavandan was a minor feeder 
road in the mid-nineteenth century. Today, however, the road connecting these two 
important commercial centres of Madurai extends upwards to present-day Dindigul 
district and has the status of a state highway, SH73. Now labelled in district records 
as the Thirumangalam–Pallapatti road, it services pilgrimages such as those to a 
Mariamman temple in Sholavandan, industries such as cotton mills, and 
Sholavandan’s agricultural belt, in addition to three trauma care centres appropriate 
to traffic flow.5  
The nineteenth century merchants’ road is now a state highway traversing 
the Kallarnatu portion currently administered under Madurai’s Thirumangalam taluk. 
Kallarnatu was transformed by new road networks, administrative structures, and 
changes in production relations. Some old centres of this nāṭu slowly transformed 
into ‘interior’ or peripheral villages as a social space emerging under colonialism gave 
new meanings to, and redirected the relationality of, caste, kinship, and territoriality.  
This is precisely the area where Kallarnatu’s rajdhani (capital) – the three 
hamlets of Mela Urappanur, Keela Urappanur, and (Ooranda) Urappanur – are 
located. Urappanur’s status as rajdhani denotes a centrality deriving from links 
between Kallarnatu and Madurai’s Nayaka polity. That is, another centre (the seat of 
the Nayaka overlord) constituted Urappanur’s status as the older nāṭu centre 
(rajdhani of Kallarnatu). Up to a point, these older social spaces were still visible. 
Urappanur’s status as rajdhani is visible in the 1910s, when district administrators 
began to work towards the imposition of CTA on Piramalai Kallar.  
In this decade, before colonial authorities notified the entire subcaste as a 
criminal tribe, they notified four Kallarnatu villages. This included Mela Urappanur, 
which continued to go by the epithet of Kallarnatu’s rajdhani. The term rajdhani 
figures in notes prepared by colonial administrators, who surveyed landholdings, 
                                                     
4 Ibid.   
5 ‘Information relating to road: important features like tourism, pilgrimage, industries, agriculture 
activities.’ n.d., accessed 14.07.2010.  
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irrigation facilities, and agricultural practices in these villages prior to their 
notification.6  
The term also surfaces in petitions challenging the notification. Consider the 
1915 petition filed by Madurai-based lawyer George Joseph (participant in the 
district’s trade union politics and anti-CTA agitations, and briefly sympathetic to, and 
active in, the Congress). Joseph petitioned on behalf of Urappanur Kallar, challenging 
the compulsory registration of all adult Kallar villagers.7 The petition stresses 
Urappanur’s status as rajdhani (as also the fact that Urappanur Kallar cultivators 
regularly paid taxes). Rajdhani echoed a juridical term colonial officials were familiar 
with. Translated as a territory’s capital, it evokes special status and an appeal for 
exception. 
Urappanur villages tried to fold the nāṭu back into new territorialities and 
administrative practices. They attempted to suture different territorialities – indeed, 
different social spaces. But while nāṭu as a way of reckoning territorial control was 
giving way to the pressures of a social space reconstituted by colonialism, it did not 
disappear. It continued in this reconstituted space, even as it came to be expressed 
differently during this transition. Some older nāṭu centres became the places from 
which representation to new political structures flowed. Urappanur seemed to have 
achieved this transition. 
In the 1950s, soon after Dumont had left Kallarnatu to write the monograph 
in which the nāṭu appears as a fixed territory, the Urappanur villages were a hub of 
Kallar political representation. In the 1952 Madras state assembly elections, Indian 
National Congress contestant from Keela Urappanur, Thinakaraswami Thevar, 
became Sedapatti constituency representative. Kallarnatu’s rajdhani was attempting 
to continue as one. 
                                                     
6 Incidentally, some of these notes and government orders (G.O.s) circulate among the subcaste today. 
In their significance and status, and in the mode of their exchange and display, these documents are 
not unlike the sacral objects redistributed in temple festivals. It is to this scattered archive as it 
appeared during public meetings and personal interactions that I pay attention to. I thank Sundara 
Vanthiyathevan for sharing the documents relevant to this section.  
7 G.O. No. 2956, Judicial, 02.12.1915, Tamil Nadu State Archives. Partially exchanged and closely 
guarded by those who have copies of it, the circulation of this document illustrates the circulation of 
archival material in Madurai and the pulling back of the archive into collective memory through local 
newspaper articles, caste histories, magazines, newsletters, and public speeches.  
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That past glory does not always match present status is as true of ūr and nāṭu 
as it is of individuals and families. In my fieldwork period, one of the key Kallar 
politicians was from Perungamanallur. This AIADMK leader was a former state 
minister, and the sitting MLA of Sedapatti constituency. Peripheral to the old nāṭu, 
Perungamanallur turned into an important hub of Kallar politics in the 1990s, when 
an annual CTA-related commemoration took off in this village (chapter 5). Contrarily, 
Urappanur villages have become more peripheral to Kallarnatu. This is particularly so 
within a representational space constituted by a jumble of affect, memories, and 
emotions. Most Kallar individuals dismissed Urappanur’s importance, saying, it might 
once have been a big place, but who cares for all that now?  
Villages that were peripheral in the nāṭu could well become new centres of 
dominance and power. One such village is Perungamanallur. Another is Malaiur. 
Malaiur’s growing importance in this shadowy or spectral Kallarnatu territory has 
little to do with its location in the nāṭu and more to do with its Euclidian proximity to 
Madurai city.  
This combine of new territorialities, circulatory infrastructure, and spatial 
practices have also affected intra-Kallar disputes over honour. One such dispute was 
the ongoing conflict over which of Kallarnatu’s eight nāṭu is the mutal nāṭu. The 
contention involves the social recognition of mutal nāṭu or, some Kallar men 
translated it, a fight over ‘which is the “first country?”’ The main dispute is between 
Tidiyan nāṭu and Valandur nāṭu. The current dispute hinges on the order in which 
nāṭu representatives receive honours during temple festivals. Both nāṭu have their 
own legends and reasons to claim primacy.  
Cuntaravantiyattēvan̲ has recently suggested that Tidiyan was the mutal nāṭu 
when Kallarnatu was an ‘independent’ territory whereas Valandur became the mutal 
nāṭu under Nayaka rule (2011: 144). Contending explanations and justifications 
existed, claims expressed through not only histories and idioms of kinship and 
kingship but also new infrastructures and positions in abstract Euclidian space. 
In October 2007, some Kallar residents of Chokkatevanpatti village, part of 
Valandur nāṭu, insisted that their nāṭu was the one with true primacy. How did they 
convey Valandur’s primacy? Pointing to the NH49 near their village, they said, ‘What 
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is the doubt? Can we not know from seeing this road itself? That Valandur is mutal 
nāṭu? Through which the main road goes? Look at Tidiyan. It is there. Somewhere. 
People like you will not even know where it is. Somewhere interior. Even the road to 
Tidiyan is not good. How can it say that it is mutal nāṭu?’  
Here we see new peripheries and centres in intra-Kallar relations emerging 
through spatial practices such as the building of major roads and highways. Other 
infrastructures have transformed relations within the subcaste. One was canal 
irrigation, partially introduced in Kallarnatu through a branch supplying Periyar Vaigai 
water to some villages in the mid-twentieth-century. Another spatial practice that 
changed intra-subcaste relations is the ribbon development along highways cutting 
across Kallarnatu. Modifications in the built environment, the emergence of new 
schools, colleges, universities, hospitals, and commercial centres, have also re-
positioned Kallar lineages and villages. I now turn to other caste conflicts related to 
roads. We shall again see that roads provide a significant axis to the reconstitution 
and reassembling of caste relations. 
Some of the most spectacular or revealing moments of caste violence or 
agitation in the late-nineteenth century and early-twentieth century were about 
roads and access to roads.8 Some scholars (Omvedt 2003: 138-9) show that access to 
roads was crucial to the Vaikom agitation, a key twentieth-century event in Indian 
politics. Although nationalist historiography has translated and reduced the event 
into a temple entry movement, it emerged from Dalit agitations for accessing roads 
near, and leading to, the temple. Noting that religion was a means to contest caste 
relations, Omvedt suggests that as religion became public, contestations over public 
space took place through religion.  
We may need to caution ourselves against transducing such efforts back into 
an emergent abstract space, as though it is uncontaminated by religion, caste, or 
kinship. This is a misinterpretation; religion continues to provide important 
moments, practices, and idioms in which caste relations are contested, negotiated, 
                                                     
8 See Frykenberg 1981 for a riot over a road in Tirunelveli district; Viswanath 2014, esp. 227-37, for 
petitions and actions regarding access to buses in North Arcot and to streets during religious festivals 
in Malabar; and Omvedt 2003 for the Vaikom agitation. 
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or strengthened. The transduction also fallaciously severs religion, religious 
identities, rituals, and temples from land relations, resource access, dispensation of 
panchayat funds, and the redistribution of power. Additionally, just as caste was cast 
away into the social (newly constituted as a category through colonial rule; 
Viswanath 2014), Dalit groups turned towards the social, transducing land relations, 
access to public space, and water allocation into the idioms and matrices that 
‘religion’ provides, even as they evoked a new framework of rights (Mosse 2003). 
Not all road access or public space disputes have taken place under the rubric 
of religion. Repeated contestations over access to public space have ensured that the 
availability of access roads to Dalit neighbourhoods, the ability of Dalits to access 
available roads, and Dalit groups’ petitions to construct new roads constitute efforts 
to rework caste relations. Additionally, government spending on infrastructure has a 
budget allocation for the SC/ ST sub-plan. This is in line with the general policy that a 
portion of all plan outlays be allocated to programmes specifically targeting Dalits 
and adivasis. In 2006–07, this took the shape of the Adi Dravida Connectivity Scheme 
in Tamil Nadu’s rural infrastructure policy. As per the scheme, 1800 kilometres of 
bituminous roads were to connect two hundred Scheduled Caste habitations. 
Ethnographic research may reveal complex negotiations between administrators and 
local social groups (not only Dalit but other caste groups) when each of these roads 
is planned and constructed, but it is already clear that policies themselves offer new 
rallying points and new resources to compete over.  
Now that roads themselves exude powers of enchantment, and the public 
nature of public space contestations have manifested in a recognition of caste 
relations’ link to access of resources, road access disputes can simply be termed as 
that – as road access disputes. Most contemporary reports and compilations of caste 
violence reveal roads, buses, and other public transportation vehicles as highly 
contested spaces. But the road’s enchantment works both ways. Its consideration as 
a universal or a public good makes it a ruse to reinforce existing power relations. One 
such instance is a well-known caste atrocity from the previous decade.  
On 29 September 2006, four members of a Dalit family were murdered in 
Khairlanji village in Maharashtra’s Bhandara district. A group of dominant caste men 
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and women from Khairlanji subjected Surekha Bhotmange, her daughter, and two 
sons to vicious and brutal acts of torture. The women were subjected by a number 
of dominant caste men to sexual assaults. The two sons were also brutally assaulted 
and their genitalia were mutilated. The aggressors killed all four individuals and 
dumped their bodies some kilometres away in a canal.  
It would be awhile before this incident became a rallying point for Dalit 
groups, although the region is shaped by decades of militant Dalit movement 
(Teltumbde 2008). Massive state repression was unleashed on those protesting 
against the massacre. A court ruling stated that the killings could not be termed a 
‘caste atrocity’ because it was related to a land dispute. The legal framing of caste 
atrocity in itself renders routine expressions of caste relations as extraordinary 
events (Rao 2010). Khairlanji clarifies that extraordinariness would be legally 
recognised only if caste was divorced from ‘ordinary’ matters such as land, water, 
housing, and roads. 
The Bhotmange family held around five and a half acres of land.9 This land 
was situated near Khairlanji’s main canal but the family had difficulty accessing 
irrigation (Teltumdbe 2008: 93). That is, the Bhotmanges’ relation to social space 
upturned their land’s location relative to irrigation infrastructure. At the core of 
Khairlanji is the tension between this family’s upward mobility and the socio-spatial 
relations expressed in ownership and control over resources (land, water, housing, 
electricity, roads). In South Asia, resources such as land and water are also 
constitutive of caste and gender relations.  
In much of rural India, village officials seldom function as disinterested 
administrators. Revenue officials and panchayat staff usually collude with dominant 
families. In effect, these embodiments of the everyday state are fixers and brokers. 
Legislations that seemingly aimed to end village hereditary offices and replace part-
time village officers with full-time village administrative officers did not radically 
change the bureaucratic field’s manifestation in rural India; they generated new 
                                                     
9 The literature on Khairlanji provides varying details. I rely on the PUCL et al (2007) report for figures.  
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patron-client relations, and introduced more elements to an already baroque 
administration.10  
Predictably, Khairlanji’s officials were serving the interests of certain 
dominant caste families. They failed to register all five and a half acres in Bhaiyalal 
Bhotmange’s name. Their persistent refusal rendered the family’s control over land 
precarious. The Bhotmanges’ control weakened further when owners of surrounding 
plots updated their strategies to usurp the land. In 2002, these dominant caste 
owners began to rally for an approach road to their fields, which would have to pass 
through the Bhotmanges’ plot. The family was coerced into parting with half an acre 
for a ten-foot approach road (PUCL et al 2007: 7). 
This was an outcome of many rounds of negotiations, petitions, and threats. 
It had the formal substance of surveys and land registers and the real sanction of 
informal caste panchayats. The access road had served as a pretext for land-grab by 
dominant castes. Thus, a road, having the sanction of a representation of space that 
pitches infrastructure as a universal good, is transduced into production relations, 
control over land, and the reproduction of unequal caste and gender relations.  
There many such extraordinary and routine instances where locally dominant 
individuals or groups used road building as a pretext for land-grab or encroachment. 
Even standard economic studies (Asher and Novosad 2014, van de Walle 2009, Ghani 
et al 2014) recognise that road construction, especially at the level of feeder roads 
and village roads, is more likely to express local political networks than any actual, 
urgent infrastructural need. Expressions of social relations become technical issues, 
clubbed in statistical and technical terminology as ‘endogeneity problems.’  
Similar moves occur at the level of highway construction. In 2006, when a 
national highway upgradation combined with a new bypass road construction in 
Trichy, a local politician sought to realign the proposed road and thus legitimise his 
earlier encroachment on a tank. Attending to negotiations over projects shows that 
                                                     
10 Building on administrative reforms undertaken by the DMK government in the mid-1970s, the MG 
Ramachandran-headed AIADMK government enacted The Tamil Nadu Abolition of Posts of Part-time 
Village Officers Act, 1981. The NT Rama Rao-headed Andhra Pradesh government introduced a similar 
legislation in 1985. 
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the road that actually materialises can differ from the one conceived. Conflicts have 
resulted in highly visible protests and litigation that highlight roads as concrete 
abstraction. Disputes disclose roads to be as much about land, water, and rights as 
they are about circulation.  
Roads, Land, and Property Disputes  
Roads not only keep commodities in circulation, they also repeatedly throw into 
sharp relief questions relating to land. Circulatory infrastructures intercalate the 
multi-scalar production of social space by reassembling land. Infrastructure-building 
brings land back to our attention from its hazy existence in the trinity, as Marx would 
have it, of land–capital–labour. Let me extend the previous discussion by considering 
infrastructure’s effects on real estate markets.  
When a newly conceptualised road takes policy precedence over measures to 
upgrade existing roads, we may safely presume that there are large-scale real estate 
concerns in the new road project. New projects successfully integrate pressures from 
a number of powerful actors – big infrastructure firms, real estate speculators, 
cement and asphalt industries, politicians, and large land-owners.  
The BMIC, Bangalore Mysore Infrastructure Corridor, project is one of the 
most well-known disclosures of road projects as real estate scams. In 1995, the 
Karnataka government signed a Memorandum of Understanding with a consortium 
of three companies, sanctioning it to construct a 111 km tollway connecting 
Bangalore and Mysore. The consortium later turned into Nandi Infrastructure 
Corridor Enterprises Ltd or NICE, giving the project its local name as the ‘nice road.’ 
Conceived under the BOOT (build own operate transfer) model, BMIC 
incorporated major real estate activities. The investment, at 1997 prices, was Rs 1600 
crore raised privately and was to be cross-subsidised through township proposals 
included in project conceptualisation (Ranganathan 2006: 2697). Project 
representations evoked the idea of facilitating regional development. Bangalore and 
Mysore were already Karnataka’s most important production and commercial 
centres. Government and infrastructure company aggressively pushed the intended 
tollway as a means to bring the cities closer, to further annihilate space with time.  
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At the time, two state highways (SH17 and SH86) and rail routes served 
Bangalore–Mysore traffic flow. To place this in a space-as-relative framework, the 
cities were at a distance of about 145 km along one of these routes. Proposals for 
comprehensive double-lining of existing rail route and for upgrading existing 
highways contended with the BMIC project but were temporarily shelved or 
overridden.  
Compared to BMIC, these alternatives needed much less capital and land. Yet 
conceived from the start as a real estate dream, BMIC managed to supersede other 
proposals. Land acquisition for BMIC was initially set at a whopping 20000 acres. Only 
7000 acres was earmarked for the tollway; the remaining 13000 was for developing 
townships along the route (Ranganathan ibid). The project has witnessed protracted 
conflicts. For instance, a retired chief engineer filed a writ petition challenging NICE’s 
Framework of Agreement that the government approved in 1997. He argued that 
BMIC was actually ‘a real estate project masquerading as a road project’ (ibid: 
2699).11  
The thrust to introduce a new road reframed regional infrastructure 
development. The government kept SH17 and SH86 out of the purview of a World 
Bank funded project to upgrade Karnataka’s highway network. It stated that the two 
highways were too narrow and that they passed through too many settlements. The 
government thus appeared to be against dispossessing residents of their land. In 
reality, it used the eminent domain principle to acquire much more land for BMIC, 
and did so under the pretext that the two highways had become narrower and more 
dangerous because of unchecked encroachment. It even incorporated ribbon 
development, one of the characteristic effects of highways, to dismiss the financially 
viable proposals for upgradation. The government additionally claimed that, being 
incapable of servicing increased traffic flows, the highways were ‘stunting the growth 
                                                     
11 After lower courts dismissed the petition, it was heard at the Supreme Court of India where it was 
ultimately dismissed in 1999 (Ranganathan 2006: 2698). Among the major reasons courts cited during 
dismissal was the petitioner’s expertise, although he possessed relevant experience and expertise. 
Interestingly, both petitioner and road authorities utilised the same calculations and frameworks, but 
the petitioner’s application of abstract calculations and notions of space was to no avail. The courts’ 
interpretation of the BOOT model suggested that the absence of direct government award of money 
to contractors renders public accountability an unjustifiable ground for challenging the project. These 
juridical interpretations made light of the state’s eminent domain tool (ibid). 
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of the region.’ These arguments allowed BMIC to emerge as the catalyst for regional 
development.  
Such statements conceal the links between global finance capital seeking 
spatial fixes through mega-infrastructure projects and the states facilitating these 
interests. Yet examining conflicts allow for a reappraisal of infrastructure projects. 
Once multiple objectives become visible, we perceive not only transport 
infrastructure’s circulation effects, ‘the generation of repetitive socio-spatial 
practices’ (Ahuja 2009: 17) but also its realty effects, the generation of new socio-
spatial practices through new townships, residential colonies, and altered property 
markets.  
BMIC illustrates the capacity of large corporations and international 
companies to influence highway planners, urban and rural development authorities, 
and state and district administrations. It also highlights the reordering and rescaling 
of socio-spatial practices. Emphasising this set of actors and actions allows for an easy 
comprehension of the ‘politics of scale’ – we readily see that scales are not fixed and 
that human action reconfigures spatial scales (Brenner 2001: 604). But all social 
groups partake in this politics of scale (chapter 6). And scale is but one aspect to the 
production of space (Brenner 2001: 597). Our analysis must therefore account for 
how ‘all social groups contribute in varying proportions (according to their social 
resources) and in conflicting ways (affected though not mechanically determined by 
their interests) to the social space of their time’ (Ahuja 2009: 30). 
The Khairlanji violence underlines social groups’ dissimilar and conflicting 
contributions to contemporary social space. The politics of scale mutates patterns of 
dominance and alliances between social groups. And caste and gender relations are 
fully socio-spatial (see Introduction). Dominance–subordination relations are 
operationalised through and influence scale, territoriality, situatedness, mobility, 
and networks. That is, social relations engage with ‘different geographical properties’ 
of different ‘dimensions of capitalist spatiality (Brenner ibid). The net of socio-spatial 
relations at each historical moment influences the forms, extent, and patterns of 
dominance.  
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Even dominant groups have different abilities to rescale and reorder their 
dominance. Locally dominant individuals and groups do not always possess the 
capacity to influence decisions on where and how highways touch or converge at 
their localities. Even so, locally dominant groups benefit from infrastructure projects 
simply by virtue of controlling land or by exercising their dominance over others in 
possession of land. Let me return to Malaiur and underscore how infrastructure-
building affects all these aspects of socio-spatial relations.  
While infrastructure-building hinges on state acquisition of land, by spawning 
other land transactions, it also opens up urban and rural land markets. In Malaiur, 
rapid transfers of land during and after the NH7 construction fostered existing 
patterns of dominance but allowed women born in Malaiur’s land-owning families to 
make property claims. 
Successful moneylenders, local politicians and big-men, and contractors 
began to dabble in real estate. The four sons of Vellaiya Thevar, one of Malaiur’s 
dominant families began to place many of its resources (economic resources and 
social relations) in the hurricane that hovered over rural Madurai. The move was well 
calculated; through its political connections to ruling government, this family 
achieved a windfall by investing in rural land. Its exponential rise was not easily 
replicable. The one other family to derive nearly the same benefits was that of 
Sivanandi Thevar; since this dominant family was linked to the main opposition party, 
it could not convert its long-standing connections to the local bureaucracy and 
politicians to the fullest.  
Translations of local dominance depend on the compositions of state 
assembly, local political representation, and bureaucracies at the time of road-
building or other land acquisition rounds. Those with strong ties to a ruling party have 
greater scope to effect such translations. When a ruling political party announces an 
array of projects to acquire land for Special Economic Zones (SEZ), this translates into 
major profits for its constituencies and representatives. Locally dominant individuals 
then engage in and thereby escalate speculative activities by purchasing land near 
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each of the zones and road projects.12 Two of the SEZ proposals announced around 
my research period were in Kallar dominated villages Vadapalanji and 
Kinnimangalam. Malaiur villagers closely followed speculative activity in both 
villages. A handful sought to participate in the speculation bubble, while others 
(affiliated to AIADMK, the main opposition party) participated in some farmers’ 
agitations against land acquisition for these SEZs.  
Those who opposed the land acquisition for SEZs admitted that when land 
acquisition for NH7 was announced, there was little collective protest from Malaiur 
land-owners. Malaiur’s dominant families (Vellaiya Thevar and Sivanandi Thevar’s) 
were keen to enter the speculative market that was bound to follow the acquisition 
and highway construction. Some individual Kallar farmers, such as Perumal Thevar 
and Krishnan, contested the land acquisition. As speculation pushed land prices 
dramatically upwards, other villagers filed petitions challenging the inadequate 
compensation.  
The scattered nature of landholdings may be another reason for the lack of 
collective protest against land acquisition. My surveys suggested that very few 
families held land over two acres. (Given the speculation that followed highway-
building, I have reasons to doubt these figures). These ‘substantial’ landowners held 
fields across Malaiur and neighbouring villages. Landowners such as Rasendran 
hoped that the speculation bubble would soon engulf Malaiur. Rasendran was one 
of many Malaiur villagers who had worked in textile mills in the area, only to lose 
their jobs when these mills shut down. These villagers waited to sell land and obtain 
(what to marginal farmers appeared as) ridiculously large amounts of cash. As the 
bubble descended, people like Rasendran became flush with cash flows that they 
could not have obtained through cultivation, mill wages, or even through small-scale 
usury. Yet others in the village had to give up their land – not directly to real estate 
companies but to local usurers doubling up as real estate agents or land procurers 
for bigger land dealers.  
                                                     
12 The Special Economic Zones Act’s Act followed the extraordinary thrust on highway building across 
India. Within ten years of its implementation, Tamil Nadu approved 54 projects, of which 50 are 
notified SEZs (http://www.sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/pdf/StatewiseDistribution-SEZ.pdf, accessed 
29.06.2015). 
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As speculation increased, and the market price of Malaiur’s agricultural lands 
near the highway and some interior roads shot up, old debts and mortgages were 
recalled. Property disputes increased dramatically. People such as Gouthaman 
constantly lamented that the ‘four-lane’ had destroyed the entire village [ūraiyē/ 
nāṭṭaiyē keṭuttatu inta road tāṉ]. Gouthaman, the youngest of Kallar three brothers, 
did not have adequate resources with which to influence the informal panchayats 
settling his family’s land disputes.  
Those who held valuable land but were disinterested in parting with it were 
pressurised by local brokers and family members working in tandem. Kannan, a Kallar 
resident of neighbouring Tenur – also transformed by NH7 – had one son and three 
daughters who routinely harangued him to divide the land, so that they could directly 
engage with brokers. These hawkish local brokers encouraged Kannan’s children. 
They thought that, left to himself, Kannan would never part with land. In some 
families, children waited for fathers to sell land and claimed money later. When 
Perumal Thevar finally assembled the money he obtained through compensation 
from government and sale to land dealers (amounting to 35 lakhs), his daughters and 
sons came around to demand full pre-mortem shares.   
The highway also ‘opened up the country’ for women, who normally 
conceded to local property inheritance rules which ensured that ‘immovable’ 
property or land only passed down the male line of descent. Rasendran had seven 
sisters. All seven of them, married and staying in nearby villages or in Madurai city, 
claimed shares in the money he obtained from selling land. He was so affected by 
their sheer audacity that he even fumed in my presence once, cursing that it would 
have better had his mother killed these ‘female donkeys’ right away, at their birth. 
Property disputes, during heated conversations, had the effect of lifting an otherwise 
universal curfew among the Kallar community on talking about female infanticide to 
outsiders (such as anthropologists and reporters).  
But women had begun to threaten their fathers and brothers with litigation. 
Whether or not they would actually approach the court or use it to leverage informal 
deals, the threat was rather common. Women’s property claims hinged on land 
entering the real estate market. Real estate generated valuable deals, turning 
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ancestral property into something women held worth fighting over with their fathers, 
mothers, and brothers. More importantly, the emergence of property market in 
Malaiur enabled them to sell the land successfully claimed to a broker. Women did 
not have to worry about how to foster dominance from a distance, as would be the 
case normally if the land were used for cultivation. For a woman born in Malaiur, the 
field could truly become one’s own – and for a very short duration, at that – only 
when it turned into a plot of land in the speculative market.  
Many gender-related property disputes initially mobilised ‘tradition.’ Sisters 
would seek their brother’s daughters as brides for their sons (and vice versa), evoking 
preferential marriage customs favouring the muṟai peṇṇ (or cutantira peṇṇ). Such 
efforts could involve many rounds of informal panchayats and negotiations before 
the girl (or boy) was freed and allowed to marry someone else. The point is, 
preferential marriage became one route to reach the land. The hypermodern 
highway thus appeared to birth the Dravidian kinship ‘system.’ Yet everyone knew 
that the insistence on following muṟai was about persistent claims to land, and not 
the perpetuation of Dravidian alliance and kin ties themselves. Of course, these 
conflicts gave sufficient grounds to reimagine older marriage patterns and 
preferences purely in idioms of care and affection, as though those had had nothing 
to do with production and reproduction relations.   
When muṟai turned ineffective tactic – which it did in Rasendran’s case, for 
he successfully arranged his daughter’s marriage with a man of his choice rather than 
with one of his sisters’ sons – property disputes emerged from the sidelines to occupy 
centre stage. Rasendran’s failure to respect muṟai led to additional years of informal 
panchayat over land (rather than alliance). It culminated in a settlement with all his 
sisters and his own daughters, who were also by then married.  
Thus, kinship, customs, and law were all weapons in many challenges and 
conflicts between the landed men of Malaiur and their daughters or sisters. Women’s 
success varied. In mid-2008, a group of women born in Malaiur but living elsewhere 
after marriage were visiting for a goat sacrifice at the Karuppu temple. Karuppayi, an 
older kinswoman from Malaiur, questioned these women. ‘Why are you all fighting 
so much for land and property? Don’t you have enough comforts already?’ Karuppayi 
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had addressed one of the visitors, Chandra, whose husband was a middle-level 
officer in the Collectorate. Chandra’s response traced the heightening conflicts 
between siblings back to the highway. ‘Those days,’ she said, ‘we did not bother. That 
land had no value. Now, it goes [pōkutu] for 80000, and 100000 and 125000 rupees. 
Why should we [daughters] alone remain sitting quietly?’ The road’s incursion and 
land value (in price terms) had papered over, according to the rest of the dialogue 
between Chandra and Karuppayi, the need (or pretence) for cordial relations 
between brothers and sisters.  
Addressing Chandra (for she was the most vocal), I asked how women could 
safeguard land, after success in claiming it. Would not the many rounds of bitter 
words and negotiations result in women losing their strongest links to the place in 
which the land was situated? Santhi, another visitor, while admitting that those kinds 
of troubles often crop up, pointed to Chandra and said, ‘But, for her, why will that 
problem come? Troublemakers, don’t they know whose land it is, what [the land-
owner’s] takuti (capability, authority, competency) is?’  
Santhi’s explanation was an astute one. Even if a middle-level bureaucrat’s 
wife severs her ties with her brothers, she has other means by which to safeguard 
property. In any case, I might have asked the wrong question. These disputes were 
often about rights in the money obtained through sale, not about inheriting land per 
se. Women’s inheritance and subsequent control over land as real estate runs into 
similar problems as their inheritance of cultivated land. In both cases, real control 
rests on proximity to land and to kin, and the ability to forge that control either 
through their own presence or through dependable local kin such as fathers and 
brothers where the land was located. Many women preferred a share in sale money 
over inheriting land.  
Land itself was not, technically, ‘going’ anywhere, but this is the verb [pōkutu] 
Tamil speakers often use when talking about prices. They appear radically different 
from the Chotanagpur adivasi who challenged that land could not be sold because it 
could not be taken away – if land is not a mat that you can roll up and take away once 
you buy it, it cannot be a commodity (Li 2014b).  
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Yet immobile plots of land can well seem to be going somewhere when a 
highway begins to go near them. Their locations in Euclidian geometry remain static, 
but their value in money terms is transformed as they come to be differently located 
in relational spaces. Although abstract, relative, and absolute notions of space and 
property regimes come together to change the assignation of value to land as real 
property, the material characteristics of land prevents its total annexation as a 
commodity. Rather, its annexation as a commodity depends on how it is reassembled 
(Li 2014b).  
Land may not be a mat that you can roll and take away, but speculative 
interest turns a plot’s value into a flying carpet. Road-building is one of the means by 
which to mount wings of speculation onto land. Following Li (ibid), we may say that 
roads network land in new ways. Following Lefebvre (1991) and Harvey (2005), we 
may say roads situate land differently in relational spaces.  
Roads and Tanks 
Alongside big infrastructure projects such as the Golden Quadrilateral and the North–
South and East–West corridors, a number of upgradation projects for other national 
and state highways were sanctioned. Single lane highways were converted into two 
lanes; two lanes into four lanes; four lanes into six lanes. New bypasses were built on 
outer edges of expanding cities. Expressways were built to bring cities closer to each 
other.  
These projects could generate more distance between adjacent locations. 
Major roads split village territories into two, and heavy traffic altered movement 
across adjoining neighbourhoods and villages. Highway upgradation can cause routes 
and pathways to disappear. One highway can modify other roads and pathways, the 
infrastructural network, and the tracks and pathways created over time through 
human and non-human action (the movement of animals, bicycles, and motorcycles). 
The new NH7 alignment transformed the paths by which Malaiur’s Kallar 
population earlier reached lands they held in neighbouring kirāmam. It changed both 
ūr and kirāmam. Consider the Karuppu temple priests’ lineage festivals. During their 
annual festivals, these Velar (‘potter’ caste) priests, their families, and lineage 
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members would carry sacred trunks containing ancestral belongings and follow a 
fixed procession route to reach the Karuppu temple. Highway construction 
transformed the procession route. The road also affected processions of other ritual 
specialists and the temple’s coparceners. If processions map and sustain territorial 
control in Tamil ūr (Mines 2005), infrastructural modifications not only change 
territoriality, they also transform other aspects of spatiality. NH7 altered the ūr–
kirāmam co-constitution that generated Malaiur. Revisions to Malaiur’s procession 
routes signalled fresh outflows of kirāmam into ūr, and new interjections between 
absolute and abstract space.   
Each new road has the potential to alter spatial practices and remake 
location, locality, territory, and place. The previous section explored how road-
building reassembles land and imparts new meanings and value to land. This section 
continues to explore how transport infrastructure act upon objects, but shifts the 
focus away from land and real estate to irrigation structures. While roads advance 
infrastructure for commodity production, they also have adverse effects on 
infrastructures important for agricultural production. Roads may be important for 
‘taking agriculture to the market’ (World Bank 2008), but they occasionally hinder 
agriculture.  
Roads and tanks can supplement of conflict each other. Many Malaiur Kallar 
took the Willingdon road as an index of their bravery and qualities. Describing how 
they – their fathers or grandfathers – built this road in the early-twentieth century, 
they attributed all agency to themselves. According to these narratives, it was 
Malaiur villagers, not the colonial state, who had decided the road alignment 
(chapter 3). 
It was only when we were not talking about the road or CTA that a non-human 
agency to decisions on this road alignment became visible. Conversations about the 
tanks along the Willingdon road suggested that road alignment had materialised not 
so much through colonial state power or Kallar subterfuge as from these tanks 
themselves. During these conversations, villagers spoke as though the road had 
simply followed the bunds of tanks on the three-kilometre stretch. Arumugam once 
mentioned four tanks on whose bunds the road had been laid out. On this occasion, 
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he oriented the tanks vis-à-vis the Karuppu temple (tanks to the temple’s north and 
to its south), not the road itself. But he also ascribed some kind of agency to the 
tanks. They had had an influence over the road. 
I wanted to know whether the tanks influenced decisions on how the road 
was to be built. Later, Arumugam would name some of the tanks (Tenur kammāy, 
Kurathikulam kammāy, Thanakkankulam kammāy, Tuvariman kammāy) filled up 
during the NH7 construction. But on that occasion, I simply gestured towards the 
highway under construction.  
Arumugam thought road alignments were earlier derived from a respect for 
tanks. ‘Those days, they built the road like that only. On tank bunds. Not like 
nowadays. With machines bigger than hills. Machines that can break hills in one 
week.’ (A local Tamil newspaper had carried photographs of a small hill near Malaiur; 
this hill had to make way for the NH7). But I thought the Willingdon road alignment 
highlighted the ‘joint venture’ nature of colonialism. The CTA implementation had 
depended on much more than state coercion.  
One of the measures following CTA had been to institute ‘Kallar panchayats’ 
in villages. Malaiur Kallar either referred to their village Kallar panchayat as 
‘karuṅkāli’ police, with all the hate that befalls informants, or more respectfully as 
‘cūrimārkaḷ vīṭu,’ the house of the ‘jurymen.’ These villagers acknowledged that 
Kallar panchayat members were junior partners in CTA implementation. I thus 
wondered, even though the Willingdon road was laid out before Malaiur’s 
notification, might the road’s materialisation have involved negotiations with these 
tanks’ ayacutdars, who belonged to not only Malaiur but also neighbouring 
villages?13  
The very possibility of negotiations reflects different policies concerning CTA 
imposition. Unlike ‘nomadic tribes’ criminalised by the Act who played an important 
                                                     
13 We were both guessing. Archival research is one route for triangulation. I have been unable to 
conduct the kind of extensive research this requires. I am equally wary of utilising the archival research 
I was able to undertake as a straightforward supplement to ethnographic research, and of offering 
scattered archival data in the garb of an analytical preference for fragments and a non-sequential 
approach to history (Ahuja 2009). In what follows, therefore, I leave the two contending examinations 
(of the Willingdon road and the tanks) as guesses. 
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role in circulation of goods (Radhakrishna 2001), Kallar subcastes were integrated 
into agricultural production through a series of expansionist polities from the 
Vijayanagara empire onwards and which had turned these peripheral regions into 
new agrarian territories (e.g. Stein 1980, Ludden 1986). The colonial administration 
did recast the Kallar as a caste of kāvalkārar – positions which colonial technologies 
of rule translated as professions of (as also a pastime or passion for) blackmail, 
robbery, and extortion. Yet it was through agriculture that administrators and 
missionaries sought to ‘reform’ this subcaste (A. Pandian 2009). In Malaiur, colonial 
administrators set up cooperatives and offered credit assistance to sink wells, 
arguing that increased productivity of land would decrease Kallar ‘proclivity’ to theft. 
Tanks would have to be respected to forge alliances with ayacutdars and to 
encourage agricultural production. 
Arumugam’s explanation is also a reminder that the early-twentieth century 
road is a different entity from the early-twenty-first century road. Roads may be 
instruments with which to ‘master’ nature. Yet, the extent to which a road masters 
or respects a tank partly depends on the tools for such mastery at each moment, and 
on locational specificities. (Another factor would be contestations between social 
groups). Tanks – themselves the result of previous human attempts to master and 
transform ‘nature’ in these rain-fed surroundings – offered almost ‘readymade’ 
solutions for road builders. (The bund of Malaiur’s main tank was coated with a 
bituminous surface recently and only after land use patterns south of the village 
changed substantially. The new surface was needed for vehicular movement on a 
track that earlier had only been touched by human and animal feet, and the 
occasional bicycles). Thus, as Arumugam pointed out, in the early-twentieth century, 
rural road construction involved the use of tracks offered by other built structures 
such as tanks.  
This would have also minimised expenditure. Capital allocation for public 
works in colonial India was burdened by the exigencies of rule and colonialism’s 
effects on capitalist development (Ahuja 2009). In the nineteenth century, Britain’s 
main export of surplus capital was another colony – present-day USA. Public works 
projects in colonial India were weighed down by considerations of how quickly capital 
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invested would yield results in the form of quicker extraction and circulation of raw 
materials and unfinished products (Ahuja 2009).  
Now, road-building projects rely on far more powerful tools, offer important 
venues to soak up capital, and aid in the production of space as a commodity. In other 
words, when India’s recent infrastructure projects offer scope for engineering 
massive spatial fixes and reassembling land for real property markets, and the 
integration of global capital is such that the sheer territorial area required to soak up 
surplus capital can literally extend to space, a highway (even a village road) need not 
respect a tank.  
Malaiur Kallar villagers were emphatic that the old road changed little of the 
tanks’ composition, function, and flow patterns. They held that the one thing that 
was modified was sluice positions – since the road was built by raising the height of 
the bund, tanks were deepened, and sluices moved further down.  
Incidentally, the men who spoke about the Willingdon road and the tanks 
were owner/tenant-cultivators. They had their own wells or rented well water from 
neighbours. Malaiur was one of many Kallarnatu villages that had had little success 
in pressurising the state to upgrade the Periyar canal irrigation network. The inability 
to procure canal water, Malaiur’s increasing reliability on well irrigation, and a shift 
to horticulture merged with changes in land use due to urbanisation and NH7 
construction – the combined effect seemed to discourage these villagers from 
associating roads and tanks. Elsewhere, cultivators, whether dependent on system 
tanks – supplied with water from canals, reservoirs, dams, and rivers – or non-
system, rain-fed tanks have repeatedly connected road building and irrigation. 
A last point before I turn to examining one such instance in Tamil Nadu’s 
Trichy district. In a telephonic conversation with Arumugam in 2015, I returned to 
exploring these connections. Now more aware of the conflicting agency of highways 
and tanks, I wanted to follow up our earlier conversations. My main sources were 
judgements (and newspaper reports) on conflicts in Tamil Nadu’s Trichy, Sivagangai, 
Tirunelveli, and Tindivanam districts. I had also looked at conflicts in Mela Urappanur, 
Keela Urappanur, and Urappanur – where allocation of tank resources such as water 
was the subject of a series of petitions made to the colonial government in the 1920s-
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40s, while conflicts on fishing rights had culminated in the death of a number of Kallar 
villagers. By now, I was also aware of similar conflicts in Madurai’s Chellampatti union 
villages.14  
Arumugam ended our telephonic conversation by complicating the analysis I 
offer below. ‘There, in the areas you are talking about,’ he said, ‘they are big, big 
cultivators [periya-periya vivacāyikaḷ]. They have the comforts for court cases. Also, 
the necessity. Here [in Malaiur], if someone has just two, three acres, he is a large 
farmer.’ What he was, in effect, directing me to comprehend was that the ability of 
individuals and groups to participate in participatory democracy depended on the 
resources they already possessed. (Yet it not only those with something substantial 
and materially visible to lose but also those with little to lose who have opposed some 
of the largest infrastructure projects in India). With this caution in mind, I now turn 
to Trichy.  
A highly perceptible account of transport infrastructure’s cascading effects on 
irrigation infrastructure is available in court rulings on conflicts between cultivators 
in Trichy’s Manikandam taluk and NHAI over the upgradation of national highway 
NH67. The NH67 is a 550 kilometres long national highway from Nagapattinam, a 
coastal town in Tamil Nadu, to Gundlupet, Karnataka.15 Let me provide a detailed 
outline of this conflict.16 
I provide a detailed account for two reasons. One, contending 
conceptualisations and perceptions of irrigation and circulation, and different 
frameworks of causality emerge through details. This is useful to my analysis towards 
the end of this section. Two, legal discourse would have us believe that it is on the 
                                                     
14 A 1983 judgement on disputes over water distribution and sharing in Mela Urappanur and 
surrounding villages passingly refers to an earlier tank versus road conflict. Sunda Thevar and Ors. vs 
The Collector of Madurai and Anr., (Madras High Court 1983), available at 
http://indiankanoon.org/doc/882071/. For a recent road vs tank dispute between two Kallar 
individuals in Chellampatti, see S.Rajuveerana Thevar vs Panbaalan, (Madras High Court 2013), 
available at http://indiankanoon.org/doc/91499723/.  
15 The highway length is from a 2012 NHAI document 
(http://www.nhai.org/doc/23june12/nh_nh%20wise.pdf, accessed 27.08.2015). 
16 Details are from Tamil Nadu Agriculturists vs The Union of India, (Madras High Court 2009), available 
at http://indiankanoon.org/doc/466836/; Selvakumar vs Union of India, (Madras High Court 2010), 
available at http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1719182/; and Punganoor Eri Pasana Vivasayigal vs The 
National Highways Authority, (Madras High Court 2012), available at 
http://indiankanoon.org/doc/63149289/. 
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basis of tediously discussed details – in this instance, details concerned matters such 
as how best to abstract a tank or a road through technical terms and measurements, 
and whether or not and when existing procedures were followed – that judgements 
are arrived at. 
Under NHDP’s Phase III, the Central Government approved a proposal to 
widen the Trichy–Karur bypass road, part of NH67. Trichy is important to road 
networks as a nodal district and as a location at which heavy-traffic highways 
intersect. NHAI decided to widen the Trichy–Karur bypass road in 2006. NHAI’s 
Project Director (Karur) initiated the task, and state and central governments 
approved the bypass. Authorities initially planned to align the road across the 
western portions of Punganoor and Kallikudi tanks, two canal-serviced system tanks 
in Manikandam taluk, with a combined ayacut of 2500 acres across several villages.17 
When the District Revenue Officer (DRO) was to initiate land acquisition for the 
bypass, Kallikudi tank ayacutdars objected that this alignment would impede 
cultivation.  
The DRO informed the Collector about these objections, who then requested 
the Project Director, NHAI, to author a realignment. The Project Director expressed 
his inability since NHAI had already approved the alignment. Nevertheless, the sketch 
of a possible realignment circulated among the authorities. This sketch shifted the 
road further east from the initial alignment. The realigned road was to be laid 
through the tanks’ eastern portions. The Collector forwarded this option to the state 
government, which in turn forwarded it to NHAI. Meantime, the agitating 
agriculturalists, district administrators, and NHAI officials met for deliberations, and 
agreed to a new alignment that reduced the road length across the tanks.  
Punganoor tank ayacutdars had not objected to the initial alignment but 
objected to the new one. Meanwhile, without waiting for NHAI approval, the DRO 
issued a notification to acquire land for laying the road as per the new proposal. 
Agriculturists depending on both tanks objected to the second notification. 
                                                     
17 In the petitions, names and figures of these tanks keep changing. For example, the Kothamangalam 
tank is referred to as the Pirattiyur tank, and some rulings refer to three (instead of two) affected 
tanks with a total registered ayacut of 2500 hectares. 
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Cultivators challenged the DRO’s summary rejection of their objections and filed writ 
petitions in the Madras High Court. In December 2009, the Court jointly heard two 
petitions, one filed by a representative of the Tamil Nadu Agriculturists Association 
and the other by a cultivator from Kallikudi village.  
The District Collector and the DRO deposed that their offices had nothing to 
do with the final decision on road alignments and stated that it was the Project 
Director, NHAI, who had finalised the proposal. But NHAI countered that the 
realignment proposal had emerged only because some agriculturalists objected to 
the initial alignment. It clarified its readiness to consider either alignment, as long as 
the ‘District Administration gives protection from the agitation of the villagers for the 
early completion of the project.’  
The new alignment reduced the road length in Kallikudi tank from 550 to 150 
metres and in Punganoor from 1350 to 1000 metres. Public Works Department 
(PWD) officials deposed that this alignment would affect only five per cent volume of 
tank water, and that the deepening of tanks would compensate the volume 
reduction. They further claimed that only 15 acres would be affected and that water 
flow would not be obstructed. Cultivators had cause to worry over the shifting 
representation of tanks – even PWD officials represented tanks purely in terms of 
volume and extant. These experts were misrepresenting tanks.  
Punganoor ayacutdars also accused a local MLA (of the ruling party) of 
pushing the realignment because he wanted to bring the road closer to a college 
managed by his trust. The court alludes to this charge, only to dismiss it as ‘politics.’ 
It sought expert opinion on the alignment’s effect on the tanks. It directed NHAI to 
form a committee of experts and asked Trichy’s administrators to coordinate with 
this expert committee. The committee was to conduct field surveys, meet concerned 
farmers, and to explore alternative alignments avoiding, or minimising damage to, 
the tanks. The judge invalidated the DRO’s order and stayed the project until the 
expert committee submitted its final report to NHAI, and NHAI approved a new 
alignment.  
NHAI was quick to set up a three-member expert committee. It had already 
stated that time was of essence and that the project had to be completed by July 
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2010. Farmer groups took issue with the expertise of committee members – a civil 
engineer, an environmental engineer, and the founder of a local NGO – and moved 
the court to include tank irrigation and agriculture experts in the committee. One 
petitioner hoped the court would direct Chennai-based Centre for Water Resources 
(CWR) to send experts to the field and submit a report on the proposed alignments’ 
effect on the tanks.18 The court ordered the NHAI expert committee to consider CWR 
opinion before placing its report. One judge admonished the petitioners for wasting 
time and obstructing the nationally important matter of highways, and said the court 
would no longer entertain petitions regarding the experts.  
In April 2010, the NHAI expert committee made a field visit and received 
objections from villagers and a large contingent of farmers led by a former AIADMK 
minister.19 It suggested three alternate alignments and forwarded its report to CWR, 
Chennai. CWR conducted its own assessments and prepared another report that 
recommended three options. It favoured complete avoidance of the tanks or aligning 
the highway along tank boundaries instead of cutting across them. The third option 
– to be exercised only if avoiding tanks was impossible – was to minimise damage by 
constructing the highway over the tanks, on the condition that hydraulic and 
hydrological assessments guaranteed that the overhead road would obstruct neither 
tanks’ inflow nor outflow.  
Both reports were forwarded to the court for the next round of hearings. 
Although the court was no expert to decide the alignment, the experts, particularly 
CWR experts, had prepared the grounds for valuing the tanks over the road. It is at 
                                                     
18 W.P. No. 21205 of 2009, and W.P. (MD). No. 5388 of 2010, both quoted in Selvakumar vs Union of 
India, (Madras High Court 2010). Hearing the first petition, in February 2010, the High Court ordered 
that the NHAI expert committee consider the opinion of the Director, CWR before submitting its final 
report. Another petitioner requested the court to direct NHAI to constitute a committee with 
expertise in the ‘Field of Irrigation, Field of Road laying, Field of Agriculture, and the Field of Intra 
Disciplinary nature embodying the above said three subjects.’ The court order on this petition came 
in April 2010, after the NHAI expert committee’s field visit.  
19 ‘Expert Committee makes spot review of Tiruchi-Karur Bypass Road,’ UNI release (accessed at 
http://news.webindia123.com/news/articles/India/20100403/1477845.html). The committee 
accepted written objections at its office for two additional days. As regards the presence of the former 
AIADMK minister, recall that Tamil Nadu then had a DMK-led government, and that, in this specific 
case, the road realignment had been undertaken at the behest of a DMK minister who wished to cover 
up his earlier encroachment on one of the tanks.  
187 
 
the start of the common order on the case that the judge quotes Thiruvalluvar on the 
importance of water to kingship.  
The court stated that NHAI consider the caution given in the CWR report, 
which stressed that the Trichy case was but a sample of the vast numbers of tanks 
that have disappeared due to road constructions. NHAI was free to choose any of the 
recommendations, but could only ask district authorities to proceed with land 
acquisitions after obtaining clearances from various departments. While the process 
dragged on outside the court, the ruling itself offers many issues relevant to our 
discussion. I concentrate on the representation of space in the language of experts 
and litigation.  
For infrastructure companies, highway authorities, and other bureaucrats – 
including some from PWD – the tank on which a road is built and the road that is built 
on or across a tank are 'causally closed' (Putnam in Hirsch 2005). A number of officials 
in recent roads versus tank litigations have claimed that the road in question would 
have no adverse effect on other entities in a given environment. In the Trichy 
petitions, NHAI suggested that a thousand metres on the eastern portion of a tank 
or a little less on the opposite side – it made little difference to highway authorities 
or infrastructure companies which alignment to follow. (But costs do matter, and 
there are significant cost differences between building over a tank and cutting across 
a tank).  
For those relying on the tank for agricultural production, alignment decisions 
could be decisive. The Trichy tanks were system tanks. New (transport) infrastructure 
destroys older (irrigation) infrastructures, even canal networks engineered by 
modern governments. Such destruction clears previously fixed capital from the 
ground and creates new venues for spatially fixing capital.  
It also shows the paramount concern with turning space into a commodity, 
with engineering a colonisation of all land. If a road disrupts a tank qua tank, it 
strengthens real estate and construction sector interests. It is by effecting an abstract 
notion of space that dominant social groups and their representatives dismantle the 
concrete. All these instances go against Hegel’s illustration of the difference between 
the abstract universal and the concrete universal. It is not the saleswoman in the 
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market who fails to grasp a crime or a criminal in concrete terms (in Stanek 2008: 63-
4). It may be the officials, the bureaucracy, and businesses who cannot to see beyond 
the crime. 
The causal closing of roads is an overarching theme in conflicts over road-
building, despite modern bureaucratic attempts to regulate a specialising impulse 
through procedures to suture (even if only briefly) what is administered separately. 
Procedurally, road building involves a brief joining of disjointed or individually 
administered realms. Revenue officials are supposed to survey the lands required for 
a particular road alignment, hear objections raised by affected groups, and pass on 
reports to district collectors. PWD officials are supposed to look into the effects of 
the road on water bodies administered by their department.20 The Forest 
Department is to submit reports on the road's effects on forests. For a project 
exceeding the cost cap, clearance has to be obtained from the Ministry of 
Environment, which is to assess the extent to which the project would affect ecology. 
But in the end, the project tears out of these hazy reunions and temporary sutures 
to re-emerge as a road project. 
Despite the spread of procedure across various ministries and departments, 
road-building projects rest on the assumption that a road is just a 'ribbon on land.' 
More to the point, within the representation of space forwarded by these projects, 
land acquisition officers treat one stretch of land just the same as another stretch 
with the same dimensions. By seeking to settle the conflict with recourse to metric 
measurement, engineers and highways officials restore our trust in numbers. This, in 
turn, advances a certain conception of politics and the political. 
While officials replace the actual tank with an abstract idea of the tank (to 
paraphrase Scott 1998), ayacutdars bring back the concrete tank, with its inflow and 
drainage patterns, its upstream and downstream connections, and sluice positions, 
and so on. The question is how the court takes cognisance of ayacutdars’ objections, 
and conceptualises tanks. The concrete tank comes to matter only through a series 
of mediations in which experts play a significant role. It is expert opinion, not 
                                                     
20 Madras Presidency was one of the first to bifurcate the PWD; it established a highways department 
in 1946. 
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ayacutdars’ understanding and representation of the concrete tank, which matters. 
The Trichy ayacutdars found a supporting voice in CWR experts but many are not as 
lucky.  
These were systems tanks. Where a road affects a non-system tank (or rain-
fed tank), NHAI officials and the bureaucracy utilise recent histories of rain-fed 
irrigation to their favour. From 1993, district officials in Tindivanam, northern Tamil 
Nadu, periodically attempted to convert five acres of a non-system tank into a bus 
terminus.21 They rejected proposed alternatives for the terminus, and argued that 
converting a non-system tank rather than a system tank was more efficient when 
land was 'scarce.’ In effect, the official argument went something like this – if 
previous governmental neglect reduced tanks’ importance to irrigation, it was more 
efficient for current governments to use tanks for non-irrigation purposes.  
Meanwhile, urbanisation and agricultural practices and policies (increasing 
costs of input, and transformations in land use and infrastructures) spur some 
cultivators towards working or investing in peri-urban property markets. Recall this 
pattern in Malaiur, where some residents turned into real estate agents, brokers, and 
procurers, drawing from their own social and economic positions to enter this sector. 
Vellaiya Thevar and Sivanandi Thevar’s families were closely linked to the DMK and 
AIADMK. Members of both families had recently held or were then holding key 
positions in local administrative bodies. These positions enabled the families to 
incorporate themselves into the baroque realty market.  
Local big-men are the link between big land dealers and landholders. Local 
brokers and big-men not only have the muscle but also the powers of persuasion to 
ensure necessary land transactions. They can convert kinship ties and relatedness 
into promises and assurances. They can also recall old loans and use indebtedness to 
pull through land transfers. Vellaiya Thevar’s eldest son, Boopati, promised 
Rasendran better prices for land near NH7 in return for a small plot near the much-
frequented Karuppu temple. Such big-men persuaded marginal cultivators by citing 
many reasons to give up cultivation. Their persuasive litany included Tenur’s defunct 
                                                     
21 S Venkatesan vs Government of Tamil Nadu, (Madras High Court 2009). Available at 
http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1430809/. 
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agricultural co-operative; increasing input prices; fewer functioning wells (estimated 
to have decreased to 35) and increasing rents for well irrigation (by January 2015, 
Malaiur well-owners charged Rs 25 per hour); and the disappearance of tanks due to 
highway construction and encroachment by building societies and realtors. If 
property dealers and investors derive advantage from the fuzziness of land titles, 
claims, and control (Li 2014b), local social relations are key to instrumentalising this 
fuzziness.  
Rural Roads and Criss-crossing Policies: NREGS Roadworks 
In 2005, the UPA government enacted a law guaranteeing a minimum of hundred 
days’ employment to each rural household seeking a job.22 The Mahatma Gandhi 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) instituted through this act 
came in the wake of prolonged and systemic agrarian crises, below subsistence 
agricultural wages, and a spate of farmer suicides.23  
Rather than rehearse the themes of corruption, improper implementation, 
and inadequate participation, I focus on NREGS’ effects on rural spaces. I engage 
specifically with transformations in rights, entitlements, and opportunities; labour 
markets; and built environments. I begin by examining NREGS guidelines and policy 
convergences that have affected the nature of roads and roadworks undertaken 
through this scheme, and then move to NREGS works in Malaiur. 
NREGS was envisioned as a workfare scheme that could generate assets in 
rural India. Besides mitigating rural crisis through employment, NREGS has 
guaranteed a steady supply of labour for ‘asset-creation’ in rural India and later on, 
a steady market for construction materials (cement, concrete) – all of which 
reconfigure rural spaces. NREGS operational guidelines covered the categorisation of 
‘productive works’ and ‘permissible works,’ the kinds of works that could be 
                                                     
22 Congress’ 2004 general election manifesto promised a national employment guarantee act 
immediately (http://www.congresssandesh.com/manifesto-2004/7.html, accessed July 2009). There 
was significant pressure to hold the Congress true to this promise. UPA’s Common Minimum 
Programme promised to legislate the act immediately (http://pmindia.nic.in/cmp.pdf, accessed July 
2009). Many political formations that supported (or were part of) Congress-led United Progressive 
Alliance (UPA) hailed the NREGS. 
23 At end-twentieth-century, India’s annual total rural employment growth rate was 0.58 per cent 
whereas annual rural population growth rate was about 1.7 per cent (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh 2004: 
52). 
191 
 
sanctioned, and on labour–material ratio.24 The 2008 operational guidelines 
stipulated a 60:40 wage–material ratio and disallowed contractors and machinery 
(Government of India 2008: 3). It also recommended maintaining this ratio at gram 
panchayat, block, and district levels.25 
The 60:40 wage–material ratio posed some issues for rural connectivity 
works. Under the 2005 guidelines, NREGS works for rural connectivity through all-
weather access roads were least prioritised. Firstly, this was PMGSY’s sole agenda. 
Secondly, the stipulated labour–material ratio poses difficulties for road 
construction. Labour costs in road construction are significantly low in India. Quality 
road construction requires high material to labour ratios. This mirrors a worldwide 
trend in workfare schemes – while labour comprises only 40-50 per cent of road 
construction costs, it could absorb 70-80 per cent of costs in other works (O’Keefe 
2005: 4).  
As NREGS stabilised, the government constituted a task force to seek 
convergences between this scheme and others. This task force identified the 
National Rural Roads Development Agency, Ministry of Rural Development, as one 
of the important ‘partners’ to NREGS, and discussed convergence between the two. 
Guidelines recommended that roadworks undertaken through NREGS not be the 
same as those taken up under PMGSY. The convergence enabled the former to 
supplement the latter.26 
One downstream effect of the NREGS–PMGSY dovetailing is more roadworks 
under NREGS. There has also been an upstream push for NREGS roadworks from 
                                                     
24 State governments could expand on the permissible works. For state governments’ prioritisation of 
works, see G.O. Ms. No. 10. Rural Development (CGS 1) Department, 1.2.2006. District administrations 
had to prepare a five-year perspective plan and a list of planned works incorporating village 
development plans. Each district’s perspective plan had to be consistent with the prioritisation of 
works. At the village level, the panchayat was to determine priority of works.  
25 Also, the amended 2013 guidelines specified that the ratio be maintained at relevant levels at which 
works were undertaken (Government of India 2013: 59). 
26 PMGSY only allowed for one road (between unconnected habitations to market/‘growth centre’) 
while NREGS allowed multiple routes for connectivity. PMGSY’s main concern is village-to-market 
roads while NREGS allows internal village roads construction. See ‘Joint convergence guidelines: 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) (Ministry of Rural Development) and Pradhan 
Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY) (Ministry of Rural Development)’ n.d. 
http://nrega.nic.in/circular/Guide_NREGA_PMGSY.pdf accessed 20.08.2015.  
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panchayat, block, and district levels.27 Already in 2004, commentators drew from 
data on earlier employment guarantee schemes to predict roadworks’ popularity 
(Chandrasekhar and Ghosh 2004: 55). In some places, roadworks were the most 
popular scheme. In Odisha’s drought-prone Nuapada district, road projects 
dominated NREGS works, avowedly preferred over water conservation and drought 
protection works due to easy calculability of wages (Centre for Science and 
Development 2008: 25).  
Since NREGS wage is task rate, and wages are high in road construction, 
workers themselves could favour roadworks (ibid: 34). Impetus for roadworks also 
came from other constituencies. While PMGSY deprioritised smaller (in terms of 
population) unconnected habitations (c.f. Asher and Novosad 2014), NREGS allowed 
these habitations to undertake road construction under PMGSY standards, 
disregarding its own guidelines on labour–material ratio since this would lead to 
poor-quality roads in constant need of repair and maintenance.  
Powerful social groups living in small habitations but with strong links to 
district and block administration could lobby for quicker construction of good quality, 
all-weather roads. Roads, once constructed, are up for appropriation by other rural 
groups but they buttress dominant groups’ interests, allowing for easier, cheaper 
access to markets for agricultural produce, and increasing value of land reassembled 
in property markets.  
Upstream and downstream pressures also influenced the definition of roads, 
and decisions on materials and mechanisms for road building. Initial NREGS 
stipulations for labour–material ratio and the kinds of material had unintentional 
effects on road construction. NREGS initially prohibited the use of cement concrete 
interlocking tiles (or boxes) for internal village road construction, and favoured local 
materials. Considering the transportation costs of bulky road construction materials, 
                                                     
27 For Himachal Pradesh’s 2013 decision to raise NREGS rural roads/ paths’ expenditure cap from 20 
to 30 per due to demand ‘from various PRI [panchayat raj institution] representative(s),’ see 
‘Clarification regarding construction of rural roads/ paths under MGNREGA,’ issued by Principal 
Secretary (RD) to Government of Himachal Pradesh on 14.03.2013. No. SMS-1/2012-13-RDD-Vol-I-
Government of Himachal Pradesh, Department of Rural Development. For NREGS roadworks in a West 
Bengal district, see Report prepared by Gfk-Mode Pvt Ltd for NREGA Cell, North 24 Parganas, NREGA 
in road construction in enhancing connectivity, 2010. 
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this seemed a good cost-cutting measure. But kuccha roads constructed with local 
material deteriorated rapidly and required continuous funds for repair (Centre for 
Science and Development 2008: 24).  
In itself, this may not have been a major issue. After all, connectivity in villages 
replicates the unevenness and orientations of infrastructure networks. Consider the 
typical caste and lineage geographies of ūr; the kirāmam’s manifestation in village 
built environment as panchayat offices, anganwadis, schools, overhead water tanks, 
and bus stops; and village roads together. ‘Main’ hamlets, where the kirāmam’s 
important buildings are normally located, and where the ūr’s powerful sections 
usually reside, are serviced by better roads than the rest of the village. But NREGS 
also recommended that preference be given to roadworks connecting SC/ST hamlets 
to the main village. Such varied stipulations an implementation jumble but enables 
less dominant sections to pressurise administrations to sanction better quality roads 
to their residential areas.  
NREGS roadworks also create a steady market for industries such as the 
cement and concrete manufacturing industries. These are key industries with 
considerable influence on government policies. Take the Indian cement industry. It 
was the second largest market in India and accounted for about eight per cent of 
total global cement production. In 2001-10, it had a phenomenal compounded 
growth rate of eight per cent, thanks primarily to a housing boom. Infrastructure was 
the second largest facilitator of growing demand for cement.28 In 2011-13, cement 
consumption was sluggish. The industry’s average growth rate fell to about four per 
cent – mainly due to the housing sector’s slowdown but also due to what industry 
analysts termed ‘regulatory delays’ in infrastructure projects.  
As supply exceeded demand, cement’s bulk, and freight-intensive 
characteristics, rising transportation costs and increasing commodity price further 
deterred consumption. But increased government expenditure on infrastructure (the 
                                                     
28 ‘Cement Sector Analysis Report,’ Equitymaster Agora Research Private Limited, 17.11.2014. 
Available at https://www.equitymaster.com/research-it/sector-info/cement/Cement-Sector-
Analysis-Report.asp. Cement demand in India comes from the housing sector (67 per cent), followed 
by infrastructure (13 per cent), commercial construction (11 per cent) and industrial construction (9 
per cent). 
194 
 
NDA government’s key priority, along with rural housing) spikes cement demand. 
Government spending on capillary roads, and village streets and lanes, also provides 
a more dispersed market for cement.  
State governments had already requested the centre to allow cement 
concrete roads and the use of cement concrete interlocking tiles for village internal 
roads. In 2011 and 2012 (years of sluggish demand), the Ministry of Rural 
Development responded. It modified the preference for local materials and stone 
and brick kharanja (mixes without cement or concrete) to allow cement and concrete 
usage, and increased the permitted width of village internal roads to three metres.29 
Thus, a number of actors, institutions, and multi-scalar considerations influenced 
policy decisions on prioritisation of roadworks, and the materials and width of village 
roads.  
In Malaiur, though, roadworks were hardly prioritised. Since August 2008, 
when NREGS works began to be implemented, and January 2015, most of Malaiur’s 
NREGS works have been irrigation-related. This is indicative of Madurai’s preference 
for NREGS irrigation works and perhaps characteristic of a district with precarious 
conditions of irrigation and comparatively developed transport infrastructure. 
Notwithstanding the focus on repairing and maintaining traditional water bodies, I 
now move onto Malaiur’s tryst with NREGS as this reveals the scheme’s effects on 
social relations and built environment. 
At the planning stage, policy makers and others had predicted that NREGS 
would affect the rural labour market. Some argued for fixing NREGS wages just below 
agricultural wages, while others welcomed any potential wage increase in diverse 
sectors.30 Later, some policy circles blamed NREGS for increasing agricultural wages 
                                                     
29 From circulars No. J-11060/1/2011-MGNREGA-I, dated 18.10.2011, and subsequent amendments 
issues on 06.01.2012, and 24.04.2012. Government of India, Ministry of Rural Development, 
Department of Rural Development (MGNREGA Division). See 
http://nrega.nic.in/circular/amendpara_Operational_Guidelines.pdf, accessed 20.10.2015. 
30 The World Bank Delhi office suggested setting NREGS wage ‘slightly below the prevailing market 
wage rate for unskilled (agricultural) labor’ (O’Keefe 2005: 2) to reduce costs to government. The 
recommendation was projected as ultimately pro-poor. The argument was this – if wage rates were 
above market wages, the scheme would be coveted by too many people, leading to a rationing of 
employment and lower-levels of coverage of the poor (ibid: 3). But costs have been insubstantial. At 
Rs 8000 crore during 2007–08, NREGS accounted only for about 1.5 per cent of total central 
government spending (Ghosh 2008).   
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(Chandrasekhar and Ghosh 2011). At times, small and medium cultivators I met in 
Madurai also blamed NREGS for making agriculture unviable. Most cultivators in 
India complain of labour shortage, and list non-farm opportunities drawing labour 
away from agriculture. Cultivators simply added NREGS to this list. Perhaps small 
landowners and cultivators feel the pinch most because their control over labour far 
exceeds their capacity to influence agrarian policies. 
In August–September 2008, Malaiur panchayat provided employment to a 
little over hundred workers for repairing a culvert. Most job seekers were landless 
labourers. NREGS wages at the time was Rs 80 per day, and the only group that saw 
a wage increase was Malaiur’s women agricultural labourers. The majority were 
women, across age groups and castes. The few men who worked on this site were 
too old to find regular agrarian work, and nearly all of them were Chakkiliyar men.  
Over time, there was a change in Malaiur’s NREGS workforce composition. 
Some women from landowning families began seeking work. Landless and poor 
families initially resented this, gossiping about women hiding their thick gold chains 
at home before they met officials to apply for employment. Landowning women, 
however, argued that NREGS work was no work at all – they wanted to be paid like 
other villagers simply for sitting at worksites – and said they had as much right as 
anyone else to employment since they were ‘wasting’ time in agricultural lean 
seasons. Irrespective of their position in local agrarian relations, what villagers 
emphasised most of all was that under NREGS, they did not work for or under 
anyone. Since there was no concrete, identifiable local employer, NREGS work did 
not lead to any demeaning of workers, unlike with agricultural labour, where toiling 
in someone else’ fields is a humiliating experience and loss of status.  
But experientially (if not in terms of wages), if implemented properly, NREGS 
worksites are not dissimilar to the fields villagers sought escape from – the same 
toiling under a harsh sun, similarly labour-intensive tasks, and similar (or worsening) 
workdays. In contrast to the general policy marshalling of urgency and efficiency, 
villagers desired slow and improper NREGS implementation.  
Normally, workers’ presence at the worksite was more important than their 
working on projects. Worksite supervisors were happy with this arrangement but 
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burdened with the knowledge that social audits could raise questions over the 
discharge of their official responsibilities. If all grama sabha constituents were keen 
on improper implementation, these questions were less likely to arise. Yet truculent 
members and non-local actors were potential troublemakers. My own presence – as 
I realised retrospectively – pressurised officials to supervise efficiently. After days of 
not objecting to work-shirking villagers who sat for hours on tank beds, often clocking 
time passively and leaving before the workday ended, officials would insist on fully 
extending the ‘manday.’ Pressurised officials could subject villagers to heavy-duty 
sarcasm, like factory- and field-supervisors. In May 2010, ‘Kammay Chandran’ 
(nicknamed thus because he had supervised many NREGS works on ‘renovation of 
traditional water bodies’) objected to villagers leaving the Pechikudi tank-site earlier 
than stipulated. He yelled that they wanted ‘campaḷam not vēlai [wages not work],’ 
and that they ‘came, waving hands, for campaḷam,’ but asked to ‘lift a maṇveṭṭi 
[spade, hoe], [their] hands would not understand [viḷaṅkātu].’ 
Malaiur NREGS worksites led to other changes and were an arena of differing 
interpretations. Residents were willing to forgo a small cut in wages – corruption was 
no big deal. The real tensions lay in the regularity of wage payment and the 
availability of work. Whether or not planners intended to target rural unemployment 
during agricultural lean seasons, once NREGS was introduced, landless labourers 
began to demand work during moments when the demand for agrarian labour 
peaked. In January 2009, Kallar, Pallar, and Konar landless women who had found 
NREGS work the previous year, said ūr cultivators had suspended NREGS for a few 
weeks so that they would be forced to participate in paddy transplantation.  
NREGS also changed the daily rhythms, especially for women workers. Having 
to spend the entire day from ten in the morning to about three or four in the 
afternoon meant a dramatic change in the mix of domestic and social production that 
rules women’s working day. Women would often rush from fields at about one pm 
and head home to eat and cook for the evening meal. But with NREGS, workers began 
carrying food to worksites; and the families of women NREGS workers began 
adapting to a different regime and rhythm to cooking.  
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We see the changes NREGS affected in social relations in Malaiur. NREGS also 
directly transforms rural built environments, creating new structures and changing 
existing ‘assets’ such as tanks, wells, bunds, small dams, concrete roads, and roadside 
plantations. Subordinate social groups do not normally have the capacity to ensure 
that gram panchayats follow models of participatory democracy in the planning, 
sanction, implementation, and maintenance of assets generated through NREGS. 
These are the very groups that also do not  control these resources. NREGS not only 
functions as an ‘indirect way of subsidising capital’ (Guérin et al 2015: 11), it also 
creates assets that could maximise benefits to already dominant rural groups. 
It is not as though NREGS simply replicated existing social relations, be they 
global and regional fault lines or local creases of friction. A road built under NREGS, 
or PMGSY, could facilitate cheaper and quicker transportation to villagers, who could 
then be better equipped to make the literal journey to labour markets in the outposts 
of towns and cities and smaller commercial centres in peri-urban areas. BY 2010, 
agrarian wages had increased slightly in Malaiur. Villagers did not trace this back to 
NREGS. But transport infrastructure seemed to have played an important role. For 
weeks during paddy season, cultivators from other parts of Madurai (from villages 
on the Periyar Main Canal network) had sent mini-vans daily to pick up and drop 
Malaiur villagers to work on their fields. Afraid that this new circulatory rhythm 
would combine with demand for NREGS work, Malaiur cultivators had raised agrarian 
wages. Roads and mini-vans briefly liberated villagers from work in the village, but 
the bargain ultimately kept landless residents from circulating within Madurai for 
agricultural work. And villagers’ participation in non-agrarian labour markets 
depends on extensive kin, caste, and even village networks. Yet a combination of 
better road connectivity and cheap public transport offers important infrastructural 
ground for both subsistence and social mobility.  
Better rural roads bring the country closer to the city and the urban into the 
country. Roads, even poor quality ones, coax urban middle-classes into buying plots 
in peri-urban realty developments and in villages where land transforms from field 
to plot and released into property markets. We thus return to the argument that road 
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projects are not just about efficient commodity and labour circulation but also about 
the repacking of land, the consumption of space itself. 
Conclusion  
The previous chapter delved into the conceptualisation of roads and representations 
of space in infrastructure policies, media reports, and industry analyses. It contrasted 
conceived space with spatial practices achieving spatial fixes through infrastructure 
development. This chapter explored road construction and roads as they emerge in 
lived and perceived space. Here, we saw how different framings of roads and road 
construction – as universal good, as abstraction and technical matter, as a matter of 
utmost urgency to India’s development – unfold in practice. 
We saw built structures affecting social relations. We also saw built structures 
affecting each other, independently of human intervention. As the judge hearing one 
of the Trichy petitions remarked, roads can be ‘all about water.’ This judge began the 
court order with a couplet from Tirukkural, a collection normally dated to the sixth 
century and attributed to renowned literary persona, Tiruvalluvar. It is as though the 
judge needed the Tamil canon and Tiruvalluvar’s backing to destabilise the causal 
closing of roads and tanks, and provide temporary relief to ayacutdars.   
We saw that road design and alignment depend not only on topography or 
‘physical space’ but also on social space and social relations, on the capacities of, and 
types of conflict between, different social groups. We witnessed social groups’ 
different abilities and resources in executing, stalling, or manipulating road projects. 
In Khairlanji, an access road offered a ruse for land grab and strengthening caste 
dominance. BMIC illustrated road projects commingling circulation and realty 
considerations. The Trichy petitions highlighted contentions between two different 
infrastructures. Coursing through roads’ effects on tanks, we saw state- and non-
state actors prioritising circulation over agricultural production to reassemble land 
and encourage rural real property markets. In Malaiur, already near the city in 
abstract space, the new highway made village land more accessible for a speculative 
property market. By considering cement, labour, soil, capital, design, policy, and 
implementation, we connected rural employment schemes, rural connectivity, and 
the reordering of rural space. 
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The recent global ‘land-grab’ relied on repackaging land through new 
statistical techniques and other acts of persuasion (Li 2014b) and on material 
transformations of social space in rural areas across the world. Rural infrastructure 
projects are a key but unnoticed component of such transformations; they enable a 
rescaling of rural property markets and the generation of constantly renewed 
colonialization of space. Perhaps, rural roads do not so much as bring agrarian 
produce closer to markets as bring the market closer to agricultural land. 
When agricultural land comes closer to spot markets, they come closer still to 
virtual markets in land. And as speculative investment in farmland increases across 
the world, land is incorporated into property markets for non-agricultural purposes. 
International investment in farmland realigns production, housing, and leisure sites. 
New built environments, infrastructures, and spatial practices rework social 
relations. 
Viewed together, the chapter’s illustrations also reveal the spatiality of 
dominance. Large infrastructure corporations, global investors in farmland, and real 
estate companies exert dominance across scales and vast territories. Caste 
dominance appears in a different light when correlated with social space. In this 
refreshed conception, each caste appears as a social group with specific scalar 
influence and territorial limits. We see caste relations in interaction with capital 
flows, spatial fixes, property markets, and circulatory infrastructures. We 
simultaneously see globally dominant actors and entities (construction and 
infrastructure companies, investors, and capital) relying on local social relations. The 
account inevitably incorporates many aspects of spatiality and sociality.   
Part III examines similar dialectics between social and spatial relations but 
takes this up through other built structures. Its chapters examine memorials in the 
light of how they represent and transform social relations. With these chapters, we 
return to the minutiae of local caste relations and consider these social relations 
through the intercalation of spatial scales. 
PART III HOW IS A MEMORIAL 
VISIBLE?  
Recent research on memory, monuments, and commemoration and defacement 
(e.g. Taussig 1999) has revisited Robert Musil’s (2006) observations on the muteness 
of memorials. Musil argued that the modern monument, although built for us to see, 
repels our sight. Given its inbuilt ‘gaze repellent’ essence, the monument only really 
comes to our notice through an external event.  
Memorial construction, destruction, commemoration, and defacement have 
been integral to many critical events; they are part of how we remember these 
events. Thinking of the Paris Commune might lead us to think of the Basilica of Sacre-
Coeur – its planning and construction on a site important to the Commune, its near 
destruction by Parisian republicans, and its later-date completion (Harvey 2002). We 
may connect Soviet disintegration to the toppling of Lenin’s statues (Taussig 1999). 
Holocaust memorials and structures commemorating the American Civil War and the 
two World Wars aim to link historical events to built forms.  
Anthropological examinations of memorials reveal the separation of built 
environments from natural environments, objects from subjects, things from 
humans, and the material from the social to be fictive. They also help us gauge the 
importance of representational spaces to the production of social space. The 
following two chapters highlight connections between material and social worlds by 
focusing on two contrasting moments – the moment of commemoration, and the 
moment of desecration – that reveal the power of memorials. Chapter 5’s 
ethnographic core is the commemoration of Kallar individuals killed during a police 
firing in 1920 and the memorial built in the Kallarnatu village where the incident took 
place. Chapter 6 takes up Malaiur Kallar responding to a statue desecration that 
occurred in Madurai city in April 2008, and analyses state and community responses 
to repeated statue desecrations and related caste violence in Tamil Nadu.  
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Chapter 5 reveals a social group’s struggle to bring its chosen memorial to the 
state’s attention and suggests that this memorial transforms the social and the 
political, the tangible and the intangible. Chapter 6 continues to highlight built 
structures’ transformative effects on space and social relations, but adds to this 
argument by analysing the state’s responses and the representations of space it 
authors to deal with conflicting social relations. I suggest that these responses are 
strategies to externalise politics and attempts to cage social conflicts in the world of 
objects.1 
Yet such faith in the world of objects guarantees little ballast against conflict. 
Objects fail this project. Once introduced, objects begin to exude certain effects, not 
simply prohibit human action, or simplify existing social relations. The transformation 
of human and ‘natural’ worlds through objects and built environments exist across 
space, time, and scales. Built environments have not rendered ecologies obsolete 
because ecologies are always already social – older settlements, dams, canals, and 
pathways shape whatever we perceive to be our present natural environment. 
Likewise, representations of space through which different actors seek to 
control the production of space – say, the rules through which states seek to govern 
built environments – cannot fully seize and transform whatever we currently 
perceive ‘human nature’ to be. Built environments are part of human nature, 
constitutive of subjectivity. Chapters 5 and 6 shall also show that memorial 
structures, and commemoration and desecration generate representational spaces, 
lived spaces riddled with internal inconsistencies (Lefebvre 1991: 41) but enabling 
individuals and groups to consciously generate feelings, emotions, and affect just as 
likely to challenge as to uphold intended outcomes. Finally, I attempt to go beyond 
standard anthropological equations between space and representational space by 
placing these ‘alongside … representations of space which coexist, concord or 
interfere with [representational spaces]’ (ibid) and spatial practices. 
                                                     
1 The idea that objects help overcome conflicts between human subjects exists across realms. In such 
representational frameworks, six-lane highways become routes out of underdevelopment/ uneven 
development (part II), metal statues help contain unruly publics (chapter 6), and gamma knife units 
stand in for cancer treatment and care.  
 
CHAPTER 5 COMMEMORATION 
How does the enmeshing of things and humans contribute to the production of social 
space? Does the built environment simply reflect social relations? Does it heighten 
or help resolve conflicts over resources, over representations of the past, and over 
social space itself? How do emotions and power attach to memorials? Do memorials 
simply express or emanate emotions? I here approach these questions by analysing 
a memorial as it becomes visible through commemoration.  
Discussions on memorials in Tamil Nadu often focus on statues of political 
leaders. This is because statues of some political leaders double up as caste icons and 
are highly susceptible to vandalism and desecration, themes I explore in the next 
chapter. For long, however, the region’s landscapes teemed with hero stones for 
slain warriors and other structures commemorating ancestors, folk heroes, and 
victims of violence. I begin this chapter by looking at a memorial built in the early-
1990s in Perungamanallur village, Madurai, and the annual commemoration of the 
‘Perungamanallur martyrs,’ killed in a police firing in 1920 when they refused to be 
fingerprinted and registered under the CTA. This incident has taken on the 
characteristics of a ‘chosen trauma’ (Gorringe 2005: 135) in Kallar social memory.1 
I then look at left political parties’ attempts to author counter-
commemorations, asking whether these parties’ public events accomplish their 
stated aim – to shift the martyrs’ commemorations away from being pretexts for 
caste mobilisation and celebration of Kallar valour and towards becoming a 
celebration of anti-imperialism.  
When I finally examine Malaiur villagers’ responses to these 
commemorations and counter-commemorations, I heed to Philip Rothberg’s critique 
of the ‘model of competitive memory,’ which ‘takes the scarcity of civic space…as the 
                                                     
1 Hugo Gorringe borrows the term ‘chosen trauma’ from psychoanalyst Sudhir Kakar to analyse 
commemorations of the ‘Melavalavu massacre.’ In 1997, dominant caste members killed a group of 
Dalit men, including the elected panchayat president of Melavalalu village in east Madurai. Gorringe 
suggests that the commemorated event is a ‘chosen trauma’ for Dalit communities and ‘encapsulates 
their grievances and demands’ (2005: 135).  
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basis for its understanding of public memory’ (2009: 309). This concluding section 
juxtaposes landscapes of competitive memory with Malaiur and Perungamanallur’s 
location in abstract space. This expositional move allows us to capture elements of 
the Lefebvrian triad in their interaction. 
  Memorials both externalise memory and help internalise it. They offer to 
memory projects both a distancing and a connecting stance. I glimpsed this twinned 
effect in early December 2007, when I visited Perungamanallur. I recall, in particular, 
my interactions with some Kallar men in a tea-and-snack stall that evening. The 
highlight of our interaction was not so much what these residents said about the 
1920 police firing as the sources they cited to one another during recall. As the men 
remembered speeches they had heard at previous commemorations, and recalled 
recently published material, their narratives connected memory, memorials, and 
memorialisation. It was as though memorial, commemoration, and document 
rehabilitate memories of the event. It was as though the memorial has begun to 
engender memories, as though memory is now an expression of the memorial. I was 
to perceive such links repeatedly during the rest of my fieldwork.  
Martyrs, Memorials, and Commemoration in a Madurai village 
Contemporary Kallar social memory accords pre-eminence to CTA implementation 
by plaiting narratives of routine colonial repression with those of specific incidents 
from that period. One of the strands most highlighted therein is the police brutality 
unleased in April 1920 in Perungamanallur, a Kallar-dominated village in western 
Madurai. By then, the state had notified the entire caste under the CTA and stepped 
up its drive to fingerprint and register all adult Kallar men in the area. As district 
authorities initiated the registration process in Perungamanallur and nearby villages, 
Kallar elders from these villages assembled at the start of April 1920 to decide their 
course of action. This assembly decided to oppose fingerprinting and registration and 
called for Kallar men from surrounding villages to gather in Perungamanallur before 
the authorities arrived. The men also armed themselves with local weapons such as 
spears, billhooks, and sickles. 
Early morning on 3rd April, a police contingent that had started from the 
station at Thirumangalam, the nearest taluk headquarters, reached the village. The 
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assembled Kallar put their oral communication networks to use, informing their kin 
in nearby villages of police movement. After a brief period of panic and hastily 
conducted negotiations, the police opened fire at the assembled men at 8:30 am. 
They fired 89 rounds of ball and 17 rounds of buckshot (Arnold 1986: 122) and left at 
least 16 people dead, including a woman killed while she was providing water to the 
injured men. The policemen returned to their station with sixty-three prisoners. 
The incident is currently termed as a paṭukolai, a massacre, and thought to 
be a turning point in Kallar experience of the CTA. We shall later see its simultaneous 
reading as a chosen trauma of the community, a nationalist agitation, and an anti-
imperialist struggle. On 3 April each year, the men and woman killed are 
commemorated as the ‘Perungamanallur Martyrs.’ 
I often heard Kallar individuals say that the martyrs’ resistance finally 
convinced colonial officials that deploying brute force against a battle-ready caste 
was futile. They also highlighted that Kallar petitioners, lawyers such as Madurai-
based George Joseph, and political leaders had raised the issue of police brutality and 
agitated against the CTA at district and Presidency level fora in the months following 
the shooting. My Kallar interlocutors, and caste and political party representatives 
took these initiatives – not to mention the martyrs’ valour – to have had a decisive 
impact, causing the state to abandon its punitive focus in tackling the ‘Kallar 
problem.’2 Thus, the contemporary memory project draws a direct correlation 
between the incident and the emergence of Kallar Reclamation.  
Such narratives allude to the 1920 killings not only as a turning point in 
relations between colonial state and Piramalai Kallar but also as reshaping 
community action and offering new venues for mobilisation. It is perhaps apt that a 
Kallar caste association planned and commissioned the memorial commemorating 
this event. 
The Memorial 
In the early-1990s, retired tahsildar and ‘community elder’ Muthu Karuppu Thevar 
and others formed the Tamiḻ Mānila Piṟamalai Kaḷḷar Uṟaviṉmuṟai, the Tamil Nadu 
                                                     
2 See ‘Namma Madurai - Massacre in a village.’ The Hindu, 3.4.2011. 
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Piramalai Kallar Association (henceforth, Uṟaviṉmuṟai). The association initiated a 
commemorative process that morphed into a spectacular local event. Common 
opinion, during my 2007-08 fieldwork, was that Perungamanallur villagers 
themselves had forgotten the event. Uṟaviṉmuṟai sought to challenge the collective 
amnesia and immediately erected a memorial at Perungamanallur as homage to 
those killed in the firing. In 1992, the speaker of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly 
unveiled the memorial. Let me describe this niṉaivu ciṉṉam, symbol of memory 
(Figure 1). 
 
By 2007, the 
Perungamanallur panchayat had 
constructed compound walls 
around the memorial. The site is 
adjacent to a tarred-road. The main 
structure, visible long before we 
enter the compound, is a long, black 
column. A stone lamp set on the 
ground faces the column. Close-by, 
mounted on a cement block, is a 
donation box – an iron safe, with its 
sponsor’s name and scenic 
depictions painted on the sides. On 
one side of the plinth on which the 
black column rests is a granite slab. 
Serving as a plaque, it lists, in Tamil, 
names of sixteen ‘Piramalai Kallar 
martyrs [tiyākikaḷ]’ and informs us 
that they ‘lost their lives in the 
shootout at Perungamanallur on 
3.4.1920, while opposing the 
Criminal Tribes Act.’ A white-metal 
 
Figure 1 Memorial Pillar, Perungamanallur, 
2007 
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sculpture of a hand-held, flaming torch caps the pillar. It is as though the structure is 
designed to pierce the sky.  
This structure becomes the focal point of the yearly commemorations. When 
I first glimpsed it, I thought the monument would be impossible to miss even on 
ordinary days. Its form scrapes at the senses, seeking to uncover the hidden history 
of the 1920 event. Villagers at the site stated that rather than installing the 
monument at the ‘battle-site,’ the Uṟaviṉmuṟai chose a prominent location in the ūr. 
One middle-aged Kallar man added that this decision flouted the practice of 
honouring warriors by installing hero stones (vīrakkal or naṭukkal) at or near the spot 
where they were slain in battle.3 The logic of visibility appears to have overridden 
older commemorative practices.  
Given the rural surroundings, the monument’s scale awed me during my first 
visit. It is to visitors, perhaps, that the logic of visualisation most appeals. When Kallar 
residents called my attention to the monument, they were perhaps only doing what 
they were accustomed to by then during interactions with journalists, researchers, 
and politicians who visited Perungamanallur mainly to write or speak about the 1920 
incident. Since I did not live in Perungamanallur, I can say little about its residents’ 
routine relationship with the monument.  
When we live long enough in a place, we become so blind to its monuments 
that it would take something extraordinary – commemoration, say, or desecration – 
for us to notice them again (Musil 2006). Commemorations and desecrations are 
affective and political acts. We may understand them as expressions of anger, pride, 
or sorrow. However, they may well redress the absence of whatever emotions we 
think of as important to life, identity, and conflict. How may we correlate the 
overfamiliarity with, and an everyday disregard to, monuments with the periodic 
ritual attention they garner? 
                                                     
3 For a brief description of the range and transformations in south Indian hero stone iconography and 
ritual worship, see Vanamamalai 1975. Hero stone installation and worship illustrate regional 
deification practices focussing on ‘divinities of blood and power’ linked to social, political, and 
demographic histories (Bayly 1989: 27-40). 
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If we ignored monuments we lived near (or went past daily), we would 
seldom plan, or feel the urge, to desecrate them. Does this mean a monument in 
itself is meaningless and that rituals are the main meaning-providers? Alternatively, 
can rituals re-inscribe meanings only because a monument is already a vehicle of 
meaning? To think that commemorations attribute meanings suggests that 
monuments are already meaningful. Yet underlying this mode of inquiry is an 
unchallenged belief that we primarily engage with architecture at a visual plane.  
The trouble, perhaps, with Musil’s observations on the invisibility of 
monuments is his sight-centric approach. Even the most visually oriented 
monuments appeal to more than the gaze. Even if we stop seeing monuments in our 
vicinity, our senses may comprehend them non-visually. Put another way, to ignore 
architecture is to have grasped it. Familiar monuments may not seize our senses (or 
all of them, anyway) but only because our bodies retain a grasp of them. We may not 
see an overfamiliar monument because in our familiarity, our bodies have adapted 
to it. This is a sensuous accommodation, and extends beyond our relationship with 
specific monuments. 
My initial experience of the Perungamanallur monument did not remain 
confined to my site perception. The monument brought back memories of other 
places and memories of my body’s experience of other sites. It enforced a sensual 
connection between my current experience and some of my previous perceptions 
and experiences of architectural forms. It reminded me, most vividly, of war 
memorial pillars. The continuous struggle of such structures against gravity lends an 
architectural expression to victory albeit in a restrained manner, not a baroque one. 
The starkness, the sheer verticality of the Perungamanallur memorial aptly evoked 
both the horrific (often inexpressible and unutterable) and human resistance to the 
horrific. I also thought its form corresponded to the task of depicting Kallar struggles 
against colonial rule. Just as the memorial generated these responses, 
Perungamanallur residents at the site pointed to a smaller structure within the 
compound, a mural painted on a rectangular cement block (Figure 2).  
As these Kallar men led me towards the mural, they began to describe the 
mural. Some of them began to compare it with the pillar. One middle-aged Kallar 
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resident described the mural as ‘innocent.’ Senthil, the Usilampatti-based lawyer 
who had accompanied me to Perungamanallur that day, distinguished between the 
association’s monument and the ūr makkaḷ’s mural. Senthil spoke of the pillar as 
though it were affected by some degree of officialesque. It was as though the 
memorial pillar – although birthed by a caste association rather than the state – has 
a degree of officialdom attached to it. He sought to reinforce this reading by 
describing the mural as a simple painting, the result of villagers recalling the event in 
an intensely emotional moment. 
 
The mural comprised of six frames, each depicting a key moment in the 1920 event. 
The first scene evokes the announcement of Kallar villagers’ compulsory registration 
under CTA. The scene depicts a white man announcing something from a platform in 
an open area. At the frame’s top-left corner is a drumbeater, whose presence signals 
the announcement’s importance. The frame’s right half is dominated by four male 
villagers in a queue and an armed policeman whose rifle has a bayonet attached to 
 
Figure 2 Mural at Perungamanallur Memorial Site, 2007 
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it. In the other scenes, there are more policemen, all of them armed with rifles and 
attached bayonets. 
The second frame depicts the act of registration. At the centre is a table with 
a sheaf of papers on it. A villager’s fingerprints are being imprinted, his body bent 
towards the table, and one hand pinned down by a policeman’s booted leg. Another 
policeman kicks this villager and pokes him with a bayonet. There is a third policeman 
in the scene; he appears to have no other function than to menace. A group of male 
villagers watch the proceedings.  
In these two scenes, the Kallar men’s deportment is one of awe. This contrasts 
with the policemen’s violent and menacing bearings. In the third scene, there are 
only two villagers. One is bent over the table. The second villager stretches forward 
and holds the first. The policeman who was bringing his foot down has now stepped 
away from the table. With one raised arm, he appears to be issuing an order. The 
other two policemen have raised their rifles.  
The fourth frame captures the moment of rebellion. A large group of Kallar 
men appear on the scene, armed with sticks, spears and billhooks. The police spray 
bullets into them. Some villagers have collapsed onto the ground. Bullets dashing out 
from police rifles target other villagers. The subsequent frame concentrates on police 
violence. The dead men are lined up on the ground like corpses. Villagers who remain 
standing face more bullets. Two policemen pick up a listless human form, as though 
intending to dispose of it.  
In the last frame, a woman kneels among the fatally injured and dead 
villagers. She offers water to one of the dying men. There are three policemen, a 
series of dashes emanating from their rifles. Two policemen shoot at the men, while 
one stands near the central female figure. She is Mayakkal, the woman who is shot 
while offering water to the dying men; Mayakkal, whose name is the last to appear 
on the list of martyrs inscribed in the memorial pillar. This is Mayakkal, who is 
specifically mentioned by most speakers during events commemorating the 
Perungamanallur martyrs. 
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The Annual Commemoration  
For nearly two decades, the Perungamanallur massacre has been commemorated on 
the 3rd of April. The commemoration now falls under the aegis of the 
Perungamanallur Tiyākikaḷ Niṉaivu Potunala Caṅkam, Society for the Welfare and 
Commemoration of the Perungamanallur Martyrs (henceforth, Caṅkam). When 
disagreements and factions threatened the memorial-sponsoring Uṟaviṉmuṟai, some 
of its key members formed this new association. The shift in nomenclature alludes to 
a shift from broad-based caste associations to special-purpose forums, and perhaps 
also, signals the growing numbers of Kallar caste associations, factionalism, and 
specialised lobbying – signs, in turn, of Kallar mobility.  
The Caṅkam influences the commemoration but this event spills over, 
affecting other political formations. It is rather obvious that the association works 
like a lobby, an interface between political parties and Kallar social groups. What is 
more effervescent is the mood generated by the commemoration, the intangible 
work of the ritual – performed once a year but influencing the everyday.  
In 2008, a series of public meetings, debates, and an academic conference 
constituted or contributed to the complex of commemorative events. Newspapers, 
notices, and hoardings erected by the Caṅkam and other caste associations and 
political parties heralded the 3rd April commemoration in Perungamanallur. Key 
public places – busy traffic junctions, main bus termini, bus stands, and other points 
along the state highway that cuts across Kallarnatu – conveyed the spatialization of 
caste identity and remade the region’s as a predominantly Kallar territory. Let me 
recall those busy days and busy places, where the abundance or ‘aggregate excess’ 
(Mines 2005: 157) of public notices produced a representational space of Kallar 
dominance, pride, and honour, and temporarily mended the fissures within subcaste, 
caste, and supracaste formations.  
Visualisation and Commemorative Action 
In the days leading up to the event, the Usilampatti bus terminus’ surroundings were 
chockfull of hoardings erected by the Caṅkam, Congress, All India Forward Bloc, DMK, 
AIADMK, and other political parties. Political parties have for long put roadsides to 
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similar use – so much so that they are charged with inculcating a ‘cut-culture’ in Tamil 
Nadu.4  
Roadside hoardings were the principal visual means by which the 3rd April 2008 
commemoration and its mood were conveyed to the public. They reproduced the 
‘highway as buyway’ (Gudis 2004). On this occasion, the highways-turned-buyways 
trafficked not in commodities but in emotions, affect, and subjectivities that 
networked social groups and political formations.5 Some hoardings invited the public 
while some simply declared an association’s participation or promised a politician’s 
presence in the 3rd April commemoration at Perungamanallur. The net effect 
rendered the commemoration as a key public event. For competing caste 
associations, political parties, and individual politicians, the commemoration served 
as a portal into the networks linking caste interests and political representation. If 
the commemoration was an opportunity for these groups and individuals to renew 
or fashion themselves as resourceful representatives of Piramalai Kallar interests, the 
hoardings announced the same to a wider public.  
Across the hoardings is a stock set of signs. A recurring image is that of 
twentieth-century political leader Pasumpon Muthuramalinga Thevar, Mukkulathor 
icon, important figure in the anti-CTA agitations, and AIFB’s (All India Forward Bloc) 
most prominent south Indian leader. Also frequently present is well-known 
nationalist Subhas Chandra Bose, who, after resigning as Indian National Congress 
President in 1939, led the AIFB formation – first as a faction within the Congress and 
subsequently as a separate party. Despite Bose’s national significance, it is no 
                                                     
4 Caste associations, temple associations, kin groups, and individuals also use roadsides to advertise 
events. Their dealings with the bureaucracy differ. In 2011, Dalit groups erected a billboard in honour 
of Thirumavalavan, head of the Vitutalai Ciruttaikal (VCK or Liberation Panthers, a political party with 
significant base among Dalit Paraiyar in northern Tamil Nadu), who was passing by their Madurai 
village. Local dominant caste members immediately took down the billboard. Their assertion – as 
though Dalit signs and symbols could not intrude into the ūr – is just one aspect of the contrast I wish 
to highlight. The other is the state support to this backlash. The local Highways Department informed 
Dalits that they did not have permission to erect the VCK flag – this, despite the presence of many 
other flags in the vicinity (Gorringe 2012). 
5 In the early-twentieth century, American industry recognised roadsides’ potential as advertising sites 
– ‘pictures, forms, and words… turn[ed] even the remotest highway with a billboard into a location of 
market relations’ (Gudis 2004:3). Catherine Gudis’s perception of highway advertisements’ effects on 
human experiences is insightful, although her argument that this phenomena showcases capitalism’s 
decentralising tendency is untenable. (We have already noted capitalism’s contradictory tendencies 
between centralisation and decentralisation, and territorialization and deterritorialization).  
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exaggeration to say that his popular significance in southern Tamil Nadu emerges 
through his association with Muthuramalinga Thevar. Bose’s image thus finds its way 
into hoardings other than those of AIFB and its splinter groups.  
Many hoardings include depictions of Maravar, Kallar, and Agamudaiyar 
figures from other historical periods. One such image is that of Puli Thevar, 
eighteenth-century Maravar chief of a pāḷaiyam (literally, fortified camp) in present-
day Tirunelveli district. Puli Thevar, who fought against the English East India 
Company-supported Nawab of Arcot, is now accorded the status of one of India’s 
first freedom fighters. Other widely represented eighteenth-century figures are the 
Marutu Pantiyar brothers (from present-day Sivagangai district), participants in the 
‘poligar wars’ between the Company and its protectorates or allies on the one hand, 
and ‘rebel’ pāḷaiyakkārar and regional overlords on the other (Dirks 1987: 19-25). 
Hoardings and posters are also chockful of metonyms of royal power. Lions, tigers, 
thrones, and chariots make frequent appearances. Together, icons and symbols 
evoke a shared warrior past and caste pride and honour. Such visual fields frequently 
emerge in other Mukkulathor-dominated southern districts (e.g. Mosse 2012: 233), 
perhaps because they affectively link the somewhat disparate subgroups of this 
supracaste. 
This constellation of signs also enables a seamless narrative of caste 
dominance, masculinity, warrior identities, and Hindu nationalism stretching across 
three centuries. Although there is a regional highlight on southern Tamil Nadu, 
connections are made to nationally recognised figures such as Bose. This striving 
towards the supra-local and supra-regional scales is also made through 
representations of Vivekananda, nineteenth-century Hindu ‘revivalist,’ propagator of 
a distinctly muscular Hinduism, and a key Hindutva symbol today. While most 
hoardings are marked by a representational glut, the overload is most evident in the 
hoardings of new, or less established, formations. 
Take the billboard (Figure 3) of the Tēvar Tēciya Pēravai, denoted here as 
Tēvar Tēciya Maṉṟam, erected outside the Usilampatti bus terminus. This outfit – the 
‘Thevar Nationalist Forum’ – displays its political lineages through images of well-
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recognised Mukkulathor figures and nationalist leaders. The single largest element in 
this collage, however, is the image of its founder-president, K.C. Thirumaran.6  
In the characteristic pose of Tamil men embodying the feudalism-machismo 
complex, Thirumaran is here twirling his moustache. A miniature-sized 
representation of the Perungamanallur memorial is at the centre. The twirl of 
Thirumaran’s moustache coalesces with the textual image above the pillar’s image. 
The Tamil text Kaḷḷarnāṭṭu Peruṅkāmanallūr vīravaḻipāṭṭu tiṉam denotes 3rd April as 
                                                     
6 Thirumaran later founded the TIFB (Teṉ India Forward Bloc). The party’s name (teṉ is Tamil for south) 
suggests its aspiration to replace the ever-fissuring AIFB. Its highly ambitious founder has organised 
Vinayaka idol immersions in Vaigai, mimicking the tactics of other recently formed, RSS-backed, Tamil 
organisations (Mosse 2012: 203). Thirumaran’s recent actions are not confined to obvious Hindutva 
religious tactics. In 2012, some Mukkulathor youth participants in the 30th October Thevar anniversary 
celebrations at Pasumpon succumbed to burns after a petrol bomb was hurled at their vehicle. 
Thirumaran joined the Tēvar Camutāya Kūṭṭamaippu, Thevar Community Federation’s, call for a 
bandh and roadblock, which threatened to quickly spin into another bout of caste-violence in southern 
Tamil Nadu. The point is TIFB’s 2008 billboard foreshadows many of these tactics. 
 
 
Figure 3 Tēvar Tēciya Maṉṟam’s billboard on Perungamanallur Martyrs’ 
Commemoration, Usilampatti, Madurai, 2008 
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a day to worship the warriors of Kallarnatu’s Perungamanallur. Indicating an upstart’s 
ambition, the text also suggests that the Forum is the commemoration’s main 
orchestrator. 
A delicate red tinges the entire billboard, as if to signal the blood that has 
been shed. The brute connection between the red background and the bloodiness of 
colonialism, however, is upstaged by the twirl of that Thevar moustache. The 
Usilampatti bus terminus is re-inscribed as Kallar territory. Kallarnatu is registered as 
warrior land, home to a proud and defiant caste, the sometime subaltern but 
incessantly sovereign Kallar group.  
This billboard is only a sample of the innumerable hoardings and posters that 
announce the commemoration and convey the ambience to be expected. This 
visualisation generates a representational space of caste dominance and territorial 
control. Usilampatti’s bus terminus and busy junction and other prominent places 
and roadside locations in Kallarnatu closely resemble the ‘centres of density’ that are 
produced in and through Tamil temple festivals and ritual seasons (Mines 2005: 157). 
The repetitive images and icons also visually indicate the rescaling of caste identities 
– captured alternatively as Piramalai Kallar identity and Mukkulathor identity.  
Commemoration as Politico-Religious Ritual 
When I visit Perungamanallur after four months, it is for the commemoration. 
Reaching Perungamanallur mid-afternoon on 3rd April 2008, I immediately see that 
the memorial site has become electric. There are arrangements for public speeches 
– chairs for the speakers and a sound system placed near the pillar, and a temporary 
shelter overflowing with people. The crowd spills over to the road outside. 
Perungamanallur’s streets are packed with vehicles and people; posters and 
hoardings temporarily colonise roadsides and building walls; party flags materialise 
in the bus stop, street corners, temples, and memorial site; and party colours and 
icons surface on t-shirts and vēṣṭi (lower-body cloth worn by men). Coconut sheaves 
are wrapped around some of the bamboo posts supporting the temporary shelter 
inside the compound. Together, ritual and monument come across as a yearning for 
monumental space, the ‘metaphorical and quasi-metaphysical underpinning of a 
society’ (Lefebvre 1991: 225). The commemoration reveals itself as a politico-
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religious event. This is both typical of regional politics (Bate 2011) and suggestive of 
a hybrid space where most public events replicate religious idioms and practices. The 
modes by which homage and mariyātai is accorded to the martyrs demonstrate 
these social relations. 
A bare-chested man in a white vēṣṭi, a saffron towel tied across his waist, 
stands by the pillar. The round metal tray in his hand holds a lit lamp and other sacred 
substances. He performs āratī, moving the tray in a circular motion. His sartorial style 
and actions resembles that of a village temple priest. The āratī is both realisation of 
climax and enactment of synecdoche in Hindu worship – this one action stands in for 
the gamut of rituals constituting worship (Fuller 2004: 68).  
The man’s reddened eyes mark him as part priest and part god-dancer, a 
suitable channel between the martyrs and those who pay homage. Villagers and 
visitors perform necessary gestures. They cup their palms over the lit lamp, take the 
palms upwards to hold over their eyes, and advance their forehead for this martyrs’ 
priest to rub vipūti, sacred ash, on. This clipped homage suits the extent of the crowd. 
The ‘priest’ spends no more than a few seconds on each individual, doling out vipūti 
in a speed that matches the nippy manner in which individuals honour the martyrs. 
Some people push a few currency notes while others drop coins into the donations 
box. (I ask how the funds generated in the process are spent but no one seems to 
know and the main organisers are too busy).  
In all, the commemoration resembles ancestral worship rituals in the region. 
At regular intervals, the man performing the āratī sets down the metal tray by the 
memorial plinth. People help themselves to the sacred substances on it. Here too, 
the commemoration reveals a grammar borrowed from small village shrines and the 
qualified informality surrounding these sites of worship. Where, depending on your 
caste, gender, and age, you may occasionally bend the rules on whether or not you 
can touch certain objects, just you may occasionally also conduct some rituals of 
worship in the priest’s absence.  
Both visual and aural fields generate the memorial site as a place of Kallar 
pride and valour. From the microphone, we hear announcements of different 
political leaders’ visits. The sheer presence of these leaders is a mark of respect – not 
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just for the martyrs, but metonymically, for the entire caste. At times, followers strive 
to turn even their leaders’ absence into a mark of respect. 
All through those hours, the microphone announces the impending visit of 
actor-turned politician M Karthik, recently appointed as AIFB’s state secretary. (The 
following year, he was to leave AIFB and start another party). We wait, as though we 
await a messiah. A slew of the same announcement (Karthik is coming…Karthik is 
coming…Karthik is coming…) probably impels some audience members to 
irreverence. I hear one man’s tart comments. As he remarks, ‘What, even the 
Mukkulathor lion’s avatar has no time,’ he gestures towards the large AIFB hoarding 
near the site.  
I had not paid attention to this billboard while entering the venue. (There are 
far too many hoardings for my passing glance to absorb each one). I perceive the 
layout: Muthuramalinga Thevar, the image of lion by his feet; Karthik and another 
AIFB state leader; Subhas Bose; Marutu brothers; AIFB leader, late P.K. Mookaiah 
Thevar; and mirror images of the AIFB flag, a striped yellow tiger pouncing from a red 
background. I perceive the modifications. While the leaping tiger in the AIFB party 
flag is a stylised image, this hoarding contains the photographic representation of a 
‘real’ leaping tiger. Even the crossed hammer and sickle – that most recognisable of 
communist iconography –perfunctorily placed above the tiger in the AIFB flag, has 
been dropped from the flag icon in this billboard.  
This, after all, is Thevar territory. As the illuminating joke, when AIFB party-
men from West Bengal address Tamil audiences, interpreters automatically translate 
every utterance of the term ‘comrades’ as ‘Tēvamār,’ Thevar folk. And the billboard 
designates Karthik as ‘avatar of the Mukkulathor lion, Pasumpon [Muthuramalinga] 
Thevar.’ It is this proclamation that the audience member mocks. One of his friends 
sardonically replies that the politician has ‘become a big-man.’ Yet are not big-men 
and those aspiring to be big-men precisely those who turn up late? A convincing 
messiah is one that you forever wait for. (Karthik was certainly a convincing one; he 
had not arrived when I left Perungamanallur late evening). 
As multiple actors turn the memorial site into a centre of density, 
representatives of caste associations and political parties vie to translate these 
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temporary characteristics of the site into permanent qualities of their person. That 
is, they convert ‘this density…into a scale of social value, of reputation, or “relative 
bigness”’ (Mosse 2012: 138). The 2008 event did not display too overt or severe a 
competition between big-men – political party representatives, neophyte politicians, 
and caste leaders take turns to place large wreaths and colossal rose-garlands at the 
foot of the memorial. This probably indicates the organisers’ competent handling of 
the pressure from each speaker or representative to be favoured over his rivals. 
Helpfully, important representatives themselves arrive in staccato fashion, as though 
to ensure that their visit does not clash with their rivals’ visits. When visits threaten 
to overlap, organisers deftly decide the sequence in which individuals are to provide 
mariyātai to the martyrs.   
The commemoration reworks the segmentary polities of precolonial south 
India, wherein a leader not only recognises a social group but also honours its 
delegated authority simply by gracing its rituals and events. It reveals the south 
Indian big-man as a little king, an updated embodiment of the politico-religious 
centres and peripheries that framed the old regime. The big-men’s speeches wed 
Kallar history to nationalist history and recreate a moral community that is both 
particular and universal in its appeal. If the commemoration is an ‘arena of local 
cultural competition,’ it certainly ‘produced deep status divisions and a vision of 
moral community’ of both nation and community (Gilmartin in Price 2005: 41), a 
point I return to while analysing some counter-commemorations. First, the 
structures of feeling that produce moral communities. 
Commemoration and Affect 
If the commemoration resembles ancestral worship rituals, who, then, are the 
martyrs’ descendants – their families; those eligible to draw the Freedom Fighters 
Pension, as dependents or descendants of martyrs; all Kallar residents of 
Perungamanallur; all Piramalai Kallar? How is the coparcenary of martyrdom 
defined? Do representatives delimit it differently? From specific individuals, to 
specific families and a specific village, all the way to Piramalai Kallar, all Kallar 
subcastes, or the Mukkulathor supracaste – the community articulating a shared past 
and a set of demands had to be revealed in each case. That is, the community for 
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which the Perungamanallur massacre became a ‘chosen trauma’ was not a given one. 
Depending on who the speaker was, the social group was ‘discovered’ afresh through 
specific utterances. The referent group shifted, depending on whether the speaker 
declared the unified past of Mukkulathor, Kallar, or Piramalai Kallar and which 
camūkam s/he articulated the demand for.  
Yet the organisers’ ultimate success was in claiming the martyrs for the entire 
community. I listen to the speakers and cannot help reimagining the sixteen martyrs 
as the caste’s founder members. They seem as important as lineage and nāṭu 
ancestors are to personhood, castes, and identities. Commemoration summons the 
sixteen as witnesses of trauma generated by CTA for the entire community.  
For the killings to turn into a critical event in Kallar social history and memory, 
the incident must generate states of shared, heightened emotions. It is vital that 
emotions materialise. These materialised, performed, emotions generate shared 
emotions. The performances also lend authenticity to the emotions.  
Reflecting on the street quarrels and bickering, the conflicts and violence, 
constituting the theatre of everyday life in Kallar villages, Dumont recognised the link 
between performance and emotion (1986: 310-11). Yet the theatre of a quarrel, the 
performance of being fiercer, sadder, or angrier than one actually is is a kind of self-
imitation. One of the speakers, a retired Kallar police officer, begins to cry on stage. 
As he speaks of the sixteen martyrs’ sacrifices, his words cue his tears. For some 
audience members, it is a little awkward to see tears rolling down masculine Kallar 
cheeks, to hear the fissured Police voice and the snags in the oratory. Yet others 
praise this, explaining the state of the speaker as contemporary testimony of a past 
trauma. The police officer’s tears and rasping speech are depositions in themselves; 
they are visible proof of the emotional scarring caused by colonial repression. A range 
of emotions latches onto speaker and audience, villagers and visitors alike.  
It will be a full three weeks before I realise the pointlessness of interpreting 
and dismissing these emotional displays as theatrics. This I shall grasp better when I 
witness another spectacular event unfolding towards end-April (see chapter 6). 
During the commemoration, the constant harking between surface and depth is 
revealed by signs of not only trauma, repression, and subalternity (of Kallar as 
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colonial subject) but of caste dominance. And Mayakkal, the woman who was killed 
in 1920, provides another venue for the generation of affect.  
There are few women around, and most of them are elderly women. (We 
stick out in the audience – I, and another woman research student). Throughout the 
event, political leaders and ‘community elders’ troop by, pay tributes, make charged 
speeches, and leave. Some read out the martyrs’ names. Nearly every speech 
mentions Mayakkal, the sole woman martyr. Was this simply commemoration after 
Beijing? Was the singling out of Mayakkal for universal mention the outcome of 
decades of institutionalised ‘gender and development’ initiatives?  
The stress laid on remembering Mayakkal is not simply a local manifestation 
of globally dominant framing of gender relations. At its root is recent Kallar history. 
Mayakkal exorcises the post-1980s stereotyping of Piramalai Kallar as anti-woman, 
since journalists reported female infanticide as a community specific practice. Let us 
juxtapose this stereotype with the sixth scene in the mural at the site. The image of 
a policeman killing Mayakkal while she provides water to dying men helps solder the 
valour of the contemporary community with that of Sangam poetry’s warriors. Brave 
Mayakkal brushes away the idea that all Tamil women were in dire need of similar 
social reforms, the idea that all Tamil women needed to be schooled out of the 
private realm, and given the option of defiance and divorce and daily duels with 
masculine dominance. Kallar woman Mayakkal is simply born with such qualities. And 
what she is born with is reinforced by Kallar kalācāram, her caste’s ‘culture.’ This is 
how Mayakkal is remembered on another occasion, by N. Sethuraman, president of 
the All India Mūvēntira Muṉṉaṇi Kaḻakam, and member of another Mukkulathor 
subcaste. The politician and principal owner of the chain of Meenakshi Mission 
Hospitals and restaurants stated that only a Kallar woman is capable of such sacrifice 
and valour. 
The 2008 commemoration was a success. The organisers had managed to 
calibrate the visits of a number of political leaders. Not a single politician crossed 
another’s path. No one was embarrassed; none seemed slighted by prominence 
given to others; not one leader’s retinue clashed with another’s. The audio system 
filled gaps between speeches with Tēvar pāṭal, paeans to Muthuramalinga Thevar 
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that grace most Kallar rituals. The heavy rose garlands, the tearful police officer, the 
bowing bodies suggest the honouring of valour. The visual and aural fields, 
overflowing with Kallar and Mukkulathor symbols, temporarily fixed the memorial in 
representational space, with all the attendant contradictory emotions and impulses.  
In the Perungamanallur commemoration, monumental space shored up 
Kallar subjectivity and caste and gender relations through a ‘play of substitutions in 
which the religious and political realms symbolically (and ceremonially) exchange 
attributes’ (Lefebvre 1991: 225). Of course, it is impossible to separate politics and 
religion, just as it is inadequate to regard religion as lending a crumbling form, a 
hangover from precolonial polities, to contemporary politics. This would be clear to 
anyone familiar with south India. Of equal interest are events that seem to exorcise 
religion, the bombastic, the supernatural, and the otherworldly from the social and 
the political. Two other events commemorating the Perungamanallur martyrs offer 
some insight into this.  
The Counter-Commemoration 
Both the Communist Party of India and the Communist Party of India (Marxist) 
participated in the commemoration of the martyrs. In fact, these parties, CPI(M) in 
particular, have been just as instrumental as the Uṟaviṉmuṟai and other Kallar 
associations in bringing the Perungamanallur incident to the public sphere. Party 
affiliated writers and researchers write in the public domain about the event. Party 
representatives participate in the annual commemorations at Perungamanallur. 
Members speak in public meetings and gatherings focussing on the incident.  
Given their election-centric focus, these communist parties have structured 
their internal organisation to mimic electoral constituencies. Mirroring this is the 
conceptual grammar revealed in their meetings. Most references are to the village 
as kirāmam rather than ūr, to society (camūkam) rather than caste (cāti), to all 
residents of an area (pakuti makkaḷ) rather than ethnicities (iṉam or iṉakkuḻu). If this 
is a game of substitution – where somewhat disreputable terms are replaced by 
analogous ones – then less vigilant speakers keep giving the game away.  
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But this is more than a game of substitution. Some of the utterances are 
metonymical. We know exactly which social group speakers refer to when they speak 
of a ‘region’s inhabitants,’ and which particular caste they have in mind when they 
use terms like ‘society’ or ‘people.’ These utterances also denote the incessant 
substitution of ‘caste’ with ‘society,’ reveal the ‘culturalization of caste’ (Natrajan 
2012), and the turning of caste into the social.  
If there is such a thing as non-verbal metonymy, it is evident at the 
Perungamanallur memorial site where the metonymic association of a distinctly 
Kallar space with public space is expressed through the built environment. Within the 
compound is an office of Perungamanallur kirāmam’s camutāya kūṭam (community 
assembly hall), constructed with panchayat funds. The presence of a memorial for 
Piramalai Kallar martyrs in a compound dubbed a community hall underscores 
macrocosmic synecdoche, a ‘whole’ used to refer to one of its parts. The unspecified 
community – in the name of which block development funds were allocated and 
utilised – actually denotes Perungamanallur’s Piramalai Kallar. The process echoes 
with the collapsing of ūr and kirāmam in the January 2008 tourist Pongal in Malaiur. 
It also resonates with the messages broadcast by the Karumathur kirāma panchayat, 
when it welcomed ‘everyone’ in March 2008 to nāṭu-centric festivals at Kallarnatu’s 
renowned Moonusami temples. The communist parties’ representatives, then, 
simply restate a regional blueprint for linking caste, community, and political 
representation.  
For the Perungamanallur memorial to achieve a fix between the caste as 
cultural community and the political representation of its interests, the 
commemorative ritual and its cognate events – public debates, and public meeting – 
has to be well attended by political parties’ representatives. We have seen that the 
3rd April 2008 event was crafted through (and enabled) a contest between different 
politicians and their retinues.  
Two kinds of CPI and CPI(M) representatives attend such commemorative 
events. Firstly, serving- or ex-members of elected assemblies and high-level office-
bearers. Secondly, locally or regionally recognised public faces. It is important that 
the constituencies addressed through public events consider these party 
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representatives as suitable representatives of Kallar interests. The moderator of a 
public debate called by the Caṅkam on the eve of the 2008 commemoration is the 
CPI State Secretary, who is a Piramalai Kallar. At a CPI(M) public meeting 
commemorating the martyrs a week later, speakers include members of its Madurai 
rural committee and the state assembly representative of Madurai East constituency. 
Apologies are tendered for the absence of the Member of Parliament (who is from 
another Kallar subcaste dominant in east Madurai). Speakers also include office-
bearers and members of the party’s block committees from Usilampatti, 
Chellampatti, and Thirumangalam – modern administrative territories overlapping 
with the older nāṭu. 
How do these formations maintain the fiction that the moral community they 
recreate through their commemorative practices is over and above the immediate 
social group they are addressing? Most caste associations and Kallar orators, writers, 
and academics today channelize their discursive efforts towards obtaining official, 
national recognition of Perungamanallur as south India’s Jallianwala Bagh, and of the 
martyrs as freedom fighters. 
This was the thrust of presentations in the conference held at Madurai 
Kamaraj University at end-March 2008. This was also a thread in the speeches made 
at Perungamanallur on 3rd April 2008. On 2nd April, the Caṅkam had organised a 
public debate in Usilampatti that culminated with similar demands. Alighting at 
Usilampatti bus terminus that evening, I found myself in that highway-buyway, 
staring at a huge flex-board advertising the event. Dominating this hoarding are 
photographic reproductions of Tha. Pandian, CPI State Secretary, and of Muthu 
Karuppu Thevar, Caṅkam representative.  
The images depict both men in white shirt and vēṣṭi. Over Tha. Pandian’s 
shoulder is a bright red towel, indicative, perhaps, of his political affiliation. In 
somewhat large fonts, he is announced as the debate’s moderator and son of the soil 
(maṇṇiṉ maintaṉ). I walk about a furlong through Usilampatti’s busy centre and 
reach the venue. The Caṅkam has erected a temporary shelter for those attending 
its event. The debate on whether the Perungamanallur martyrs had fought for 
national liberation or for a community’s (camutāyam) liberation.  
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I ponder over the possibility of such a debate when public events have already 
shrouded the incident with the heavy cloth of nationalism. I cannot help recalling the 
memorial inscription that denotes those killed in 1920 as Piramalai Kallar martyrs, 
and mentions that they died resisting the CTA. Commissioned but sixteen years ago 
by the Uṟaviṉmuṟai, predecessor of this debate’s organiser, there are no words in 
that inscription to signify nationalism or the freedom struggle. By 2008, however, few 
could deliver a public speech on Perungamanallur without linking it specifically to the 
nationalist movement.   
At the debate’s preliminaries, Muthu Karuppu Thevar is felicitated, and 
lauded for being the first person to think of a memorial in Perungamanallur. A Kallar 
man born in Perungamanallur recalls all the visits by political leaders spewing weighty 
words and mighty speeches. But not one of them, he tells us, ever thought of 
constructing a memorial. For such a thought to materialise, and then for that 
memorial to be constructed, the community had to await the debut of its elder, 
Muthu Karuppu Thevar. As the speaker uses the construction of the memorial to 
signal an individual’s immense devotion to his community, he simulates the 
significance of symbols to politics. Although it is locally dominant, the caste seems to 
have only recently learnt the ‘use of symbolic means,’ much like the Uttar Pradesh 
Dalit groups Nicolas Jaoul (2006) writes about. And for the symbolic value of the 
martyrs’ memorial to be realised, martyrdom has to be reinterpreted. This seems to 
be the point of the evening’s debate.  
The two individuals who have to argue that the Perungamanallur martyrdom 
is purely a community’s battle do not have their heart in it. They just about allow 
themselves to sketch the incident’s back-story. They do this, concentrating (if at all 
we can see the intent of two mangled presentations) on what they think are the 
reasons for CTA imposition on Piramalai Kallar. Resounding a main trend in 
contemporary social memory, they argue that Piramalai Kallar are the real reason for 
this legislation. In capsule-form, both these speakers disclose the Kallar subjectivity 
produced through this social memory: that strict passion for independence; that 
constant rebellion against taxations and tributes; that menacing quality with which 
the community defended their territory from invaders, kings, and colonial officials.  
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That is the gist of most booklets, speeches, newspaper articles on 
Perungamanallur. Take the case of a recent publication, an edited volume (Jeyaraj 
and Maheswari 2003) that synthesises the Perungamanallur martyrdom as 
incontestable nationalism. Even the book’s cover squeezes out as much nationalism 
as a cover design can – a representation of the memorial is superimposed on a map 
of India, its base positioned somewhere near Madurai, its torch blazing somewhere 
near New Delhi. The anxious, mimetic, demand by a Tamil social group that the 
nation recognises Perungamanallur as the south Indian Jallianwala Bagh. 
When he enters these waters, his cue of a red shawl weighing down gently 
upon his shoulder, moderator Tha. Pandian has to steer the ship of his address 
tightly. How does anyone hold on to their propaganda line while making as many 
changes in the deep sea of rhetoric as they may have to? This is no easy task, even 
for the most sincere. Not when the rhetoric is waves upon waves of Kallar 
sovereignty, Kallar valour, and Kallar’s nationalist spirit. Not when caste pride and 
nationalist spirit are crest and trough. Will the CPI State Secretary call upon a bit of 
anti-imperialist wind for help? 
Tha. Pandian latches onto one declaration – the sordid fact that India lost out 
to a bunch of traders, the English East India Company, not even to a foreign power’s 
military. I have heard this view repeated in other public meetings in the region. It gels 
with the widespread rhetoric of colonialism as a shameful matter, of being subject to 
colonial rule as a lack of will, a great psychic failing. But here, in Kallarnatu, what is 
even more shameful, is defeat at the hands of a traders’ gang, not even a worthy 
military force. This fits well with the warrior culture espoused by social groups with 
distinctly martial pasts.  
But Tha. Pandian was present at the behest of a caste association. An even 
more enriching illustration of the inefficacy of merely changing words and 
introducing new elements to an existing universe of signs so as to change caste 
relations is an event organised by one of these communist parties. The CPI(M), busy 
on 3 April that year in Coimbatore district where its party Congress was being held, 
made a comeback a few days later. It announced a public meeting to commemorate 
the Perungamanallur martyrs. The party’s USP was to delineate the martyrs as 
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‘warriors who warred against the Criminal Tribes Act and imperialism.’ The meeting 
was held under a roadside canopy erected near the Usilampatti bus terminus. 
At this event, one of the first speakers is a member of CPI(M)’s Usilampatti 
unit. His speech slithers between nameable and unnameable, welfare category and 
social identity, universal and particular – backward classes, people, community, 
society, race, jati, and Piramalai Kallar. He rehearses one of the most common 
denominators of CTA-related memory, Kallar daily experience of this measure. I think 
of other public speakers who have deplored government school textbooks for 
carrying little information about the CTA, the repression it facilitated, and the 
struggles against it.  
But here is social memory, grasping what an event-centric history fails to. 
Identical to a number of other narrations and production of these memories, the 
CPI(M) speaker’s very first mention is that of the restriction on mobility and, close on 
its heel, the implication of restricted mobility on sociality and on the routine 
discharge of kinship obligations. He speaks of adult Kallar men confined nightly to 
their homes or the nearest police stations. He mentions their inability to travel freely 
and participate in rituals and festivals of their kin. By twinning mobility and sociality, 
such narrations recreate the late colonial period as a moment of aggregate 
repression.  
For long, I was surprised that this reconstructed past had little room for the 
labour question. Was it that any attention to the transformation of labour under the 
repressive Act could inadvertently throw light on contemporary social realities, as 
these are expressed through labour relations, particularly between Piramalai Kallar 
themselves? Was it that it is easier to remember an unbroken history of valour than 
it is to excavate specific regimes of labour exploitation under the Act? Was it that it 
is easier to make claims as an oppressed community still suffering from historical 
deprivations?7 Was it that languages of caste and community outweigh languages of 
class?  
                                                     
7 This absence of labour-related memories might indicates community specific impacts of CTA. Unlike 
other notified communities that provided compulsory labour in factory-sites, mica mines, or textile 
mills (Radhakrishna 2001, Kamat 1998), Kallar Reclamation included the setting up of agricultural 
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Another speaker states that the ‘Fingerprint Act’ was the Piramalai Kallar’s 
‘Visa Act.’ If individuals from CTA-notified communities had to go from one ūr to 
another, he adds, they could only go if they had a visa. Just like… Nowadays, if you 
have to go from India to Sri Lanka, Pakistan, China, or Russia or America, you need a 
visa. There is something called a ‘visa law.’ You need a visa, a passport. That same 
law for the Piramalai Kallar was the CTA. It was the Piramalai Kallar’s Visa Act.  
This CPI(M) member drew parallels between colonial restrictions on mobility 
and contemporary restrictions on international labour mobility. The analogy worked 
because he did not challenge international restrictions on human mobility, thus 
rendering intra-national restrictions ridiculous, unnatural, and repressive. CTA 
restrictions appear all the more repressive because they restricted Kallar movement 
within their own territory. The analogy only naturalised state space and enfranchised 
the present community – by aiming for national recognition of Piramalai Kallar as a 
community of freedom fighters, as a people neglected by the state even though they 
were instrumental in its creation – through complete integration to new 
territorialities.  
Social memory’s re-creation of the community’s total repression becomes 
apropos to identifying the particular event as a chosen trauma. This enables the 
community to make tangible claims. It allows for event-specific demands – e.g. 
freedom fighters’ pensions. It also feeds into community-wide demands – e.g., better 
affirmative actions for Denotified Communities (DNT), communities first notified 
under the CTA, and then denotified in 1948 by an act of the Government of India.   
                                                     
credit societies, new irrigation infrastructures, and some agricultural settlements. Anthropologist 
Anand Pandian’s (2009) Piramalai Kallar respondents recalled coping with the CTA not only by toiling 
and labouring but also by embodying and cultivating savagery and civility. Kallar speakers at the 
January 2008 tourist Pongal announced themselves as a community of warriors and cultivators. With 
the popular Tamil adage, ‘Māṭu kaṭṭi pōr aṭittāl māḷātu cennel eṉṟu yāṉai kaṭṭi pōr aṭitta uḻavar 
kūṭṭam,’ one Malaiur resident staked claims to belonging to a cultivators’ community whose paddy 
harvests were so great that they had to use elephants instead of cows. The unintended irony, coming 
as it did from the resident of a peripheral village that had long depended on rainfall, is only one feature 
worth noting about such proclamations. The point is, public statements on a community’s past are 
context-specific – CTA-related commemorations articulate the Kallar as a warrior group; agrarian 
festivals and rural tourism events articulate the Kallar as a peasant group. Perhaps the labour practices 
engendered by CTA can be skimmed over because Kallar individuals can readily and creatively annex 
Tamil notions of agrarian civility to recreate themselves, when necessary, as peasants.  
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Who are the Real Caṇṭiyar (Real Toughs)? Two Villages in the 
Race for Memorials 
When Kallar associations, representatives, pamphleteers, and researchers 
participate in the ‘zero-sum struggle over scarce resources’ (Rothberg 2009: 3), they 
compete against an unspecified other or a specified Dalit other. Understanding the 
‘relationship between different social groups’ histories of victimization’ is difficult 
because Kallar and Dalit memorialisation can equally partake in a ‘competition of 
victims’ (ibid: 2). Throughout, this thesis has hinted at this competitive memory and 
memorialisation. (Recall Kallar self-representations such as ‘we are more heroic than 
any other caste,’ ‘we are unlike others who complied with the British,’ and ‘we are 
ones who mounted a continuous resistance to external rule’). Earlier in this chapter, 
we saw other claims – the Perungamanallur massacre has as much national 
significance as the Jallianwala Bagh massacre; other massacres have been in the 
limelight and are in the history textbooks, but not this one – illustrating such outward 
competitive memory. This section focuses on competitive impulses within the 
subcaste.  
Kallar social memory, unsurprisingly, mimics the social reality of fissures along 
lineages, sub-lineages, even families and individuals. Given the pressure on all Kallar 
to perform cāti kuṇam, social memory mirrors the existing fissures, factions, and 
competition within the subcaste.  
In January 2008, a Tamil newspaper article generated great anger in Malaiur. 
The article had mentioned the results of a jallikattu – the bull baiting competition in 
the Tamil Tai month (mid-January to mid-February) – that had taken place years 
earlier. Reporting that competition, the journalist had wrongly attributed victory to 
a baiter from a neighbouring village over a notoriously untameable Malaiur bull. 
Malaiur men became livid. ‘How could [the journalist] write this? How could they 
print that our bull was tamed by another ūr? What will [everyone] think [about us]?’  
I was new to Malaiur and recognised but few of those flying off their handles 
after reading or hearing of this article. What did I then perceive in the middle of the 
festive season? When it seemed as though the kirāmam was busy with the tourist 
pongal and the ūr prepared itself for the harvest ritual, amidst heated lineage and 
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sub-lineage divisions (vakaiyaṟā and kūṭṭam) congregations? During preparations for 
the village’s bull-running spectacle?  When older Kallar men tried to discipline 
younger adult males to allow the common ‘temple’ bull to run the stipulated distance 
unchallenged, and cautioned young adults to be choosy about whom to throw 
turmeric water on (which is the ritually sanctioned moment of flirtation during the 
Tai Pongal)?  
Amidst all this, some men had found the time to read that article and become 
so angry, and fuel each other’s anger, and talk about bashing the journalist, or 
targeting the magazine’s office, or teaching a lesson to the residents of that losers’ 
village for lying to the journalist. The men were more worried about Malaiur’s and 
their ancestors’ portrayal because of the timing of that article – coming in the midst 
of the controversy over jallikattu, they thought, the article was sure to be read 
widely. 
The court had called for a ban on the sport, on the grounds of prevention of 
cruelty towards animals. Many individuals I met those days thought the ban an 
affront to nothing less than Tamil culture; another government move to belittle 
‘Tamil culture’s true upholders’ – castes such as Kallar whose warrior past was tested 
and prepared and wrought in such situations. One of the fronts defending jallikattu 
was the Madurai-based Tamilagar Veera Vilayattu Peravai – forum to defend the 
Tamils’ heroic sports. And it is as a sport that schools men in agility and fearlessness 
that jallikattu is celebrated.  
I might not have noted all this, but a Madurai based tourist suggested I read 
this as proof of anger’s theatricality. Sure enough, the anger subsided quickly. But it 
is worth noting that a long-dead bull can be commemorated though folksongs, 
stories, and monuments for expressing that ūr’s and its residents’ kuṇam. On 
Malaiur’s main approach road, a Kallar ottai vīṭu had installed a memorial 
commemorating a ‘heroic’ bull. 
Later, Kallar residents often mentioned the numerous hero stones in Malaiur 
as a documentation of their special qualities, of their being more courageous than all 
the other caste-folks put together. In May 2008, some Malaiur and Tenur Kallar men 
explained that their caste’s menacing and ‘rough’ quality (miraṭṭu) was useful and 
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important as a livelihood skill. They added that the innumerable hero stones in 
Kallarnatu testified to their courage and prowess (vīram). All Kallarnatu villages were 
replete with such commemorative proof, they said, and then claimed that Malaiur 
displayed this proof the most.  
Intra-Kallar competitive memory manifested as disputes over which of the 
Kallar territorial units, villages, lineages, or individuals deserve special status as 
caṇṭiyar, colloquial Tamil for a toughie, a mafia man, general overlord, or a strutting 
big-man. A Kallar man is thought to be born a toughie. He is then thought to navigate 
life by enacting insolence, instilling fear in others (animals and people), and 
embodying machismo. But can every Kallar man stake claims to be caṇṭiyar?  
For over a month after the Perungamanallur commemoration, I was the 
audience of stories of bravery, sacrifice, and Malaiur’s centrality in the Kallar 
resistance to the British. Whenever I attended a commemoration of the 
Perungamanallur Martyrs, some Malaiur Kallar residents would ask me for details of 
the public event. I did not know anyone from Malaiur who attended these events in 
2008 but some residents had do so previously. 
On 5 April 2008, daily wage women workers in Ammasi and Karuppayi’s fields 
hailed me as I was walking nearby and asked where I had disappeared for two days. 
When Ammasi heard that I had been to Perungamanallur, he began questioning me. 
Ammasi: What did they say, Dhivya? Did [they] speak about Jallianwala Bagh? 
Dhivya: Yes. 
A: Did [they] say how the fight started?  
D: That too. Then… Yes, [they] have released a book now, right? After all that 
research in the University, ūr people and researchers say identical things. 
A (dismissive): They do not know. 
D (agreeing): They do not know. 
A: Have forgotten… Those who live there do not know anything. 
D: Then, everyone spoke of the eight nāṭu, and the twenty-four upakirāmam.  
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A: Yes. Yes. Only that, they will speak about. Other [matters], [they] do not [even] 
know to say. [They] keep speaking about nāṭu, upakirāmam. 
[Ammasi has repeatedly said that his sons know not even a fraction of what he knows 
about their caste and its history. He thinks this is a generic condition of Kallar youth. 
If he otherwise laments this loss of knowledge, why is he now dismissive about the 
importance of Kallarnatu’s structure? This perhaps hints at the difference between 
informally expressed anxiety over forgetting, and the formally expressed social 
memory. Public memorialisation is, or ought to be, more than an opportunity for 
salvaging dying folk traditions and knowledge]. 
Focussing on the bed of greens I am working on, I casually mention my 
telephonic conversation with a CPI(M) member we both know. Ammasi casually asks 
me what he had said. I inform him, and proceed to talk about party representatives 
I had heard over the last two days. I then talk about the public debate in Usilampatti. 
Ammasi looks up from the soil bed, turns, and asks about the debate. 
Ammasi: About this?  
Dhivya: Yes, on what had happened at Perungamanallur – was it a community 
thingummy or a nationalist battle? [Pause]. I do not understand why they are doing 
this for the past eight years. 
A: This is the handiwork of the communist chaps. Who entered the fray to expand 
their party. That, only if they include the Kallar will the party swell up. But those 
fellows [Kallar], they cannot be bound to anything (kaṭṭuppaṭa māṭṭārkaḷ)... At least 
this, Dhivya…By [their very] nature (iyal)…  
Ammasi then explains his point by turning to local arrangements for the grant 
of fishing rights in tanks. (The illustration becomes digression, but here it is). 
Ammasi: Only after flinging the white [towel] (veḷḷai vīcu) can fish be caught. Near 
Thirumangalam, there are two ūr, Keela Urappanur and Mela Urappanur. There, the 
authority (ātikkam) [was] Thinakaraswami Thevar. When he flings the white [towel], 
only then can there be any fishing.  
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Recall that these two villages, Kallarnatu’s ‘rajdhani,’ and Keela Urappanur’s 
Thinakaraswami Thevar, an Indian National Congress man who had served as a 
representative to the state legislative assembly decades ago (chapter 4). I knew 
something of fishing rights in the region and could recollect that the distribution of 
fishing shares have also been ‘expressions of rank’ (Mosse 2003: 170). I am 
unfamiliar, however, with the term veḷḷai vīcutal.  
When I tell Ammasi this, he mimics the action, taking an imaginary towel from 
over his shoulder and flinging it. I know that action. Anyone living in Tamil Nadu or 
familiar with Tamil cinema (especially with its nativity films) would understand this 
gesture; it surfaces frequently during quarrels and challenges between Tamil men. A 
man who challenges another with this action signals that his contender is worthless, 
as easy to get rid of as a speck of dust or an irritating fly. This is a gesture signalling 
power and dominance. Ammasi’s use refreshes my understanding; I now take the 
gesture to signify largesse, a peculiarly feudal largesse. For a big-man to stand by a 
tank and fling his white towel to flag off the fishing is to authorise others to fish.  
Ammasi talks as he performs the gesture.  
A: Take the towel, like this, and throw, like that, only then, can [anyone] go down 
into the tank. Like, before chariots are drawn – only after [the person with the 
authority] flings the towel, can [people] draw the chariot. Those [people], they have 
that kind of mariyātai. Mela Urappanur people say, ‘Cannot do all that. We will catch 
fish without [waiting for] veḷḷai vīcutal.’ That Keela Urappanur man, [Thinakaraswami 
Thevar] is the one who flings. Mela Urappanur says, ‘[we] cannot accept that.’ A great 
dispute (takarāṟu) ensues. Men, women, all go. Mela Urappanur, Keela Urappanur 
lock hands. It is nothing. They say, ‘[Let us] go, we will fish without waiting for veḷḷai 
vīcutal.’ Thinakaraswamy Thevar says, ‘only after veḷḷai vīcutal can there be any 
fishing.’ All, men, women enter the tank, saying ‘[we] will not be bound… will not be 
restricted by anything.’ In the shooting that happens, all at once, five people die.’  
I ask if he knows when this occurred. He says, just now, after the 
Perungamanallur ‘shooting.’ I ask if it is in the white man’s time. He says, no, 
afterwards, after independence. In the period Ammasi probably denotes, this tank 
benefited from good drainage (Dumont 1986: 97). Resources (such as water and fish) 
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were perhaps ample; and conflicts over resources were probably intense. I have 
learnt of a crucial moment when earlier modes of distributing resources were 
contested; also that this was one conflict where Kallar individuals contested the 
honour, rank, and shares of chieftains or big-men from their own caste.   
Ammasi: So, in this cāti (caste), can you see what [people] have died for? Women too 
have died. The Perungamanallur deaths are no big deal. That is why 
[Perungamanallur villagers] have forgotten. It is no great matter. One day, there was 
a fight (caṇṭai). It ended. Some ten people died. Why talk about it forever, joblessly? 
That is his [the Perungamanallur man’s] outlook.  
Ammasi appears to take this as the reason for Perungamanallur Kallar’s 
inability to recall the incident in all its details. In this view, the forgetting has little to 
do with the shelf-life of ‘communicative memory,’ which, at about three generations, 
requires supplanting with ‘cultural memory’ (Assmann and Czaplicka 1995). For 
Ammasi, the forgetting is because violent death is so integral to Kallar life. Police 
killings and death by bullets is not extremely shocking. According to Ammasi, and 
some others I earlier interacted with, there is one main character in this play to 
recover the Perungamanallur firing from collective amnesia and bring it to public 
notice.    
Dhivya: So now, CPI(M) chaps are taking this up? 
Ammasi: They [CPI(M) workers] keep saying, ‘something, somehow, [the 
Perungamanallur people] died. [They] did this, did that.’ But those fellows 
[Perungamanallur Kallar] couldn’t care less. This is what [communists] called 
‘tiyākam’ (sacrifice, martyrdom). ‘[At Perungamanallur, they] resisted the white man, 
did this, did that.’ That is…The occupation (toḻil) itself is to oppose (etirkkiṟatu) 
someone or the other, the occupation of the Kallar houses/ castes. This is what is 
important, Dhivya. Know this. This is what happened in our ūr too. For you, this seems 
like a big deal. ‘They died!’ What else will happen? Now, if [someone] hits you, won’t 
you hit harder? About this, they are all saying, ‘They resisted…they resisted.’ So now, 
we too say, ‘Yes, yes…We resisted.’  
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Ammasi says all this in a spirit of jest, and I respond with laughter. I now say, ‘We 
have to keep changing ourselves according to the times, shouldn’t we?’ 
Ammasi: Not at all a big event, that Perungamanallur shooting. In our village, what 
he [unnamed Malaiur man] did to oppose, to oppose the British, was that, [he] set 
fire.  
Dhivya: Where? 
A: In Malaiur. 
D: Who on? 
A: [On] British. There was a policeman, who brought the (registration of) fingerprints. 
[The men] refuse, saying we will not [register] fingerprints, and set fire. Now, is that 
great, or is it great to die in a shooting? 
I stay silent. The group of daily wage labourers is a varied one. It is an all-woman 
group; one of them is Pechi, a Chakkiliyar woman. I hear Pechi’s voice; she is the one 
responding to Ammasi’s unanswered question.  
Pechi: This is what is great. 
Ammasi (turning towards Pechi): Do you understand? 
Pechi: I can understand.  
Ammasi: This Dhivya does not. That is, [white man] comes to our ūr, to ask people to 
keep fingerprints. In all of India, the first ūr to register fingerprints is Malaiur… That 
side [near Usilampatti and Perungamanallur], for those guys, it is only in 1919. So, 
when [white men] come for fingerprints, [Malaiur Kallar] say, we will not keep (our 
prints). [White man] hits him. [The villager who was hit] is Bosan Kaluvan. He is 
watching, watching, then he gets kerosene, pours it over that sleeping [policeman], 
sets him on fire. He dies. 
Pechi now has a query for Ammasi, which she poses after addressing him with his 
caste’s honorific title. 
Pechi: Tēvarē, earlier, was there a station in our ūr? 
Ammasi: Oh, yes! 
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The significance of Pechi’s question only becomes clear when Arumugam 
finally stops. Pechi herself did not know – just as she did not know for sure, except 
from snatches of conversations she had overheard earlier, of the munsif [muṉcip] 
court the colonial state had built in Malaiur to contain its Kallar population – that she 
has assisted Ammasi, provided him a prompt in the day’s theatre of competition 
between Malaiur and Perungamanallur. How is he going to proceed with this tale of 
two villages, two ūr, as contemporary Kallar memory would have it, of utmost 
significance to Kallar experience of colonial repression? The one, where CTA was 
implemented early on? Or the other, where an organised attempt to oppose the 
compulsory registration of Kallar men under the Act? Which would emerge the 
winner?  
Ammasi had already made that clear. He addresses me again.  
A: There was a station here, Dhivya. In Perungamanallur, there was no station. There 
were no stations in any other Kallarnatu [village]. There were no courts. In Malaiur, 
there was a court, police station, bank… ahmmm… this… ahmmm… weaving work… 
Loom.  
Two or three of the women explain this to me, in unison. ‘Weaving yarn… Cloth, cloth, 
making cloth, Dhivya.’ This unit had operated in Allikodi’s parents’ house (chapter 3). 
Ammasi goes on, asking me if I knew why the white man installed all this, these 
buildings for surveillance and policing, these small workshops, in his village.  
A: ‘Let this robber reform,’ [white man] thought. Gave loans from bank for 
agriculture. ‘No need to repay, [just] farm.’ What did [Malaiur Kallan] do? Went on 
farming and went on stealing. “Ok. If agriculture is difficult for you, then spin this 
yarn and give it here,’ [white man] said, and set up a loom. ‘That too is not possible,’ 
[Malaiur Kallan] said. Carried on with robbery. ‘How to subdue (aṭakku) him?’ [white 
man] thought. Tried to shut him in the police station. Could not be restrained.  
Ammasi says since the Madurai court was so far off, the officers decided to build a 
court in Malaiur.  
A: So what [the white man] did was, he kept a court right here, kept a jail right here. 
Jail, court, station, kept all this. But… couldn’t be restrained. Only then did they catch 
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[villagers] and take them to Tirupparankunram. Brought in [CTA]. And ignoring an ūr 
that made so many sacrifices… ‘In Perungamanallur, some day, [some people] died,’ 
and… Now, they run around, thumping their chests, saying, ‘We are the true 
caṇṭiyar.’ Dhivya, do you understand what I am saying? 
Dhivya: Yes, I understand. 
A: Was a station in Perungamanallur? 
D: No. 
A: Was there a court? A jail? So, who is the caṇṭiyar?  
Hmmm. I do notice – this is all evidence of Malaiur being a tough. It is not just about 
martyrdom and sacrifice. Ammasi is half-joking. (I shall realise later, when he and 
other Kallar residents present Malaiur as Perungamanallur’s competitor, that the 
jesting tone is a pretext).  
Dhivya (in splits): You, no doubt.  
Ammasi: Yes. But it has taken you this long to say this. 
Pechi remind us that she had said so a long while ago, had she not.  
Ammasi has not given up. Like a lawyer building his case, he moves on to the incident, 
the preparedness of the Kallar, the police firing, and the deaths.  
A: There [in Perungamanallur], taking all useless things… [Police] is going to shoot. 
Knowing this, that they are going to shoot, how should you go? One woman picked 
up a winnow and went! To shield herself from bullets. See that wisdom. That is how 
[they] died there, Dhivya. Went with country made fireworks; ‘if [the police] throws, 
we will also throw.’ Did not even know what a rifle was.  
I tell him how, months ago, some people had prodded me to turn 
Perungamanallur into my primary field-site. He says Perungamanallur villagers truly 
do not know anything, and asks if those who wanted me to base myself there were 
Perungamanallur residents. I said no, they were not. Ammasi thinks this is immaterial 
– every man from Usilampatti claims Perungamanallur as his own ūr, that whatever 
has happened, they claim, ‘this is our ūr.’ I convey something of my fatigue, after 
listening to several speeches and being in different public events where everyone 
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was talking of Jallianwala Bagh. Two days, too many speeches to pay attention to, 
and I had to stay home an entire day. This prompts Ammasi to say that they must 
learn to speak well, but that they do not know what to say. He then says, ‘That Jeyaraj 
has written a book [Jeyaraj and Maheswari 2003]. Everyone reads it, comes, says the 
same thing. If you keep on grinding already-ground flour, of what use is that?’ 
Malaiur was replete with hero stones; villagers often said there are hero 
stones and memorials for every act of bravery or sacrifice. Here, the lack of a CTA-
related memorial was becoming a concern. Some of Malaiur’s influential Kallar men 
began exhibiting a competitive spirit vis-à-vis Perungamanallur. They recalled many 
occasions when the ūr almost constructed a monument. They spoke of innumerable 
archival references to ‘Malaiur Kallan,’ saying their ancestors figured in massacres 
and riots in Sivakasi, Dindigul, and everywhere else. Yet no monument. Every time, 
they said – in the time of the ‘Muslim invasion’ (the brief period in the fourteenth 
century when Madurai was captured by an army of the Delhi Sultanates), in the 
Nayaka period, in the white man’s period – it was the Malaiur Kallar. Yet no 
monument. 
Whenever the absence of a memorial or Perungamanallur figured in our 
conversations, these men stressed that Kallar opposition to rulers emerged from 
Malaiur. They sought to substantiate this claim, for instance, by saying that only 
Malaiur, the ūr that held kāval, watching rights, in many of Madurai’s streets and its 
palace, in Ramanathapuram and other distant places, was close enough to the city to 
be of any threat to rulers. 
In the months prior to the April commemoration, as far as I remember, 
Perungamanallur was nowhere close to being the main competitor. Malaiur Kallar 
usually set their village against Kallar-dominated villages such as Tidiyan, Valandur, 
Urappanur, Dharmattupatti, villages that had held ritual and political significance in 
Kallarnatu. They dismissed these villages as trickster ūrs that had cheated the brave 
but innocent Malaiur of the centrality due to it. The pre-April months seemed to 
express a different temporality, marked by the January Tai Pongal and the māci 
paccai festivals (in March) at the Moonusami temples. Malaiur Kallar then forwarded 
abstract conceptions of space to justify their ūr’s claim to mutalmai in temple 
237 
 
festivals. The village that could not claim centrality in the older nāṭu benefitted from 
the emergence of abstract space. To recapitulate, Malaiur utilised the economic 
benefits some of its Kallar residents obtained via spatial practices engendering and 
engendered by abstract space, to modify its location in Kallarnatu.  
After 3rd April, although Malaiur Kallar continued to differentiate themselves 
from villages such as Tidiyan (mutal nāṭu, the unit with precedence over the other 
seven nāṭu of Kallarnatu), Perungamanallur became an important rival. The same 
representations of space – of being the Kallar village closest to the city centre – were 
now carried over to conversations about the lack of a memorial and the lack of public 
attention on Malaiur.  
Some residents claimed that the memorial was erected in Perungamanallur 
only because Malaiur was not united. They spoke of CPI(M) tiring of Malaiur 
infighting over the names that would be inscribed in the memorial and then 
redirecting its gaze towards Perungamanallur. Katraja spoke of a Germany-based 
Tamil man who had intended to construct a memorial in their ūr – he had read so 
many white man’s documents replete with mentions of Malaiur Kallar that he could 
not think of any village more deserving of a memorial.  
But in Malaiur, there is no unity, Katraja lamented. When the man from 
Germany tried to construct a memorial pillar, with the names of some villagers 
initially registered under CTA, many had resisted it. Why? Although one’s 
grandfather’s, and great-grandfather’s name (and Kallar men at the time had the 
same three or four names – Bosen, Kaluven…) would be inscribed, one’s own name 
would not.  
There is absolutely no passion for the ūr (ūr uṇarvu), Katraja continued. 
Earlier, we saw the shifting moral community evoked through the 
Perungamanallur martyrs’ commemoration. Those who could stake claims to be the 
martyrs’ descendants kept varying. In Malaiur, the coparcenary of valour was so 
limited in scope, so fractious, so divided a house, that any materialisation of that 
subjectivity in the form of a memorial seemed impossible. In 2008, the battle 
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between Malaiur valour and Perungamanallur martyrdom seemed decisively against 
Malaiur.  
In 2014, however, Kallar residents organised a commemoration of CTA 
implementation in Malaiur. At the event, a memorial was unveiled, and a Piramalai 
Kallar Conference (mānāṭu) was organised by some politically active Malaiur Kallar 
residents and some non-Malaiur Kallar. The conference venue was near the village 
bus stand, by the main approach road that nominally separates kirāmam from ūr, or 
the panchayat office and the balwadi (where village children are provided 
government stipulated daily doses of ‘nutrition’) from the Vinakayar temple on the 
other side. Usilampatti-based lawyer Senthil said it had been a big event, attended 
by many people. Ammasi, one of the main organisers, said that despite the posters 
and publicity, the turnout was smaller than expected. He hoped that the event would 
realise its potential for organising his community.  
In January 2015, some men spoke of individuals like the former Malaiur 
panchayat president, who had recently joined the BJP. ‘What else to do? There is 
going to be no other party in Tamil Nadu soon.’ They thought the ex-president was 
thinking of the time when DMK head Karunanidhi dies – leaving behind him a faction-
ridden party that would immediately splinter – and AIADMK head Jayalalitha ‘goes’ 
(no crude word like death for her; these men were AIADMK supporters), without 
appointing any successors. These men thought the BJP would use the impending gap 
in regional politics, and that a few in Malaiur were strategizing in this light.  
But the 2014 caste conference was planned alongside the memorial’s 
unveiling. The commemoration and conference had served up a moment when the 
new memorial brokered between culture and politics, between caste as a cultural 
entity (Natrajan 2012) – cāti as camūkam and camutāyam – and political 
representation. I asked the organisers whether they hoped for effects similar to those 
of the Perungamanallur commemoration. Let’s wait…let’s see (pārppōm, pārppōm), 
they said.  
One of the organisers was Katraja, who, eight years earlier, had bemoaned 
the lack of ūr uṇarvu, passion and love for the ūr of Malaiur. By January 2015, it had 
somehow surfaced. Intra-village conflicts seemed contained enough for Malaiur’s 
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Five Thevar Lineages to install a memorial. What form did they decide upon, for the 
materialisation of ūr uṇarvu?  
A cement lion crouches on a disc atop rectangular pillars rising from a cement 
plinth (Figure 4). A Tamil inscription provides the date of the pillar’s unveiling. The 
inscription on another side of the plinth tells us that Malaiur’s Five Thevar Lineages 
installed this structure in memory of their ancestors. It also extols Malaiur’s sacred 
soil for nurturing vīram, courage, and commemorates the sovereign ūr for humbling 
white rulers by extracting ‘quarter āṇā’ as watching fees (from a policeman of the 
colonial state). The plaque on a third plinth face tells us the memorial commemorates 
the white rulers’ implementation of the ‘Fingerprint Act’ on Malaiur Piramalai Kallar 
residents. Some details of the government order, G.O., through which the colonial 
bureaucracy commuted this decision, are included in this inscription. 
If the Perungamanallur memorial commemorates sacrifice or martyrdom, the 
Malaiur memorial commemorates valour. The Malaiur memorial symbolises a hybrid 
 
Figure 4 Malaiur Memorial Pillar, Muthuramalinga Thevar statue in 
background, January 2015 (edited to preserve anonymity). 
 
240 
 
of colonial archive and social memory, blending G.O. details with the localised 
reference of CTA as the Fingerprint Act.  
Next to this structure is a bronze statue of Muthuramalinga Thevar. The 
juxtaposition of the statue of Muthuramalinga Thevar, ‘teṉ pāṇṭi ciṅkam,’ southern 
Pantiya lion, (after the Madurai Pantiya rulers, a common reference point for many 
southern Tamil castes), and the CTA memorial seemed a great touch. The near 
contiguous placement of pillar and statue portends events where the two memorials 
might come alive. It had the potential to activate commemoration and desecration – 
acts that render memorials hyper-visible. 
CHAPTER 6 DESECRATION 
Let us now reverse the gaze.  
Chapter 5 analysed memorials revealed in commemorative moments. What would 
happen to our analysis if we looked awry at the previous photograph, blurred the 
commemorative pillar, and brought the statue to the fore (Figure 5)? This chapter 
takes up memorials, statues in particular, as they become visible through acts of 
desecration.  
The first section closely tracks the responses of a group of Malaiur villagers to the 
desecration of their icon Pasumpon Muthuramalinga Thevar’s statue in April 2008. 
This section highlights the interplay between ‘irrational’ affect and the nearly 
‘rational’ streamlining of that affect; people’s responses to the state’s responses to 
 
Figure 5 Bronze Thevar statue, Malaiur, January 2015. 
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desecrations; the ability of things to become more alive, more human than human 
beings; and the effects of new technologies like mobile phones on rumours, riots, 
and mobilisation.  
The following section takes up bureaucratic responses to the ‘statue wars’ in 
Tamil Nadu. It analyses the state’s effort to externalise politics into objects, and to 
favour materials that might produce objects robust enough to absorb conflict itself. 
It focuses on the state government’s idea that if only statues were made in bronze, 
it would be a lot easier to manage caste conflicts. Tracking the consequences of this 
faith in objects, we shall see that the bronzing of statues has had an unintended 
effect – it made vandalism difficult, but made desecrations all the more viable. We 
shall see that the new material suits the ‘culturalization of caste,’ processes through 
which caste elites turn cāti into camūkam, or jati into samaj (Natrajan 2012: 89-91). 
All caste iconic statues, irrespective of material, allow for a new sense of belonging 
that turns away from considerations of ‘blood’ and ancestry proper towards broader 
cultural communities (ibid). All statues allow territorially embeddedness dominance 
to incorporate geographically extended belonging. Yet bronze statues invite 
desecration more than vandalism. They thus fit better with the politics of honour, 
disrespect, and dignity through which extensive notions of iṉam (ethnic category), 
camūkam, and metonymic camutāyam (society) rescale caste relations. 
By tacking these processes to the political field where social groups seek to 
pitch dignity as a keyword, I examine different conceptions of subjects and objects. 
For it is in such a field that the concept of dignity, which captures what it means to 
be human and what is inhuman, begins to embrace the thing, the statue. The third 
section gauges the criss-crossing of subjects and objects by examining how 
contending social groups jump scales through statues. I explore legal material on 
statue related conflicts from other locations in Tamil Nadu – not only because this 
highlights regional patterns to such rescaling actions but also because 
anthropological analysis needs to take seriously the abstraction that legal discourse 
hinges upon. The concluding section returns to Malaiur. I take in recent 
developments, linking a new bronze Thevar statue in Malaiur to the transfer of 
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existing caste conflicts onto the built environment, and the built environment’s 
generation of new conflicts.  
Narratives, social memory, and commemorative practices (chapters 2, 5) 
convey a contemporary reality where the evocation of martial pasts helps reproduce 
subjects forever on the brink of violence. Such aggressive dispositions aid a range of 
activities from usury to speculation in real property markets, lending themselves to 
contemporary Kallar dominance. But place-specific histories and an uneven spatial 
fabric – partially produced through the re-assembling of land and location (chapter 
4) – have contributed to uneven Kallar dominance within Kallarnatu. We may recall 
that narratives and everyday conversations– for instance, that Kallar residents of 
long-urbanised localities and of villages transformed by canal irrigation caricature 
their caste members in ‘interior’ or ‘notorious’ villages as less reformed, and that 
predominantly Kallar neighbourhoods in Madurai city are considered notorious 
localities (part I) – hint at intra-caste contestation. 
Let us briefly tackle these issues at the level of supracastes. Non-Kallar 
individuals usually grasped the Mukkulathor supracaste as an undifferentiated social 
group, bracketing all its constituent groups as ‘Thevar people’ or ‘Thevar caste.’ 
Likewise, representatives of different political formations often highlighted a generic 
Mukkulathor identity. Yet Piramalai Kallar men and woman switched between 
grouping themselves along with and differentiating themselves from other 
Mukkulathor castes. Despite resignifying their notification under CTA as an outcome 
of specific subcaste (or, as in the case of Malaiur, even village) sovereignty, Piramalai 
Kallar individuals could occasionally attribute greater fierceness and savagery to 
other Mukkulathor castes. I became aware of this, perhaps for the first time in 
February 2008, when a group of Malaiur Kallar women told me that people in 
Ramanathapuram, Virudhunagar, and Tirunelveli, are fiercer. I was to hear these 
views repeated later, when other Malaiur Kallar projected these southern Tamil 
Nadu districts as ‘vettu kuthu’ places, where Mukkulathor castes were forever ready 
to slash and stab everyone.  
Existing literature on Mukkulathor-Dalit violence appears to validate the 
Malaiur Kallar’s image of other Mukkulathor castes. Mukkulathor castes are 
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perceived as one of the main producers of southern Tamil Nadu as ‘backward, less 
civic and given to sickles and primordial violence’ (Krishnan 2008: 150). This, as Rajan 
Krishnan writes, ‘may make sense in the popular “logic” of imagination, [but] critical 
thought should hasten to warn of the dangers of stereotyping and the limitations of 
representative practices [in media such as Tamil] cinema’ (ibid).  
Despite clubbing all of southern Tamil Nadu as a violence-prone region, 
academic scholarship, and reports by government, non-governmental organisations, 
and media has concentrated on atrocities against Dalits in Ramanathapuram, 
Tirunelveli, and Virudhunagar (e.g. Jeyaranjan and Anandhi 1999). Yet Madurai’s 
Piramalai Kallar have also been associated with violence against Dalits. Among the 
places marked by caste riots are Piramalai Kallar dominated Bodi and Kandamanur 
(Ganeshram 1989, Manikumar 1997).  
It is unclear how we may interpret geographical variations in Mukkulathor–
Dalit conflict. Does the lower level of atrocities against Dalits in Madurai’s Kallarnatu 
reveal differences in dominance within the supracaste, wherein Piramalai Kallar are 
less aggressive? Or does it reveal weaker Dalit politicisation in Kallarnatu, as 
compared to other southern Tamil Nadu micro-regions? We may rephrase part of the 
interpretative problem to meet a query over dominance and demographic patterns. 
Let us recall the peculiar sociological denotation of rural settlements with one large 
dominant caste and many smaller service castes as ‘single-caste’ settlements, and 
settlements with more than one dominant caste as ‘multi-caste’ settlements, with 
more than one dominant caste. Statistical differences in reported incidents of 
Mukkulathor–Dalit violence might then mark Kallarnatu’s ‘single-caste’ 
characteristic, where conflicts over territorial control and dominance occur within 
one caste rather than across castes.  
Some scholars suggest that Piramalai Kallar dominance is marked by greater 
uncertainties and a marginality that is both sub-regional (apropos other dominant 
castes in Madurai) and internal (apropos the supracaste formation). Comparing 
Piramalai Kallar with Pudukottai’s royal Kallar, Dirks suggests that social relations and 
territorial control in Madurai’s Kallarnatu is affected both by the marginal 
productivity of land and by Piramalai Kallar’s ‘political marginality’ (1987: 215, 257-
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61). If we pursue the argument that Mukkulathor dominance is but ‘paper 
dominance’ (Ganesan 2012), Piramalai Kallar dominance appears more flimsy. 
Analysts (M.S.S. Pandian 2000: 502, Kohli 1990: 176) of post-1990s caste 
violence in southern Tamil Nadu have also suggested that most individuals from the 
Mukkulathor castes and the Dalit Pallar caste are in similar economic situations. The 
fragility of Kallar dominance, and economic similarities of its majority with Dalits, 
turns affect into a powerful political machine that produces a united moral 
community. Affect allows for a suturing of differences within castes, the production 
of supra-local groups, scale-jumping, and the canalisation and reterritorialization of 
caste conflicts. I begin analysing these processes by tracking the aftermath of the 
desecration of a Muthuramalinga Thevar statue in Madurai.  
Desecration as Death, and worse: An Ūr responds to a Statue’s 
Desecration 
One afternoon in April 2008, Kannan, elderly Kallar man from Tenur, began arguing 
that the Criminal Tribes Act was actually a Kallar Control Act. Sitting under the banyan 
tree near the Karuppu temple, Kannan pared down this claim, asserting that the CTA 
was actually a Malaiur Control Act. Kannan’s claims, and the routes through which 
he arrived at them, should have garnered my full attention. But murdered colonial 
policemen, Kallar lineages ancestors such as Kuppaiyandi Thevar, for whose military 
service the Ramanathapuram ruler had granted village Pattinamkathan, 
Ramanathapuram as māṉiyam, and so on – these references were of no help in 
fighting my fever-induced weariness.  
By the time Kannan got talking about Kuppaiyandi Thevar and his māṉiyam 
lands, I had nearly dozed off. I was barely registering the connections Kannan had 
been making between poverty, ecology, and thieving, when a comment by someone 
else caught my attention. ‘Heard the news? Seems like [they have] broken the Thevar 
statue.’  
The courier of this news is ‘Fish Seller’ Pichai, middle-aged Malaiur Kallar man, 
whose patta peyar (pet name) stemmed from a job he had handled once. He is 
addressing other men of his caste and village, all middle-aged, in one leisurely pose 
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or other. Rasendran is resting on the nāṟkāli (‘four-legged,’ a rudimentary cot made 
by looping rough coir ropes on a wooden frame) placed before the tea-stall by 
Subramanium, the owner. I notice other men, dozing or reading the dailies or 
weeklies. 
Rasendran asks Pichai which Thevar statue has been demolished. Pichai tells them it 
is the Goripalayam statue. Rasendran asks Pichai how he knows of this. 
Trouble. I stop listening to Kannan. I now bend an ear. I only hear snatches. Yet I 
sense the awakening of emotions – the incredulity, to start with – in some of the 
voices. An event is in motion, and it fills me with unease. I hope the news is 
unfounded. I hope my fears turn out to be baseless. As a last, childish resort, I 
stubbornly focus on Kannan’s face and voice.  
Within two minutes, during which time we were spared the news, Kannan paused his 
narrative to ask me if there was anything I wanted to know. Kannan was going 
through a particularly sad phase. His relation with his wife was progressively 
deteriorating, his three daughters and their husbands were claiming shares in his 
property, while his only son was waiting for total possession of property and had 
become a rude, lazy alcoholic. Added to which was Kannan’s disposition, his 
penchant for playing big-man, and to read the tiniest of slights, such as not having 
his audience’s complete attention, as a huge challenge to his importance. This was 
probably why Pichai, Rasendran, and the others had granted us those two minutes. 
Failing to come up with a query, and faltering as soon as I began, I provided the break 
that they had been waiting for. They addressed him.  
Pichai nearly hollers. ‘Maamaa, [they have] destroyed the Thevar statue.’ 
Kannan is stunned. His eyes bulge as he demands to know if this is true. They affirm 
it. Rasendran chips in, ‘just been talking about it; about a quarter of an hour…’ Pichai 
interrupts, saying it has been a quarter of an hour since the destruction, while 
Rasendran continues, ‘…since the news reached…’ They are using the Tamil verb uṭai, 
which means (among other things) to break, crack, split, or burst into fragments. 
Rasendran continues to speak. He thinks all Madurai is bound to ignite. Pichai again 
says it has been a quarter of an hour since the destruction. 
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I ask, ‘Which statue?’ They reply that it is the one in Goripalayam. (But I already knew 
that). 
I ask, ‘Who destroyed [it]?’ 
In unison, the men say, ‘Don’t know who destroyed [it].’ One of them adds, ‘Don’t 
know which group.’ 
Pichai: Only a quarter of an hour since [we] got the information. 
Kannan (his disbelief belying the routine targeting of statues): In broad daylight? 
P: Now, just a quarter of an hour ago. 
Kannan says it was probably bombed. [I know of one instance when a bomb was 
hurled at a Muthuramalinga Thevar statue. In 1996, six people threw a bomb at a 
statue in a village near Vatrayiruppu, southern Tamil Nadu (M.S.S. Pandian 2000: 
506)]. Pichai agrees, and proceeds to tell us how he came by the news of the 
destruction.  
Pichai: Quarter of an hour ago…three people came in a car…two ladies and a 
man…They bought some [sweets] and ate. When [they were] leaving, [I] asked, 
“What is it? What is up?” They said, ‘Our relatives live in the town’…Ahm… [They’re] 
our Thevar folk only... ‘We reside in Pasumalai. When [we were] coming in the 
vehicle, the police said “[They] have set fire to the Thevar statue and destroyed it. 
There will be riots. Wherever you are, just leave and reach your ūr.” We were scared 
to go eastwards. Came here.’ They asked for the way to Pykara [a locality near 
Tirupparankunram, where many Kallar mill workers have settled]. They are going 
roundabouts. [I] asked how long ago it happened [and] they said, ‘Just now, about a 
quarter of an hour ago.’ 
Kannan: Meggggaaa trouble. Periya viṉai. 
Rasendran: Mega agony [vētaṉai] is sure to come. Madurai will be destroyed [aḻiñci 
pōkum].’  
Pichai: [As though] merely Madurai will be destroyed. 
Kannan agrees. He says he cannot even predict all the places that would be shaken 
up by this news. But other men recall caste geographies in precise terms, naming 
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localities and neighbourhoods, and urban settlements where Piramalai Kallar 
predominate. Subramanium counts the places and people that shall fill the emergent 
atlas of revenge. He begins with the Karimedu Kallan. In Kallar-generated 
representational spaces, this evocation is significant. Kannan immediately picks up 
on the introduction of this heroic figure. He repeats the words ‘Karimedu Kallan,’ his 
tone implying that the Kallar of Karimedu, a locality in Madurai city, are not going to 
let the vandalism remain unavenged.  
Rasendran: Why, all of Tamil Nadu…  
[I will soon know that this is only the first of many utterances when geographies of 
caste and violent retaliation predicate upon each other. These men’s interactions will 
involve a movement up successive levels to include larger and larger areas of 
Mukkulathor dominance, and then a movement of return to places closer home, to 
places of Piramalai Kallar notoriety. This double move shall occur repeatedly today.].  
Through representational space, Goripalayam moves nearby, even though the two 
locations – ours’ and the statue’s – are about fifteen kilometres apart. Now, one of 
the men wants to call someone for more information. In the meantime, 
Subramanium, or Subbu, speaks acerbically, at an escalating pitch, about Tamil 
Nadu’s current DMK government and Chief Minister Karunanidhi. He tells everyone 
that Karunanidhi’s rule has to end, for he is the one constantly fuelling caste riots. 
But Rasendran brings us back to the specifics. ‘Gosh, to break the Goripalayam 
statue! Look at their aggression (tāṭṭiyam).’ Subbu temporarily lets go of Karunanidhi 
to agree with Rasendran. ‘What aggression!’  
The man trying to make a call rues the tendency of cell phones to stop working when 
most needed. I offer my phone, hoping a telephonic conversation will calm the men 
a bit. Temporarily forgetting everything about rumours and riots, I am reposing great 
faith in facts to lend a sense of proportion, even to stave off trouble. The man refuses, 
trying again through his own phone. Another man suggests they place a call to a 
kinsman who has been in town (Madurai city) since morning. Kannan thinks this will 
be of little use, and worries that ‘this…this news, no one is going to speak of it.’  
Subbu: Will not tell.  
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…. 
A lull and then Pichai begins embellishing – this is how his sorrow-soaked tones seem 
to me – or he is probably only paraphrasing his conversation with the travellers in 
that car. The point, in any case, is the rhetorical strategy with which Pichai underlines 
that it is none other than the Goripalayam statue that has been destroyed. 
When the people in the car told Pichai about the vandalism, he had asked them which 
statue they were referring to. Is it a statue near some village (kirāmam), or some 
roadside one in town? No, it is the Goripalayam statue, the tallest Thevar statue in 
India, in the entire world! ‘Even that female person became sorrowful. “Look at what 
[they] have done. Look at what [they] have done to such a big statue.”’  
[Pichai’s ‘even that female person’ gain significance later, when some of these men’s 
wives arrive at the tea-stall and try to lower the men’s murderous anger. When Malar 
will try diffusing their fiery mood for revenge, her husband Rasendran shall spit out, 
‘What is this talk? Is this the talk of a Kaḷḷacci [Kallar woman]? By now, an Usilampatti 
Kaḷḷacci would have taken at least a broomstick and stood right at the front.’] 
Subbu is unfurling that mental map again, calling out other places marked for trouble. 
But Rasendran is adamant. Whatever be the reactions, they are not going to be that 
localised.  
Rasendran: Just watch, total Tamil Nadu will go up in flames. 
Subbu: Hmmm.  
Subbu is distracted. Supposing the Chief Minister, or some other government figure 
‘comes, saying they will immediately install [another] statue, then? What should [we] 
do?’ Both Rasendran’s and Kannan’s voices rapidly ascend. 
Rasendran: If [they] want to install! [We] cannot just let them do that! ... 
K: Aey… 
R: …Why da, after it has been broken, why, is the Thevar group a…a… 
Intense anger provides Kannan with a startling analogy, immediately and eagerly 
extended by Rasendran. 
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K: To slash you, and subsequently… 
R: …After cutting [you] up…ahmmm…if [the perpetrator] says ‘[I] will stitch [up your 
wounds], plaster [your broken bones], give you an injection?’ How would that be? 
Would you accept that?  
And yet, Subbu wants to think the possibility through. What if someone makes a 
statement and newspapers quote him saying ‘I will immediately install a statue?’ 
[There have been precedents. Soon after the 1996 bombing of the Thevar statue near 
Vatrayiruppu, the government promised precisely this (M.S.S. Pandian 2000: 507). In 
1998, the government was quick to replace a damaged Thevar statue in 
Virudhunagar with a new one (ibid). From the state’s point of view, this is an 
appropriate move, particularly for easily breakable statues, while vandalism of later-
date (bronze) statues requires a different set of responses]. 
Kannan scoffs at press releases and promises, as though he wants to foreclose any 
containment of the vandalism’s consequences. He sacks Subbu’s imaginary conflict 
arbitrator. Why bother about someone who ‘took a broomstick to his tongue a long 
while ago?’ This is a reference to Karunanidhi’s, possibly all DMK leaders’, loss of 
honour – they have performed an ultimate act of debasement, touching something 
as filthy as a broomstick with their tongue. This moves the others, mostly AIADMK 
supporters, to unfurl their own flag of anger against DMK. By 2008, a good number 
of Madurai residents have had it with Alagiri, one of Karunanidhi’s sons. I have been 
hearing of him and his faction since moving to Madurai.  
Subbu: Yes, now, first of all, if only [someone] can beat up and kick Alagiri out of 
Madurai…’ 
Pichai: Do not know how many people will become sacrificial offerings (pali ākiṟatu)! 
[He is saying this as though these killings shall take place on their own, as though they 
are detached from human volition].  
S: So long as [Alagiri] remains, there will be many… 
[It is common perception that Mukkulathor vote en masse for AIADMK, and recent 
trends from Mukkulathor dominated regions suggest its partial validity. Interestingly, 
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the Goripalayam Thevar statue was installed in 1974 by the Karunanidhi-led 
government – in a move to break the anti-DMK stance of Mukkulathor groups 
(Ganesan 2012). Clearly, appeal to a caste’s symbols cannot permanently serve 
politics. The tactic is afflicted by diminishing returns; when it works, the tactic is soon 
mimicked, even exaggerated, by other political formations.  
The men continue to blame DMK for fuelling caste riots. This is what is chilling – the 
perceived inevitability of a person’s or a group’s participation in a riot, even as they 
hold that some external force (a rival political party or a political formation 
representing the interests of a rival social group) is inciting their participation. It is 
revealing how people readying themselves to violence can blame others for inciting 
them. It is as though, now that an external force has incited them, they cannot help 
but execute that design].  
….  
Pichai: Why, in Madurai…if right inside the lion’s castle, the lion is killed… 
Subbu approves. Yes, is this not the lion’s fortress? If [someone] enters this fortress 
and strikes, then, how will it be? 
I have been sitting with my back to the kirāmam’s stage for theatre and other cultural 
performances. I can see it now, with all the clarity of recollection. My first visit to 
Malaiur. That first glimpse into how the kirāmam and the ūr fold themselves, over 
and over, to reproduce the Tamil village. The colourful paintings of Muthuramalinga 
Thevar, Subhas Bose, and Tamil deity Murugan, and their ‘vehicles,’ a lion, a dragon 
(!), and a peacock. I also think of all the hoardings that pin Thevar to a lion, of the 
innumerable references to Thevar as the southern Pantiya lion.1 Subbu and Pichai 
face this wall painting, while they continue spinning tropes so heady that it begins to 
change reality.  
                                                     
1 Generally symbolising royalty and warriorhood, the lion has additional significance for Mukkulathor, 
who often refer to Muthuramalinga Thevar as one. Lions are depicted alongside Thevar on book 
covers, paintings, posters, and statues. The lion is represented as Thevar’s vehicle (mimicking Hindu 
deities – for instance, the peacock as Murugan’s vehicle). Popular songs equating Thevar with a lion 
are played during many kinds of Kallar rituals and events.  
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Madurai is like the lion’s fortress [ciṅka kōṭṭai], and the lion is Muthuramalinga 
Thevar. Their tropes did not simply translate an event, or an affect, into something 
more understandable. The translations crossed over to what unfolded that day. At 
first, the day unfolds a series of tropes. Subsequently, this tropology begins to unfold 
the day, setting the event off in particular directions. 
Subbu is not the only person who has taken a shine to these tropes. Others mention 
the arrogance of the intruders of this space. 
It is at this point that Ammasi Thevar makes his appearance, pedalling his pista-green 
cycle back from Malaiur. He thrusts his cycle away. No preamble. With his gritty 
voice, he gets down to business. ‘They say the Thevar statue has been broken.’ Pichai 
briefs him. Someone stresses that it is the Goripalayam statue, no less, and 
Rasendran responds to this reminder. To smash the Goripalayam statue itself, 
then...this Madurai…what does it matter whether this Madurai exists or not? 
Ammasi Thevar transports a frosty power to our surroundings. In a cold voice, he 
instructs the others on how to proceed.  
Ammasi: Let the bus come. Will set fire. A few…In Madurai… 
The next public transport vehicle to come into Malaiur. The 1 p.m. bus. Are they going 
to do that, set fire to it? But Subbu thinks the government will suspend public 
transport service and that the bus will not come. 
Ammasi: So what if it does not come today? It has to come one day or the other.  
Kannan: Nothing will as much as sway. Are you saying the bus will come here? 
Pichai: Why will they [the government] leave the buses? Will he [angry Kallar] not 
ignite the buses? There, within the city, they may be plying the buses.  
[There is a small pause. A pause is treason. This is how the men appear to test time 
today – each moment deserves to pass only if it is used. Ammasi provides a general 
comment, as though to fill up that short empty duration of time.] 
Ammasi: ‘Why, what audacity.’  
The term Ammasi uses is tairiyam – courage, or, rather (from his tone) spunk, 
audacity.  
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…. 
[All along, I have been waiting to make some move, something that can immobilise 
this verbal exchange, halt all this at the level of words, at least. An inane question 
duly follows.] 
Dhivya (to Ammasi, the late entrant): Did you see this on TV? 
Ammasi: What?  
He is not even listening to my question. He has taken his cell phone out of his shirt 
pocket. Meanwhile,  
Rasendran: It is like hurling the Thevar race [iṉam] down and stomping on it.  
[The loss of honour and public standing – this theme is beginning to predominate. 
Rasendran emphasizes the instrument of symbolic violence – the legs, among the 
most debased portions of the human body, with which the Thevar race is being 
trampled upon. Given the feudal representation of the human body, symbolising 
caste as varna, and meanings and actions determined by caste relations, to be 
trampled upon is a double dishonour. Firstly, the dishonour of being subject to this 
violence. Secondly, the dishonour and the loss of rank that can be both consequence 
and expression of being touched by another’s feet. All this talk is geared towards an 
objective so far unstated – to blame the Dalit, at once an abstract political figure and 
a localised, identifiable social group. This talk of disrespect manufactures anger. The 
talk of dishonour and loss of rank brings the men closer to conjuring flesh, bones, and 
caste to the yet to be named destroyer of the Thevar statue.] 
Although Ammasi has ignored me, Pichai responds. No. ‘This is news that came now, 
in the last ten minutes.’ It is as though Pichai has not registered my continued 
presence, ever since he returned to the tea-stall with this tidal bit of information.   
I say, ‘No, no, I am asking Ammasi how he got to…’ 
Preoccupied, Ammasi mutters agreement, and continues handling his mobile phone. 
No news on the television. Pichai is about to tell me why this is impossible. He 
mentions a moratorium on electronic media coverage of “communal clashes.” 
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Kannan interrupts. Pointing to the lorries running on a mud track at some distance, 
he says, ‘Aey, here, here…go there. Let someone take the cycle and go…do not allow 
these vehicles to run.’ 
But Ammasi, who has been pushing buttons with a sense of urgency, finally gets 
through and begins talking. 
Ammasi (over the phone): Annen, this is Ammasi speaking. Annen, there is some talk 
in Malaiur now. Is it true? [They are] saying the Goripalayam statue has…broken, is it 
really so? [Listening] Is it so only on that side? [Listening] Well, they have been talking 
of it being smashed. [Listening] Is that so, annen? Ok, then, [we] will find out…ok, 
ok… 
Ammasi turns to address the other men. ‘He says cow dung has been dissolved and 
let...’ 
Kannan: What? 
Ammasi: It seems that [they] have dissolved and thrown dung. 
[It so transpires that the statue has not been shattered or broken. No bombs. No 
lumps off the bronze statue. Will this translate into lesser anger?]  
Rasendran: ‘That is…Whatever it is, it is indecent, disgusting [aciṅkam]. 
Ammasi: ‘Whatever be the action, it is indecency, is it not?’ 
Rasendran: Whatever it is, indecency is indecency, is it not, pa?  
Pichai: Why pa, to pour dung, that is…it…is more hurtful/ more backward [piṉṉam] 
than destroying, pa. It is like pouring human excreta on a man, is it now? 
[One short call from Ammasi to his “elder brother” (anna), a lawyer and brother of 
an ex-MLA, and we have moved from destruction to desecration. A new set of 
emotions emerge, adapted strategically to the fresh news. I am to hear it said, 
repeatedly, that desecration is dishonour, disrespect, insult, indecent, avamāṉam, 
aciṅkam. Losing one’s honour is worse than death. Desecration is worse than 
destruction.] 
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…. 
Vineetha, a young Kallar woman who runs a small shop nearby, has stopped over 
with her daughter, a toddler. She must have perceived the atmospheric change, for 
she asks, ‘What is it?’ Pichai fills her in. ‘The Thevar statue ma…At Goripalayam, our 
statue is there, right, the Thevar statue? He is saying dung has been poured.’ 
Vineetha nods absentmindedly.  
Rasendran: The news is not known yet. Now, imagine if the news flies… 
[But all the while, the news has indeed been taking wing. First, Pichai’s accidental 
journalism (which in retrospect seems to have been part-rumour, part-fact). Then, 
Pichai’s reportage to others present in the tea-stall. Then, a (failed) phone call to 
connect this place of leisure to someone closer to the memorial. Then, Ammasi’s 
entrance and another phone call.  
All the while, cycles have whirred and motorbikes have revved up to where we sit. 
Other men have scurried to the same place. This place of leisure, this tea-stall looks 
more of a public place today than on normal days. It is now, at the time of an 
impending conflict over social space, that the tea-stall most clearly enunciates what 
a public place is like. It is today that the tea-stall shows itself to be catering mostly to 
Malaiur and Tenur Kallar, some non-Kallar, and passers-by and visitors. It reveals 
itself as a place barely utilised by local Dalits, even though the plastic throwaway cups 
anticipate Dalit presence. 
The tea-stall has been a centre of broadcasting and bravado. Each time one of their 
kinsfolk saunter by or stop for tea, the men present ask, ‘Heard?’ and proceed to tell 
them. Soon the tea-stall assumes the role of a makeshift wartime military 
headquarters. The enemy is unnamed, but this will soon change. At site after site like 
this, the unknown desecrator of the Thevar statue might be assigned a known 
identity. Initially, Dalits as a whole. Subsequently, Dalits in the village or the vicinity.]. 
A man who has stopped by at the tea-stall predicts the outcome of the news 
spreading. ‘Here, there, in this place and that, riots will definitely occur.’ 
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[It is almost as though the riots are to have lives of their own, as though they would 
create themselves]. 
Ammasi is muttering about the consequences of the correction. ‘He said [they] have 
poured dung.’ 
[Is there a fear that this is somehow less significant, that it shall seem less 
bombastic?] 
 Kannan shouts. ‘Aey, isn’t this similar?’ 
Ammasi: [The lawyer] said, ‘That is what they are saying, that is the talk that is 
emerging, they have done something there’...  
Kannan is adamant that the two (destruction and desecration) are analogous. 
Kannan: Is this not alike? Is not what you are saying [desecration] akin [to 
destruction]? 
Ammasi: Yes. 
Rasendran: Is not pouring dung a bigger insult than breaking? 
Ammasi: No matter what the action, is it not an insult? 
Pichai’s doubts, probably harboured for a while, surface. ‘So, the news, it is correct? 
I was scared that is it false, when I kept telling [you all].’ He is reassured by the other 
men, who say ‘No way,’ ‘How can that be?’ and so on. They stress on the ‘true’ nature 
of the lawyer Ammasi has spoken to. I notice Rasendran’s wife, the typically quiet, 
sensitive Malar, only when she begins to speak, mentioning a need for greater 
verification. In my fear, and with the knowledge of my powerlessness weighing down, 
I have been thinking of a possible intervention. For me to call the police seems 
useless. I have been thinking of a CPI(M) member, who knows these men rather 
intimately, and also knows enough people in the district administration. I ask the men 
if they think he might know, if they think of him as a potential source of information. 
They are dismissive at first; they have already crosschecked with their own kin, the 
lawyer who will not lie. (Later on, others and I try calling the CPI(M) member, but he 
does not respond until a man whose mobile number he cannot identify makes a call).  
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Malar: [We] should find out who did it. 
Rasendran: Whoever it may be, [he] is [going to get it] good. 
Kannan: Who did it… 
Malar: [Someone] must have seen it, right? 
Kannan: In effect… in effect… we can only be angry with Harijan. 
[The men shift gears, ramming their verbal rage, till now concentrated on 
Karunanidhi and Alagiri, against Dalits, and particularly one local Dalit caste, the 
Chakkiliyar]. 
Kannan, who had initially said that he could not possibly predict the extent to which 
and the places in which the effects of the vandalism shall be felt, now recalls his own 
past actions against Chakkiliyar, and prods others for a repeat of those actions.   
Kannan: Those…now…I went, one dusk…into the Chakkiliyar…went and smashed all 
the Tenur Chakkiliyar houses.  
Ammasi: Must smash…Malaiur, everything…toda...must finish… 
Kannan: At Malaiur, you…at dusk… 
Ammasi: Send a messenger, a tom-tom, to [neighbouring villages], all…What do you 
say, Pichai? 
Kannan approvingly reminds them. ‘The way you turned up last time…’ 
Ammasi: Yes, the same, [we] have to fetch [the others] and come…Not one should 
remain. 
Pichai responds to Ammasi’s call to relay information and commands to Kallar 
residents of neighbouring villages. 
Pichai: Ammasi… 
Ammasi: Yes? 
P: These [neighbouring village] chaps are unreliable. So, just Tenur, Malaiur… now, 
today… 
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A: Blows…[in] Malaiur today… 
P: Tenur… 
A: …In Tenur…beat up… 
[…] Kannan re-enters this plan of action. 
Kannan: All of it…enter and… 
Ammasi: …[Let us] hit, smash. 
Kannan: No, today…today, there is an excellent chance…beat, smash…[they] must 
cry out, aiyaiyō [in grief, pain]…If anyone…anyone that says “my contam,” “your 
contam,” “you are my own,” “we are your own,” must be beaten up. 
[This is Kannan’s Great Transformation. From where he started – painting an early-
twentieth-century pastoral scene of harmony and Kallar largesse and patronage for 
their Dalit agrestic slaves during famine and other generalised crises, of a village full 
of hunger-ridden Kallar families, their ecologically determined grain-thefts, and the 
generous parcelling out of their nightly haul of grain to every single family, both 
Thevar and Harijan – to where he is now, at this moment.  
And like most great transformations, the second moment contains the first, and the 
first moment is grasped better through the second. Kannan’s movement from 
summoning the Kallar as jajman, as patron, to bearing witness to his own 
perpetration of violence against Chakkiliyar, is a swift revelation of the seeds of the 
second moment in the first. It is this transformation, this movement from the first 
moment to the second, which allows us to comprehend patrons better. The second 
moment, the threat of violence and actual violence, illuminates the first moment, the 
benevolence of patronage, to show us its horror.].       
There is also Selvi. Selvi, who has been fidgeting all along, finally asks Kannan, “Why, 
pa, now, will you let [people] beat up your own servant?  
Kannan: Of course, must beat up… 
[The exact term Selvi and the others use, sounds like paṭaiyaṉ, but could be paṭiyaṉ. 
The Tamil lexicon translates the first term as ‘slave.’ The second term was used for a 
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category of landless agrarian labourers, who were remunerated by grains measured 
in a vessel known as paṭi]. 
 Three or four other men repeated the Tamil term Selvi had used. It is a term I had 
not heard earlier here. I take this to be one of many local terms with which labouring 
people in a system of agrestic bondage are referred to. [The preferred term in 
Malaiur for former agrestic slaves or tied agricultural labourers is paṇṇaiyāḷ, who 
were paid in cash or grain shares (Viswanath 2014: 28)]. These men dismiss the whiff 
of patronage that comes along with this term, one of them saying it is as useless as 
an aubergine (which, in Tamil Nadu, is viewed as a really useless vegetable). Kannan 
is even more explicit in dismissing the patron’s hint about the term. 
Kannan: Protection? Bollocks! (paṭaiyāppu mayirāppu)…  
[Selvi’s laughter at the slang is a little on the edge]… 
Kannan: Aey, to date, there is not a single person in Tenur who has given the 
Chakkiliyan more patronage, more support [ātaravu] than I have… 
Selvi (sardonically): Is that so? 
Kannan: But on that day…see, what happened that day… 
Selvi: Yes? 
Kannan: …on that day, I was the one who beat up and set fire after breaking in. Today 
too...today, too, I say that I am going to do the same. As soon as [I] go, all [of them] 
will approach, saying, ‘Thevare!’ Let them! Just have to thrash them and fling them 
down, that is all. 
Selvi exclaimed, āttāṭi āttā. Laughs, her laughter still on the edge. Just look at him! 
Kannan: What else, then? 
Rasendran: Community honour [or consciousness], is that an ordinary thing, sister-
in-law? 
[The term Rasendran uses, while trying to placate his fictive sister-in-law, Selvi, is kula 
kauravam or kula uṇarvu.] 
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Selvi: Why pa, now… 
Rasendran: …By now, others – they would have boiled over and gotten blisters by 
now. 
Ammasi (apparently referring to a past act of vandalism): To have let them go, the 
day [it] was destroyed/vandalised, that was a mistake. 
Selvi is trying her best to intervene, but her voice is drowned out by Ammasi. 
Ammasi: ...Let them go scot-free…That is why [they] can do [something like this] 
today, so easy. 
[This incessant focus on Chakkiliyar belies the interpretation that anger against Dalits 
is directly proportional to the headway made by them in the fields of education, 
professional employment, and access to other kinds of resources. Were this the case, 
Kallar anger would reveal a particular hatred for Pallar. In the surrounding villages, it 
is Pallar who are the better off among Dalit castes. In Malaiur, Pallar landholding is 
greater than Chakkiliyar landholding (which is insignificant). Some Pallar families 
include magistrates and lawyers. The first person from Malaiur pursuing an MBBS 
degree is a young Pallar woman. Most Pallar families in Malaiur live in better houses 
than Chakkiliyar. For all that, Kallar anger turns away from Pallar villagers. In fact, the 
general opinion (among many Kallar, a significant number of Pallar, and most 
Chakkiliyar) is that there is much ‘oṟṟumai’ or unity between Malaiur Kallar and Pallar. 
Much later, in 2014-15, at the heights of a Kallar–Chakkiliyar conflict in Malaiur, some 
Chakkiliyar men and women shall repeat that Pallar stay away, remain on the side-
lines (otuṅki iruppārkaḷ), and do not stick their necks out into anything.  
For all their lack of social mobility and insignificant political mobilisation, it is the 
Chakkiliyar who become the hated figure in Kallar speech today.] 
[I begin anew. Another tactic. If all these people think DMK is inciting caste riots, 
would it not be better to keep it at that level, where these men’s targets are the Chief 
Minister and his powerful son?] 
Dhivya: Is all this Alagiri’s doing? Acts of DMK people? 
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Kannan: Yes ma. Karunanidhi himself, that is who. 
Rasendran: The man himself, a terro… [They] themselves trigger caste riots (cāti 
kalavaram), trigger everything. [They will] hack down someone or the other, and… 
Kannan: That is… He does not like Mukkulathor, this Karunanidhi.  
[Echoing Pichai, Rasendran speaks as though they are powerless in the face of 
external incitement – even if they turn into violent men, they will be puppets 
responding to emotions created for them elsewhere]. 
He did it once, earlier. He does it again now. As a lorry trudges down a mud track at 
some distance from the tea-stall, Kannan calls attention towards it. (This track is new, 
having emerged from the movement of private vehicles or lorries transporting 
construction material to the NH7 nearby). 
Pointing in that direction, Kannan says, ‘Here, look, that lorry that is coming here…go, 
[tell them] if the vehicle comes here, it will burn. Go. Take a cycle and go.’   
Someone suggests that they wait.  
Kannan (livid): No, no…just do not allow them to run, [I] ask. Why, why, who is he 
[the vehicle owner/ contractor], that Mr. Big wheel? [The others laugh, because 
Kannan is back to swearing]. Or else, get the cycle, I will go.  
Rasendran tries to reason out with him. 
Rasendran: Why, [have anything to do] with some individual man? To halt the 
government… the bus…  
Kannan: [I say that we] must halt everything.  
Rasendran (continuing): …only if you attack there will [the government] learn. What 
does [some lorry driver] know? 
Kannan: No, no…Word has to spread, does it not – of why vehicles are not running 
here?  
Malar gathers courage and voices her disagreement with Kannan’s scheme. (In fact, 
she is going to disagree with most of the retributive actions the others, inclusive of 
Rasendran, shall contemplate). 
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Kannan: No ma. Aey… 
Rasendran: Oh, act [we] must, act [we] must. Something, a… 
Kannan: Every one. Must not even allow the motorbike chaps here to go into the ūr. 
[There is so much method to the manifestation of emotions. This potential mob – 
which is what it appears to be right now – is not amorphous, without agenda, or even 
without limits. The men regulate their anger. They govern the performance of that 
anger.  
I can perceive their structure of feelings, the fault-lines along which they run revealed 
in every utterance. I can also see the men structuring their feelings. I sense an 
emotional core which is neither completely internal, nor completely external.  
There is the outburst of anger. Then, the cultivation of it. Then, the streamlining of 
it. ‘This is an excellent chance,’ Kannan has said, an excellent opportunity to teach 
Chakkiliyar a lesson. And he has urged the others to hold on to this opportunity. This 
is a chance to be angry at Dalits, a chance to nurture that anger, to hold on to it, and 
then, to direct it.  
Likewise, this anger is routing around for objects that can receive it. And, amidst the 
play of emotions, decisions are taken on which of the objects are most fit for attack 
– not the privately owned goods carrier, but the government run transport bus.] 
[Another treacherous pause skids into place. It must be expelled with an utterance. 
Within seconds, Kannan interjects.] 
Kannan: Cai. (Shit!)  
[This spurs the others.] 
Ammasi: Great obscenity [aciṅkam]. 
Rasendran: Just obscenity? This…if [we] do not do something… 
Kannan: [What,] to do nothing? 
Rasendran: …[no one] will respect (matippu) [us]. 
Kannan: Innumerable… 
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Ammasi: In broad daylight! 
Kannan: Yes! 
Rasendran suddenly positions the day and the desecration within the ritual calendar. 
Rasendran: Festival (tiruviḻā)! 
Pichai: Crowded…must have been so terribly crowded, right?  
Rasendran: What audacity (tuṇiccal)! 
Kannan: At prime time (mukkiya nēram).  
Pichai: This Chakkiliyan, Pallan… 
A: Had [they] at least done it on the sly…but in broad daylight, on a festival day!  
[The men correlate the statue desecration with the sacred rituals during the Tamil 
calendrical month of Cittirai (mid-April to mid-May). Here in Madurai, Cittirai is 
perceived as a seamless combination of two temple festivals. One is the Cittirai 
festival of the main deities of the Meenakshi Sundareswarar temple, the city’s 
primary sacred centre. The other is the Cittirai festival of Alagar, a form of Vishnu and 
the main deity of the Alagar temple, located at about 21 kilometres from the city 
centre. This season of major temple festivals begins with the Meenakshi 
Sundareswarar temple’s twelve-day Cittirai tiruviḻā (in a sense, the annual renovation 
or a re-orienting of the city towards its sacred centre) and ends with the nine-day 
Kallalagar festival – known so because the deity is dressed as a ‘Kallar.’  
This second festival has some overlap with the first. It commences at the 
Alagar temple, situated near ‘Ambalakkarar territory’ (Ambalakkarar is the honorific 
of eastern Madurai’s Kallar subcaste). On the fourth day, the procession of Kallalagar 
to Madurai begins. On the sixth day, the processional idol reaches and enters the 
Vaigai river at a central location in Madurai, and is then taken to Vandiyur, where the 
idol and the procession halt overnight. On the seventh, the procession returns to the 
riverbank and the deity reveals himself through Vishnu’s ‘ten avatars.’ During the 
festival’s last two days, the procession returns to Alagar temple, with the idol 
travelling again in a ‘poo pallaakku,’ a flower-decked palanquin. This is what the men 
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refer to – the festival, the thousands who participate in it, the extremely crowded 
space of Madurai, and the ‘centrality’ of this period within sacred time. 
 At first, the men only recall the day’s significance while second-guessing the 
desecrators’ tactics. They are astounded that this could occur during the festival, 
when crowds mill about the city. How could someone fling dung at the statue without 
being noticed when, even on normal days, at least five or six traffic policemen are 
stationed at the Goripalayam junction? The logic is then turned on its head – the 
desecrators probably gave this a lot of thought and chose their moment well. This 
aciṅkam, this grotesque desecration during sacred time, angers the men all the more. 
The sacredness of time makes the desecration all the more meaningful.]  
Meanwhile, Pichai makes a call and gets through to his son, currently in Madurai. He 
is still trying to find out what exactly has happened, even though no one else is 
bothered about what exactly the statue has been subjected to. Pichai finds out that 
the desecration has occurred at daytime (this generates greater anger) and that 
public transport buses are still plying in Madurai (this generates surprise).  
Now addressing the others, Pichai repeats, ‘Yes. [They] have flung dung.  
I have not stopped yearning for tactics. 
Dhivya: Did [they] do this at night? 
Pichai: Morning. At ten.  
Dhivya: Which means, within everyone’s sight.  
[This is the ‘tactic’ I come up with. I have been thinking that if the desecration has 
occurred in ‘broad daylight,’ identifying the desecrators will be easy. I have also 
recollected the backroom talk of some civil liberties activists and others. Of occasions 
when caste organisations (or political parties) desecrate the icons or statues of their 
own leaders (or leaders of constituencies they are wooing), so that the incident and 
its aftermath can be utilised as a rallying point. Incidentally, the cue for these 
recollections came from Rasendran, who obliquely referred to that possibility, if only 
in connection with DMK. I also think that to deface a statue in daytime, at a crowded 
venue, requires some assurance, a great deal of public support, and a confidence that 
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can only stem from dominance. It could also be an act of resistance, an act of 
desperation, or even the act of a ‘madman.’] 
Pichai: Yes. And as to how [he] flung [it], and who flung it…  
Someone finally gets through to the CPI(M) member; everyone is informed that the 
desecration occurred at around 9 am. Rasendran cannot stop repeating this.  
Rasendran: At nine? At nine? Then, then, how are the buses plying?  
Someone else – it is Mokkarasu – comes by and begins to bubble.  
Mokkarasu: ‘Here, has everyone…Are the Kallar still in the ūr, or have they died, all?’  
The rest explain. They only heard of the desecration a while ago, that in their area, 
very few know, and that since this occurred ‘within’ the festival, the details are still 
unknown. The mention of the festival brings the focus back to the ritual calendar. 
Chinna Kalai, who arrived late and has been mostly silent, now remarks. 
Chinna Kalai: And tomorrow is the day of the flower palanquin. 
Rasendran: Let it be. Let it be the day of the flower palanquin. Ignite. Completely. 
Throw a bomb. 
Chinna Kalai laughs nervously. I have known this middle-aged Malaiur resident as a 
gentle and thoughtful man, one of the few villagers affiliated to CPI(M). I now think 
of his political leanings.  
As for the rest, now is the time to get back to their own ritual, the reintroduction of 
specific villains.  
Pichai: These Vitutalai Ciruttaikal – those fellows must have done this. Those guys… 
Rasendran: Sure it is them. 
Pichai: They must be the ones who did it. 
[…] 
Pichai: Between them and us… 
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[I have not given up. Would the quest for knowledge serve as a tactic? Could an 
‘innocent’ query douse the fire?] 
Dhivya: Vitutalai Ciruttaikal, [they] are…? 
Rasendran: Thirumavalavan. 
Chinna Kalai: Thirumavalavan. 
Pichai: Yes. Thirumavalavan. 
[These men equate the Dalit Panther Iyyakkam or Vitutalai Ciruttaikal (Liberation 
Panthers), the movement and the subsequently formed electoral party with a (Dalit) 
Paraiyar mass base, with its leader, Thirumavalavan]. 
Dhivya: This…there is someone else, isn’t there? That Puthiya Tamilakam? He… 
Kannan: That chap…he has [gone] off.  
Kannan is suggesting that Krishnaswamy, leader of Puthiya Tamilakam (a party with 
a Pallar base) has ‘switched off.’ He thinks Krishnaswamy has gone off the radar.   
Rasendran: They all are…barely some fifteen people remain now. 
Everyone laughs. I laugh. I find out that I have laughed loudest.  
[If they perceive their rivals as weak, they may spare the execution of the violence]. 
Chinna Kalai: Yes, they must be the ones who have done it. 
Mokkarasu recalls Muthusamy, another Dalit politician. 
Rasendran: Muthusamy, Thirumavalavan… 
Mokkarasu: Yes. These are probably the ones who did it. 
Chinna Kalai: Devendra Kula Vellalar…all these…all these dogs, all. 
[For a second, I think Chinna Kalai has his own tactics. Talk of violence makes him 
uncomfortable. He wants to play the part of a Kallar man, nonetheless. Or perhaps 
he wants to play this part only so that others will not dismiss him when he turns on 
his fire-fighter hose each time a specific act of violence is mentioned. I wonder if I am 
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being liberal towards Chinna because of his sympathies with CPI(M). I get this sense 
because I see him struggling to get the insult – ‘dogs’ – out of his mouth. The 
interpretive moment passes]. 
…. 
The men continue with their verbal assaults, with their mapping of vengeance, with 
their contemplation of action. Pichai is saying, ‘By nightfall, the turbulence 
[kontaḷippu] will become known;’ Pichai is saying, ‘Making trouble…there, those who 
live southwards, in Virudhunagar, and…;’ and Kannan is talking of ‘that Goripalayam 
area itself’ (which abuts Kallar-dominated localities); and Ammasi has come to know 
that some people are already, at this very moment, staging a road-block, right by the 
Thevar statue; and Rasendran is saying, ‘within Madurai…for some ten...ten days, it 
has to be on fire, which is when [they] will be scared. And [is it enough] to just talk? 
[We must] go there and…’ 
Then, Chinna Kalai points out, with some trepidation, that they have ‘only poured 
dung, right? Have not done anything else, [have they]? 
Ammasi: Now what…[can] surpass that! 
Rasendran: What is there, that can top this? 
Chinna Kalai’s disquiet turns into awkwardness at the retorts and he turns sheepish. 
‘No, he had said, [they have] chopped it, stabbed it…that’s why.’ 
Pichai: Throwing dung, or destroying – aren’t they one and the same? 
Chinna: Ah, so, that is the way [it is]. 
Pichai: Then, this Chakkiliyan…the extent to which… 
Chinna: Then, who, who…who is the one who poured? 
Subbu: Alagiri’s party men.  
In the meantime, a father has called his son, who studies in a college in Madurai. In 
the conversation, the son is cautioned. The father tells him, ‘This is going to take a 
different movement. [So] you could even cut college and return.’ The conversation 
268 
 
generates more rumours. Those listening on are angered, when they hear that the 
desecrators had come in ‘two groups.’  
Rasendran: Just look at that, the way [they] are acting. [He continues, cutting across 
other men who begin to speak]. As a group! [If they are coming as a group] and 
tipping [dung], then, look at how [the situation] is! 
The men remind one another that people are already picketing by the Thevar statue. 
The inevitability of an altercation is considered. Ammasi brings everyone back to their 
immediate surroundings. ‘No, no, these folk…Today…the thrashings that these 
Chakkiliya lads.’ [He doesn’t quite mean young Chakkiliyar boys, nor is he simply 
infantilizing all Chakkiliyar. Like the singular ‘Chakkiliyan’ the men have been using, 
Ammasi’s words are intended to be disrespectful].    
And Rasendran returns to the public transport bus, which he had earlier identified as 
the proper target of anger.   
Rasendran: …No! I say, the bus, our bus – [let us] set fire to it. 
But Chinna Kalai, having failed to dissipate anger by downplaying desecration, now 
chuckles nervously. The bus is not just a thing, he reminds others. ‘No way! Must tell 
the driver and conductor “get down and go,” and then…’ Ok, Rasendran agrees. ‘[We 
will] tell each one of them, “Get down, get out,” and…’ That is not even necessary, 
says another. ‘What do you think, they’d still be sitting in the bus?’ This prompts 
someone else to suggest that they empty or finish off [kāli] some two or three buses. 
And Malar, with all this talk of retribution, begins to wonder what those Sellur chaps 
are doing. I try to deflect. 
Dhivya: Those who live in Madurai? In Karimedu and…? 
Rasendran: All…our people only, so many people live there. 
Malar: Karimedu, Sellur… 
Those who had contacted people in Madurai inform us of developments. Kallar 
groups have been reaching Goripalayam. When the father of that student says, 
‘These boys, they are going to Goripalayam in fours and fives,’ Rasendran is quick to 
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retort, ‘Why are they going to Goripalayam? Why not hold up a bus [wherever they 
are] and set it alight?’ The father says, ‘That is my son,’ and laughing nervously, 
reminds others that there are consequences of such actions. ‘If he does…’  
Rasendran pipes down, ‘No, [I’m] just talking.’ The father says, however, that all 
those college students there, have already formed groups. Kannan responds, saying, 
‘Oh, mother! This sort of thing, this is what is timepass for college fellows.’  
…. 
The men tick off whoever objects to the planned retaliation. They plan a roadblock 
at the state highway the next day. Ammasi comes up with a more detailed plan. By 
night, they are going to send a message to surrounding villages – nobody is to work 
the next day, but should instead proceed towards and block the state highway. Pichai 
says this is important, that things will be fine only if there is action here and there. 
Rasendran fondly recollects a young man from Malaiur. Appreciating his ‘speed’ 
[vēkam], Rasendran wonders what would have happened by now had he come to 
know. But the father’s reminder of the consequences of violence seems to have left 
a mark on others. Now, Ammasi is saying, ‘No, why this work for him? But at dawn, 
we…’ Rasendran agrees. Ammasi wavers again. 
Ammasi: Look here, folks. Only when something is done in the night will they fear. 
Selvi protests again. But this time, she alludes to laws and prisons. Ammasi dismisses 
her protests.  
Ammasi: What better work than that, for us? [We’ll just] go and stay in the jail for 
some ten days. Hit the SCs, using this opportunity.’ 
The wavering continues. Some think they must do something in Malaiur, others 
prefer the roadblock. Then, I am ticked off – ‘enough, your being here, head straight 
home, stay put, do not step out for two or three days.’ The perils of the outside are 
not spelt out, but my fever and my fear staple me to the interiors of my rented abode.  
Those who dished out the stay-safe-indoors advice to me were the ones who 
intended to make certain homes unsafe; some had mentioned vandalising and 
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destroying Chakkiliyar houses in the past, and some desired to repeat this violence. 
They also intended to make public spaces risky. I stayed at home.  
Despite the moratorium against reporting exact details of incidents that are 
bound to cause disturbances, news of the Thevar statue desecration had spread. 
Censorship was no match to the mobile phone. (Prior to the advent of this 
technology, people informed their fellow caste members and organised themselves 
by other means, such as pasting posters on buses). There was a general sense of 
unrest in Madurai, especially in Usilampatti taluk, for some days. A number of buses 
were attacked and damaged through stone pelting. Shops remained shut. Some 
picketers were arrested for blocking roads.2 The day after the desecration, Kallar men 
and women jammed the Wellingdon road–highway t-intersection. Luckily, reactions 
to the desecration did not reach the levels threatened; the roadblock was the high 
point. And yet, no ‘jail’ for the men and women who blocked the highway. This is part 
of what infuriates subordinate social groups protesting in a similar fashion.  
Dalit activists note that when their organisations seek permission to organise 
processions, the authorities seldom grant it easily. In 2005, southern district 
administrations refused to grant Puthiya Tamilakam permission to hold pre-election 
public meetings or conduct processions in Virudhunagar (Rajapalayam), Tirunelveli 
(Sankarankoil), Ramanathapuram (Paramakudi) districts. Hearing writ petitions filed 
by party members challenging these refusals, the Madras High Court judge quoted 
from a number of colonial era judgments, which in turn referred to English law on 
public gatherings, that  
Highways, indeed, are dedicated to the public use, but they must be used for passing 
and going along them, and the legal mode of use negatives the claim of politicians to 
use a highway as a forum, just as it excludes the claim of actors to turn it upto an 
open-air theatre. The crowd who collect, and the persons who cause a crowd, for 
whatever purpose, to collect in a street, create a nuisance.3 
                                                     
2 ‘Thevar statue vandalised, tension in Madurai,’ The Hindu 22 April 2008, ‘Madurai tense after statue 
is vandalised,’ Times of India, 22 April 2008. 
3 Dr. K. Krishnasamy and Anr. vs The Superintendent of Police and Others (Madras High Court). 
Available at http://indiankanoon.org/doc/545499, accessed 19.12.2014.  
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This ruling illustrates the conceptions of space, particularly that of public space, that 
underwrites such legislations. Here we see that legislators, planners, bureaucrats, 
and police consider only particular users (and use) of space as legitimate.  
On 21st April, once I reached home, I tried contacting someone I thought 
would be of help. He finally returned my call late evening, busy with meetings on the 
desecration. I conveyed what I had heard in Malaiur that afternoon. He said that a 
Kallar political outfit had likely desecrated the statue.  
When I head out to Malaiur a couple of days later, I get Ammasi and this man 
to speak over the phone. (They know each other well). Ammasi is genuinely shocked 
when he hears what I had earlier heard. The Thevar statue is so overpoweringly 
sacred that he cannot believe that a Kallar, or another Mukkulathor person(s), might 
have desecrated it. Clearly, the sacred is no surplus here, it retains its grip over the 
surface of the political; this is not quite a disenchanted world where acts like 
defacement and desecration are required to out the public secret, the sacred roots 
of power (Taussig 1999).  
Political organisations can desecrate statues of their own icons. The 
Goripalayam incident may well have been one such instance. But can such news be 
revealed? Hardly. A few days later, the district administration pins the blame onto a 
‘madman,’ a homeless person with a mental illness. Ammasi and others refuse to 
accept this; they know the madman to be a scapegoat. 
It does seem beyond belief that someone mentally disturbed could desecrate 
the statue with such great precision. Dung was splashed on at least two specific 
areas. One was the face. Whoever had defaced that statue had done so by climbing 
the iron stairwell used during commemorations – when leaders and individuals climb 
up these stairs and stand on the wide platform to garland the statue. The polluting 
substance had been lugged up the same staircase which was used regularly by a 
group of elderly Kallar women to transport pots of water with which they cleaned 
the Thevar statue. (It was one of these women who had noticed the desecration). 
The other place where dung was smeared was the plaque naming the 
inaugurators of the statue. So, dung over the name of M. Karunanidhi, DMK Chief 
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Minister in 1974, at the time of the statue installation. And dung over the name of 
P.K. Mookiah Thevar, Pappapatti born Piramalai Kallar leader, All India Forward Bloc, 
and close disciple of Muthuramalinga Thevar.  
Perhaps the point of a desecration is that the whodunit is relatively 
unimportant. Once enacted, it allows people to respond as they would like. Each act 
of desecration reveals relationships between social groups, between humans and 
objects, and between objects themselves. Michael Taussig is right in pointing out that 
defacement is an energy flowing from an active and activated object of critique 
(1999: 43). An inter-object constellation became evident in the weeks following the 
Goripalayam statue desecration. A few more Thevar statues were desecrated. But 
one Thevar statue saw a fresh start, a birth of sorts.  
In Malaiur, the Goripalayam desecration provided an opportune moment for 
Kallar residents to install a Thevar statue. Since I was ill and had to leave for 
Bangalore, I returned after nearly two weeks had passed. When I returned, the statue 
was the first matter to come up in my interactions with Kallar villagers. A middle-
aged woman from Sivanandi Thevar’s family (one of Malaiur dominant families) said 
they had decided to utilise a bandh day to install the statue. This was long pending. 
Others said there had been many attempts to install a statue, but unsuccessfully, due 
either to conflicts within the caste, or to the government’s new protocols on statue 
installation. The taut atmosphere following the Goripalayam desecration gave these 
Kallar villagers an opportunity they seized. The situation was so tense, they had 
calculated, that no one could dare stop them.  
Once they unofficially unveiled the statue, the local police had received an 
anonymous phone call. Scores of police personnel had been sent to Malaiur but the 
Kallar villagers were prepared. Many of the conversations about the statue were 
marked by the pride with which women’s participation in the skirmishes with the 
police were recollected. The police could do little. The statue had been installed 
without government approval. The only concession to bureaucratic procedures was 
the covering of the statue with gunny sacks. The sacks were to stay until government 
sanction for the statue was obtained.  
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Moreover, following official ‘requests’ for a bronze statue, Kallar villagers 
formed a Thevar Statue Forum (Thevar Cilai Peravai). It had fifteen members 
representing Malaiur’s Five Thevar Lineages. The forum decided to replace the 
cement statue with a bronze one. For this, they collected vari (contribution) from all 
households of the five lineages. The representatives also began to search for the best 
bronze Thevar statue they could commission. Malaiur Kallar had agreed to enter this 
‘age of bronze.’4 
The Age of Bronze 
In many of southern Tamil Nadu’s cities, towns, and villages, statue vandalism has 
served as a trigger of caste violence. Desecrated statues of Ambedkar and 
Muthuramalinga Thevar, in particular, have the ability to dramatize ever-present 
conflicts between caste groups. The state government’s responses have varied, but 
initially, in the late-1990s, it devised a series of new rules regarding public statues 
and other memorials.  
These procedural changes have had their own effects. These effects are 
legible in specific instances where local bureaucracies and social groups have 
confronted and negotiated each other, ostensibly on procedural grounds. Before 
examining the effects of new procedures, let me return to the 2008 negotiations 
between the district administration and Malaiur Kallar over the Thevar statue 
installed in the wake of the Goripalayam desecration.  
After some days of high drama, Kallar villagers acquiesced to one of the 
government’s injunctions. They agreed to the ban on cement and Plaster of Paris 
statues, and embraced the idea of bronze statuary. For the moment, the local 
bureaucracy could congratulate itself on its persuasiveness and success. 
                                                     
4 I intend for the term to suggest two references. The first is to Rodin’s ‘The Age of Bronze,’ a bronze 
statue that looked so real that its viewers thought he had simply cast a living person. This reference 
opens up an idea of statues ‘livingness.’ The second alludes to an article on statue installation and 
politics in India, titled ‘The Bronze Age’ (Ahmad 2008). By turning the title on its head, I reverse the 
assumptions of this article (indeed, of the vast literature on statue wars) that spending public money 
on statues deflects attention from health, housing, education, and other pressing issues. This presages 
my review of dominant ideas on what a statue in space is or does.  
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What exactly did caste associations or groups and political parties agree to, 
when they concurred to rules regarding the material of statues? This pact had partly 
to do with the considerable value of bronze. A group or association that can afford 
to sponsor a metal statue proclaims its existing dominance or its social mobility. 
Already, in 1979, Tamil Nadu’s Rural Development and Panchayat Raj Department 
had stipulated that all costs involved in statue installation and maintenance had to 
be borne out by concerned individuals or organisations.5 This included the 
reimbursement of all expenses (e.g., to remove and reinstall water supply pipes or 
sanitation lines, and to repair footpaths or roads) incurred by local administration in 
urban areas. In 1995, a department letter clarified that existing statues, so long as 
they did not obstruct the flow of traffic and their installers had paid the full amount 
required for maintenance, could remain in their current locations; if the full amount 
was not paid, the government could remove the statues, without disturbing peace.6  
Firstly, statue installers had to be able to afford maintenance costs. Secondly, 
statue installation, re-location, or removal often does ‘disturb peace.’ The 
government sought to mitigate such conflicts by specifying the material of the statue 
– as though the permissible bronze would work against the partible nature of 
‘society.’ In turn, this specification escalated installation costs. While increasing 
commissioning, installation, and maintenance costs limit the kinds of organisations 
and individuals that can share in this practice, I am more interested in linking this 
stipulation with the bureaucratic faith in objects’ ability to absorb social conflict. 
In 1990, prior to the eruption of statue desecrations, the Municipal 
Administration and Water Supply Department emphasised the necessity of having 
statues made out of bronze.7 By the end of that decade, much appeared to have 
changed regarding statues and social space. The ‘caste clashes’ in Tamil Nadu’s 
southern districts only revealed the workings of a social space in movement, of the 
utilisation of differential space by social groups, and of statues ‘sparking’ off 
                                                     
5 G.O. (Rt) No. 1711, Rural Development and Panchayat Raj Department, 26.10.1979. 
6 This correspondence (Letter No. 15661/ C3/ 94-96, Rural Development Department, 12.06.1995) 
took up suggestions of a Public Works Department report, referred to in G.O. No. 248, Rural 
Development Department.  
7 G.O. (Rt) No.193, Municipal Administration and Water Supply Department, 23.08.1990. 
275 
 
underlying conflicts. In response to this explosion of contradictions in space, the state 
government appointed a high-level committee, headed by a retired Supreme Court 
judge, to examine reasons for repeated caste violence and to suggest preventive 
measures.  
The committee made three main recommendations pertaining to statues – 
one, that neither the government nor any individual can install (new) statues of any 
leaders; two, that existing statues must be protected in suitable manner; and three, 
that when possible, existing statues be shifted to safe places.8 These 
recommendations stemmed out of the committee’s opinion that the vandalism of 
unprotected statues was precipitating caste riots.9 In September 1998, the Municipal 
Administration and Water Supply Department passed an order accepting these 
recommendations, adding that the government’s permission was required prior to 
shifting existing statues to a safer place (where vandalism could be avoided).  
This initial bureaucratic response – to ban new statues – could not, however, 
be sustained.10 At an all-party meeting that met twice in October 1998 to discuss 
caste related violence in the state’s southern districts (and prior to which the 
committee’s report was circulated among all parties), the earlier decision to ban new 
                                                     
8 G.O. No. 186, Municipal Administration and Water Supply Department, 21.09.1998.  
9 Ibid. I rely on secondary reports due to my inability to access the committee report, Report of the 
High Level Committee for Prevention of Caste Clashes in the Southern Districts of Tamil Nadu, 1998. 
The committee, headed by (Retd) Justice S. Mohan, also recommended that ‘existing statues be 
bunched together,’ ‘a mass campaign, with prayer meetings and human chains, be launched against 
untouchability,’ and ‘an awareness campaign be launched among Dalits that people belonging to 
other castes are not their enemies.’ The committee reasoned that ‘casteist violence’ is connected to 
the practice of untouchability, and to a Dalit misunderstanding of other castes as enemies although 
‘reservation benefits enjoyed by them had the unqualified support of leaders belonging to other 
castes’ (UNI release, http://www.rediff.com/news/1998/oct/22tn1.htm, accessed 27.04.2015). By 
reducing caste to untouchability, and treating it as the outcome of a ‘mind-set,’ the committee 
misrepresented caste relations. These analytical moves rid the committee from turning its eye to 
conflicts over control of different resources (land, water, and transport infrastructure), places, and 
public space in general. Instead of redirecting the government’s attention to long-pending demands 
over resource-access and control, the committee posited rather vacuous recommendations, such as 
organising human chains and prayer meetings, or ridiculous ones, such as the resolution of caste 
conflict by educating Dalits in the virtues of amicability and peace. Apart from recommending a total 
ban on installation of political leaders’ statues, the committee also recommended that the practice of 
naming transport corporations or districts after leaders be discontinued. The government could not 
accede to the ban on new statues. It did, however, retract from naming a section of its transport 
corporation after Dalit icon Veeran Sundaralingam. (See also ‘Shift statues of caste leaders,’ The 
Tribune, 23.10.1998). 
10 G.O. No. 186, Municipal Administration and Water Supply Department, 21.09.1998. 
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statues was dismissed.11 The deliberations concluded with a decision to allow new 
statues to be installed contingent on prior government permission. A government 
order issued the following month included this rule, and others, for the installation 
and maintenance of statues, memorial archways, or memorial pillars.12  
These rules did not stipulate the material of statues, but bureaucratic 
responses and later litigation on conflicts rendered the material used more 
important. At some point, the government’s guidelines regarding statues’ material 
became part of the wider set of procedures for memorial installation and 
maintenance. Conflicts and petitions regarding permissions for statue installation 
have led to more frequent citation of the guideline that statues be made of bronze. 
I have already mentioned that the bronzing of statues leads to an escalation 
of costs. Recall that representatives of Malaiur’s Five Thevar Lineages collected vari 
from all Kallar households of the five lineages. The statue tax placed additional strain 
yet very few complained about it. (Although I often heard individuals bemoan 
prestations at life-crisis rituals, I did not hear anyone complaining about temple-
related vari or about this statue vari).  
Although bronze statues cost much more than cement or Plaster of Paris 
ones, the material’s value cannot be reduced to money terms. Through its gold-
                                                     
11 Recently, however, the Supreme Court of India ruled that ‘henceforth, state government shall not 
grant any permission for installation of any statue or construction of any structure in public roads, 
pavements, sideways and other public utility places’ (I.A. No. 10 of 2012 in S.L.P. (C) No. 8519 of 2006). 
Interestingly, the bench’s impulse to treat religious and political structures (e.g. mosques, temples, 
churches or other places of worship, and statues) as though they were sheer excess (at best) or 
obstruction (at worst) in places of ‘public utility’ (e.g. roads and highways) must be compared with 
what the order does permit. The bench clarified that ‘obviously, this order shall not apply to 
installation of high mast lights, street lights or construction relating to electrification, traffic, toll or for 
development and beautification of the streets, highways, roads etc. and relating to public utility and 
facilities’ (emphasis added). The representation of space forwarded by the Court takes roads and 
highways as neutral infrastructure, as though these sites are devoid of politics and religion. It also 
props up a fictive division between tollgates and temples, and between street-beautification and 
statue-installation. In contrast to tollgate constructions and beautification drives, which are 
represented as though bereft of beliefs and politics, temples and statues are represented as places 
saturated with beliefs and politics obstructing public utility. That individuals make strategic use of such 
a logic is best illustrated by Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister’s early-2015 directive that all ‘illegal 
statues, cut-outs and flexis’ be demolished, since they posed a major threat to commuters. Although 
CM Chandra Babu Naidu cited the Supreme Court order, he intended perhaps only to target the 
statues of his predecessor, the late YSR Reddy (from the Congress), and hoardings erected by YSR’s 
son, now heading a rival party. ‘Remove statues of leaders of all hues in 15 days: Naidu,’ The New 
Indian Express, 07.02.2015. 
12 G.O. No. 248, Rural Development Department, 23.11.1998. 
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mimicking sheen and colour, the material of bronze transports the statues of ‘caste 
icons’ to a realm hitherto reserved for deities and for political figures privileged by 
nationalist historiography.  
At first sight, this new emphasis on bronze seems like a measure to minimise 
accidental damage. Consider an Ambedkar statue in Cuddalore district’s Palaya 
Pattinam village, which was slightly damaged by a pole accidentally falling on it. The 
Madras High Court judge who heard a petition regarding later developments and 
conflict over the statue’s installation and re-location fleetingly refers to this accident. 
(I analyse this conflict later). Referring to the accidental damage caused to the 
Ambedkar statue, the judge reiterated the need for the government to permit only 
bronze statues, since ‘a bronze statue will avoid any such development.’13 Bronze is 
also an insurance against ‘nature.’ It is more impervious to heat, dust, and moisture 
than clay, cement, and Plaster of Paris. Bronze’s suitability derives from its lesser 
instability than that which inheres in other materials (cement, clay, Plaster of Paris, 
or even stone).  
Yet the most important angle to the bureaucratic privileging of bronze lies in 
the alloy’s capacity to offer better protection against vandalism and desecration. We 
have now moved from natural causes to human action. Whatever the cause of 
damage or desecration, the Tamil Nadu government sought to externalise politics 
onto material. The most common bureaucratic reasoning to convince statue 
installers to adopt bronze runs as follows. Bronze makes statues less susceptible to 
damage and vandalism; make it difficult for mischief-makers to break the face, arm, 
or torso, or remove the entire statue in stealth, and under cover of night; put statues 
behind bars, if need be, but ensure they do not look jailed.  
It is unsurprising for a judge to hope that bronze would help avoid certain 
kinds of damage. The alloy does have the ability to insure against some kinds of 
damage. More striking is the belief that bronze would absorb social conflict. In August 
2008, Rajesh, a Malaiur panchayat official, stated that replacing the cement statue 
with a bronze one boded better for the entire village (motta ūr). He said it would be 
                                                     
13 T. Amirthalingam vs The State, (Madras High Court 2010). Available at 
http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1531674 accessed on 19.12.2014.  
278 
 
good for ‘these people and those.’ As Rajesh spoke, his hand movements articulated 
more precisely what he meant by ‘these people,’ ivarkaḷ, and ‘those people,’ avarkaḷ.  
As Rajesh said ivarkaḷ, his right hand went up and out towards the direction 
of the tank bed where the Thevar statue had been recently installed, thereby 
denoting a social group (Kallar) through its icon (Muthuramalinga Thevar’s statue). 
When he said avarkaḷ, Rajesh pointed in the direction of the Chakkiliyar settlement, 
thereby exactly signifying the non-Kallar residents who had most cause to worry. 
Rajesh’s gestures also communicated an inherent shift in socio-spatial terms. He had, 
within seconds, passed from denoting a symbol or a memorial in village space, in case 
of Kallar, to denoting mere location in that space, in case of Chakkiliyar. And Rajesh 
also embodied the bureaucratic faith in bronze statues to reduce trouble for all 
concerned.  
Kallar villagers explained their decision to replace the cement statue with a 
bronze one differently. Weeks before my conversation with Rajesh, the Thevar 
Statue Forum’s members had provided some explanations for the replacement. The 
reasons they cited had little to do with permission or government procedures or 
bronze’s avowed ability to stave off social conflict. In fact, I do not recall anyone using 
the term ‘permission’ during that period. Somehow, the forum members (and other 
Malaiur Kallar) conveyed the impression that officials had suggested, not ordered, a 
bronze replacement.  
At the time, I knew little about the rules related to statues. When I returned 
to Malaiur after a short trip in May and heard about the cement statue installation 
and police presence, the preferred terms of reference in our conversations were 
words like ‘trouble’ or ‘problems’ (piraccaṉai). When forum members mentioned the 
skirmishes between police and ūr Thevar, they only used ‘trouble’ while proclaiming 
that the trouble with officials would end slowly. Bronze or not, once a statue was 
installed, it would become fixed. 
The trouble with officials did disappear. I no longer took conscious notice of 
the statue. I failed to note when exactly the gunnysack covers came off the statue, 
or whether at all they came off during my first stay. When I returned in 2010, I saw 
that this veil of ignorance, the bureaucratic pretence of the statue’s non-existence, 
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was no longer necessary. None of the residents could precisely date the unloading of 
the gunnysack covers from the statue. Their responses were vague – ‘right away,’ 
‘days ago,’ and even ‘then and there.’ The village and the bureaucracy wilfully forgot 
that the statue was not supposed to be there. The cement statue’s existence in space 
went unquestioned even as the village awaited the commissioned bronze statue.  
‘A statue necessarily means headache’ [cilai eṉṟālē talaivali] said one revenue 
official in Madurai. Clearance for a statue was no small matter. It cut across 
administrative fields. No objection certificates had to be gathered from revenue 
officials, who would have to check details of the land in which the statue had to be 
installed; from the Public Works Department, which would have to assess possible 
effects on sanitation and water supplies; from the Highways Department, in case the 
statue was to be installed alongside or on a highway; and from the Police 
Department, whose records on caste or communal riots generated knowledge of the 
topophilic and topophobic characteristics of that place.  
The Madurai revenue official spoke of the difficulties tahsildars and other 
revenue administrators met with whenever statue installation led to the eruption of 
earlier land disputes. He also sympathised with police personnel, who, poor things 
(pāvam), had to man these sensitive spots, while their hands were tied by what he 
thought were the knotty politics of caste. It would be better for each community to 
be responsible for its own statues, he said. Precisely such a move – the privatisation 
of protection – has been one of the administrative responses to southern Tamil 
Nadu’s statue wars (which I elaborate later). 
Yet the reordering of protection to statues, by making them with sturdier 
material, has hardly made them more thing-like. Instead, the material move has led 
to a greater humanisation of the thing. The bronze statue is even more life-like. Since 
bronze provisions greater insurance against nature, changes to such statues are 
traced more urgently and immediately back to the world of humans. Since natural 
damages are technically reduced, bronze statues have become more susceptible to 
acts of desecration. It is more difficult to saw off the neck of a bronze statue, but the 
neck can carry a ‘garland’ of footwear. It is not so easy to stick a rod into a bronze 
statue, but bronze makes for a great showcase of smears and swabs. It is not so easy 
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to take the face off a bronze statue, but eyes and lips of bronze are surfaces that 
attract and hold, and exhibit and reveal, substances such as human and animal 
excreta.  
If the bureaucratic move was to externalise conflicts over statues onto the 
world of objects, it has failed. The object of the statue is now all the more 
subjectified. Acts of desecration – readily available means to symbolise, extend, or 
conclude conflicts via statuary – have granted not only more sacred but more human 
qualities to statues. What it means to be human in South Asia is tied to caste 
relations. Caste attends to identities and personhood. How human one is and what 
kind of human being one is – these are subject to (contested) gradations, and are 
inherently relational.  
If we bring to any analysis of caste, Marx’s observation that what is thought 
of as inhuman is dependent on how the human is defined at that moment, we expand 
our analytical horizons to include many competing frameworks. We begin to see that 
pure and impure, sacred and secular, citizenship and human rights, dignity and 
honour, and inhuman conditions of labour and subhuman ‘traditional’ caste 
occupations generate caste relations and subjectivities. Some of these are much 
older regional frameworks that permeate the world of objects – rather, the entire 
world. But it is due to the amalgamation of these frameworks that a statue 
desecration can pull up to the surface of social life not only the characteristics of 
sacred space and qualities attributed to idols and deities but also qualities attributed 
to human subjects and citizens. A statue’s desecration is not just met with rituals (e.g. 
bathing and anointments with special substances) to re-inscribe its sacredness, but 
also with talk of dignity, honour, citizenship, and rights.  
Exactly which of these two trends – the sacralisation and the humanisation of 
the statue – takes the upper hand is a thoroughly contingent affair. For one, this 
depends on the groups taking the initiatives. The 2008 Goripalayam Thevar statue 
desecration was met with grand gestures on behalf of political formations and 
bureaucracy. Through his mobile phone conversations on the day of the desecration, 
Ammasi relayed that there was already a successful roadblock at the Goripalayam 
junction. The next day, newspapers carried reports of what else transpired in 
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Goripalayam. The district administration was quick to mobilise the equipment and 
personnel of the nearest fire station.14 Powerful jets of water were utilised to wash 
away all traces of dung. Political organisations mobilised their own resources, 
bringing in huge vats of milk and rose water to anoint the statue with, in ways similar 
to idol apicēkam. N. Sethuraman of the All India Muventra Munnani Kalagam 
declared his intention of sitting on a hunger strike until the administration caught the 
desecrators. The administration took him in and released him later that evening, 
while negotiating with other ‘representatives’ such as an AIFB state committee 
member. Effervescent groups (the ‘mob’ or the ‘crowd’ proper, in legalistic parlance), 
such as the students and young men who reached the venue, responded to the 
desecration in ‘autonomous’ ways.  
Many smaller incidents contributed to the agoraphobic mood. As 
bureaucracy and political formations negotiated, the political was simultaneously 
being fashioned and stretched through seemingly minor events such as stone-pelting 
and aggressive vehicular movements (jeeps, motorbikes, and other vehicles used by 
Kallar men). Roadblocks and bandhs generated silence and stillness. All this produced 
immense fear.   
Following the desecration, at Goripalayam, political formations appear to 
have emphasised sacralisation; at Malaiur, Kallar responses contained both 
sacralisation and humanisation. Both sacralisation and humanisation worked in 
tandem to produce affect. Since personhood and divinity intermingle by practice and 
as concepts across South Asia, I must clarify what exactly I mean. We could simply 
comprehend these processes as illustrating the co-constitution of the sacred and the 
human. Seen this way, the statue’s humanisation is unsurprising; it would only index 
regional contiguities of deities, persons, and objects.  
Yet, statue desecrations do not so much reveal a hidden transcript of 
sacredness (cf. Taussig 1999) as the hidden humanness of the object. The emphasis 
on dignity and honour in Malaiur was no simple refraction of sacredness and 
distinction. In revealing its own humanness, the desecrated statue revealed new 
                                                     
14 ‘Thevar statue vandalised, tension in Madurai,’ The Hindu, 22.04.2008. 
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notions of human beings. Through a remarkable simulation of certain Dalit political 
conceptualisations of dignity and honour, the humanisation of the statue by Malaiur 
Kallar revealed the humanisation of honour. That is to say, they appear to have 
inadvertently adopted the idea of rights-bearing individuals. This signals the intrusion 
of ‘rights-talk’ in older styles of making distinction. 
Malaiur Kallar may have unwittingly borrowed from this socio-political field, 
when they spoke of the desecration as though it was not just an affront to the 
sacredness of the statue but also an affront to their own subjectivities, their own 
human qualities. Of course, base and polluting substances, such as dung, are an 
affront to the statue’s subjecthood. When Pichai translated the desecration – to pour 
dung over a statue is like pouring human excreta over a human being, and that this 
is more hurtful than destroying the statue – he humanised the object much more 
sacralised it. Of course, Pichai’s act of transduction highlights the contiguity of 
deities, people, and objects. But it does so through an illustration of caste atrocities, 
where often, reports of violence against Dalits foreground humiliating and 
dehumanising actions such as having human excreta poured down a Dalit person’s 
throat.  
Ambedkar statues highlight other, interrelated, aspects of these processes. 
Groups opposing Ambedkar statues confront not only Dalits’ rights to public space, 
but also the statues’ right to be in space. The Ambedkar statue’s right to be in space 
can now be framed independent of the rights of groups seeking its installation. 
National or state-space must, after all, make way for the statue of the man 
considered to be the ‘Father of the Indian Constitution.’ What is important is that it 
is state-space that Dalits take recourse to when installing (and protecting) Ambedkar 
statues, thereby rescaling their demands and interests. 
Statues as Portals to Scale-Jumping 
Multiple scales co-exist in, and contribute to the making, of every place (Agnew 
1987). Late capitalist place-making occurs in a social space produced through multi-
scalar actions of social groups, things, and abstract entities. As crises of accumulation 
become more pronounced and spatial fixes to the ‘limits to capital’ became more 
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widespread (Harvey 2006), social classes and groups also rescaled their actions. This 
reality led to a resurgence of academic interest in the scale question – in geographer 
Neil Brenner’s words, the ‘post-1970s shaking-up of the scalar hierarchies and 
interdependencies associated with organized capitalism in a new round of crisis-
induced sociospatial restructuring,’ made academics more aware of how social 
groups utilise scalar restructurings to heighten or resolve contradictions (2001: 603). 
But how do scalar restructurings link with ‘other forms of sociospatial structuration’ 
(ibid)?  
In itself, rescaling is not unique to capitalism. Networks of nāṭu and ūr 
temples, and of temples, irrigational infrastructures, human settlements, and trade 
routes emerged in a space that was characterised by periyanāṭu, nāṭu, and ūr spatial 
scales (Stein 1977) and was produced by warrior, mercantile, peasant, artisanal, and 
labouring groups that constantly rescaled their practices (chapter 1). 
In April 2008, when Rasendran, Kannan, and Ammasi evoked the geographies 
of terror, they were bearing witness to older territorialities. Their responses also 
evoked recent territorialities and rescaling of caste relations – a Mukkulathor 
identity, which had, like other supracastes, emerged out of the deterritorialization 
and reterritorialization impulses of a colonial state-space and the subsequent 
national state-space (Goswami 2004). In May 2014, some Malaiur Kallar installed a 
memorial in their village and utilised a commemorative moment to organise a 
Piramalai Kallar Conference. Here, too, they were seeking to jump scales. 
Let me return to the Ambedkar statue in Cuddalore.15 This statue was 
installed in front of the Palaya Pattinam village library after an August 2008 grama 
sabha or village council meeting endorsed this. Nearly half of the village’s 700 
families were Dalit. Soon, however, a section of the village (including some of its 
Muslim residents) rallied to shift the statue to the banks of a pond near the Dalit 
settlement. This section had the support of local officials – e.g. the tahsildar and the 
revenue divisional officer of the block in which the village was located.  
                                                     
15 Details and citations are from T. Amirthalingam vs The State (Madras High Court 2010). 
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One village resident approached the court to prevent the statue re-location. 
In January 2010, as soon as the High Court passed an interim stay order, the 
petitioner conveyed the same to the tahsildar and the revenue divisional officer. That 
very night, however, a large police contingent descended on Palaya Pattinam – not 
to ‘protect’ the statue, but to aid local officials who had hired an earthmover to 
forcibly remove and relocate it. A large number of villagers had gathered near the 
library in order to protest against the relocation. The massive deployment of forces 
– about 200 policemen – around the Dalit settlement readily conveys that the police 
were primarily hedging in Dalit protestors. Meanwhile, the seven-foot statue was 
extricated from its five-foot pedestal and shifted to the pond near the Dalit 
settlement.  
It is as though a most reductive metonymy is at work here. The drive 
(overseen by police menace) to shift Dalit protestors from the ūr to their settlement 
parallels the forcible shift of the Ambedkar statue from the kirāmam centre (between 
the panchayat-administered village library and the office of the Village 
Administrative Officer) to its periphery. The struggle over statue location switched 
between turning Ambedkar into an exclusively Dalit icon and Dalit assertions of 
Ambedkar’s universality. In fact, the judge who ordered that the statue be restored 
in its original location deplored ‘that a National Leader is sought to be considered as 
a leader of a community disregarding his contribution to citizens of India irrespective 
of their caste, religion, and community.’ He also added that the petition challenging 
the statue relocation ‘unceremoniously to a [D]alit settlement’ helped ward off the 
‘dis-honouring’ of Ambedkar. 
The language of honour and dishonour resonates with what became evident 
in Malaiur following the Goripalayam Thevar statue desecration. In both cases, 
individuals and associations, and petitioners and institutions, pitched dishonour as 
the ultimate insult to a great leader. It is true that Thevar and Ambedkar serve as 
icons of particular claims and as figureheads of certain social processes – for 
Mukkulathor mobility, dominance, and claims to subalternity, and for Dalit mobility 
and assertion. Yet caste groups seldom find it sufficient to box their icons within 
particular histories and politics.  
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Particularity is forever being mitigated by public claims to the universal 
relevance of their icons and leaders. This has been easier with Ambedkar than with 
Thevar, for reasons linked to the two leaders’ political actions and projects. One way 
to claim universal relevance is to hitch the icon onto the national canvas. This 
transposal often (e.g., Puli Thevar and the Marutu brothers; chapter 5) evokes the 
category of the ‘freedom fighter.’ The appeal to the national scale, and the 
naturalised nation-state, is a means to naturalise dominance. Such appeals also heft 
struggles against domination. 
A number of spatial categories, dimensions, and scales were at work in Palaya 
Pattinam. During the conflict, whenever – e.g., Ambedkar’s birth and death 
anniversary, the anniversaries of the Mahad satyagraha and the Manjolai tea 
plantation workers’ massacre – a group (whether Dalit villagers, or political 
organisations) sought to garland the statue, other village groups and the local 
bureaucracy opposed them. Statue vandalism (which here took place under official 
patronage) and the repeated opposition to garlands and other means to 
commemorate Ambedkar is significant to our examination of the conflict. But styles 
of commemoration, such as garlanding, is of no less significance.  
The commemoration of Ambedkar in this village seems formally similar to the 
Perungamanallur martyrs’ commemoration (chapter 5). Indeed both Kallar and Dalit 
commemoration and desecration tactics borrow from a wider network of symbols 
and interpretative universes. And within this universe, commemorations of 
Ambedkar often include the garlanding of his statues. This symbolic act of placing 
garlands over Ambedkar statues make sense when it is placed within the larger 
political and cultural field. 
The garland exists as a symbol of honour, respect, mariyātai and divinity or a 
high social standing. But the garland, just as much as the dung thrown on the 
Goripalayam Thevar statue, is a symbol that exists within wider political and social 
fields. This is why even subordinate groups, whose own positions in society are 
partially caged through ideas of purity and pollution, or of sacred and polluting 
substances, are game to utilise the same symbols. There is, after all, a path 
dependency to ‘symbolic’ resources, just as there is to capital and labour flows. And 
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it to this galaxy of signs that Dalit mimetic actions (such as placing garlands, lighting 
lamps, making speeches that bind hyper-masculinity to political assertion, or even 
acts of desecration) ought to be traced back. 
But there are other political strategies and tactics. In Palaya Pattinam, as soon 
as the strategic move to relocate the statue from village centre to caste settlement 
and the local bureaucracy’s participation in it became evident, Amirthalingam, a 
village resident, made a representation to Cuddalore’s District Collector. He then 
filed the petition that initially resulted in the statue’s hasty relocation (before the 
High Court’s stay order was officially conveyed) and finally led to the ruling that the 
statue be shifted to its original location. 
This incident illuminates a significant aspect of spatial scales. When the 
petitioner reached out beyond the village, he was not simply borrowing frameworks 
(for example, of rights, which does not even appear once in the court order) at higher 
spatial scales to resolve a local conflict. Already, to install an Ambedkar statue in a 
village, is for Dalits to utilise a multiscale strategy. This is one of the means by which 
Dalits overcome Ambedkar’s fear of the Indian village, which he rejected as ‘a 
negation of the republic.’  
An Ambedkar statue has the potential to turn local conflicts into regional, 
national, or international issues. Ambedkar statue installers in Palaya Pattinam and 
Karanai villages (see below), like Malaiur’s Thevar statue installers, are actors in a 
relational space. They are residents of villages that already contain the global, the 
national, the regional, and the sub-regional (cf Mines 2005: 217). A statue works as 
a portal to different scales simply because it contains within itself all these scales. To 
understand this is to simultaneously work through the conceptual troubles regarding 
spatial scales (Brenner 2001), such that the heuristic nature of the scale concept is 
not forgotten, and nor do we forget that spatial scales are not separate hierarchical 
levels but are more nested and intercalated with each other than the concept seems 
to suggest (Lefebvre 1991).   
Objecthood, like subjecthood, involves an intermeshing of spatial scales – in 
the creation of objects, in commodity production, and in the uses and concrete 
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meanings of commodities and objects. And nothing captures this better than the 
utilisation of Ambedkar statues in land-related conflicts. 
The most dramatic instances of scale-jumping via statues have occurred 
during recent struggles, such as in Chengalpattu district, to reclaim Depressed Classes 
land or Panchami land. Caste relations in this northern Tamil region are partly a 
product of decades-old conflicts between landed groups and agricultural labourers. 
Here, a repressive mirasi tenure, existing well into the late colonial period, provided 
mirasidar proprietors with complete control over land, including those classified as 
purambokku, wasteland or government lands. Here, ecological uncertainties, 
together with the socio-political relations that determine tank irrigation and 
resource-access, rendered cultivation a tricky business. Large tracts were left 
uncultivated and classified as wasteland, and land-related conflicts escalated from 
the mid-nineteenth century (Basu 2008: 270).  
Social space in this region, then, emerged out of conflicts between dominant 
classes and subordinate groups whose numbers swelled with Dalit, predominantly 
Paraiyar, agricultural labourers. Mirasidars strategically included wasteland while 
declaring their total landholding, and preferred ‘ulkudi’ labourers who could be more 
easily dominated (Basu 2008). If these strategies culminated in greater mirasidar 
usurpation of wasteland, it also intensified Dalit demand for land. 
By 1891, a famine year, conflicts had escalated to such an extent that 
Chengalpattu’s District Collector submitted a report on the conditions of depressed 
classes, particularly of agrarian bonded labourers. The question of land resurfaced 
when the collector – J.H.A. Tremenheere, the first to recognise the ‘Pariah Problem’ 
as a state problem (Viswanath 2014: 96) – highlighted the importance of provisioning 
land and turning Depressed Classes into landholders. In 1892, the government 
passed the Depressed Class Land Act, and distributed twelve lakh acres of land to 
Depressed Classes. These Panchami lands were, by law, not transferrable to non-
Dalits. 
At the start of the twenty-first century, little of this land remained in the 
possession and control of Dalits. For instance, by 1992, locally dominant sections, 
aided by revenue officials and other administrators, had usurped most of the 650 
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acres granted in 1933 to Dalits of Chengalpattu’s Karanai and surrounding villages 
(Devakumar 2007: 42). Karanai only illustrates state-level statistics on the extent of 
such appropriation – estimated to be two and a half lakh acres (Thangaraj 2003: 148). 
It is into this social world that the Ambedkar statue entered, effecting not only 
symbolic changes but also material ones. Ambedkar statues allowed Dalit social 
groups and movements to synchronise conflicts over objects in space and conflicts 
over land, over space itself. 
In 1991, Chengalpattu’s Dr. Ambedkar Centenary Movement sought to 
reclaim Panchami land by installing Ambedkar statues (Mosse 2012: 223). In October 
1992, activists installed an Ambedkar statue in land owned by a Karanai Dalit 
resident. The same evening, a prompt counterattack began with locally dominant 
groups and officials trying to bring down the statue. This initiated a series of rapidly 
unfolding events, and resulted in the death of two Dalits and gunshot injuries for 14 
Dalits at the hands of the police (Devakumar ibid: 42-4).  
Yet such retaliations cannot fend off the effects of yoking statues to land. 
Being ‘a potential source of caste clashes if damaged or desecrated by non-Dalits, 
[Ambedkar statues] acquired state protection’ (Mosse ibid), thus indirectly enabling 
Dalits to consolidate their claims over land. In many villages, Dalits have adopted the 
same tactic to reclaim land, utilising the concrete power of the thing (of the statue) 
to contend over the abstract power of the thing qua commodity (of land). Dalits here 
have thus played these two kinds of power against each other.  
Thus, contending claims to land could find expression in statues. Statues, 
alternately, could result in or consolidate new claims on land. This is perhaps why 
state authorities regularly retrace statue desecrations and their reinforcement of 
space’s sacralisation and humanisation back to the stark worlds of abstract space. 
For example, the local police briefed the media that the desecration of an Ambedkar 
statue in a village in Mau district in December 2008 and subsequent protests by 
Buddhist-Dalits was actually ‘the fallout of a land dispute between a section of 
Buddhist followers and locals.’16  
                                                     
16 ‘Ambedkar statue desecrated in UP village,’ The New Indian Express, 12.12.2008. 
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Bureaucrats and locally dominant castes repeatedly make such statements, 
representing caste atrocities and caste relations as though these were not about land 
or access to other resources. The idea is that conflicts over material resources do not 
count as caste atrocities. When the well-known 2006 Khairlanji massacre in 
Maharashtra came up for hearing, the judge considered it to be outside of the 
purview of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 
1989, precisely because a land dispute had triggered the event.  
Clearly, the labour of the statue in Indian politics is a strained one. No statue 
can completely protect, translate, or further social groups’ interests. For all that, 
though, the Tamil Nadu government sought to provide protection to statues. Since 
the late-1990s, moreover, it has returned this work of protection to the social groups 
themselves.  
Protecting the Statue: New Developments in Malaiur 
The Goripalayam statue desecration incited some Malaiur’s Kallar in mid-2008 to 
agitate around their own installation, a cement statue of Muthuramalinga Thevar. 
Desecrations open up the field for other desecrations, for re-sacralisations, and 
provide moments of easy victory in a social group’s negotiations with the district 
administration. Tamil Nadu’s statue wars birth additional statues. An event relating 
to one statue affects an entire network of statues.  
When the Thevar Statue Forum was set up in Malaiur in 2008, its immediate 
agenda was to commission a bronze Thevar statue. Some members travelled to 
Chennai, and finally settled for a shilpi, a sculptor, or a workshop near 
Mahabalipuram, site of the renowned Pallava period sculptures. Forum members 
mischievously admitted to have chosen that workshop simply to travel afar.   
The bronze statue was to replace the cement statue that had an equally 
interesting story. A group of young Kallar men were reputed to have lifted the 
cement statue from Tirupparankunram, where it had languished in a kinsman’s 
home, unrecognised and lifeless. One amongst this group was Karnan, an unmarried 
construction worker who shared a small house with his mother. It was from his 
mother that I first heard of the story behind the cement Thevar statue. In 2015, I 
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heard his mother refer to that incident again. Gathering pride as she went on, she 
spoke of her son’s enthusiastic involvement in the transportation of this statue to 
Malaiur, concluding with the words, ‘Thevar na uyiru.’ It was the sort of utterance 
bound to addle a translator’s head. She had simply strung together the words 
‘Thevar,’ ‘means’ [eṉṟāl; colloq, ṉā) and ‘life’ [uyir]. Which could mean any or all of 
these things – that Karnan held Muthuramalinga Thevar – or his statue, or others 
representation – to be close to his own life; that Karnan holds Thevar to be dearer 
than his own life; or else, that for Karnan, a Thevar statue is life. It is this collapse 
between symbols and people, and between objects and subjects, that this chapter 
aimed to understand.  
By my January 2015 visit, the new bronze statue had replaced this cement 
statue. The new statue was roughly eight feet, nearly half the size of the Goripalayam 
statue. Like the Goripalayam structure, the Malaiur one had Thevar holding a rolled-
up petition, and symbolised him as leader of anti-CTA agitations. This was a statue 
meant to dazzle, through its material, if not size. It seemed as monumental as the 
more famous one in Goripalayam.   
It called attention to itself, exhibiting its newness. I nearly missed registering 
the few constables who were mulling about near it – the statue had such an even 
lustre, shining like a huge sunlight collector. Whoever said that the monument is the 
most invisible thing in the world? It was the police I was (almost) blind to.  
Within a minute, I reached the houses near the bus stand. Those I ran into 
gathered as much news of the ethnographer as they could in minutes. (Headline 
style). I was repeatedly asked, ‘Have you finished writing?’ My answer was no. ‘Have 
you found work?’ No, I had not. ‘Pāvam.’ And the women asked, ‘Children?’ No, I had 
none. ‘Pāāāāāāvam.’ Having my failure established on all these counts, having 
turned into the object of universal pity, I plotted my escape by running into the 
nearest house where (I thought) I could ease my way out of the interactive nature of 
ethnographic knowledge.  
Question hour in Arumugam and Jyothi’s house was gentler. I tried gradually 
to reassert myself as an anthropologist. Soon, their neighbours and relatives, and 
some of the women I had already met on my way, came over. They asked me about 
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my life. I asked them about theirs. Some of the young adults I had known had 
exchanged the child’s curiosity for the teenager’s semi-diseased state of shyness. 
Some of the boys had taken a nutcracker to their voice. Some of the men and women 
I had known had died. Some of the young women I knew had married and moved to 
their new homes in other villages, cities, or even a couple of streets from their 
parents’. All this while, I had not finished writing, I was yet to start working, and I had 
not produced children. Pāvam, pāvam, pāvam. I just about wedged in a question 
about the new statue. 
Actually, I was not even sure if it was officially installed. There were reasons 
for my doubt. The statue had looked garden-fresh. Plus, its face was covered by a 
piece of cloth that flapped cheerfully in the breeze when I caught sight of it. To put a 
lid on a face, I thought, could only mean that life had not yet been breathed into the 
statue by the state or the public. Assuming the statue was to be unveiled soon, and 
thinking the police presence in Malaiur was related to this, I asked when the unveiling 
was to take place. There was some prevarication.  
‘Oh, that…’ 
‘Hmmm…’ 
‘Nothing of that sort…’ 
Finally, one woman (it was an all-Kallar gathering) grinned and said, ‘[we] kept it 
[there] way back.’  
Once I got past that public secret, I did not have to press much for details. The 
only confusion was over the exact date of the installation. When I pursued my query 
on when that had taken place, it once again became clear that we all have different 
conceptions of time, and different notions of what counts as important and what 
does not.  
With my fact finder’s interest in exact dates, I asked, ‘When?’ Year? Month? 
What date, even? (Why not?) 
‘Way back. How long has it been since you came here, Dhivya?’ 
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I had last been in Malaiur in May 2010. Yes, it has been that long. And there was no 
bronze statue then. So, when? 
‘Much later.’ 
And when was that? I do not know why, but I feel like this is the one vital thing 
to establish, right away. Not the effects of the statue’s presence per se, but how long 
it has been there for. For the people I was conversing with, the statue itself, its being 
there, is what matters. 
Jyothi indulged me. ‘Deepavali time.’  
‘Last Deepavali? Two months ago?’ 
No, the one before that.  
So, the statue had been installed two Deepavalis ago. Everyone seems bored 
with my quest for dates. I had to let it rest – it was probably installed in the last 
quarter of 2013 – and move on. 
I exclaimed – but the face is covered!  
Why is the face covered still, after all these months? As per government rules, 
no one could install a statue without obtaining prior sanction from the district 
administration. Had my informants installed it first and only then bothered to seek 
permission? Such things are known to happen. This had happened once before in 
Malaiur. In 2008, during my first round of fieldwork. 
Nonchalantly, I asked if they are awaiting permission before unveiling the statue. 
Arumugam responds, ‘Permission? Is that even a problem for us?’  
A cluster of voices. Each marking pride in its own way. Each partaking of a 
collective pride. A room full of animated faces. Each with an expression somewhat 
singular. Each showcasing a collective recollection of some pleasant memory. I get to 
hear of the time of that Deepavali, when a great number of police descended on the 
village in order to prevent the statue from being installed. Pechi speaks (and others 
repeat these words, over and over) of the men and the women, the elderly and the 
young, and the young and the younger still, who, together, had fought with the 
police. Another woman recollects the entire ūr to have participated in that show of 
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strength. Hundreds of – no, no, at least a thousand – police were deployed. And yet, 
they couldn’t halt the installation.  
After 2008, I ought to have known that the covering of the statue does not 
necessarily mean sponsors awaiting permission to unveil it. I did not recollect this 
immediately, though. And there was no way I could have guessed that the ‘un-facing’ 
or covering up of the statue, was actually a new development, an outcome of an 
ongoing caste conflict. 
It so transpires that they covered the statue’s face only recently. Moreover, 
this is the result of a tacit agreement between ūr Kallar and district administration. 
Nearly everyone said it was the police that had suggested this. Once again, the 
dominant section of the ūr had collaborated with the local bureaucracy to create the 
temporary fiction of the statue not actually being where it was.  
The statue may not yet have had its official birth, but local residents were 
more than aware of the life-like qualities it possessed. These attributes were also 
signalled in another way. In December 2014, or the Tamil Margali month, as villagers 
prepared for their annual pilgrimage to the Murugan temple in Palani, Malaiur had 
served as an arena of caste conflicts. This dispute between Kallar and Arundhatiyar 
(or Chakkiliyar) had turned Malaiur into a visibly conflictual space. But one 
Arundhatiyar man linked the new restrictions imposed on his caste-members to the 
new statue.  
Pandi, one of the few Malaiur Arundhatiyar who participated in organised 
Dalit politics, traced the latest expression of village-level conflicts in the realm of 
temple festivals back to the Thevar statue. Referring to a recent diktat that prevented 
Arundhatiyar from accessing public space near the tank bed during one of their caste-
specific festivals, he stated that this Kallar-imposed restriction was connected to the 
Thevar statue. Pandi said that ūr Kallar had argued that Chakkiliyar access to public 
space during their temple festivals put the newly installed Thevar statue at risk.  
The December 2014 conflict blazed through January 2015. Pandi asked me, 
rhetorically, why he or any other Arundhatiyar would harm Muthuramalinga Thevar’s 
statue. Thevar had fought for our entry into the Meenakshi Amman temple, Pandi 
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said. Why would we want to dishonour his statue? But Kallar folk did not even follow 
the actions of their own leader, even though they were so quick to put up his statues 
all over. Pandi reiterated that Kallar justification for denying Arundhatiyar access to 
public space was completely unfounded. ‘They have nothing to fear from us; we are 
not going to do anything to the statue.’  
Then, Pandi went on to add another level to his argument, which was that the 
statue was being used by the Thevamar to control Chakkiliyar. (These are Piramalai 
Kallar, he stated, at one point, as though it was important to identify the subcaste, a 
distinction most non- Kallar do not bother about). From temple to statue to a 
generalised sociology of Dalit life in Malaiur, Pandi’s analysis of the events pressing 
down upon him and his fellow caste members was simultaneously an analysis of Dalit 
contributions to the making and remaking of the village.17 And they were remaking 
the village – the policemen and policewomen I saw each day I visited Malaiur in 
January 2015 had been stationed there only because Dalits participate in the 
production of space.  
This is the counterpoint to the rhetorical question posed by Kallar villagers, 
who had asked why the administration needed to provide protection to the statue, 
at all. ‘We are there for protection, are we not,’ (nāṅkaḷ irukkōm illaiyā, 
pātukāppukku) was a common refrain I heard. Indeed, this is what the Tamil Nadu 
government had unleashed, when it shifted protection or pātukāppu of statues to 
the ‘community.’  
Government rules and subsequent juridical clarifications suggest that the 
District Collector only permit those statues for which ‘reliable’ persons produce an 
affidavit taking full responsibility for statue protection. There are at least two ways 
of judging the reliability of concerned persons. One simply tests their capacities to 
                                                     
17 This crisscrossing between sites and events is dramatically captured in the murder of Sawane, a 
police constable in a Maharashtra village in 1992 (Rao 2010). Sawane’s murder had taken place 
outside a Hanuman temple. It was the first case to be framed as a caste atrocity and heard under the 
Prevention of Atrocity Act. While dominant caste groups suggested that Sawane’s presence had 
desecrated the temple, the judge retraced the murder back to Sawane’s repeated attempts to install 
an Ambedkar statue in the village. 
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provide security and protection. The other seeks provisional judgment on the 
troubles that the proposed statue could cause. This consideration would open 
discussion on social space and the ‘users’ of space, on the history of riots and conflicts 
of the site, and on the general trends in the communities’ past utilisation of statues 
in such conflicts.  
Of these two notions – the community’s reliability in providing security to the 
statue versus the community’s reliability in not evoking caste ‘sentiments’ via the 
statue, that is, its respect for the lives of others – Malaiur’s Kallar preferred the first 
one. Pandi’s arguments suggest that the 2014-15 Malaiur caste conflict was an 
outcome of the state returning pātukāppu to the community. The community had its 
own idea of furnishing pātukāppu. Protection of a statue opened up the possibility 
of further oppressive practices. In order to protect the statue, another community 
(Dalit castes) had to be restricted, and in rather new ways. 
CONCLUSION 
There is sufficient scholarship to destabilise the conception of space as mere setting 
for human life, everyday concerns, events, and patterns of dominance and 
subordination. Across disciplines, scholars have read space as a text, treated space 
as metaphor, and seen spatial arrangements as expressing relations between social 
groups. This literature helps exorcise the dominant Cartesian conceptualisation of 
space as an empty container, an ‘unvarying suitcase of the world’ (Ernst Bloch in 
Ahuja 2009: 19). 
This thesis was neither solely interested in the spatialisation of social relations 
nor in the social construction of space. It also avoided focussing on representations 
of space only to show that innumerable human tactics destabilise dominant 
conceptions of space. Taking off from Henri Lefebvre’s thesis on the production of 
social space, and utilising his triad of representations of space, spatial practices, and 
representational space (1991), it offers some lines of enquiry for an anthropology of 
space.  
The first relates to transformations of social space. The thesis highlighted the 
dynamicity of space, different aspects of contemporary spatiality, and the 
importance of historical processes to the production of social space. It considered 
the relationality of places, the dynamicity of place-making, the links between 
territories and scales, and locations and networks. It concretised the abstract thesis 
of the production of space through deliberations on sites, territories, location, 
uneven development, uneven space-time compression, the intercalations of spatial 
scales. It attended to conflicts and processes that produce social space and render it 
dynamic.  
A second line of enquiry relates to transformations of social relations. The 
ethnography of South Asia touches upon this theme but subsumes the processual 
and relational nature of social groups under a focus on social change. Part of the 
problem emerges from long-standing and dominant representations of this region as 
a static space. This assumed inertia gave historical, regional, micro-regional, and 
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ecological specificities of social group formations the short shrift, and fixed patterns 
of dominance and subordination for all times and spaces. Given these frames of 
representation, any change would make for a noteworthy topic of discussion.  
It is unsurprising, then, that there are a number of ethnographies on caste 
social mobility (e.g. Hardgrave 1969, Osella and Osella 2000) but few that capture 
the ‘mobility of Asia’ (Ludden 2003). To do so, one must account for the dynamicity 
of space itself, and recognise that conflict is an important aspect to the production 
of space (Ahuja 2009). Few ethnographies of South Asia pursue this course; fewer 
still seem interested in arriving at the connections between dynamic space and 
dynamic social relations. The third line of enquiry relates to this socio-spatial 
dialectics. The account of this dialectics also involved examining how space, people, 
and things act on each other.  
The emphasis on process, dynamicity, and relationality, and the socio-spatial 
dialectics called for a particular mode of exposition. The thesis engaged with these 
lines of enquiry not as separate ones but as a triadic one, grasping these elements as 
a single mode of enquiry that an anthropology of space can engage in. Let me 
summarise how I did this.  
Reflections on enquiry and exposition 
I organised much of the ethnographic, historical, and comparative material around 
particular kinds of sites. I considered each site as a concrete abstraction, moving 
beyond the binary of the general and the particular, and disclosing interconnections 
and co-constitution of places, people, and things. A form of query structured the 
entire thesis. Its three parts fanned out from very simple questions. What are field-
sites, roads, and memorials? How do they become visible to us? How do we 
comprehend them?  
At least four reasons mediated my choice. One, it helped me challenge 
isolating and fragmenting treatments of places and sites. Two, it  allowed me to 
demonstrate that places and sites only come into being through relations and 
networks that render them co-constitutive of other places and sites. Three, I could 
highlight enduring patterns and dynamic processes in the co-production of space and 
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social relations. Finally, framing the discussion around sites permitted a better grasp 
of the dynamicity of dominance and conflict. As Lefebvre puts it, space often exhibits 
a dual nature. It confronts us as with ‘an immediacy and an objectivity’ but also offers 
a ‘mediating role,’ enabling us to reach beyond surfaces and through ‘opaque forms’ 
and ‘apprehend something else’ (1991: 182-3). 
Part I took up the relations between places, revealed history’s presence in the 
production of contemporary caste essence, and examined the links between knowing 
and representing, imaginaries and practices, cities and villages, villages and micro-
regions. It introduced regional spatial categories and territories, and emphasised the 
internal relations between places. It also introduced Malaiur – the place, the 
residents, and the socio-spatial relations at the centre of my ethnographic 
investigations – as a representational space or locus of imaginaries, and linked these 
to the production of village and caste subjectivities.  
Part II was organised around roads and highways as they generate new 
rhythms and space-times, speculative land markets, and property and inheritance 
disputes. Here we saw infrastructure’s multiple effects – the facilitation of certain 
kinds of dominance and subordination; the transformation of territories, places, and 
social relations; and the creation of new grounds for contestation. This involved 
looking into social groups, individuals, and institutional frameworks as well as roads’ 
effects on people and other objects. In analysing conflicts between social groups and 
conflicts between things (e.g. roads, land, and water), chapters 3 and 4 attended to 
the many actors who produce space and to the simultaneous action of social space 
on these actors. International and national institutions, bureaucrats and planners, 
national and local politicians, real estate companies and local brokers, village big-
men and indebted small landholders, sons inheriting property and daughters 
demanding their share in inheritance, road and land, field and water, tank and road, 
ayacutdars and bureaucrats deliberating on the meaning and effects of road and tank 
– all these actors impacted project implementation. To see highways transforming 
property, kinship, and caste relations in a village was to see, simultaneously, how 
these relations and local land, labour, and credit markets affect infrastructure 
projects. 
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Part III looked at memorials as they were unhinged from their seemingly mute 
existence as landscape objects through periodic commemoration or desecration. 
Commemorative structures and statues installed by political parties, governments, 
caste associations, or statue installation forums consisting of lineage representatives 
revealed networks of administrators, political representatives, and rural and urban 
caste members. The chapters here also highlighted the networking of social and 
spatial relations, and of people and things. Statues transformed the land they were 
installed in and tanks and temples they were situated near. They enabled Dalits to 
strengthen their claims to land. They led Kallar to enforce new restrictions to 
Chakkiliyar everyday mobility, pilgrimage participation, and observance of temple 
rituals and festivals.  
I could have approached my thesis aim and themes through other sites such 
as temples and houses. As a site, a temple differs from roads, tanks, commemorative 
pillars, and statues. The social relations and contradictions that temples express and 
generate are partly unique, reflecting site-specific characteristics. Using temples as 
one of my framing sites would have highlighted site-specific modes of reinforcing 
social relations, and of sharpening, or birthing, conflicts. I could have analysed how 
temples and attendant practices (new roadside temples, lineage temples, household 
shrines, reconstructed ūr and nāṭu temples, pilgrimages, rituals, consecrations, 
membership, honours disputes) weave absolute and abstract space as they produce 
and partake in processes of resacralisation that enhance the extraction of surplus 
value here. As it now stands, my thesis does not explicitly examine temples. But 
temples incorporate socio-spatial relations – ūr and nāṭu territorialities, the rural and 
the urban, castes and lineages, the political and the economic, honour disputes, 
rituals and built environment, practices and narratives, and social relations of land 
and water. They also exist in a network that includes other sites – roads, tollgates, 
land, markets, fields, textile mills, irrigation, houses, statues, herostones. What I 
withheld as a framing site resurfaced as matter scattered across the chapters’ main 
text and footnotes.   
Likewise, I could have engaged with houses as a separate site and taken up 
themes I have hardly touched upon. I could have simply confirmed the house as a 
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domestic and intimate site that could unite body, cosmos, and dwelling, invite the 
evil eye, and exist as a living plot, or even as the locus of a daily refreshed habitus – 
themes reiterated in regional ethnography (Daniel 1984, Osella and Osella 2000; 
2009). I could have treated the house along with many associative elements. This 
approach would have entailed discussions on housing projects (government policies 
of housing for rural poor, or for adivasis, Dalits, and other communities), kin circles 
and credit societies, temporalities of loans and gifts, and attempts to synchronise 
biological time and rhythms of prestations (during life-crisis rituals) with the social 
time of house construction and reconstruction. Such an enquiry would highlight 
intercalating spatial scales, the territorial spread of crises, the fixing of 
overaccumulated capital in the housing sector, and credit and commodity markets. 
It would simultaneously examine settlement patterns and relations of dominance 
and subordinance, interiors and exteriors, the poetics and politics of dwelling, and 
caste and kinship networks. Together, these examinations would grasp the socio-
spatial dialectics through which the house, the home, and housing projects and 
policies come into being. 
I could have shifted the lens this way or that, approached the matter at hand 
through this object or that, one built form or the other, and still come to similar 
conclusions. Put another way, this work exists in a space somewhere between what 
I have included here, and the interpretations and analyses that did not make the final 
cut. This excess, however, influenced the themes and sites that I did explore in my 
thesis. By way of summarising this thesis’ contributions, let me link my themes and 
aims to existing anthropological fields.  
Revisiting ūr, kirāmam, nāṭu 
By approaching the themes from an ethnography of caste relations, dominance and 
subordination, village and micro-regional territories, and social space in rural south 
India, this thesis intervenes in the urban-centric anthropology of space. Much of the 
critical literature on space relates to urban territories and the urban form. 
Metropolitan cities, the sites of capital’s concentration, appear more frequently than 
rural spaces or the smaller cities and towns comprising most of the world’s human 
settlements (Heitzman 2008). This urban-centric approach and focus is one of many 
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aspects to have cast a shadow on rural studies. Anthropologists have recently 
remedied this state of play with questions such as ‘do villages matter?’ and if so, 
‘how?’ and ‘why?’ (Mines and Yazgi 2010).  
This thesis forwarded one approach towards comprehending how villages 
such as Malaiur matter to an anthropology of social space. It also dealt with other 
kinds of territories, and stressed the relationality of places and territories. One of my 
opening moves was to introduce ūr and kirāmam. I shall now revisit that discussion. 
Recall that Valentine Daniel (1984, 2010) suggested that ūr is ontic whereas kirāmam 
is epistemic. Throughout, the thesis showed that representations of space, or space 
as conceived by the state and planners, are not just ways to know space; they make 
material interventions. Representations and epistemologies generate path 
dependencies and patterns to the circulation of human beings and things. Yet we 
have seen individuals and groups challenging abstract representations with their 
practices, and by mobilising emotions and affect. We saw them evoking 
representational spaces to contest plans, documents, and other individuals and 
social groups. How may we review the debate over ūr and kirāmam in this light? 
This calls for recalling the processes, relations, and incidents examined in this 
thesis. I now offer that ūr and kirāmam are best conceptualised as relational and 
dynamic categories. This is to say that epistemological changes intervene in ontology, 
and transformations in ontology lead to new epistemologies. Take the redefinition of 
kirāmam; the redrawing of kirāmam boundaries; modifications in enumeration; 
reclassification of human settlements; changes to rules, policies, and procedures; 
new ways of understanding administration, rule, and participation; new plans for 
circulation and rural connectivity; and the emergence of new concepts of rights, 
individuals, representation, and democracy. Have they not transformed territories as 
live projects, place-making, ūr and nāṭu relations, centres and peripheries, and 
temple rituals, festivals, and processions?  
Take the time and space specific project of what we constitute the world to 
be. Consider what objects and subjects are; how the animate and inanimate, and 
divinities and persons, and space and time interact; what the real consists of; and 
what measures of boundedness, embeddedness, extensions, and exchanges 
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constitute these. Do these not impinge upon conceptions of space and time, ways of 
knowing human subjects, animals, other animate entities, things, and nature; ways 
of administering territories and populations; and the knowledges through which we 
seek mastery over or co-existence with self, other, and world?  
Decisions on where to relocate, to build or install new shrines, statues, 
homes, hotels, worksites, and roads, and conflicts between Dalit Panchayat 
representatives, and caste and lineage representatives occur in a space that merges 
what we conceive (if only heuristically) as separate realms.  
I set my arrival scene at Malaiur during the January/ Tai Pongal celebrations 
in 2008. Towards the end of the last chapter, I began sketching my (equally bogus) 
exit scene. Let me return specifically to 26th January 2015, as Malaiur marked India’s 
Republic Day, to concretise my observations about ūr and kirāmam. On both 
occasions – tourist Pongal, 2008 and Republic Day, 2015 – I was witness to the folding 
in of ūr and kirāmam.  
In end-2014 and early-2015, Malaiur was bursting at the seams, ripped 
through conflicts between Kallar and Chakkiliyar groups. I earlier mentioned aspects 
of that moment (chapter 6). Recall that ūr Kallar had imposed new restrictions in 
2014. They disallowed Chakkiliyar access to the main tank during the festival cycle 
dedicated to Kaliamman, a fierce goddess. The five Chakkiliyar lineages had separate 
shrines but commenced their festival after Tenur Chakkiliyar commenced theirs. In 
December that year, conflict heightened as the ūr prepared for the annual pilgrimage 
that men undertook to Palani’s Murugan temple. Malaiur residents have undertaken 
this pilgrimage since the late-1970s. From a small group of ten to twenty individuals, 
the pilgrims’ group swelled up to over hundred and fifty men. The pilgrimage itself, 
and the accommodation for pilgrims and other villagers at Palani, was not marked by 
caste differentiation.  
This, at least, is what I observed in January 2009, when I travelled in a private 
vehicle that families of some Kallar and Pallar pilgrims rented so that we could reach 
Palani on the same evening as the pilgrims. Whatever ‘spiritual factionalism’ existed 
– pilgrims now undertook the journey in two separate groups – was over the meaning 
of pilgrimage. The split revolved around the extant and nature of permissible 
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comforts during pilgrimage. The smaller of the groups, headed by Ponnusamy, a 
Kallar cultivator who lived in a largish house by Malaiur’s main tank, hired a vehicle 
that carried utensils and other belongings, and arranged with an Agamudaiyar 
caterer from a neighbouring village to prepare food during the pilgrim. At Palani, this 
group also performed aṉṉatāṉam, feeding Malaiur pilgrims and others. All this 
meant the group collected more pilgrimage vari (tax or contribution). The larger 
group roughed it out – camping at roadside, rest house, or at porches of 
accommodating house-owners along the route, and eating wherever and whenever 
they could.  
Both factions included Kallar, Pallar, Chakkiliyar men, and men from other 
Malaiur castes. Once the pilgrims started walking out of the ūr and towards the Palani 
koil, caste did not seem very central, a point Pandi reiterated in January 2015 
whenever he spoke of the conflict between some of his caste members (Chakkiliyar) 
and some powerful members of Kallar. But at the threshold, having received the 
blessings of god dancers embodying lineage deities, when the pilgrims finally 
assembled at Malaiur’s Vinayakar temple (situated near the main tank), priests 
distributed sacred substances in a caste-specific order. Pilgrims across castes 
received these sacred substances but they did so in an order that reflected caste 
relations through mutalmai and mariyātai distinctions. In January 2009, the entire 
process had appeared as though pilgrims could achieve oneness with god (Daniel 
1984) only after they were caste-differentiated.  
In 2014, some Kallar individuals refused to allow Chakkiliyar pilgrims into the 
Vinayakar temple. Much of the temple-related disputes were, as Pandi emphasised, 
a result of changes to the built environment. The recently installed bronze Thevar 
statue was close to the main sites of conflict – the tank that Chakkiliyar women were 
prohibited from accessing during their festival, and the temple at which Palani 
pilgrims congregated before leaving the ūr.  
Other disputes supplemented these. To protest the new temple-related 
restriction, Chakkiliyar funerary specialists withdrew their ritual services when a 
Kallar man died in the village. They relented when Malaiur Kallar threatened to 
restrict Chakkiliyar access to their own burial ground. Some Kallar men also 
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reportedly beat up a Chakkiliyar sweeper during this phase. At the time, Malaiur 
kirāma panchayat employed ten Chakkiliyar men and women as sweepers. These 
individuals had avoided the pilgrimage-cum-temple dispute much to the chagrin of 
more militant Chakkiliyar. Pandi and others interpreted this avoidance as lackey 
behaviour, aimed at securing employment through the panchayat. But these 
sweepers were on a partial strike. They had refused to sweep their lineage temples. 
Pandi interpreted their refusal as a strike against the ūr, and said they would refuse 
until ūr people ask them to. Panchayat employees, however, said they would 
recommence sweeping the temples only if the kirāmam decided to increase their 
token wages.  
Although the panchayat-employed sweepers participated in the Republic Day 
celebrations, they continued to neglect their own deities. On Republic Day, these ten 
Chakkiliyar men and women yelled at and fought with the panchayat officials, the 
president, and other representatives, in public view. The arguments were not about 
temples or wages. They were about a non-wage entitlement, the set of new clothes 
that the panchayat had to provide them with on the occasion of the Republic Day.   
Later that day, I accompanied panchayat-employees Muniamma and her 
husband, Panaselvam, to their home. Both stated the joint resolve of the ten 
sweepers to fight for the new clothes. When the panchayat failed to hand over 
clothes they were entitled to receive in 2014 Deepavali, they had not pursued the 
matter. But this time? This time, we will not let them go scot-free, said Muniamma.  
   The temple conflict and contestations in the ontic space of ūr impacted 
Chakkiliyar individuals employed as sweepers by the kirāmam, the panchayat. The 
sweepers’ decision to neglect fierce gods added another dimension to the ūr dispute. 
The neglect of fierce gods and the withdrawal of funeral work could threaten the 
entire ūr (Mines 2005). Wage disputes and access to space commingled. That is to 
say, conflicts only appeared to be occurring separately as ūr and kirāmam disputes. 
We cannot comprehend one without comprehending the other. And all dimensions 
to the conflicts transformed Malaiur as ūr and kirāmam.  
This is an apt moment to revisit nāṭu, to see how the project of agrarian 
territoriality has fared (Ludden 2002: 236), and sum up tensions between ūr and 
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nāṭu, different kinds of ūr, and contests over centrality and distinctions within nāṭu. 
This is about the many territories that are important to social life and space but 
absent in current scholarship. I shall hinge this discussion around mutalmai and 
mariyātai, and summarise the relationality and dynamicity of places and territories.  
One of the objections raised initially over my interest in Malaiur emerged 
from individuals who froze centre and periphery in Kallarnatu. These non-Malaiur 
Kallar fixed the village as peripheral to nāṭu while Malaiur Kallar sought centrality. 
Through narratives that incorporated historical processes and location in abstract 
space, residents turned their ūr into the site where caste kuṇam was most 
concentrated. These narratives were backed by, and fed into, transforming spatial 
and social practices. An early notification of village Kallar under the CTA, millwork, 
usury, the sponsorship of special dramas at nāṭu temple festivals by millworkers’ 
association, urbanisation, highway-building, and changes to land use provisioned 
some Malaiur Kallar families social and economic success and rendered Malaiur 
mobile within nāṭu.  
Malaiur Kallar seek to relocate claims to centrality, mutalmai, and mariyātai 
in an abstract space by emphasising village–city relations and suppressing ūr–nāṭu 
relations. Likewise, Chokkatevanpatti Kallar ascribe mutal nāṭu status to Valandur, 
the nāṭu their ūr was part of, by locating this territory in relation to a national 
highway. Valandur’s contention with Tidiyan nāṭu for primacy took in referents of 
Nayaka kings, kingship and territoriality, and overlordship and micro-regional 
chieftainship, and newer referents such as proximity to national highways and the 
condition of village approach roads. 
The sheer existence of mutalmai disputes illustrates that abstract space did 
not freeze precolonial considerations of rank and honour. New disputes incorporate 
new idioms. If British colonialism turned honour into a commodity (Dirks 1987), 
residents of some Kallarnatu territories incorporate characteristics of abstract space 
to reinterpret honour. Consider villages close to Madurai city (Malaiur, Tenur, 
Pechikudi), infrastructure networks (Chokkatevanpatti), and urban centres and 
significant property investments (the SEZ villages Vadapalanji and Kinnimangalam); 
villages near Madurai Kamaraj University campus on NH49; and those near 
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Chekkanoorani and Usilampatti (urban centres). The consolidation of empty, 
homogenous space has aided the re-inscription of these villages into an absolute 
space of Kallarnatu. The commoditisation of space, the primacy of exchange value 
over use value, has generated a revaluation of centrality and peripherality in ūr–nāṭu, 
nāṭu–nāṭu, and upakirāmam–nāṭu relations.  
Primacy, distinction, and rank – rather than becoming fixed by colonialism 
and capitalism – are resignified through considerations of caste, lineage, kinship, 
village, kingship, and territoriality. What colonialism appears to have frozen, new 
ruralities have thawed. Millwork, usury, real estate speculation, cinema theatres, 
granite quarrying, and road and canal infrastructures – relating to land, labour, credit, 
and property markets, and spatial practices of production and reproduction – 
destabilise colonial constructions of tradition, and hereditary offices, titles, and gifts 
by introducing a new dynamism into mutalmai and mariyātai claims. 
Dynamic social relations and their geographies 
As I returned to Malaiur one last time before ‘writing up’ this thesis, local caste 
relations seemed to resemble structural models of caste in more ways than they did 
earlier. To catch Malaiur in a brief net would likely cast the village as that dreaded 
sink of localism, a location of ‘age-old’ repression of Dalits through practices and 
idioms of untouchability and purity and pollution. It would easily fit into the template 
of anti-caste reportage, a village that continued to impose traditional restrictions, 
refusing Dalits access to tanks and temples. 
Yet from my time in Malaiur over the years, I recognised some of these as 
new restrictions and new practices. In 2015, Chakkiliyar individuals at loggerheads 
with Kallar groups often spoke as though the past was better than the present. 
Pandi’s mother stated that ‘those were better days; more freedom to walk 
anywhere; our children entered any temple.’ Most Chakkiliyar men and women 
presented the conflict using older regional terms signalling entitlements and shares 
while a handful, such as Pandi, also used the concept of individual and human rights.  
Recall (chapter 6) that some Chakkiliyar connected these new restrictions to 
the Thevar statue. Kallar effort (or ruse) to protect the statue had generated new 
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restrictions on Chakkiliyar. This is another manifestation of the newness of the old 
(Bate 2011). It illustrates that patterns of caste dominance and conflicts now exhibit 
more similarities across regions. Dalit groups jump scales to contest caste relations. 
Local dominant castes import modes of oppression from other regions. Dominant 
and subordinate groups reinvent religion as a sphere of struggle, transduce struggles 
for land as struggles over statues, and transform protection of statues into 
restrictions over social groups, sacralise statues, humanise statues, and deify and 
desecrate caste icons. The state sought materials and objects appropriate to a 
political fix while castes sought actions appropriate to materials. Courts, police, and 
media could reduce conflicts to a simplex reading while subordinate groups and 
individuals could add elements to conflicts. Having recalled these processes and 
events, let me demonstrate how this thesis has responded to calls for rethinking 
caste relations and domination (Natrajan 2005, Mosse 2012).  
We have seen that both dominance and resistance operate at intercalated 
spatial scales and are reterritorialized. We have noted that intercalations and 
reterritorializations do not emanate only from human actions. As our analysis 
incorporated objects, we saw that power is not only involved in the production of 
objects; it enters into and dwells in them, and emanates from them.  
From Malaiur Kallar responses to the Goripalayam Thevar statue desecration, 
and the focus on Malaiur Chakkiliyar in their canalisation of representational space 
to local caste relations, it would appear as though the relative inability of Chakkiliyar, 
as opposed to village Pallar, to leave the village and significantly avoid participation 
in agriculture makes them more vulnerable to caste atrocities. Luckily, the violence 
did not materialise. Firstly, Kallar efforts to mobilise en masse failed, thwarted by 
caste members who diffused the situation, and somewhat checked by the fear of 
legislative and police action. Secondly, Chakkiliyar themselves were not totally 
removed from administration, police, and regional politics. In January 2008, four 
months prior to the statue desecration, an elderly Chakkiliyar agricultural labourer 
from a nearby village had stated that young Chakkiliyar boys had found some support 
at the police-station administering to a number of villages including Malaiur. 
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Neither Kallar dominance nor Chakkiliyar subordination seemed total. 
Domination and resistance are ongoing projects. Yet, the presence of Malaiur 
Chakkiliyar in the worlds of agrarian production – where relations of dependence and 
extra-economic coercion are immediately obvious – is a noteworthy issue. Like other 
poor villagers, younger Chakkiliyar men sought to escape the village through the 
construction labour market. To do so, however, they again had to negotiation caste, 
kinship, and village solidarities.  
This calls for re-examining the modes by which caste relations shape rural and 
urban India, and production relations. When placed alongside the fragmented labour 
markets in non-agrarian sectors, which have their own caste and kinship gateways, 
we see that caste is internal not only to agrarian production but to subcontinental 
variants of capitalism. We could read this as region-specific manifestation of a 
worldwide trend, where ‘capital has always sought the fragmentation of labour 
through cultural, formal and spatial means’ (Narotzky, in Natrajan 2012: 109). When 
we see caste relations as internal rather than external to capitalism, and locate this 
relation with the colonial and postcolonial histories through which the abstract space 
of capitalism emerged here, we begin to grasp social space’s hybridity.  
In turn, this highlights the non-tenability and instability of many popular 
conceptual distinctions – rural and urban, caste and capitalism, extra-economic and 
economic. This thesis approached the problematic through additional moves. It 
focussed on the hybridity and dynamicity of social relations themselves. Here we saw 
that social groups garner their relative permanence not only from notions of 
community and caste through which they are united, but also through things, and 
through space itself. Roads and buses as much as threshing grounds and village 
squares; urban caste neighbourhoods as much as village caste streets; temples as 
much as toll-gates; fields as much as factories; worksites as much as places of leisure 
produce this social space. They provide certain enduring patterns to dominance-
subordination relations and provision new venues for contestation.   
Positing either modernity or capitalism as the salvage to a ‘caste-ridden’ 
subcontinent has aided us little in understanding contemporary space, dominance, 
and resistance. For fundamental to such views is an inability to see that the actual 
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social fragmentation of communities  is linked to the effacing of fragmentation 
through the ‘ontological heaviness’ of caste, the reification of community itself 
(Natrajan 2012: 108-9). By devoting its attention to conflicts and competition within 
Piramalai Kallar, this work clarifies how fragmented, rather than homogenous, castes 
become internalised to the logic of capital and part of capital accumulation. The 
processes and relations, and the event and the everyday, described in these chapters 
can be annexed to substantiate that ‘fragmentation makes the idea and reality of 
“community” appear simultaneously as labor’s need for identity to gain livelihoods 
and capital’s need to fragment class action through the reification of differences 
other than class’ (Natrajan 2012: 109). 
As processual and dialectical relations, space and dominance can be 
approached through examinations of social groups, money, abstract markets and 
real marketplaces, future and spot commodity trade and their instruments, policy 
papers, archival documents, government orders, statues, billboards, canals, wells, 
pump-sets, and electricity cables. 
By attending to details and minutiae, we see dominance and resistance 
materialising and transforming through statues of community icons and idols of 
temple deities; television sets, mobile phones, and loudspeakers as well as drums, 
documents, and hoardings; and roads and streets as well as land and irrigation. 
Schools, enumerated categories, government policies, and legal institutions 
announce social relations as much as houses, temples, statues, and informal 
panchayats. We see these social relations expanding and shrinking, embedding and 
dispersing. We see them transforming as they jump scales, produce scales, and are 
reterritorialized and deterritorialized. Territoriality and scale, space and place, 
location and relation, documents and monuments, streets and houses, ūr and 
kirāmam, are operationalised when castes disperse and regather – now appearing as 
local groups, and now as supralocal groups, now as territorially embedded subcastes, 
and now as geographically extended supracastes. 
Finally, as to what fieldwork in Madurai and the subsequent years of research, 
thinking, and writing most impressed upon me. It is this. That attending to details and 
tendencies; relations and networks; and actors, actions, and the acted upon helps 
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demonstrate reveal the stealthy and continuous traffic between social space and 
social relations, and between people and things. This thesis is offered in the spirit of 
exploration. We would benefit from further disclosures of the ways in which South 
Asia’s integration into and location in global capitalism has resulted in a hybrid social 
space.
GLOSSARY 
 Only frequently occurring terms are included here. I follow the convention of 
glossing caste names by references to their ‘traditional occupations,’ with the caveat 
that this is an identity-producing practice, more than a reflection of these groups’ 
histories. 
Agamudaiyar  One of the three Mukkulathor castes 
predominant in southern Tamil Nadu 
 
āḷkaḷ  people, category of people (caste) 
 
ayacut  
(āyakaṭṭu) 
command area of an irrigation source 
(e.g. tank) 
 
cāti 
(jāti, jati) 
  
caste 
caṇṭiyar 
 
rogue, dominating person, a tough 
Chakkiliyar 
(Arundhatiyar) 
 
 
a Dalit caste with leatherwork as a 
‘traditional’ occupation, often 
employed as agricultural labourers 
conta ūr native village 
 
iṉam  community, ethnic category, caste or 
race 
 
iṉām  
 
a category of tax-free land 
Kallar  ‘warrior castes’ in southern and central 
Tamil Nadu; one of the three 
Mukkulathor castes  
 
Kallarnatu 
(Kaḷḷarnāṭu) 
Kallar country; here, region westwards 
of Madurai city inhabited mainly by 
Piramalai Kallar 
 
kammāy 
 
irrigation tank 
 
kāṭu forest, wasteland 
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kāval watching, protection, policing 
 
kāvalkārar person with guarding duties 
 
kirāmam  
 
village (as administrative territory) 
 
koil  
(kōyil, kōvil) 
 
temple, palace, church 
 
Konar caste with shepherding as a ‘traditional’ 
occupation 
 
kuṇam 
(Sanskrit guṇ)  
 
property, fundamental quality, 
attribute 
Maravar  ‘Warrior caste’ predominant in Tamil 
Nadu’s southern districts, one of the 
three Mukkulathor castes 
 
mariyātai   Distinction, honour, respect 
 
Mukkulathor  a supracaste comprising of Tamil-
speaking Agamudaiyar, Kallar, and 
Maravar castes, three castes attributing 
similar warrior pasts to themselves 
 
mutalmai  primacy, firstness 
 
Nadar 
(Shanar) 
  
caste whose ‘traditional’ occupation is 
toddy tapping 
nāṭu  
  
country, region, territory, agricultural 
tract 
 
pāḷaiyakkārar 
(English Poligar, Polygar) 
person commanding a pāḷaiyam 
(fortress or military camp) 
 
Pallar   one of the two largest Tamil Dalit castes, 
mostly employed as agricultural 
labourers 
 
paṅkāḷi 
 
shareholder, co-parcener, agnate, kin 
paṇṇaiyāḷ  bonded labourer  
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Paraiyar one of the two largest Tamil Dalit castes, 
often employed as agricultural 
labourers 
 
Piramalai Kallar Kallar subcaste predominant in 
‘Kallarnatu,’ west of Madurai city 
 
taricaṉam 
(Sanskrit darsan)   
heightened visual perception, exchange 
of qualities between viewer and viewed 
 
toḻil work, occupation, labour, toil 
 
ūr village 
 
ūrani  pond, usually a source of drinking water 
 
varalāṟu history, past 
 
veḷḷaikkāraṉ white man, often referring to British 
coloniser 
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